



KF 27
.I5567

1974h









FOOT



UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUB—
HEROIN TRAFFICKING AND ADDICTION—OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

**HEROIN TRAFFICKING AND ADDICTION AND RELATED
DRUG ABUSE PROBLEMS**

OCTOBER 7, 1974


Serial No. 93-102

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1974



COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

HARLEY O. STAGGERS, West Virginia, *Chairman*

TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts	SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio
JOHN JARMAN, Oklahoma	ANCHER NELSEN, Minnesota
JOHN E. MOSS, California	JAMES T. BROYHILL, North Carolina
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan	TIM LEE CARTER, Kentucky
PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida	CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio
LIONEL VAN DEERLIN, California	DAN KUYKENDALL, Tennessee
J. J. PICKLE, Texas	JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas
FRED B. ROONEY, Pennsylvania	JAMES F. HASTINGS, New York
JOHN M. MURPHY, New York	JAMES M. COLLINS, Texas
DAVID E. SATTERFIELD III, Virginia	LOUIS FREY, Jr., Florida
BROCK ADAMS, Washington	JOHN WARE, Pennsylvania
W. S. (BILL) STUCKEY, JR., Georgia	JOHN Y. MCCOLLISTER, Nebraska
PETER N. KYROS, Maine	DICK SHOUP, Montana
BOB ECKHARDT, Texas	BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR., California
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina	NORMAN F. LENT, New York
BERTRAM L. PODELL, New York	H. JOHN HEINZ III, Pennsylvania
HENRY HELSTOSKI, New Jersey	WILLIAM H. HUDNUT III, Indiana
JAMES W. SYMINGTON, Missouri	SAMUEL H. YOUNG, Illinois
CHARLES J. CARNEY, Ohio	EDWARD R. MADIGAN, Illinois
RALPH H. METCALFE, Illinois	
GOODLOE E. BYRON, Maryland	
WILLIAM R. ROY, Kansas	
JOHN BRECKINRIDGE, Kentucky	
THOMAS A. LUKEN, Ohio	

W. E. WILLIAMSON, *Clerk*

KENNETH J. PAINTER, *Assistant Clerk*

Professional Staff

WILLIAM J. DIXON	CHARLES B. CURTIS
ROBERT F. GUTHRIE	LEE S. HYDE
JOHN L. GAMBLE	ELIZABETH HARRISON
JEFFREY H. SCHWARTZ	

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT

PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida, *Chairman*

DAVID E. SATTERFIELD III, Virginia	ANCHER NELSEN, Minnesota
PETER N. KYROS, Maine	TIM LEE CARTER, Kentucky
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina	JAMES F. HASTINGS, New York
JAMES W. SYMINGTON, Missouri	H. JOHN HEINZ III, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM R. ROY, Kansas	WILLIAM H. HUDNUT III, Indiana

KF27
 .I5567
 1974h

CONTENTS

Statement of—	Page
Bartels, John R., Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice.....	2, 13
DuPont, Dr. Robert L., Jr., Director, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.....	2
Ernst, David H., Acting Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State.....	2, 21
Hesse, Rayburn F., executive director, National Association of State Drug Abuse Program Coordinators and chairman, International Committee on Social Policy.....	246
Additional information submitted for the record by—	
Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Administration:	
Agents assigned in foreign regions and their language training...	215
Agreement between the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs Service for the exchange of narcotics related information.....	103
Agreement with Coast Guard.....	130
Agreement with FBI.....	131
Appendixes to Mr. Bartels' statement: Background material on opium production and narcotic abuse statistics.....	16
Estimates of annual opium production, calendar year 1972...	16
Source and destination of opium production.....	16
Average daily cost of heroin for addicts.....	18
Estimated annual losses due to addict thefts.....	18
Estimate of U.S. annual addict population and heroin consumption.....	19
Drug-related deaths.....	19
Concern over resumption of poppy cultivation in Turkey expressed by DEA to the State Department.....	97
Court cases involving 500 or more pounds of marihuana.....	77
DEA's fiscal year 1975 supplementals.....	39
Domestic removal statistics.....	35
El Paso Intelligence Center.....	123
Export and import figures for amphetamines and barbiturates.....	222
Hallucinogens in U.S. illicit markets.....	225
Illicit barbiturate data.....	223
Methadone: A review of current information.....	55
Narcotic related and methadone deaths in New York City.....	54
"National Narcotics Intelligence Study," April 1973.....	139
Operational agreement between Immigration and Naturalization Service and DEA.....	119
Questions submitted by Congressman Symington and answers by DEA.....	236
Reduction of quotas on dangerous drugs.....	224
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention:	
Attachments to Dr. DuPont's written statement:	
Number of federally funded drug treatment programs, chart.....	9
Approximate distribution of fiscal year 1974-75 treatment slots.....	10
Fiscal year 1975 drug abuse prevention discretionary agency budget—treatment/rehabilitation crosscut.....	11
Drug law enforcement agency budgets (excludes drug abuse prevention activities)—fiscal years 1969-75.....	12
Correspondence concerning suspension of and reinstatement of mandatory urinalysis program in the armed services.....	67
Greensboro, N.C.—Heroin use study.....	64
Narcotics overdose death: methadone and heroin.....	44

IV

Additional information submitted for the record by—Continued

State Department:

Attachments to Mr. Ernst's statement:

Table I.—International narcotics control program, detailed fiscal summary-----	Page 28
Table II.—Funding by activity, fiscal year 1974-75 (estimate).	29
Table III.—Funding by cost category, fiscal year 1974-75.	29

HEROIN TRAFFICKING AND ADDICTION—OVERSIGHT

MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul G. Rogers [chairman] presiding.

Mr. ROGERS. The subcommittee will come to order, please.

Earlier this year, this committee worked on and passed the Controlled Substances Act. At that time we were pleased to receive testimony from the President's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the State Department that the frightening epidemic of drug use which had gripped this Nation has subsided and was leveling off, and had particularly been reduced in heroin addiction.

The hearings this morning are oversight in nature and are occasioned by more recent reports which indicate that the epidemic of drug use—especially heroin, opium, and cocaine—is having a resurgence.

When we last reviewed the law and the drug situation, we heard that there were approximately 300,000 to 350,000 heroin addicts. There are now reports that this figure has risen dramatically. Because traffic and use of drugs is illegal, we are hard pressed to come up with firm figures on just what magnitude these increases represent, but only last month estimates of the problem went so far as to place that figure at 600,000 to 800,000 heroin addicts.

I am not prepared to totally accept such figures, for certainly they would indicate that all our efforts are failing miserably. I am concerned, however, that the recent increases in deaths from drugs—up 100 percent in Chicago—and street reports of increased availability of heroin, mean that we are facing once again a drug epidemic in this Nation.

President Nixon labeled drug abuse as the Nation's No. 1 domestic problem some time ago, and for a time it appeared that we had successfully stunted drug traffic and use, but with the resumption of poppy planting and harvesting in Turkey, I have a great foreboding that we are again entering another era of hard drug use in this Nation, which may well surpass the nightmares of the early 1970's.

The State Department, with pressure from the Congress, negotiated with Turkey, the world's largest poppy producer, and reached an agreement to terminate poppy cultivation, but I am concerned that the State Department did not take aggressive action to insure that Turkey would stick by this agreement. With the absence of Turkey, Mexico became the main supplier of heroin. Mexican brown heroin now floods this Nation, and we see small and medium towns involved with heroin for the first time. With the resumption of Turkey again in the heroin trade, I fear that we will soon see the greatest flood of

heroin in the history of our Nation. Mainly because of these concerns we have called these hearings to have reports from the agencies as to just exactly what the situation is and what should be done.

Do any of the members have anything they would like to say?

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to join in your remarks. Having been actively involved both in travel to Turkey prior to that decision and being concerned with the Mexican situation and knowing that my State and particularly the city of New York probably suffers as greatly as any geographical area in this country, I do have an overriding concern that we, of course, take a very careful look through these types of oversight hearings.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. Symington.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend you for holding these oversight hearings. I think the American people would like to learn what is the dimension of the problem. What countries are cooperating? Which are not? How can we most effectively assist the law enforcement communities around the country as well as the Federal authorities in curtailing the problem. I think the American people are prepared to support any reasonable initiative that the Government may take. I think it is up to the Congress to work with the executive branch in any way we can to establish those initiatives and go forward with them.

There are a lot of questions that I have and I am sure other members have of our witnesses this morning. We are grateful to them for being with us.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Chairman, I hope we are wrong that we are entering another era of hard drug use but I think the facts do indicate we ought to take a hard look at the question and I am glad you are holding these hearings.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much.

Our first witness today will be Dr. Robert L. DuPont, Jr., director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.

We also have with us Mr. John R. Bartels, Jr., who is the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice; and Mr. David H. Ernst who is the deputy senior advisor on International Narcotics Matters, Department of State.

We will first hear from Dr. DuPont.

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT L. DUPONT, JR., M.D., DIRECTOR, SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION; JOHN R. BARTELS, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND DAVID H. ERNST, ACTING SENIOR ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. DuPont. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to present the views of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention on the status of addiction in the United States.

In June 1971, when SAODAP was created there were many estimates of the number of heroin addicts in the United States. The numbers ranged widely often reflecting the personal biases of their authors. While no truly adequate estimate of the number of heroin addicts is available even today, one of the most responsible estimates is that made annually by Dr. Joseph A. Greenwood for the Drug Enforcement Administration. Using the same techniques these estimates are updated annually.

The Greenwood estimates indicate that the active pool of heroin users was 630,000 in 1971 and 610,000 in 1972. The 1973 estimate fell slightly to 580,000 narcotic users of which about 40 percent, or 250,000, are estimated to be active heroin users. These 250,000 active heroin users are one measure of the unfinished task before us.

About 125,000 of the remaining users are receiving help from one of the more than 2,000 drug abuse treatment programs which now exist throughout the Nation. Additionally, about 85,000 users are in jails and prisons. The remainder have been successfully treated, have voluntarily stopped using narcotics or have died.

Drug addiction and drug use is constantly changing, and I would like to discuss with you today some of the changes.

By January of this year most of our evidence indicated a downturn in heroin addiction. We knew that the supply of heroin had been reduced, both as a result of Turkey's decision in 1972 to ban the cultivation of opium poppy and as a result of generally more effective law enforcement nationwide. We had evidence from virtually every State of excess treatment capacity. In February of 1974, for example, only 55 percent of all federally funded community-based treatment slots were filled. Waiting lists had virtually disappeared. Overdose deaths, hepatitis, and property crime rates were down in many parts of the country. The Special Action Office at this point in time began to turn more of its attention to "outreach" activities.

Outreach is designed to bring into treatment persons who have not voluntarily sought it. We have developed two basic approaches, one working through existing treatment facilities and one working through the criminal justice system.

In 1972 the Special Action Office developed a concept called TASC, Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime. Under the program, which was instituted on an experimental basis in several Federal, State, and local court systems, persons who were identified as drug abusers at the time of arrest were referred to treatment under a variety of conditions. At the present time, there are 19 TASC programs in operation processing over 1,000 persons per month.

Recently we have worked with the Department of Justice to develop more comprehensive pilot programs in six selected Federal court jurisdictions where a high rate of addiction exists among the arrested population. The purpose is to develop a comprehensive system of identification and referral, including the options of pretrial diversion, diversion to treatment as a condition for bail or personal recognizance, treatment within the prison system and treatment as a condition for probation or parole. If this program is demonstrated effective, we would like to see it become a model not only for other Federal courts but for State and local courts as well.

Other outreach activities developed by our office include a public health model. One way to use this model is for counselors or other trained personnel to interview an addict reporting for treatment to determine his friends who might also be users. Outreach workers can then be dispatched to the area to interview these persons and encourage them also to report for treatment on a purely voluntary basis. Along this same line we have funded demonstration programs involving mobile vans which are sent to areas known to have a high rate of addiction; trained workers talk with addicts they meet along the street, and if the person volunteers for treatment he is taken immediately to a program for enrollment.

Another important factor in reducing, or at least limiting, the pool of addicts in this country has been the effective work undertaken by the Department of Defense and the Veterans Administration. In 1971 when the Special Action Office was created heroin use was rampant among servicemen in Vietnam. A comprehensive study has since been undertaken of a sample of Army enlisted men who left Vietnam in September 1971. Forty-three percent of this group admitted having used narcotics while in Vietnam, and twenty percent considered them still addicted to heroin.

The latest followup study, released in May 1974, showed that only 2 percent of all these returnees were still using narcotics a year later. The combination of identification, referral to treatment prior to return and the vitally important factor of change in circumstances and reduced availability upon return to the United States, combined to reduce the number of servicemen addicts dramatically.

Similar procedures were subsequently applied worldwide. Since 1971 urinalysis data has been collected on a regular basis for all the services in all military theaters. The percentage of confirmed drug users has always been relatively small—generally under 1 percent. Beginning in September 1973, there were indications of an encouraging downturn both in the percent and the numbers identified as drug positive.

From September 1973 to June 1974, the figure remained between 0.6 and 0.9 percent and the number of Department of Defense clients in treatment remained relatively steady at between 20,500 and 21,800. Then in July of 1974, the Department of Defense suspended all urinalysis. The order went into effect on July 18 but the data we have indicates that even in that period of less than a full month the percent of confirmed drug positives rose, for the first time in almost a year, to 1.2 percent, or a 50 percent increase.

At the same time, the number of clients in treatment dropped significantly; and while approximately 2,000 of this drop can be accounted for by a change in reporting procedures, it does not account for the entire drop to 17,087 reported clients in treatment in July. This data is far too scant to draw firm conclusions; one month of data does not establish a trend. But there is cause for concern that drug use may be on the increase in the military; and an even greater cause for concern that the military at the present time has no way of measuring the extent of drug use among its servicemen.

There is also some cause for concern over scattered data now coming in from civilian sources. In trying to predict national trends, the treatment and law enforcement communities have learned the necessity of working together. Law enforcement follows certain indicators

of the extent of supply: numbers of seizures and their location; the price and purity of drugs on the streets of key indicator cities; overdose death rates and drug related crimes, for example. We share this data collected by the Drug Enforcement Administration. In addition, we watch for such indicators as change in demand for treatment; length of waiting lists; cases of serum hepatitis or hospital emergency room episodes. We are interested not only in overall shifts in numbers but in where those shifts occur.

In recent months we have become aware of a very important phenomenon: an unexpected increase in heroin addiction in smaller cities like Eugene, Oreg. and Jackson, Miss. This has led us to speculate that drug use radiates out from the major population centers and can be expected to hit some smaller cities, and eventually perhaps some rural areas, after a reasonably predictable time lag. To test this hypothesis, teams of investigators were sent out from our office to look at 10 selected medium-sized cities throughout the country.

All 10 cities showed major increases in heroin use in the last decade and evidence of current epidemics of heroin use were substantiated in 4 of these 10. The reasons for the occurrence of these epidemics and the direction that they took often varied based on local cultural conditions. In addition, this ripple hypothesis would seem to be substantiated by the recent experience of my colleagues in law enforcement who tell me that a larger proportion of their seizures and arrests are now occurring in the smaller cities.

Another change which we are following very closely is an increase in demand for treatment in certain geographic regions of the country—particularly the Southwest, the west coast and more recently in Illinois and Pennsylvania. The Drug Enforcement Administration has plotted the spread across the country of so-called Mexican brown heroin, based on their records of seizures.

We could practically do the same thing based on increased demand for treatment. Within the last year the number of clients in treatment in the State of California has increased from 16,000 to 23,500. At the same time the number of heroin overdose deaths in the city of San Diego has increased from 29 in 1971 to a projected 105 in 1974. In Texas, where the availability of Mexican heroin has created a large and fairly steady number of heroin users in the border cities, there is evidence of a resurgence of heroin use in the more northern city of Austin and the State has reported in the last 6 months 500 untreated drug abusers who have died, been arrested, or developed serum hepatitis.

Similar data have come in from the State of Illinois, which law enforcement identifies as a major distribution point for Mexican heroin. The number of clients in treatment has tripled in the last year and a half, and in the first 6 months of 1974 Cook County—Chicago—reported a 100 percent increase in overdose deaths. Even New York City has reported, within the last few months, a sharp increase in the number of heroin detoxifications being performed in the Tombs and the Brooklyn House of Detention, indicating an increase in the availability of street heroin in New York also.

Mr. Chairman, I want to stress that these changes are only indicators of what is taking place in some parts of the country. We have not found that all smaller cities have growing heroin problems, and

all large cities have not had a deterioration in the heroin problem. But it is significant that all of the indicators, which have been going steadily down over the last 2 to 3 years, have turned up or remained flat for the last 6 months. So we have a genuinely new situation and a worrisome one. We can no longer talk about "turning the corner on heroin addiction."

The purpose of our office is to coordinate the overall Federal response to treatment needs and to make adaptations in that response as they become necessary. This is what we are doing.

We estimate that there are presently 160,000 clients in all treatment programs—federally, State, and locally funded. Of the 80,000 clients in programs funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, about 25,000 are being treated for problems with drugs other than heroin. Approximately one-third of these—13 percent of the total—are involved primarily with marihuana or hashish; one-third—11 percent—with amphetamines and barbiturates; and smaller percentages with such substances as inhalents, hallucinogens and alcohol.

As the demand for treatment has shifted geographically, we have moved to meet this need. Thus, in fiscal year 1974 we reprogrammed Federal funds to take away treatment expansion money from States with excess capacity and to make it available to the States where new needs had been identified. Thus, of 95,000 slots which were federally funded in fiscal year 1974, 13,722 were reprogrammed to meet new demands. Most of the new treatment capacity was created in States like California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, where a clear and continuing demand for treatment exists.

With 55 States and territorial drug abuse prevention agencies presently operational, we are now receiving regular reports of treatment needs for every part of the Nation. These needs are constantly undergoing assessment, with both increases and decreases in State needs being taken into account. It is anticipated that, as in fiscal year 1974, some fiscal year 1975 treatment funds may be reprogrammed at the end of the fiscal year, although the number of slots available is likely to be small because of the high utilization rate.

We are also watching for signs that the increase in demand for treatment may exceed the funds presently budgeted for that purpose. If it becomes apparent that there is a cumulative increase in demand for treatment, in addition to the localized shifts we are presently meeting with existing resources, then we will find it necessary to request additional, supplemental funding. At the present time, however, we are meeting existing demand with existing resources.

Nationally 80,000 of the 95,000 treatment slots are presently filled. We estimate that at the present time that the remainder or 14,000 slots will be filled by January 1975. The utilization rate of treatment slots has been going up steadily since last spring. In cities such as Chicago, Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, all available treatment slots are already filled.

At the same time that we are adapting our resources to meet changes in demand for treatment we are also moving ahead with research and development of methods of treatment.

This committee has long had an interest in our research on antagonists and the long-acting methadone-like drug, LAAM. At the present time there are two major cooperative studies underway to test the

safety and efficacy of LAAM in normal male ex-heroin addict volunteers and to create a group of clinicians across the Nation expert in the use of LAAM. The Veterans' Administration cooperative study has 430 patients who have taken LAAM. This study is nearing completion and the data should be processed within the next few months. The second study is a cooperative study of clinics across the Nation and involves approximately 700 patients and should be complete within 1 year. All indications are that LAAM will be at least as safe and as efficacious as methadone as a replacement therapy for heroin addiction.

Our most promising antagonist, Naltrexone, is in the early phase II stage of development; that is, short-term safety and efficacy studies are currently being done. There are more than 300 patients now receiving Naltrexone across the country. It is being used in approximately 17 clinics and preliminary data would indicate that the drug is as safe as methadone. Later testing of Naltrexone will follow the pattern of LAAM and a national cooperative undertaking. A study is being piloted in five clinics and great care is being taken in consultation with an expert committee of the National Academy of Sciences to develop a standardized reporting system for the full study. The late phase II study will be a major safety and efficacy evaluation and is scheduled to begin in January 1976. This will involve 10 additional clinics across the Nation.

Finally, we are experimenting with propoxyphene napsulate, a drug approved for use in humans on a short-term basis as an analgesic. It is felt to be of potential use as an alternative to methadone in the treatment of heroin addiction. It is attractive because of its low abuse potential. We are about to begin three studies to determine the efficacy of propoxyphene napsulate in the treatment of chronic heroin addiction, particularly as a detoxification agent.

Treatment of other forms of drug abuse also merits our continuing attention, especially in view of the fact that over 30 percent of federally funded treatment slots are filled with nonopiate abusers. To help us in developing better techniques for working with these patients, we have established 11 pilot, in-hospital detoxification programs for polydrug abusers. To date, about 800 clients have been treated in these programs, and we have learned not only how to detoxify persons with heavy polydrug habits but we are developing techniques for providing the essential psychiatric followup care which many of these patients require.

By our estimates, one American in seven has used marihuana. Mr. ROGERS. What is that?

Dr. DUPONT. One in seven Americans over the age of 12 has used marihuana at least once.

Clearly not all of them encounter problems with marihuana use. But a surprisingly large number of clients in federally funded treatment programs—13.5 percent—report a major problem with marihuana or hashish. Within the last 2 years, continuing research has turned up evidence of changes in basic cellular mechanisms, and initial research indicates that there may be adverse immunologic and genetic implications for long-term or heavy marihuana use. In addition, marihuana has been found to have adverse effects on reaction time

and on mechanical performance, consequences of particular concern in connection with marihuana use and driving.

Numerous clients are also turning up in federally funded treatment programs with primary or secondary problems with alcohol. We have been working closely with the National Institute on Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse to develop joint research and, in some instances, joint treatment programs. We know that persons who abuse drugs very often switch from one drug to another, or use drugs in combination depending on availability, cost, or the effect they wish to achieve. We know that alcohol potentiates the effects of barbiturates and some other substances. We therefore believe it is essential that this kind of cooperative effort continue.

Mr. Chairman, I think the most important lesson we have learned in the 3 years since the Special Action Office was founded is that drug abuse is a constantly changing phenomenon. We have seen changes which began on the east or west coasts spread to the Midwest. We have seen patterns which began in the big cities spread out to the satellite cities, the suburbs and finally the rural areas. We have seen one pattern of drug abuse followed by another and another until the cycles and the geographic spread become fairly predictable. And we have seen drugs which we thought were in disfavor in the "youth culture" enjoy a resurgence based on such changing factors as cost and availability, combined with some unpredictable phenomenon which we can only describe as changing myths or changing folk lore among the groups at risk.

In my opinion, we are far from winning the "war against drugs." In fact, I have concluded that the metaphor or a "war" is misleading. It implies that with sufficient resources we can "win". Dealing with drug abuse is more like weeding a garden. Our efforts produce good results but the task requires constant attention. In this context, we admit that we frequently turn one corner only to be confronted by another. But this is not to say that considerable progress has not been made:

We have provided rapid and large-scale expansion of treatment for drug abusers.

We have moved forward on new frontiers, both for understanding the causes of drug abuse and for finding new ways to treat it.

Perhaps most important of all, we no longer have a Federal policy toward drugs which is based purely on a law enforcement approach. In fact, the new Federal policy is a cooperative, inter-dependent effort of both law enforcement and treatment.


What is required now is continuing vigilance by treatment and law enforcement but also by parents, educators and young people themselves. We must continue our research and make the results available. We must provide the best information to our young people and stress not only the temporary dangers of experimentation but the long-term dangers of a lifetime of drug use—including alcohol, nicotine and mind-altering pills. The important thing is that we now have the Federal capability to monitor shifts in drug use and drug trafficking patterns and to respond with appropriate measures. We have made great progress but we still have a long way to go.

Mr. Chairman, that is an overly long statement but in the spirit of the oversight hearings I thought it was important to cover a wide range of subjects.

Thank you very much.

[Attachments to Dr. DuPont's written statement follow]:

NUMBER OF FEDERALLY FUNDED DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS



*Includes OEO programs (remaining programs were transferred to NIDA in the fall of 1973).


**1/1/72 DOD facilities data unavailable: 1/1/74 data reflect 10/31/73 facilities totals worldwide.

***The bulk of LEAA-funded treatment programs are block action grants, discretionary treatment funding is being phased out during FY 1974.

****The model cities program, under which city agencies have utilized federal block grant inter alia to support drug abuse related activities, is being phased out during FY 1974.

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF FY 1974-1975 TREATMENT SLOTS

COMMUNITY BASED
TREATMENT SLOTS IN
DIRECTED PROGRAMS
(about \$160M/year in Federal
Funds) WITH STATE-LOCAL
MATCH (about \$40M/year)
WHERE APPLICABLE
(about 65,000 slots)



INSTITUTIONAL
TREATMENT SLOTS : { DOD 20,000
VA 8,000
BOP 5,000
(about 33,000 Slots
and \$70M Federal
funds) **33,000**

COMMUNITY BASED
TREATMENT SLOTS
SUPPORTED BY FEDERAL
BLOCK GRANTS (about
10,000 slots and
\$20M Federal Funds)

TREATMENT SLOTS
NOT SUPPORTED BY
FEDERAL FUNDS
(about 111,000
slots and \$210M
state/local funds)

TOTAL 249,000

Note: State and local figures shown above are estimates based on limited data and are accurate to about $\pm 15\%$. DOD estimate based upon projected average monthly levels of treatment service delivery (includes inpatient, residential, and outpatient services).

FISCAL YEAR 1975 DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION DISCRETIONARY AGENCY BUDGET—TREATMENT/REHABILITATION CROSSCUT

[in millions of dollars]

Agency	Fiscal year—											
	1973						1974					
	1969	1970	1971	1972	BA	OBL	OUTL	BA	OBL	OUTL	BA	OBL
SAODAR.....	0	0	0	0	25.0	21.7	0.4	23.5	23.5	32.4	8.9	8.9
HEW:												
NIDA ¹	21.9	19.8	38.4	68.3	165.1	129.6	73.4	175.8	207.6	123.6	157.0	157.0
OE.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SRS ²	0	0	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	.9	.7	.7	.7	.4	.4
OEO.....	2.2	4.5	12.1	11.0	(16.0)	(16.0)	(10.5)	0	0	0	0	0
VA.....	.6	4.8	.7	16.0	23.0	23.0	23.0	23.8	23.8	23.8	24.4	24.4
Justice:												
SOP.....	.5	1.1	1.4	1.7	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.2	4.2	4.2	7.5	7.5
LEAA ³4	1.3	4.5	4.6	.2	.2	.2	0	0	0	0	0
DEA.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OOO.....	(1)	(1)	4	39.6	48.9	48.9	46.0	46.7	46.7	42.0	43.1	43.1
Total.....	25.6	31.5	58.2	142.0	266.3	227.5	147.0	274.7	306.5	226.7	241.3	241.3

¹ Includes sec. 409 formula grant funding for fiscal years 1973, 1974, and 1975.² Included in totals for NIDA.³ Less than \$100,000.⁴ Discretionary funds.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. du Pont.

I think if the members are agreeable we will go ahead and have the statement by Mr. Bartels and then we may have some questions and then we will have Mr. Ernst's statement.

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BARTELS, JR.

Mr. BARTELS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.

Distinguished members of the subcommittee, let me give you a brief overview of where we stand now for the coming year and secondly what our major goals are as the Drug Enforcement Administration and they are essentially to be in a position to respond very quickly to the outside changes such as the increases from Mexico and the potential increase from the Government of Turkey and finally to increase the quality of our investigation in cases both as it relates to the evidence that we produce and toward the type of distributor with a view to reducing the availability of hard drugs in this country.

As you know, our mission is to control the accessibility of narcotics and dangerous drugs to current and to potential drug abusers throughout the United States. As a result, fewer people should experiment with drugs, fewer among those who do experiment should advance to chronic intensive levels of use while more of those who do advance to chronic intensive levels of use should seek treatment as a result of law enforcement efforts.

The tangible implications of these effects are that fewer people die of drug overdoses; that fewer people disable themselves from leading productive lives; that fewer families crumble before the bitterness and suspicion that attends drug abuse; and that fewer children begin experiments which can kill them suddenly in dramatic accidents or slowly in a process of deterioration and decay. Thus, it is to preserve lives that our agents risk their lives and that the rest of us in DEA labor—whether to produce intelligence, to shutoff diversion from licensed firms, to develop equipment which will protect agents, or to make appropriate decisions in scheduling drugs. A very great deal depends on DEA's capability to adequately perform each element of its mission without regard to the manhours involved or danger to our agents. As we see a growing influx of drugs from Mexico straining our resources we are very much concerned over the possibility of an increased flow of heroin coming from the replanting of the opium poppy in Turkish fields.

All narcotic drugs and most of the psychotropic substances destined for American addicts and users originate from outside the United States. According to our most recent estimates, approximately 70 percent of the heroin reaching this country comes from poppies grown in Mexico. The remainder comes from Turkish heroin manufactured from caches of opium produced in Turkey before that nation instituted its ban on production 2 years ago and from the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Laos and Thailand. Cocaine, which is becoming a preferred drug of abuse, is illegally imported from South and Central America.

Virtually all of the marihuana seized by DEA, Customs, and INS agents comes from Mexico and the Caribbean. We have found it necessary and effective, therefore, to move our resources and manpower to overseas and border points, as close as possible to the foreign sources for drugs.

Since the Government of Turkey banned the growth of the opium poppy, so-called brown heroin, manufactured and grown illegally in Mexico from poppies also grown there, is steadily increasing and has become our number one target. I would like to discuss briefly our activities with the Government of Mexico and along the United States-Mexican border.

In November of 1973, Mexican Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada and I met in Mexico City to formulate plans for an intensified joint effort to eliminate the flow of narcotic substances to and from Mexico. Mexico is also used as a transshipment point of European narcotics and South American narcotics.

As a result of this meeting, a special task force began operations in the State of Sinaloa and the State of Durango. This operation became a probe into the principal enforcement areas of narcotic eradication, interdiction of narcotic substances, and the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police.

From January 1974 through April 1974 the Mexican Federal authorities registered what I believe to be outstanding enforcement accomplishments. These included the location and elimination of seven heroin-producing laboratories, the seizure of 73 kilograms of heroin, 129 kilograms of opium, 62 kilograms of cocaine, 215 tons of marihuana, and 6 million units of dangerous drugs. During this period 1,311 defendants were arrested, 325 vehicles and 12 aircraft were seized by the Mexican Federal Police.

I may add that in previous years the emphasis in Mexico had been to a greater extent on marihuana interdiction than it had been on either dangerous drugs or heroin.

On June 25 of this year a 6-month DEA investigation was concluded in Mexicali, Mexico when Mexican, Federal Judicial Police, with the support of DEA agents, seized 42 tons of marihuana destined for delivery into the United States. This is the largest single seizure of marihuana recorded. Similar seizures have become common.

Another cooperative endeavor with the Government of Mexico culminated successfully on September 11, 1974, with the arrests of 113 Americans and 27 Mexicans. This international investigation immobilized a multimillion dollar producing and trafficking network responsible for virtually all of the illicit amphetamine tablets (mini-bennies) smuggled into this country—an estimated 30,000 kilograms or 3 billion tablets a year. In addition, the four labs' tableting dies that were used were seized in the State of Mexico.

In terms of DEA agents assigned to Mexico and border posts, the following table reflects the priority I have given to this problem:

	On board as of	
	June 30, 1973	Aug. 31, 1974
1. Mexico region.....	13	21
2. Agents assigned to United States-Mexican border (excluding San Antonio)...	34	157
3. Number of agents in special task forces.....	54	

We have found it necessary to increasingly move our men out of the United States to the farflung parts of the world in order to have resources closest to the source and where the agents can initiate the most productive investigations in cooperation with host countries.

We know that to be effective we must stop the flow of drugs at, or near, their foreign source and at the highest level where the apprehension of violators can have the most impact. We have found that the closer the point of interdiction is to the source of the drug the greater is the quantity handled by a decreasing number of people. This is the target at which we aim in order to achieve optimum results.

We now have 49 foreign regional and district offices of DEA compared with 23 in 1972. Twenty-four more foreign district offices are scheduled to be opened by the end of fiscal 1975, bringing the total to 73.

Currently we have 151 agents assigned to the foreign offices, up from 48 in 1971. We have projected 265 agents for foreign locations by the end of 1975.

Arrests and seizures made by DEA agents with the cooperation of foreign authorities have increased as follows:

Year:	Arrests
1971-----	281
1972-----	504
1973-----	716
1974-----	1,325

Suffice it to say, seizures of cocaine, marihuana and hashish show an upward trend through 1974 while those of morphine base and heroin were up through 1973 but down in 1974 due mainly to the cessation of the opium production in Turkey.

I believe it imperative that I bring to your attention our grave concern over the decision of the Government of Turkey to resume the growth of the opium poppy.

When Turkey ceased growing poppies for opium in 1972 we saw a marked decrease and even a shortage in the availability of heroin on the east coast. The heroin which was available was highly diluted and very expensive. We have seen a shortage of morphine base in the Marseilles area which we believe led to the shortage on the east coast.

Turkey has now announced its intention to resume the growth of poppies only for the extraction of morphine through the "poppy straw" process, a procedure where the entire poppy crop is harvested and subjected to a chemical process in a manufacturing plant. This is reportedly a more controllable process than that formerly used whereby raw opium was removed from the poppy pod by farm labor.

Despite Turkey's announced intention to thoroughly police this process, we fervently hope that new shipments of heroin do not again appear on the east coast. Independent of the lifting of the ban, the Government of Turkey has also declared a general amnesty which included certain drug traffickers who had been in Turkish jails who now, being free, may resume their former trade. These two events taken together do give us cause for concern.

We must increase our agent assignments to Europe and the Near East to preempt any renewal of the French Connection for Turkish morphine base and find the means for accomplishing this concentration of efforts and of agents without diverting our resources from other critical areas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Appendixes to Mr. Bartels' statement follow:]

APPENDIXES:—BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON OPIUM PRODUCTION AND NARCOTIC ABUSE STATISTICS

ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL OPIUM PRODUCTION CY 1972

Description of Data: The data indicated below is an update of the 1971 data provided in the "World Opium Survey, 1972." All commercial producers of opium are required to submit annual production data to the United Nations. This data is then freely available to all member states.

Analysis: There has been a gradual increase in licit opium production due to increased demand on the part of the pharmaceutical industries. Iran exercised its option in 1969 to resume opium cultivation.

OPIUM PRODUCED

[In kilograms]

	1969	1970	1971	1972
Bulgaria.....	0	0	0	16
India.....	868,000	794,000	943,000	990,747
Iran.....	8,000	78,000	156,000	373,973
Japan.....	0	0	4,000	30
Pakistan.....	0	0	12,000	4,570
Turkey.....	117,000	51,000	150,000	66,434
USSR.....	217,000	227,000	200,000	113,725
Yugoslavia.....	0	0	1,000	554
Other.....	9,000	7,000	(¹)	(¹)
Total.....	1,219,000	1,157,000	1,466,000	1,550,049

¹ Not available

SOURCE AND DESTINATION OF OPIUM PRODUCTION

Thailand

An estimated 150–200 tons of opium come from the Thailand border provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, and Nan. Processed opium, in the form of smoking opium, is consumed chiefly in Southeast Asia, although some of it is now finding its way to Europe and the U.S. Number Four injectable heroin is sent to European and American markets. Number Three smoking heroin ("Red Rock") is appearing in increasing quantities in Europe and North America, used principally by local Chinese populations.

Laos

Northern Laos produces about 20–40 tons of opium, in Royal Lao controlled area, a large amount of which is consumed by the local users. Some opium is also produced in areas of Laos under Pathet Lao control, but no data is available on the amount.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong is a major transit point for all opiates. Laboratories there tend to specialize in smoking heroin, but some injectable heroin is also produced.

People's Republic of China (PRC)

The PRC produces about 100 tons of opium legally each year, apparently under very strict controls. None of all allegations of widespread international trafficking of PRC-originated opium could be substantiated, although minor amounts may be smuggled across the border into adjacent areas of Laos and Burma. There is no evidence that this trade is sanctioned by Peking.

South Korea

A small amount of illicit opium is produced in South Korea. In 1972 and 1973, seizures were running at the rate of about 20 kilograms per year. Most of the opium is probably used by South Korean addicts, although a minor portion may be smuggled to Japan or sold to U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

Mexico

Total production is estimated at between 5 and 15 tons. Although there is evidence of growing heroin abuse within Mexico, it is believed that nearly all Mexican heroin finds its way into the U.S.

Afghanistan

Estimates of opium production in Afghanistan, all of which is illicit, vary. The best estimates are between 100 and 200 tons. A small amount of opium is consumed locally in the poppy-growing region. Foreign visitors also account for some; but the bulk (probably exceeding 90 percent) of the opium produced in Afghanistan is smuggled across the border into Iran, usually accompanied by opium of Pakistani origin.

Iran

Since the reintroduction of legal opium production into Iran in 1969, production, which is carried out under very strict supervision, has varied between 8 and 217 tons. All of this is produced for distribution to Iranian addicts, and there is no evidence of significant diversion. In fact, Iran is a victim country and is the destination for nearly all the illegal opium smuggled out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Large amounts of this are seized each year along the Afghan border. This opium, which is also distributed to Iranian addicts, allows the government to cut back on planned opium production in the following crop year, and contributes to the fluctuations in production. 1973 opium production was given as 90 tons. No figures are yet available for 1974.

Pakistan

12 tons of opium were produced legally in Pakistan in 1973, but a much larger and undetermined amount was produced in tribal areas outside the government's control. Estimates of this range from 32 to 170 tons, with the higher figure probably being more accurate. The great part of Pakistan's illegal opium is smuggled across Afghanistan into Iran by Afghan tribesmen. A smaller amount, perhaps now reaching between 10 and 15 percent, is smuggled out of the country by ship, mostly through the port of Karachi. Destinations for some recent narcotic shipments originating in Karachi were reported as Europe, Hong Kong, and the U.S. Although most of these "narcotics" were probably hashish, some opium may well have been included.

Turkey

There was no licit opium production in Turkey in the 1974 crop year. Some minor illicit production may have occurred in a region about 100 miles north-east of Ankara. During the period of the ban (July 1972 to July 1974) both opium and morphine base continued to flow into illicit international channels from Turkey. Opium shipments, mostly to Egypt, sometimes amounted to more than a ton. Both the opium and the morphine base shipments derived from illegal opium stockpiles accumulated over many years before the imposition of the 1972 ban.

With the resumption of legal opium production beginning with the summer of 1975 harvest, an increase in both illegal opium and morphine base (all of which is illegal) shipments can be expected, drawn mainly from illegal stockpiles rather than current production. This could amount to 25-35 opium tons equivalent yearly over the next several years.

Judging from past performance and announced plans for the 1975 crop year, and assuming normal weather conditions, a total opium gum harvest of somewhat over 200 tons can be anticipated. If the traditional method of pod incision is used, and if the control measures used in 1971 and 1972 are applied, diversion would probably amount to between 20 and 40 tons. If improved control systems are introduced or if the commitment in manpower and vehicles to harvest control is greatly increased, diversion might be held below 15 tons.

The poppy straw method, if used, would in theory reduce greatly the problem of diversion of opium gum. However, under the terms of the Single Convention there are no control provisions for cultivation and licensing of poppy straw. Turkey is aware of this, and we fear that the cultivation "could get out of control" in a few years if the farmers are allowed to grow without "licensing" and "controls" similar to gum opium controls. If they grow on State farms, the straw cultivation could be adequately controlled. Reaching this objective, however, would depend on total cooperation from the growers, a foolproof system for

maintaining surveillance over all poppy fields during the harvest period, or a combination of both. In practical terms, it is estimated that 10-15 tons of illicit opium might be gathered illegally in Turkey during 1975, either from unlicensed plots or illicit incision. This amount would tend to increase in later years as growers with trafficker connections devise ways to avoid detection.

India

Announced production for the current crop year is 1050 tons. No illicit production is reported. As much as 100 tons of Indian licit opium production may be diverted into illicit trade, with most of it being consumed locally. There have been numerous reports of smuggled Indian opium arriving in Sri Lanka, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai. Some illicit opium may also be brought into India from Southeast Asia. At the present time it is unclear whether India is a net exporter or importer of illicit opium.

Burma

350-400 tons of opium are produced in Burma's Shan and Kachin states. A substantial part of this opium is consumed locally; this varies with the export price that can be obtained at the time the opium is available. Local consumption is partly in the form of raw opium, which also makes up the greater part of the opium exported. About 6 tons of opium are produced in the Chin States of Burma. Most of this is sold to traders from India and Bangladesh.

Equador

An Undetermined amount of opium is grown illegally in Equador and converted into heroin there. Available information is insufficient to support an estimate of either opium or heroin production. No information is available on where either is consumed.

Peru

Opium fields have been observed in Peru, but there is no information available on production figures or on the destination of any opium or heroin produced there.

Yugoslavia

As a signatory to the 1974 pact, Yugoslavia is entitled to produce 100 tons of opium. Actual production varies between 3 and 4 tons yearly. There is no evidence of illicit production or significant diversion of legally produced opium.

AVERAGE DAILY COST OF HEROIN FOR ADDICTS

Description of Data: DEA maintains a heroin retail price and purity index for the United States and most urban areas. The data from which this estimate is derived is composed of a statistical sample of actual evidence purchases made by DEA and Task Force agents.

Analysis: It is estimated that the average heroin addict requires a minimum of 50 mg. of the drug daily, to support his habit.

There has been a steady increase in the retail price of heroin paid by addicts, due to lessened availability through law enforcement activity. This reduction in supply is a consequence of increased pressure upon Near Eastern and European producers and middle men, as well as a disruption of domestic trafficking organizations, particularly of the middle level of the distribution network.

HEROIN COSTS FOR ADDICTS

	1972	Fiscal year— 1973	1974
Dollars per milligram—Heroin.....	\$0.86	\$1.16	\$1.15
Cost per day 50 mg.....	43.00	58.00	57.50

ESTIMATED ANNUAL LOSSES DUE TO ADDICT THEFTS

Description of Data: A number of studies conducted in New York and Baltimore indicate that addicts receive 60% of all financial support through theft and larceny. The balance of support is contributed by welfare, families, employment and other forms of activities, licit and illicit. The study conducted in New York was composed of 7,000 persons; in Baltimore, 1,000 persons. It is believed that this sample group was fairly representative of the hard-core addict population.

Analysis: For the purpose of an estimate, 50 mg. a day was computed as the average heroin requirement. Since no comparative data was drawn to the pre-addiction employment status of the sample groups, it cannot be assumed that all or most illicit activity was solely a consequence of heroin addiction.

ANNUAL HEROIN COSTS PAID BY ADDICTS

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974
Year ¹	\$4,783,000,000	\$5,610,000,000	\$5,247,000,000
Thefts ²	2,870,000,000	3,366,000,000	3,148,200,000

¹ Amount required by addicts to pay heroin costs.

² Amount obtained by addicts through theft and larceny.

ESTIMATE OF U.S. ANNUAL ADDICT POPULATION AND HEROIN CONSUMPTION

Description of Data: The total number of narcotics users is estimated by utilizing arrest reports received from state and local police, as well as other agencies. Hardcore heroin addicts are estimated to constitute 40% of this total. The others are comprised of casual heroin users, methadone addicts, and users of synthetic narcotics.

The average daily dosage required to maintain an addict is estimated to be 50 mg of heroin.

Analysis: There has been a steady decrease in the number of heroin addicts and heroin abusers.

A number of interrelated factors appear to have combined to produce this trend:

A decrease in heroin availability and quality due to disruption of the Europe-Near Eastern trafficking networks.

Substantial arrests of upper and middle level violators, primarily on the East Coast, thereby impeding "street" distribution upon which addicts depend.

A decrease in demand for heroin, due to improved education and treatment facilities.

A shift in abuse patterns toward depressant and hallucinogenic drugs.

The availability of heroin substitutes in the form of methadone and barbiturates.

NARCOTIC ABUSER ESTIMATES

	Calendar year—		
	1971	1972	1973
Heroin addicts.....	273,000	265,000	250,000
Narcotic users.....	628,000	612,000	579,000
Annual heroin consumption (kgs).....	4,983	4,836	4,562

DRUG-RELATED DEATHS

Description of Data: Since October, 1972, DEA has utilized a rigorous data collection system, with strict definitions and controls, to collect drug death and injury statistics. This system is called the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). Prior to October, 1972, death data was collected independently from only those city/county medical examiners who maintained such information. Each examiner used his own definitions and procedures to determine the number of drug related deaths. For this reason, data for 1970-1972 is available only on a calendar year basis for selected cities, is not available by drug or as a national total, and cannot be directly compared to CY 73 or FY 74 statistics.

A point should also be made concerning definition of terms. Where there is a distinction between a drug related death and an overdose death, this difference was not discernable in deaths reported before DAWN. Even under the DAWN system the distinction is not made in every case. Therefore, DEA reports overdose deaths and drug related deaths under the category "drug related deaths" to insure comprehensive coverage.

Analysis: Nationwide statistics CY 73 (Chart A) indicate that narcotic/depressant substances are the most dangerous with heroin, methadone, barbiturates and other narcotic/depressant substances having accounted for 95% of the total.

On a city basis (Chart B), it is evident that deaths in New York City dominated other areas of the U.S. from the years 1970-1972, while reported figures from the Eastern cities were in the proximity of those reported in the Midwest and West. In 1973, however, drug deaths in Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Francisco far exceeded those reported in the East. Only New York continued to report higher deaths than the cities to the West and New York totals themselves were heavily influenced by methadone deaths which accounted for 53% of all deaths in CY 73 and 69% in FY 74.

Analysis continued: A substantial portion of all deaths in the Midwest and Western cities in FY 74 were caused by heroin with Detroit, Chicago, Low Angeles, and San Francisco reporting heroin in 35-51% of all cases; heroin accounted for only 9-27% of the deaths in the three Eastern Cities (Chart C).

Drug related death data supports in full the theory that the heroin problem has shifted Westward with the influx of brown heroin.

A.—Drug related deaths—nationwide*		CY 73
Heroin/morphine.....	1, 142	
Methadone.....	567	
Other narcotics.....	62	
Barbiturates.....	1, 168	
Other depressants.....	397	
Stimulants.....	83	
Cannabis.....	3	
Hallucinogens.....	7	
Other.....	76	
Total.....	3, 505	

*Source: DAWN— 24 selected cities.

DRUG RELATED DEATHS BY CITY¹

	Calendar year—			
	1970	1971	1972	DAWN 1973
New York.....	893	916	942	885
Philadelphia.....	114	100	113	85
Washington, D.C.....	NA	85	71	69
Detroit.....	NA	NA	NA	205
Chicago.....	142	190	137	287
San Francisco.....	56	55	65	340
Los Angeles.....	NA	NA	NA	1, 020

¹ A perfect comparison of data collected before calendar year 1973 and DAWN statistics is not possible because of differing reporting procedures.

DRUG RELATED DEATHS BY CITY AND DRUG¹ FISCAL YEAR 1974 (1ST 9 MD)

	Heroin	Methadone	Depressants	Other	Total
New York.....	242	624	26	7	899
Philadelphia.....	6	4	42	9	61
Washington, D.C.....	7	5	43	19	74
Detroit.....	94	17	65	10	186
Chicago.....	101	5	128	13	247
San Francisco.....	90	3	144	22	259
Los Angeles.....	372	1	451	39	863

¹Source: DAWN—saturated date.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Bartels.

Mr. Ernst, maybe you should give your statement now, and then we will question as a panel.

STATEMENT OF DAVID H. ERNST

Mr. ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee on behalf of Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance who is out of the country. Ambassador Vance is now in Jamaica and he is later going on to Mexico and other Latin American countries which are of high concern to us in the fight against the drug problem.

However hard we fight the problem of drug abuse at home, we cannot solve it unless we succeed in winning and maintaining comprehensive and effective cooperation abroad. Some of the key drugs of abuse originate in foreign countries. There is a legitimate need for opium as a source for codeine and other medicinal compounds, but illicit opium—from which heroin can be processed—has been produced in such countries as Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and neighboring Mexico.

Of course, marihuana is also grown in the United States and we have had our problems with U.S.-manufactured amphetamines, barbiturates, and other mind-bending drugs. The U.S. sources we are attempting to deal with through a domestic crackdown, but for the foreign substances we must look to other governments for cooperation.

This we have been doing in an important way since mid-1971 when narcotics control—with emphasis on heroin and cocaine—became one of our principal foreign policy objectives. At that time the Department of State was assigned the primary responsibility for developing an intensified international narcotics control effort and for managing the expenditures under the program. While we in the Department of State receive the appropriation and provide leadership, the international narcotics control program is a combined effort of several U.S. Government agencies coordinated by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control.

The Cabinet Committee was established in August 1971 under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State and also includes the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Agriculture, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Ambassador Sheldon Vance, the senior adviser to the Secretary on narcotics matters, serves as Executive Director of the Committee.

There is an interagency Working Group which assists the Cabinet Committee. This is composed of officials at the assistant secretary level in each agency who deal directly with narcotics matters. Ambassador Vance chairs the Working Group.

The Cabinet Committee and Working Group are serviced by an interagency senior working level coordinating subcommittee which monitors all narcotics control programs and policies. In addition, special projects and studies are initiated and appraised by functional subcommittees which report to the coordinating subcommittee in such areas as law enforcement, training, legal matters, intelligence, research and development, and prevention.

The Cabinet Committee has met on five occasions to establish priorities and guidelines and to initiate and/or approve major narcotics control projects on both the bilateral and multilateral fronts. The most recent meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on November 27, 1973, when it met jointly with the President and the Domestic Council Cabinet Committees on Drug Abuse.

While the international narcotics control program receives policy guidance and program direction from the Cabinet Committee mechanism which I have described, through both formal meetings and regular coordination among members, the ongoing projects are staffed out by personnel who serve on regional interagency narcotics control committees chaired by Department of State officers. Regional committee meetings—regional in the sense of geographical—have been held frequently since the inception of the Cabinet Committee structure; they are called primarily to distribute and discuss draft position papers and cables. In most instances, agency comments and clearances are obtained and coordinated outside of the formal meeting setting by either the regional bureau coordinator or a designated action officer. For all such meetings and clearances, there is participation by a member of Ambassador Vance's staff, which is currently at the level of 14 persons.

To complement the mobilizing of resources in Washington, narcotics control officers have been designated at virtually all foreign posts. They operate within the framework of the Ambassador's country team, a top-level group at each post which utilizes the expertise of all appropriate agencies represented at the mission.

Thus, whether in Washington or abroad, under the leadership of the Department of State, there is a constant process of coordination among Federal agencies. AID is the executing agency for our narcotics control assistance funds. The new Drug Enforcement Administration in Justice is principally responsible for cooperating with foreign enforcement agencies; CIA for strategic intelligence on the narcotics traffic; the Department of Agriculture for research on replacement crops; the U.S. Customs Service in Treasury for border control and technical assistance to foreign customs agencies.

The Treasury Department, in addition to its customs function, has a financial policy interest. The Department of Defense is involved where military assets are useful in assistance programs or where U.S. Armed Forces overseas are attached. The Special Action Office and HEW are involved where assistance is provided for overseas programs of education, prevention, and treatment. The U.S. Representative to the United Nations plays an important role because of the drug control efforts of the U.N. and its specialized agencies. USIA provides the expertise for our informational program abroad.

With the growing recognition that drug abuse is not just a U.S. problem but one that was present in many countries throughout the world, an increasing number of countries have worked with us both on a bilateral basis and through various regional and international programs to eliminate illicit supplies and to suppress illicit trafficking.

To encourage such cooperation and to assist foreign governments and international organizations to augment their antidrug capabilities, we have provided an average of \$22 million in grant assistance over the past 3 years. Our request for international control funds for the current fiscal year is \$42.5 million. Most of the expenditures are allocated for narcotics control action programs we have with countries which have a significant current or potential involvement with illicit drugs. The bilateral programs, which are under continuous review, emphasize cooperative law enforcement and exchange of intelligence. The major categories of grant assistance are training programs and equipment for foreign enforcement personnel and financial assistance

for crop substitution and related agricultural projects. I have some tabular data for the committee showing the uses of the funds, which I have submitted for the record.

Our training program, which is planned and coordinated by the CCINC Training Subcommittee, includes inputs from DEA, the U.S. Customs Service and AID. Since 1969, DEA and its predecessor agency have held courses and seminars here and overseas for more than 4,300 police officers from 40 countries. Within the past year the Customs Service has trained in the United States and abroad more than 1,300 foreign customs officers and executives representing 29 countries. Since mid-1970 the International Police Academy has provided narcotics instruction for 152 ranking supervisory and management personnel from 30 countries. This significant program has paid off in improved enforcement techniques abroad as reflected by the growth in arrests and seizures.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to comment briefly on several of our key country programs.

MEXICO

Mexico is the No. 1 priority country in our international narcotics control efforts. As Dr. DuPont has stated, the Mexican opium crop and heroin labs are the current source of a very large percent of the heroin in our streets—the so-called Mexican brown heroin, which has not only moved into our large cities but is also spreading to some of the smaller communities throughout our country, as also stated by Dr. DuPont. Moreover, a very large portion of marihuana entering the United States is produced in Mexico.

In our cooperative program with the Mexican Government we are helping them by providing aircraft, mainly helicopters, to assist in the eradication of opium poppy cultivation in the western mountains, a remote area where it is very difficult for government control forces to operate, and we are furnishing some other equipment to aid in the general interdiction effort. The Mexican Federal Government is intensifying its campaign to eradicate illegal crops of opium poppy and marihuana.

As Mr. Bartels described, United States-Mexican cooperative measures are paying off with some recent significant seizures but much remains to be done before the present trend of illicit trafficking can be reversed. For fiscal year 1975, Mr. Chairman, a minimum of \$5 million of our international narcotics control funds are being allocated for the Mexican program.

COLOMBIA

A country with extensive coastlines and numerous landing areas, Colombia is the major transit point for illegal shipments of cocaine entering the U.S. market. The Colombian Government has launched a great effort to eliminate the criminal element, to combat drug trafficking, and to crack down on the laboratories processing coca base smuggled in from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. The United States is moving forward with an assistance program tailored to help the new Colombian Government thrust. We are furnishing such enforcement items as jeeps, motorcycles, radios, and laboratory equipment. We are also providing antinarcotics technical training for the judicial police, the national police and customs.

JAMAICA

This Caribbean island has emerged as a major supplier of marihuana to the United States, surpassed only by Mexico. Moreover, there is evidence that Jamaica is a transit point for the smuggling of cocaine and heroin to our country from South America. Within the past year, the Jamaican Government has undertaken major steps to curb illicit drug activities. In response to urgent requests for assistance from the Jamaican Government, a U.S.-assisted task force has been initiated to intercept boats and aircraft engaged in narcotics smuggling, to disrupt trafficking rings, and to suppress marihuana cultivation. Our support consists of loaning of helicopters and transfers of communications equipment and investigative/enforcement aids.

TURKEY

In 1971, with the realization that a substantial amount of opium produced in Turkey was being diverted to illicit narcotics trafficking, the Turkish Government concluded that a total ban on poppy growing would be the most effective way to stop the leakage. As the world's major victim country of heroin from Turkish-origin opium, the United States pledged \$35.7 million to compensate Turkey for its expected loss of legitimate export earnings and to help Turkish development agencies start projects which would offer new sources of income for the former poppy growers. The ban was fully implemented in the fall of 1972.

However, the Turkish Government which assumed office in January 1974 reconsidered the ban and, in spite of continuous high-level diplomatic representations made by U.S. officials and those of other governments concerned, rescinded it on July 1. The U.S. Government compensation payments to the Turkish Government had already stopped at the first indication that the ban might be revoked. Of the \$35.7 million only \$15 million was actually transferred.

In high-level dialog between our two Governments we have made clear our deep concern at the possibility of a renewed massive flow of heroin from Turkish opium to the United States. We stressed the vital need for effective controls. A special United Nations team also held discussions on this subject in Turkey on the invitation of the Turkish Government, which had stated publicly that it would not allow its poppy cultivation resumption to injure other peoples.

In mid-September the Turkish Government issued a statement that it would adopt a method of harvesting the poppies called the poppy straw process. As Mr. Bartels indicated, this involves the collection by the Turkish Government of the whole poppy pod rather than opium gum. Traditionally, the opium gum was taken by the farmers through lancing the pod in the field and it was a portion of this gum that was illegally bought by the traffickers.

We would, of course, have vastly preferred that the ban were not lifted. However, if the Turkish Government implements effective policing to make sure that the opium gum is not extracted by the farmers, the great reflow of heroin that we fear can be avoided. Information from Ankara is that new and substantial enforcement measures are being developed. This will be followed very closely, Mr. Chairman.

FRANCE

Prior to the Turkish opium ban, France was the major traditional conduit for the U.S. market of heroin made from Turkish-origin opium and morphine base. The emergence of a domestic drug abuse problem in France in 1970 created public concern and, coupled with our urging, contributed to a great increase in French cooperation with the United States in the drive against illicit heroin production and international trafficking in drugs. The French enforcement officials shut down five heroin labs in the Marseilles area in 1972 and another one in 1973.

While there has been some movement in recent months in morphine base and heroin from supplies held in storage, the combination of the Turkish opium ban and enforcement activities in Western Europe have reduced the so-called Turkish-French connection to a trickle. However, close continued cooperation with the French and other Western European authorities is essential to head off any resumption of trafficking in heroin whether based on Turkish opium or possible connections with other sources in the Near East or in Southeast Asia.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Golden Triangle area, where Burma, Laos, and Thailand come together, is the largest source of illicit opium in the world with an estimated annual production of 600 to 700 tons. Most of this production is consumed by opium smokers in Southeast Asia. Since 1970, when heroin processed from opium in Golden Triangle refineries began to become widely available to U.S. troops in Vietnam, we have been concerned that heroin from this source would increasingly reach the United States, especially as the ban on opium production in Turkey, together with the tightened enforcement, largely dried up the traditional Middle Eastern/European route to the United States.

For the past 3 years, therefore, we have made Southeast Asia a major object of our international control efforts. We have centered a significant share of our suppression efforts and resources in our cooperative programs in Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. The biggest concentration has been in Thailand which serves as the major transit area for Burmese-origin opium. A recent series of agreements for U.S. assistance to Thailand include helicopters, communications equipment, vehicles, and training programs. Important steps were also taken on the income substitution side, including the approval of an aerial survey of northern Thailand where opium is grown by the hill tribes. In Burma the Government will utilize helicopters supplied under our program in its stepped-up antinarcotics efforts. For fiscal year 1975 Thailand and Burma together will account for about \$11 million of our international narcotics control funds.

While our joint suppression efforts are making some headway in Southeast Asia, we should not view the situation there through rose-colored glasses. Antinarcotics efforts in Southeast Asia run up against several unique problems. Burma and Thailand are threatened by insurgent groups which control or harass large areas of the opium-growing regions. The governments have limited resources and few

trained personnel available for narcotics control. In addition, the lack of internal security hampers police action and intelligence operations against traffickers. The Government of Burma, for example, does not have full administrative control over a significant portion of the area where most Asian poppies are grown.

The topography of the Golden Triangle area is mountainous, wild, and uncontrollable. When one smuggling route is uncovered and plugged by police and customs teams, the traffickers can easily detour to alternate routes and modes of transportation. We need only look at the difficulties that our own well-trained and equipped law enforcement agencies have in blocking narcotics traffic across our clearly defined, peaceful border with Mexico to gain a better appreciation of the difficulties in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, use of opium has been tolerated in the area and opium has been regarded as a legitimate commodity of commerce for centuries under both colonial and indigenous governments. For the hill tribes, opium is still the principal source of medicinal relief for endemic diseases and is also the most lucrative crop to sell or barter for basic necessities.

And so the situation in Southeast Asia is complex and long term.

Concurrently with our bilateral action programs, we have given full support to the multilateral or international efforts in the fight against illicit narcotics production and trafficking. The United States was a leading proponent of the establishment of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. To date we have contributed \$10 million of the \$13.5 million made available to the Fund by all countries. In Thailand the Fund is assisting in a comprehensive program designed to develop alternate economic opportunities for those who grow opium; the Fund has a similar project in Lebanon for the development of alternatives to cannabis production.

Within the past year the Fund has financed a World Health Organization worldwide study of drug dependence which we hope will contribute toward clarifying the nature of the problem we seek to solve. It is also financing treatment and rehabilitation activities for drug addicts in Thailand, fellowships and consultancies in rehabilitation in various countries, an evaluation to the treatment program for heroin addicts in Hong Kong and seminars on community rehabilitation programs in Europe.

The U.S. Government has also taken the lead in formulating two major pieces of international narcotics legislation. The first relates to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. I am happy to report that the United States sponsored amending protocol to that convention, which would considerably strengthen controls over illicit production and trafficking, has been ratified by 32 of the 40 countries necessary for coming into force. The United States was the first country to ratify the Protocol on November 1, 1972.

The second major area of international legislation pertains to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances which would provide international control over LSD and other hallucinogens, the amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers. The administration submitted the

Convention to the Senate in mid-1971 with a request for its ratification. We are anxiously awaiting congressional approval of the proposed enabling domestic legislation that would pave the way for ratification of this essential international treaty. U.S. approval of the Psychotropic Convention would strengthen our hand in obtaining cooperation from other governments in controlling the classic narcotic substances.

The approach to a successful antidrug program cannot, of course, relate to supply alone. Nor is an attack on the demand side alone the answer. Only through a combined effort can the job be done. Thus, the basic objective of our international program has been to reduce availabilities of illicit supplies so that addicts will be driven into treatment and others will be deterred from experimentation.

I think we can point with some pride to our role over the past 3 years toward a tightening of international controls. Worldwide seizures and arrests have been significant as other countries have joined in the battle, and there has been a move in the direction of more effective controls through treaty obligations.

There are other signs that foreign countries are pitching in. While we are, of course, the major contributor, 37 other countries have budgeted a total of \$3.5 million to the United Nations Fund. The largest contributors are Canada (\$1,000,000), West Germany (\$500,000), Japan (\$400,000), the United Kingdom (\$360,000), France (\$300,000), Sweden (\$157,000), Australia (\$128,000), the Netherlands (\$116,000), Italy (\$103,000) and Norway (\$94,000).

There is widespread support for INTERPOL which has been assigned the collection and exchange of narcotics intelligence information as one of its fundamental duties. At the organization's headquarters in St. Cloud, France, there are more than 50 seconded police officers from 8 countries who spend a good portion of their time on narcotics matters.

While no other country has assigned narcotics agents abroad on the same scale as the United States, there is some action in this area on the part of other countries. France has assigned narcotics agents in the United States. West Germany has an enforcement officer in Afghanistan. Hong Kong has placed a narcotics representative at the British Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

By no means can we rest. The progress we have made in conjunction with other governments has put the heat on traffickers throughout the world. However, it should be apparent to us all that abundant supplies of narcotics—both in storage and under cultivation—quickly respond to illicit high profits.

Things are not looking brighter in this field. Rather than let up, we must strengthen the international control mechanism to reduce illicit trafficking. The member agencies of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control will continue to work toward this end so that the present scourge of drug abuse can be abated and future waves can be prevented.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Attachments to Mr. Ernst's statement follow:]

FUNDING TABLES

TABLE 1.—INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM, DETAILED FISCAL SUMMARY

[In thousands of U.S. dollars]

	Actual, fiscal year 1974	Estimated, fiscal year 1975
I. Country programs:		
Latin America:		
Argentina.....	\$347	\$200
Barbados.....	0	2
Bolivia.....	57	45
Brazil.....	194	243
Central America.....	0	40
Chile.....	70	28
Colombia.....	257	537
Ecuador.....	292	326
Jamaica.....	323	500
Mexico.....	5,000	5,000
Penama.....	26	18
Paraguay.....	21	10
Peru.....	248	93
Uruguay.....	24	11
Venezuela.....	52	43
Total.....	6,911	7,096
Near East and South Asia:		
Afghanistan.....	0	50
Pakistan.....	893	750
Total.....	893	800
East Asia:		
Burma.....	4,800	4,800
Regional initiative.....	18	0
Cambodia.....	0	0
Indonesia.....	80	100
Laos.....	1,614	1,152
Philippines.....	352	250
Singapore.....	0	50
Thailand.....	6,186	6,864
Vietnam.....	96	0
Total.....	13,146	13,216
Total, country program.....	20,950	21,112
II. International organizations:		
Interpol.....	0	135
U.N. Special Fund.....	2,000	5,000
Cento.....	0	20
Colombo plan.....	0	100
Total, international organizations.....	2,000	5,255
III. Interregional program:		
Treining.....	3,732	6,500
Support costs.....	456	400
Total, interregional program.....	4,188	6,900
IV. Currently unprogramed funds.....		
	0	9,233
Program total.....	27,138	42,500

TABLE II.—FUNDING BY ACTIVITY, FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND 1975 (ESTIMATE)

Country	Total, by function	Enforce	Agriculture	Health and education
MAJOR PROGRAMS				
Burma:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	\$4,800	\$4,800		
Fiscal year 1975.....	4,800	4,800		
Mexico:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	5,000	4,924		\$76
Fiscal year 1975.....	5,000	5,000		
Thailand:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	6,186	4,926	\$1,260	
Fiscal year 1975.....	6,864	3,029	3,835	
Laos:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	1,614	1,005	245	318
Fiscal year 1975.....	1,152	642	268	288
Total:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	17,600	15,655	1,505	394
Fiscal year 1975.....	17,816	13,471	4,103	288
Total.....	35,416	29,126	5,608	682
SECONDARY PROGRAMS				
Pakistan:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	893	893		
Fiscal year 1975.....	750	750		
Colombia:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	257	257		
Fiscal year 1975.....	537	525		12
Ecuador:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	292	292		
Fiscal year 1975.....	326	326		
Philippines:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	352	352		
Fiscal year 1975.....	250	250		
Paru:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	248	248		
Fiscal year 1975.....	93	93		
Brazil:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	194	194		
Fiscal year 1975.....	243	243		
Total:				
Fiscal year 1974.....	2,236	2,236		
Fiscal year 1975.....	2,199	2,187		12
Total.....	4,435	4,423	0	12

TABLE III.—FUNDING BY COST CATEGORY, FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND 1975

Country	Total, by function	Equipment	Personnel	Training	Other ¹
MAJOR PROGRAMS					
Burma:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	\$4,800	\$4,800			
Fiscal year 1975.....	4,800	4,800			
Mexico:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	5,000	4,924	\$76		
Fiscal year 1975.....	5,000	5,000			
Thailand:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	6,186	5,303	575	\$308	
Fiscal year 1975.....	6,864	4,804	935	175	\$950
Laos:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	1,614	275	661	101	577
Fiscal year 1975.....	1,152	193	470	15	474
Total:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	17,600	15,302	1,312	409	577
Fiscal year 1975.....	17,816	14,797	1,405	190	1,424
Total.....	35,416	30,099	2,717	599	2,001

See footnotes at end of table p. 00.

TABLE III.—FUNDING BY COST CATEGORY FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND 1975—Continued

Country	Total, by function	Equipment	Personnel	Training	Other ¹
SECONDARY PROGRAMS					
Pakistan:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	893	893			
Fiscal year 1975.....	750	750			
Colombia:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	257	209	35		13
Fiscal year 1975.....	537	354	76	7	100
Ecuador:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	292	203	72		17
Fiscal year 1975.....	326	181	125		20
Philippines:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	352	316	30	6	
Fiscal year 1975.....	250	150	70	30	
Peru:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	248	217	19		12
Fiscal year 1975.....	93	75			18
Brazil:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	194	194			
Fiscal year 1975.....	243	243			
TOTAL:					
Fiscal year 1974.....	2,236	2,032	156	6	42
Fiscal year 1975.....	2,199	1,753	271	37	138
Total.....	4,435	3,785	427	43	180

¹ Includes limited budgetary support for enforcement agencies and costs of locally procured supplies, materials, and services.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Ernst.

I think the committee first of all would like to get it clear on the record just exactly what our situation is as to an increased population of addiction or not, and I take it from the testimony that there is a definite trend or change. Could we get any more specific as to whether we have more or less addicts this year than we did last year?

Dr. DuPONT. Mr. Chairman, we had a trend that was strongly downward from 1972 through 1973, and many of us predicted that it would continue. The only thing we can say now unequivocally is that we no longer have a general downward trend. That is the strongest statement we can definitely make.

Whether the current heroin trend is up is a more complex problem; we do know that it is up in many cities. Whether the sum nationally is up is unresolved. The two factors to which we attribute the increases in heroin addiction are (1) the substantial increase in Mexican heroin in the United States and (2) the spread of heroin use from larger cities to some smaller cities.

I mentioned that we sent out a team to look at 10 American cities—medium-sized cities—with respect to heroin spread. We identified an increase in Eugene, Oreg., and Jackson, Miss. In addition, we found localized epidemic increases in Des Moines, Iowa, and Austin, Tex. We found the heroin problem was decreasing or staying level as of a couple of months ago in Pensacola, Fla.; Boulder, Colo.; Racine, Wis.; Greensboro, N.C.; Omaha, Nebr.; and Macon, Ga. So we are talking about a complex pattern. The main thing to say though is that we are not talking about a general downturn any more.

Mr. ROGERS. Where have we seen dramatic increases in the use of heroin in the United States?

Dr. DuPONT. The most striking have been those areas supplied by Mexican heroin—California, Arizona, and Chicago, Ill., have been the most striking. The cities where we found the strongest evidence

of a downturn over the last 2 years were Washington, D.C., and New York City. In New York, for example, the number of active addicts appeared to fall during the last several years from levels of around 200,000 down to a level of about 60,000. That was a very dramatic decline. In the District of Columbia the number of active addicts fell from 18,000 in 1969 to about 2,000 in 1973. Those were cities in which we had the best evidence. In both cities the downward trend has been arrested and there are signs now of an upward trend, although from a far lower level than we had 2 years ago in those cities.

Mr. ROGERS. I notice, Mr. Bartels, that your withdrawal or removal from the domestic market has been dropping, is that true, from 1972 and 1973, even though your force has increased?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, it has.

Mr. ROGERS. Why is that?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, what we have done is to put emphasis on the international aspects. The seizures that were made domestically in the periods from the mid-1960's up through 1971 were made as a result of rather substantial seizures in this country of Turkish heroin, white heroin, which was traditionally shipped in large amounts—100 kilos, 80 kilos, 40 kilos.

When you take a look at the problems attendant in organizing the transshipment of the morphine base from Turkey to Marseilles, its refinement there into heroin and subsequent transshipment and distribution into the United States, you see that it has to be highly organized for acquiring shipments in substantial sums. As a result of the Turkish ban, we have not only seized heroin in such quantities in the United States but working with the French we have seen that the French connection, those distributors and refiners and financiers around the Marseilles area, have not been able to get the morphine base.

The traffic has shifted over this 2-year period to a simpler distribution system, a broader system, frequently less organized and made up of individual entrepreneurs who can simply go down to Mexico on their own, raise \$20,000 or \$5,000 or \$10,000 and make a greater number of smaller smuggling efforts across a border which is 2,000 miles long and is far less difficult. So it has been a change in the distribution system, Mr. Chairman, that has resulted in that.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I notice in the tables the DEA Federal drug removals from the domestic market beginning in 1972, 1973, and up through September of this year; for heroin in 1972 you removed 995 pounds; in 1973 about one-third of that, 309; and through September of this year only 73.

Cocaine—443, 239, 995.

Hallucinogens—157 million down to 17 million, down to 445,000.

Marihuana—from 47,000 pounds down to 25,000 pounds and now down to 21,000 pounds.

I thought we were having more marihuana coming into the country. Are we?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we are having more coming into the country and we are also seizing more both overseas and I believe in the country.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, maybe I misread the figures but they would not seem to indicate that.

Mr. BARTELS. Are you reading from 1973, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ROGERS. Well, in 1973 I see 25,000 pounds of marihuana.

Mr. BARTELS. And in 1974 it went up to 103,000.

Mr. ROGERS. Now my figure shows 21,650 through September. I guess this is fiscal year 1974.

Mr. BARTELS. My figure is the DEA cooperative removals with foreign countries. We may be reading from two different figures.

Mr. ROGERS. This is from the domestic market.

Mr. BARTELS. What I have is statistical tables, DEA domestic removal. Is that the same?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. BARTELS. Which is 12,000 in 1971; 47,000 in 1972; 25,000 in 1973.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. BARTELS. And then 103,000 in 1974.

Mr. ROGERS. We have 21,650 for fiscal year 1974—I guess through September.

You have had an increase in seizure of marihuana?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the estimate of marihuana coming in? Is there any estimate at all now?

Mr. BARTELS. No. I cannot give you an accurate estimate but I can refer to a number of acute cases involving seizures which were not made before and it involves the reversal of the distribution trend that I spoke about for heroin and that is an increased organization. As Mr. Ernst mentioned, we have been working very closely over the last 5 months with the Government of Jamaica and during that period with our assistance they have destroyed 270,000 pounds of marihuana and over 5,000 pounds of seed as well as leading to several cases involving seizures of more than 20 tons once it comes into this country so that we have seen an increase in organized marihuana traffic using airplanes both for Mexico and Jamaica which did not exist 2 years ago.

Mr. ROGERS. Where is the major exporter now? Who is the major exporter into the United States?

Mr. BARTELS. Mexico is still the major exporter with Jamaica a close second.

Mr. ROGERS. What would you think is the percentage of marihuana that is used in the United States that is home grown? Is any grown here? What percentage would you think?

Mr. BARTELS. There is some grown here, it is relatively small. Occasionally we will find it grown here but on a much smaller scale, probably less than 2 percent.

Mr. ROGERS. So you don't feel that is a significant problem?

Mr. BARTELS. No, sir, it does not make sense either for a whole number of reasons. It is not as good quality, people say, and also you increase the risk of being caught if you have a field of marihuana; it is very difficult to avoid detection.

Mr. ROGERS. What are the latest scientific soundings on marihuana, Dr. DuPont, that have been brought to your attention?

Dr. DuPont. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, 5 years ago the Federal Government got very actively interested in the marihuana issue and a number of authoritative reports have been issued including the annual reports from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to the Congress and the Shafer Commission Reports.

These reports were released in the context of exaggerated claims about the health hazards of marihuana. They put the issue in a more honest and accurate perspective. Thus, we have had during the last 4 years the scientific community and Government agencies alike cautioning against hysterical statements about marihuana.

One of the most positive things that came from that was the tendency to move away from the use of criminal penalties and particularly jail sentences for the possession of marihuana, toward making marihuana possession a misdemeanor and generally getting away from putting people in prison for the possession of marihuana. We still have not achieved the goal of decriminalizing marihuana possession. Now having said that as a background, many people concluded that marihuana was truly safe and thought that the Federal Government and the scientific community were—if not actively, at least passively—encouraging the consumption of marihuana.

In the last year, as additional research evidence has accumulated, we are seeing a swing of the pendulum back as a series of studies emphasize the dangers of marihuana smoking. But we are not going back to the hysterical statements of previous years. No one is saying today that marihuana use leads to heroin addiction in all cases, or that drug-crazed marihuana addicts are running around the streets. In the last year, we have had a series of studies which has raised new questions; let me outline them very briefly for you and the committee.

One of the major concerns has been the report in two studies of reduced male sex hormone levels in people who have smoked marihuana. This raised broadly based questions about the consequences of marihuana smoking, particularly by pregnant women who may be bearing a male fetus, and by young people who are reaching puberty.

Another major source of concern is the impact of marihuana on the immune mechanism both in terms of disease resistance and the possibility that it is related to tumor growth or the suppression of that growth. These findings are pre-clinical findings that is, they come from testings in laboratories. We don't have any evidence in human populations of negative consequences on the immune mechanism, but we are concerned about it because of the number of studies that we have seen in that area which suggest this is a problem.

We are also concerned about the effects of marihuana intoxication on driving ability and the problems of memory and concentration while intoxicated. I am not talking about long-term effects after the person has stopped, but immediately after he has consumed the drug.

We are also more concerned than we were some time ago about the escalating pattern of drug use within a minority of the population. It does not appear that everyone can stabilize on experimental or occasional use, but in a minority of cases there is an escalation of the use of marihuana that is of concern. Within the last year some new studies—and again the evidence is conflicting which suggest that long term or heavy use may cause chromosome damage.

The sum total of this is to reemphasize the need for caution about this drug and to get across to the public that marihuana is not a safe drug. In particular in that regard I think one finding is very important. For a long time many people thought that if young people, or others, smoked marihuana they would not consume other drugs; that is, that

if we encourage the use of a relatively harmless drug we would discourage the use of relatively more harmful drugs, including in many people's minds alcohol.

The evidence that we have now is to the contrary and it is this: The increasing consumption of any drug, licit or illicit, is associated with an increased likelihood of use of all other drugs, licit and illicit. So by being permissive or encouraging with respect to the consumption of marihuana, we do not guarantee a reduction in the use of other drugs but actually increase the likelihood of greater use of all drugs.

The increased consumption of alcohol we have seen among young people in the last few years is directly connected with the consumption of many other drugs. We have not, in other words, reduced the consumption of alcohol by increasing the amount of marihuana consumption or vice versa.

Mr. ROGERS. Let me just ask one or two other questions and then my time is up.

How much of the marihuana would you think is brought into the country and is used in terms of tonnage?

Dr. DuPONT. I don't know. I was in San Diego and saw two huge trailer trucks filled with marihuana that had been intercepted coming across the border. I think it is no longer measured in pounds but in tons.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have any estimate, Mr. Bartels?

Mr. BARTELS. I can give you some very rough estimates but I don't have them here and I am not happy with them. The thing that we are seeing, as Dr. DuPont says, I can give you an idea of the size of the problem. Ten years ago from a prosecutorial point of view a seizure of 500 pounds was a substantial seizure; today those are not prosecuted in Federal courts because they are too small. That gives you an idea of the type of picture.

Mr. ROGERS. Who makes the judgment not to prosecute?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, I think it is the U.S. attorney. It will be prosecuted in a State and local court, the man does not walk free. In other words, if every U.S. attorney prosecuted every 500 pound case that he had, his calendar would be clogged with those sorts of cases. In other words, there are enough 1 ton and above marihuana cases that that decision can be defended. I think that just gives an indication of the size of the problem.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you make any judgments as to whether the law is not proper or should be changed?

Mr. BARTELS. Which law, Mr. Chairman; the Federal law or the various State laws?

Mr. ROGERS. The laws that apply in this situation. It is not very encouraging that they simply will not prosecute because there are so many.

Mr. BARTELS. The Federal law is essentially proper. The problem is that you are getting a great number of people and a great increase in absolute availability of marihuana with a great number of people dealing in it and the substantial sums can be made from it. We had an incident which I can relate to you as not totally typical but I think fairly indicative of the attitude of dealers and that is we had an undercover situation in the Northeast recently where a dealer came to one of our agents and offered to trade a quantity of heroin for so many pounds of marihuana at the same profit margin.

He said, "If I get caught with the heroin, I will go to jail; if I get caught with marihuana, I will not go to jail at all and I can make as much money on it." So that mentality exists.

Now when I say the U.S. attorney will generally not prosecute, that does not mean the offender will not be prosecuted; it will be referred to a local or a State court.

Mr. ROGERS. I think it would be well if you could give us some statistics for the record. I realize you would not have them now.

Mr. BARTELS. I may add that in the statistics we supplied we apparently mislabeled that 1974 figure which should apply to the first quarter only, I am informed, not to the entire year.

Mr. ROGERS. I think if you will make that clear for the record it would be helpful.

Mr. BARTELS. I certainly will.

[The following information was received for the record:]

DOMESTIC REMOVAL STATISTICS

DOMESTIC REMOVALS

Description of Data:

DEA Federal and DEA Task Force Removals (Chart A & B)

DEA domestic removal statistics represent a total of all drug purchases and seizures made by DEA or cooperating enforcement agencies as part of ongoing DEA Federal investigations. The source documents for these statistics are the chemist analysis reports which are prepared on each drug exhibit received at DEA laboratories. Utilization of these reports, which primarily function as court documents, insures correct identification of each purchase and seizure as well as accurate tabulation of the amount removed.

DEA Task Force removal figures are extracted from a Task Force statistical report which includes purchases and seizures analyzed by DEA labs as well as those sent to state or local labs for which DEA has no chemist's analysis. Because state/local labs may utilize varying procedures in analyzing drugs received, it is possible that Task Force removals include some packaging materials in total weight reported.

Customs & INS Removals (Chart C & D)

Federal drug removal data for U.S. ports and borders is extracted from monthly reports submitted to DEA by the Bureau of Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The data itself reflects a tabulation of drug seizures made by these agencies as analyzed by field tests performed at the time of seizure. Customs/INS dangerous drug seizures are not broken down into specific categories (eg., stimulant, depressant, hallucinogen) but rather, are considered as one category labeled "dangerous drugs" and reported in terms of five grain dosage units.

Analysis:

Cumulative heroin removals from various Federal enforcement activities are 30% below totals from FY73 and 67% below FY72 figures (Chart E). This declining trend reflects the decrease in heroin trafficking in Europe and consequent shortages of white heroin in the United States. In light of this shortage, brown heroin has become increasingly available in the U.S., with DEA domestic heroin removals now predominately brown.

Total cocaine removals have been growing steadily for each of the last four years indicating increased availability and popularity of that drug.

Dangerous drug seizures at U.S. ports and borders are substantial and increasing, indicating that a large quantity of these substances originate from foreign sources. This fact seems to represent a supply shift, since several years ago seizure figures supported the belief that most dangerous drugs were of domestic origin.

STATISTICAL TABLES I
A.—DEA DOMESTIC REMOVALS

	Fiscal year—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Opium.....	9	16	7	11
Heroin.....	226	995	309	271
Cocaine.....	427	443	239	388
Marihuana.....	12,723	47,700	25,805	103,374
Hashish.....	1,054	127	1,148	515
Dosage units:				
Hallucinogens.....	3,697,737	156,697,643	17,095,893	2,834,422
Depressants.....	319,006	688,810	933,199	593,853
Stimulants.....	10,319,923	48,707,942	4,691,589	8,634,172
Methadone.....	36,468	155,290	203,651	4,543

B.—DEA STATE AND LOCAL TASK FORCE REMOVALS

[In pounds]

	Fiscal years—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Opium.....	NA	NA	-----	0.4
Heroin.....	NA	NA	206	147
Cocaine.....	NA	NA	152	139
Marihuana.....	NA	NA	18,586	75,775
Hashish.....	NA	NA	45	133
Dosage units:				
Hallucinogens.....	NA	NA	50,913	468,551
Depressants.....	NA	NA	-----	-----
Stimulants.....	NA	NA	19,178	210,683
Methadone.....	NA	NA	-----	-----

C.—CUSTOMS REMOVALS

[In pounds]

	Fiscal year—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Opium.....	38	50	136	20
Heroin.....	937	620	212	76
Cocaine.....	360	335	685	908
Marihuana.....	177,388	211,198	281,896	450,352
Hashish.....	3,163	9,438	8,987	8,099
Dangerous drugs (dosage units).....	6,310,060	16,238,385	10,462,053	23,591,447

D.—IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE REMOVALS

[In pounds]

	Fiscal year—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Opium.....	NA	1	20	2
Heroin.....	NA	15	41	45
Cocaine.....	NA	44	49	46
Marihuana.....	NA	80,689	226,166	246,000
Hashish.....	NA	18	86	683
Dangerous drugs (dosage units).....	NA	2,064	5,340,205	1,261,000

¹ All drugs on statistical tables are reported in pounds except for dangerous drugs which are reported dosage units.

E.—DOMESTIC GRAND TOTAL REMOVALS
DEA, CUSTOMS, INS, STATE AND LOCAL TASK FORCES

[In pounds]

	Fiscal year—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Opium.....	47	67	163	33, 4
Heroin.....	1, 163	1, 630	768	539
Cocaine.....	787	822	1, 125	1, 481
Marihuana.....	190, 111	339, 587	552, 453	875, 501
Hashish.....	4, 217	9, 583	10, 266	9, 430
Dosage units:				
Hallucinogens.....	3, 697, 737	157, 697, 643	17, 146, 086	3, 311, 973
Depressants.....	319, 006	688, 810	933, 199	593, 853
Stimulants.....	10, 319, 923	48, 707, 942	4, 710, 767	8, 844, 855
Dangerous Drugs.....	6, 310, 060	16, 240, 449	15, 802, 258	24, 852, 447
Methadone.....	36, 468	155, 290	203, 651	4, 543

DEA/COOPERATIVE REMOVALS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES—TOTAL

Description of Data:

These statistics reflect the amount of seizures made by DEA agents working in consort with their foreign counterparts. Cooperation also extends itself to include monetary and technical assistance. All the exhibits are analyzed by the host countries and are not under the purview of DEA.

Analysis:

The overall increase from FY 1971 to FY 1973 is due to the expansion of DEA into more foreign countries, more awareness of drug abuse by foreign countries, and better cooperation. The decrease of opium derivative drugs in FY 1974 is due mainly to the cessation of the opium production in Turkey.

DEA IN COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES—TOTAL

[In pounds]

	Fiscal year—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Opium.....	2, 243	1, 433	52, 071	31, 596
Morphine base.....	2, 205	1, 628	2, 934	796
Heroin.....	488	2, 340	1, 174	659
Cocaine.....	261	246	1, 011	1, 114
Marihuana.....	28, 794	106, 910	220, 326	335, 520
Hashish.....	11, 308	8, 447	24, 097	63, 421
Hashish oil (quarts).....	0	0	0	31
Hallucinogens (dosage units).....	24, 794	2, 025	2, 334	2, 744
Hallucinogens (gross pounds).....	0	2	1, 600	0
Depressants (dosage units).....	1, 430, 000	0	945, 478	1, 275, 035
Depressants (gross pounds).....	58	0	1	2
Stimulants (dosage units).....	365, 015	425, 780	133, 860	3, 283, 368
Stimulants (gross pounds).....	53	0	55	81
Methadone (dosage units).....	0	0	0	145, 084

FOREIGN HOST COUNTRY REMOVALS

Description of Data

Host country removals reflect those illicit drugs seized by foreign governments without the assistance of DEA. Aggregation of these figures only began in fiscal year 1974 at the foreign regional level in an attempt to gage the volume of traffic within those countries with whom DEA maintains an advisory relationship. Input is purely voluntary and no measure of validity is presently possible due to the fact that the data received can be neither verified nor compared with past years.

Analysis

It is anticipated that, once a data base is established, these statistics can be combined with DEA cooperative foreign removals to provide trend indicators of illicit drug activity within those foreign countries in which DEA is active.

HOST COUNTRY REMOVALS

	Fiscal year 1974
Opium (pounds)-----	63, 976
Morphine base (pounds)-----	984
Heroin (pounds)-----	995
Cocaine (pounds)-----	1, 549
Marihuana-----	643, 656
Hashish (pounds)-----	130, 783
Hashish oil (liters)-----	259
Hallucinogens (d.u.)-----	65, 839
Hallucinogens (pounds)-----	2
Depressants (d.u.)-----	1, 421, 445
Depressants (pounds)-----	2
Stimulants (d.u.)-----	3, 288, 055
Stimulants (pounds)-----	108
Methadone (d.u.)-----	145, 084

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. DuPont, let me ask you this: What are we doing now to find an antagonist? You mentioned that some, but are we doing a sufficient amount? Does it have enough urgency in the application of our funding and our goal to get proper antagonists?

Dr. DuPONT. Mr. Chairman, I share with you a sense of impatience about developing alternative pharmaceutical agents to combat addiction. We have two quite promising agents. The problem is that with the current increasing level of concern about the introduction of new drugs on the market, we have to be very cautious in the testing that is done prior to their introduction.

We are putting all the resources that we think can be usefully absorbed into that process but it is a painfully long one. I have discussed this frequently and at great length with our scientific staff, and I am persuaded at this point that we are doing as much as can be done.

Mr. ROGERS. Lastly let me ask this: Are we effecting any cures?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes; a great many people have stopped using all kinds of drugs as a result of treatment and as a result of changing public attitudes about stopping the use of drugs. There is a lot to be said on the positive side. At the very minimum, even accepting the most gloomy conclusion from these hearings and this report, we are not in the situation that we were several years ago when we had a problem that was mushrooming out of control with very little response on both the demand side and supply side. There is now a very substantial capability to deal with the problem, and we don't have a situation that is spiraling wildly out of control.

On the other hand, I certainly did not expect to be here now talking about the possibility of national increases in the use of drugs, particularly heroin. Six months ago I felt we would never fill the 95,000 federally funded treatment slots and now we expect to have them all filled by January 1.

Mr. ROGERS. What about the request for your agency, Mr. Bartels? Have you asked for any moneys that have not been granted?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes; we have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. What have you asked for?

Mr. BARTELS. We had two supplemental requests over the past 6 months. One was for \$16.9 million in response to the Turkish situation, the other was for \$2.5 million as a result of the tragedy that occurred in Miami right next to your district.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes; where the building collapsed.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir; and seven people were killed. We had a laboratory destroyed in that collapse so that we have asked for additional funds.

Mr. ROGERS. What has been the reaction of the Department of Justice?

Mr. BARTELS. They have supported it.

Mr. ROGERS. They do support it?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. What about OMB?

Mr. BARTELS. It denied the \$2.5 million supplemental.

Mr. ROGERS. They have denied?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. So the request has not come to the Congress?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. ROGERS. How many agents did you figure you needed out of this request where there were some \$16 million, you say?

Mr. BARTELS. We put in a request for 200 agents and for 50 para-professionals, most of whom were intelligence analysts and people to work with computers on intelligence gathering.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you.

[The following information was received for the record.]

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 1975 SUPPLEMENTALS

In response to your request for information regarding the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) supplemental requests for FY 75, we have researched our files and reconstructed the following sequence of events:

Turkish threat.—On July 15, 1974, DEA submitted to the Department of Justice a FY 75 supplemental and its FY 76 MBO/Budget request. The justification for the supplemental was the renewed narcotics threat resulting from the Turkish resumption of poppy cultivation. The supplemental included 602 positions and \$16,892,000 for personnel and related support costs. The joint submission, however, was in conflict with the prescribed budgetary procedures required by OMB Circular No. A-11, dated June 28, 1974, i.e., the budgetary authority level in the FY 76 MBO/Budget submission included the entire amount of the FY 75 supplemental which had neither gone to OMB nor the Congress for approval. Consequently, the Office of Management and Finance advised DEA to recalculate its FY 75 supplemental and FY 76 MBO/Budget request if it wished to submit a formal FY 75 supplemental or to subsume the FY 75 supplemental request into the FY 76 MBO/Budget request in lieu of the supplemental. DEA decided to incorporate the total supplemental request into the FY 76 MBO/Budget submission. In response to this critical need, the Department recommended in excess of 400 positions and \$12,673,000 of the total \$23,110,000 program increase to enable DEA to cope with the Turkish problem.

Miami disaster.—In August 1974, the DEA Miami Regional Office collapsed. In the aftermath of the disaster, the city of Miami condemned the entire structure which precluded salvage of most of the contents.

In response to the disaster, DEA approached the Congressional Appropriations Committee with a request to adjust its FY 75 appropriations level to recover the one-time costs incurred in Miami. The Committee advised DEA that it was more appropriate to forward a supplemental request to OMB; consequently, in September, 1974, the Department forwarded a \$2,517,000 supplemental to OMB for relocation operations, establishment of permanent facilities, replacement of equipment, and travel/overtime. The request was denied in its entirety by OMB on the assumption that the costs could be recovered in FY 76. The Department, therefore, chose to grant \$1,247,000 of the Miami supplemental request as part of the FY 76 budget request to OMB. This figure allows for temporary relocation of the regional office and laboratory, replacement of equipment and vehicles, and temporary duty/travel. The remainder was not allowed for FY 76 but will be included in the Departmental FY 77 budget request.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Symington.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For Mr. Bartels, on page 4 you mention the Americans arrested in Mexico on September 11. Are all those cases being processed now? It is pretty early to dispose of them. Do you know what the procedure is that is going on there?

Mr. BARTELS. They were all processed. They were all arrested on indictments so they have all been indicted. In some cases I understand there has been an indication of pleas of guilty. None have come to trial. The others are in the motion procedure.

Mr. SYMINGTON. On these illicit amphetamines, we had hearings a couple years ago, in which we learned that these were produced by legitimate producers of amphetamines and they had gone into the illicit traffic. How come this is still going on? I thought we took care of that.

Mr. BARTELS. What is happening, sir, is that the amphetamine is directly produced overseas, especially in Europe, and it is then shipped to illegitimate or illicit people largely in Mexico and there tableted into mini-bennies and smuggled across the country. We believe the Psychotropic Treaty would be helpful, our ratification of that, in imposing the same sort of bans on those European countries about which you speak.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Right.

For Dr. DuPont, you mention on page 11 that one in seven Americans has used marihuana. What do you mean by used—puffed on a cigarette or really engaged in it for a period of time?

Dr. DUPONT. Let me give you just the roughest kinds of figures about that. In the surveys which have been done, the question is asked, "Have you ever used marihuana?" One in seven Americans over the age of 12 answers that "yes." At some point they have used marihuana.

Mr. SYMINGTON. That is adults?

Dr. DUPONT. That is over 12. Let me just go on with that if I could. About half of those people are continuing use and the other half say they are not now using it at all. Of those who report continuing use, about 20 percent report regular use, that is, several times a week or more. So we are talking about a range of 2 percent of the American adult population that reports regular, active marihuana use.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Two percent. All right.

Now for Mr. Ernst. You discuss on page 12 of your testimony the Golden Triangle refineries and you place considerable emphasis on the problem from that quarter. You point out that the year was 1970 when heroin so processed became widely available to U.S. troops in Vietnam. I think that was the year in which an article appeared in the Egyptian press by the editor, Mr. Haikel pointing out a conversation between Nasser and Chou, I believe, in which Chou said, "We welcome the Americans to Vietnam because that is where they can find heroin and take it home with them."

I mentioned this to Mr. Ingersoll at the time and he assured me that Red China, that has contiguous borders, was in no way involved in the traffic or in the encouragement or assistance to the traffic. Would that be your assessment?

Mr. ERNST. Yes, my assessment is as you received it from Mr. Ingersoll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There is no change there?

Mr. ERNST. No change there.

Mr. SYMINGTON. All right.

Again, Mr. Ernst, on page 5 you indicate that \$42.5 million is requested for international control funds. Do your attachments give us a breakdown of how this money is allocated? Does any go to Turkey at the moment or is that cut?

Mr. ERNST. Sir, do you have attached to your copy of my statement a copy of these tables?

Mr. SYMINGTON. You have that breakdown there?

Mr. ERNST. Yes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If so, maybe we will go on to something else.

Mr. ERNST. I might just say that the big programs are Mexico, Burma, and Thailand both for the fiscal year 1974 and estimated for the fiscal year 1975. These tables which I have presented give the breakdown both by country involved and also by types of equipment and function; by that I mean whether it is going into enforcement or going into agriculture to get at the supply side through a cutting back in growing.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me now ask you about a December 1973 GAO report entitled "Difficulties in Immobilizing Major Narcotic Traffickers" which indicated that Mexico had refused to extradite individuals and that Mexican laws have not been effective in ending trafficking from that country. That seems to be a different assessment than the one you have given us concerning the cooperation with Mexico. Are you pleased with the cooperation received? Is there anything else we can do?

Mr. ERNST. I think I might say something, and Mr. Bartels might also say something on this point if you permit, and that is that there is cooperation and yet there is substantial trafficking at the same time because of the magnitude of the problem.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, do you think the cooperation is sufficient? From the point of view of our Government, are they doing everything that they can do?

Mr. ERNST. The cooperation is growing, the recognition of the problem by the Mexican authorities is a keen recognition. Our resources that they are using, according to our assessments, are being applied effectively. However, the fact remains that the economics of this business is such that with the profits to be had by the traffickers there is an ever-growing enemy—

Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me read you a paragraph from this GAO report. It says on page 24—Are you familiar with this report?

Mr. ERNST. I am not, sir.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think you should become familiar with it. This is the part which inhibits undercover work. It reads: "Mexican Laws: Under the law there a buyer of illicit drugs, even if he is an undercover agent, is as guilty as a seller and therefore he must arrange for the Mexican authorities to arrest the trafficker prior to the exchange of the drugs because he cannot make buys and the undercover agency has difficulty making known the organizations."

That seems to be the problem in their law. Now perhaps it is a defensible approach, but is that something you would be consulting with them about and trying to work out improvements there?

Mr. BARTELS. If I may, that is a problem with their laws. It is a problem with every civil law country based on the Napoleonic Code with which we deal. It is avoided in a number of ways. There are other problems that are more advantageous to narcotics addicts and we just have to operate within their laws.

The key to the question that you asked is that I am convinced that they are giving total cooperation to the extent they can and I think that is the key to it. This stuff is grown in some of the most beautiful and barren country of the Sierra Madre that runs from Acapulco right on up to north of Los Mochis and the mountains there are 10,000 to 12,000 feet. There are no roads and there is very little you can do without a helicopter.

Mr. SYMINGTON. To the extent they can under their law.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. Who is the No. 1 heroin purchaser? Are we? Is there more sold in this Nation than in any other country?

Mr. BARTELS. I say Iran and the United States.

Mr. ROGERS. Of the two, who would rank first?

Mr. BARTELS. I believe at this point Iran would but it is very close.

Mr. ROGERS. Between the two?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to follow up on Mr. Rogers' question, you talk about licit or illicit heroin.

Mr. BARTELS. I was talking about illicit.

Mr. HASTINGS. There is not a question on licit, of course.

Mr. BARTELS. No.

Mr. HASTINGS. Dr. DuPont, I would like to ask a question. The New York City figures, you gave 60,000 and you estimate now heroin users in the city of New York down from 200,000 a couple years ago.

Dr. DuPONT. Yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. You say that if it is not increasing, at least it is now stabilized, or are you saying it is increasing in number?

Dr. DuPONT. There are some indications from New York that the problem is increasing, and that is one of the two cities where we had the most strongly established, consistent downward trend over the last 18 months.

Mr. HASTINGS. In the treatment centers you say we have 2,000 programs throughout the country. How many of those would be methadone?

Dr. DuPONT. About 700.

Mr. HASTINGS. 700.

Dr. DuPONT. Yes, sir. About half of all the opiate patients in treatment in the country are being treated with methadone and about half are in drug-free programs.

Mr. HASTINGS. Are they mostly detox programs? What is the percentage breakdown?

Dr. DuPONT. In terms of the slots there are about 70,000 maintenance slots and about 5,000 or 10,000 detoxification slots. But a maintenance slot is one person for a prolonged period of time while in

detox patients turn over every 3 weeks. In general the number of patients served is probably greater in a year through the detox programs than in the maintenance programs.

Mr. HASTINGS. Is there much maintenance in perpetuity?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes, there is some, but the primary advantage with methadone is that the patients in treatment retain their interest in coming off methadone. All over the country the number of people who stay on methadone for a year at a time is much smaller than would be expected. For example, in the District of Columbia, of the 12,000 people who were treated with methadone less than 1,500 are still taking it now.

Mr. HASTINGS. These people are the ones that we would aim at with an antagonist.

On the question that the chairman asked, who was providing this research? Is it federally funded?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes, sir; it is the Federal Government.

Mr. HASTINGS. How about private industry pharmaceuticals?

Dr. DuPONT. They have been very eagerly cooperating with us, and this committee has been helpful in bringing us together.

Mr. HASTINGS. I don't know what that cooperation is. You say it is substantial?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes. It involves identifying the agents and doing pre-clinical testing in Federal facilities. We have used the Lexington facility, for example, as well as Federal grantees to test a wide variety of substances developed by the pharmaceutical industry and we now have, as a result of that effort, a very promising drug which has the characteristics we were looking for. It is nontoxic, it does not have any side effects that we know of, it lasts for a day, it can be taken orally. It looks like a very good drug.

Mr. HASTINGS. Are you finding much diversion of methadone?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes. That is particularly a problem in New York City. Elsewhere in the country the problem is substantially reduced and the indicators are down throughout the country generally.

Mr. HASTINGS. Do you have any figures on New York City methadone diversion?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes. I don't have them with me but I can submit them for the record. [See "Methadone Data" below.]

Mr. HASTINGS. I understand they are fairly substantial; is that correct?

Dr. DuPONT. Yes, sir, they are.

Mr. ROGERS. I think I saw figures showing that there were more methadone deaths—almost twice as many in New York, the latest figures I saw—as deaths from heroin.

Dr. DuPONT. That is the case. I think that the ratio does not accurately reflect the situation, however, since part of the reason for the biggest change has been the dramatic reduction of heroin deaths.

We will supply those numbers for the record.

One problem we have in New York City is that the overdose data is available only through calendar year 1973. They have had some trouble getting current data for the Medical Examiner's Office which makes it difficult to chart trends.

Mr. HASTINGS. Will you submit the figures you have?

Dr. DuPONT. Absolutely.

[Testimony resumes on p. 62]

[The following information was submitted for the record by the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention:]

NARCOTICS OVERDOSE DEATH: METHADONE AND HEROIN

Recent articles in the *New York Times* (8/16/74) and *The National Observer* (9/21/74) have dealt with methadone overdose deaths in New York City. (These articles are included as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.¹) Both articles stated that the total number of 1973 narcotism deaths (745) was lower than the 1972 number (924); and both articles noted that the number of "Toxicologically confirmed narcotism deaths due to methadone" was over twice as large in the last half of 1973 (131) as in the first half (50).

The references to these data were made in different ways: New York City Chief Medical Examiner's release called the 181 deaths "Narcotism deaths due to methadone, toxicologically confirmed."

The *New York Times* article referred in one place to "methadone poisoning" and in another to "methadone fatalities." Other terms used synonymously were:

"deaths directly attributable to narcotics"

"narcotics-related deaths"

"methadone deaths"

"deaths directly attributable to methadone poisoning"

"definite methadone deaths"

"toxicologically confirmed methadone deaths"

The *National Observer* article had a similar list of terms:

"methadone-related deaths"

"... a person dies of methadone"

"directly attributed to methadone"

"methadone ... listed ... as the principle cause of death ..."

"overdose"

"methadone deaths"

"... methadone accounted for ... deaths"

"... which drugs are killing people"

A first conclusion one might reach is that we have a certain number of events (deaths) described by a variety of terms which raises questions about the precision of the cause-of-death determining process, the classification of causes of death, the language describing causes of death, or all three.

For example, it is well known that cause of death data are difficult to handle at best. For an individual it is not too hard, if the facts are known, to establish what was wrong with the person and what series of conditions and events led to his or her death. The whole matter of principle or contributory cause, pre-existing conditions, and which condition or event led to what outcome has always been a problem, especially when classifying numbers of deaths into categories.

The matter becomes even less clear if one considers synergistic effects of more than one drug and adverse effects of adulterants used to dilute drugs.

To help straighten out these many interacting factors, the National Institute on Drug Abuse is funding two projects. The first is an effort by University of California researchers to develop a "model reporting system of drug deaths" and is being built on the statistics being collected from coroners or medical examiners in nine large U.S. cities. The other project is being carried out by the New York Medical Examiner's Office and consists of conducting thorough investigations into the causes and circumstances of each "methadone-related death" identified by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. The plan is to find ways of preventing such deaths in the future.

Another interpretation problem arises in the New York City Medical Examiner's Office Report—namely that a potentially significant definition change was made between the first and second halves of the year: "One important revision occurred between the first and second periods (First and second halves of the year 1973). In an effort to accurately assess and reflect non-narcotic substances as they are relevant to the cause of death in these cases (deaths), alcohol was not considered to be a contributory agent in these cases unless chemical analysis indicated at least a 0.10g% level of blood alcohol. For the first half of the year, alcohol was considered in classifying such cases, regardless of the level indicated."

¹ Appendix not printed.

This change in definition if built into the table of data such that some part of the increase in "Methadone only" cases (50 to 131 or an increase of 81 cases) is certainly attributable to nothing more than the definition change. Since no first half-second half year comparisons were given in the report where the alcohol definition remained constant (either definition would do), it is not possible even to estimate the effect of changing the definition at midyear. It is not evident from the data, the report or the newspaper articles based on the report, that the dramatic increase may not be as large as it appears. Indeed, the possibility is not ruled out that the increase may not be real at all.

The above discussion has attended to serious definitional problems which, alone, cast serious doubt on the interpretability of the data.

In regard to methadone in New York City, the first question to ask is how many people are using methadone as part of their treatment since the suspicion is that New York, the city in question, has more than its expected share of methadone attributed deaths. The National Institute on Drug Abuse has published a report entitled "Universe II and III Comparative Presentation, August 20, 1974." The purpose of this report was the establishment of the numbers of patients in treatment by city and state. While 30% of the reporting was incomplete, the remaining 70% may be taken as indicative. Table I provides case load data for New York City and for the total United States. New York City has 30% of the patients in the whole country. Also, New York, unlike the rest of the country, has nearly three quarters of its case load in maintenance programs. In fact, half of the nation's maintenance patients are in New York City programs. Thus, whatever the relationship between maintenance programs, maintenance patients, and events with which methadone is associated, it would not be surprising to find half of "it" in New York.

The next obvious question is whether the people in trouble with methadone are patients in maintenance or other treatment programs. In the newspaper articles the points are made that:

"Fewer than a quarter of this city's addicts are on maintenance programs . . . yet somehow these deaths are supposed to show the 'failure' of the maintenance concept." (*National Observer*.)

"... of the 181 deaths attributed directly to methadone last year, only 10 were of persons enrolled in methadone treatment programs." (*New York Times*).

"... a total of 83 persons enrolled in methadone treatment programs were among the 745 persons whose deaths were listed as narcotics-related." (*New York Times*.)

From another source, a similar relationship is found. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) is a jointly sponsored data-collecting project of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Facilities reporting into the system are emergency rooms of general hospitals, inpatient units, crisis centers, and medical examiners from selected Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) in the United States. Drug emergencies at the participating facilities are reported as "episodes" and the involved drugs are reported as "mentions." Thus, for one episode there may be several drug mentions (up to six) but the average number over all facility types is 1.3 mentions per episode.

While one individual could conceivably experience more than one episode in an emergency room, inpatient unit, or crisis center, a medical examiner episode happens only once (since the individual dies). The drugs associated with the deaths are then reported as mentions and are tabulated as such in the DAWN reports. If all the methadone mentions by medical examiners for a given period were selected, the number would correspond directly with the number of episodes (deaths) since methadone would be mentioned only once per episode even if other drugs were also mentioned. The cause of the death is given as "overdose" or "drug was contributory factor but not sole cause." In the first case, "overdose," if methadone is mentioned alone, the "overdose" is attributed to that drug. However, if other drugs are mentioned in combination, the "overdose" drug becomes quite unclear.

For all methadone mentions from all facilities in the DAWN system from July 1973-July 1974 the program enrollment was distributed as shown in Table 2. For medical examiners only 7 percent of the mentions were reported to be in treatment programs and virtually all of them were in detoxification/maintenance. This statistic is consistent with the newspaper statements and the New York City Medical Examiner's Office Report. However, note that the DAWN data cover a different period of time (July 1973-July 1974) than that covered by the New York City Medical Examiner's Office Report (January 1973-December

1973). Also, the latter report covers New York City only while the DAWN data cover the entire New York City Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (New York City plus surrounding counties).

The DAWN cause-of-death data for the New York SMSA are generally consistent with the data from the New York City Chief Medical Examiner's Office. Table 3 indicates that about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total narcotics "overdose" deaths were cases where methadone was used alone ($124/529=23\%$). For all cases where methadone was mentioned and "overdose" was reported the proportion was about $\frac{1}{4}$ ($394/539=74\%$). These data are consistent with the New York City Medical Examiner's Office data given in Appendix 3. For methadone only, the proportion is given by $181/745=24\%$, while for all narcotism deaths where methadone was mentioned the proportion is given by $(181+196+145+60)/745=78\%$.

For some of the DAWN medical examiner reported deaths, more than one drug was mentioned. In the case of New York City about 30 percent of the methadone mentions occurred alone; thus 70 percent occurred along with some other drug(s). The comparable figures from the New York Medical Examiner's Office data are 24 percent used alone and 76 percent used in combination.

The comparison of methadone with heroin in New York and for other cities is another part of the perspective. Figure 1 shows a time series of the medical examiner mentions for each drug for the New York SMSA and for all other SMSA's in the DAWN system. The methadone/heroin reversal is quite evident and has been so for the last year. Table 4 presents heroin and methadone medical examiner mentions for each SMSA in the DAWN system. Clearly, New York is different from the other SMSA's in the system not only because of the methadone/heroin reversal but also because of the fact that of all the 1,015 methadone mentions in all DAWN SMSA's, 926 (91%) of them occurred in the New York SMSA.

Medical examiners are only one data source and a legitimate further question is obvious: Does methadone show up as a mention to any great extent in facilities other than the medical examiners? DAWN emergency room data on methadone and heroin mentions are presented in Figure 2 for the New York SMSA and for all other SMSA's combined. Heroin, methadone and all narcotics mentions for New York have shown either level or slightly decreasing trends over the past year. In all other SMSA's combined the trend for heroin and all narcotics was noticeably upward and slightly upward for methadone. These data give support to the idea that some significant drug emergency trends in New York are downward, a contrary indication to some of the medical examiner data.

To illustrate the composition of the all narcotics category shown in Figure 2, another body of DAWN data is presented in Figure 3. The emergency rooms in the 29 DAWN SMSA's in combination with an additional sample of emergency rooms in other cities permit national projections of emergency room mentions. Heroin and methadone clearly have greater numbers of mentions than the other narcotic categories. In addition, the noticeable upward heroin trend from Figure 2 does not seem to appear in Figure 3 or perhaps the trend is obscured by the large variation in the number of heroin mentions. The categories other than heroin and methadone do not show any trends at all, either up or down.

Table 2 shows the percentages of methadone mentions for emergency rooms by treatment enrollment. The proportion reported to be in treatment was very much higher for the two hospital type facilities (about $\frac{3}{4}$) than for the medical examiners (7%). The crisis centers reported a figure midway between (about $\frac{1}{2}$).

Figure 4 shows emergency room comparisons for New York and other SMSA's of the percentage of narcotic mentions used alone (not in combination with other drugs). The most striking feature of this graph is the much higher percentage of methadone mentions used alone for New York (72%) compared to all other SMSA's (44%).

Crisis centers also report to DAWN and Figure 5 reveals that the New York City crisis centers reporting to DAWN had very few narcotic mentions of any kind while crisis centers in DAWN SMSA's other than New York showed very few methadone mentions.

Having reviewed all these data, we are confronted with several facts, observations, or reported findings:

1. The number of narcotism deaths in New York City declines from 1972 to 1973 (New York City Medical Examiner's Office Report).
2. The number of "Toxicologically confirmed narcotism deaths due to methadone" doubled during the last half of 1973 when compared to the first half (New York City Medical Examiner's Office Report).
3. New York City has nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ of all patients in all kinds of drug treatment for the whole country (Universe III).

4. Half of the methadone patients in the United States are in New York maintenance programs (Universe III).

5. Seven percent (DAWN), 7.6% (*New York Times*), and up to "Fewer than a quarter . . ." (*National Observer*) of the narcotism deaths in New York City occurred to patients in treatment programs (*New York Times*, *National Observer*, DAWN).

6. For overdose deaths due to narcotics (DAWN) or due to narcotism (New York City Medical Examiner's Office) methadone only was mentioned in about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cases and methadone only or in combination with other drug(s) was mentioned in about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cases.

7. For 24 percent (New York Medical Examiner's Office Report) or 30 percent (DAWN) of the deaths where methadone was mentioned, methadone was mentioned alone.

8. In New York City methadone and heroin are reversed in order of prominence for medical examiner and other DAWN facility data (DAWN).

9. New York City trends are level or slightly downward for methadone, heroin, and all narcotics; the total for all other DAWN SMSA's combined shows noticeably increasing trends for heroin and all narcotics and a slightly increasing trend for methadone (DAWN).

10. Narcotics other than heroin and methadone showed no increasing or decreasing trends (DAWN).

11. In New York City people seen in emergency rooms and hospital inpatient units are more likely to be patients in treatment programs (67% and 70% of all methadone mentions) than people seen in crisis centers (36%) or as deaths reported by medical examiners (7%) (DAWN).

12. Emergency room DAWN data indicate that in New York City 72 percent of the methadone mentions were reported as methadone used alone. The rest of the SMSA's in DAWN showed 44 percent as the comparable figure (DAWN).

13. New York City crisis centers reporting to DAWN reflected very few narcotics mentions of any kind (DAWN).

If one were presented with the above 13 statements to be used as "indicators" of the "methadone situation" in New York City, a commonly made assessment might turn out as follows:

	Statement Number
"Methadone Situation" is becoming—	
Worse.....	2, 6, 8, 12
Better.....	1, 9, 10, 13
Either (depending on argument).....	5, 7, 11
Statement does not apply.....	3, 4

In conclusion, what the data show is that the problem of methadone overdoses is much more complex than some of the reports have indicated. Furthermore, it is impossible to separate the issue of illicit methadone abuse from that of heroin abuse. As the DAWN data indicate, only in New York does the number of methadone mentions exceed the number of heroin mentions. With a reduction in the supply in heroin in New York there was a concomitant decrease in the number of narcotism deaths from 1972 to 1973. However, this reduction in supply may have increased the demand for illicit methadone, which possibly accounted for the apparent increase in methadone overdose deaths. What the situation points out is that the issue of what constitutes an overdose death requires further clarification and analysis. This we are attempting to do with the studies set forth above. In addition, NIDA is presently funding a study with Fordham University to examine the issue of methadone diversion and to determine the sources and causes of such diversion.

TABLE 1.—UNIVERSE III CENSUS DATA (COMPLETE REPORTING ONLY)

(Numbers of patients in treatment in Federal and other programs)

Type of treatment	New York City		Total United States		New York City as percent of total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Maintenance.....	35,235	73	68,733	44	51.3
Detoxification.....	353	1	3,696	2	9.6
Drug free.....	12,374	26	83,039	54	14.9
Total.....	47,980	100	155,468	100	30.9

TABLE 2.—NEW YORK CITY OAWN METHADONE MENTIONS FACILITY TYPE BY TREATMENT ENROLLMENT, JULY 1973–JULY 1974

Facility type	Total mentions	Enrolled in treatment				Not enrolled	Unknown
		Total	Oetox/ mainte- nence	Other/ unspecified			
Total.....	3,223	1,534	1,477	57	1,174		515
Emergency rooms.....	1,450	966	922	44	226		258
Medical examiners.....	1,014	75	73	2	761		178
Inpatient units.....	655	456	449	7	131		68
Crisis centers.....	104	37	33	4	56		11

PERCENT OF TOTAL

Total.....	100	48	(46)	(2)	36		16
Emergency rooms.....	100	67	(64)	(3)	15		18
Medical examiners.....	100	7	(7)	(0)	75		18
Inpatient units.....	100	70	(69)	(1)	20		10
Crisis centers.....	100	36	(32)	(4)	54		10

TABLE 3.—DAWN MEDICAL EXAMINERS, JULY 1973 TO APRIL 1974—METHADONE, HEROIN, AND ALL NARCOTIC DEATHS

Time period	Total narcotics	Methadone			Heroin			Other
		Total	Alone	Combination	Total	Alone	Combination	
July–September 1973.....	127	81	34	47	45	4	41	1
Overdose.....	60	38	15	23	22	3	19	
Other.....	67	43	19	24	23	1	22	1
October–December 1973.....	246	178	67	111	65	1	64	3
Overdose.....	159	117	44	73	40	1	39	2
Other.....	87	61	23	38	25		25	1
January–March 1974.....	215	163	46	117	51	2	49	1
Overdose.....	151	119	37	82	32	1	31	
Other.....	64	44	9	35	19	1	18	1
April–June 1974.....	219	164	35	129	53	4	49	2
Overdose.....	159	120	28	92	37	1	36	2
Other.....	60	44	7	37	16	3	13	
Methadone overdose summary:								
1st 6 mo.....	219	155	59	96				
2d 6 mo.....	310	239	65	174				
Total.....	529	394	124	270				

DAWN MENTIONS MEDICAL EXAMINERS JULY 1973 - APRIL 1974

FIGURE 1.




TABLE 4.—DAWN MEDICAL EXAMINER MENTIONS, JULY 1973-JUNE 1974

	Heroin	Methadone
Boston.....	9	1
New York.....	299	926
Philadelphia.....	10	11
Pittsburgh.....	11	1
Washington, D.C.....	10	6
Miami.....	17	4
Atlanta.....	2	—
Detroit.....	112	26
Cleveland.....	6	4
Toledo.....	5	—
Chicago.....	133	6
Indianapolis.....	—	—
New Orleans.....	20	1
Little Rock.....	4	—
Kansas City.....	1	—
Omaha.....	2	—
Minneapolis.....	4	2
Houston.....	7	2
Oklahoma City.....	3	—
Denver.....	6	6
Albuquerque.....	11	2
Seattle.....	—	1
Los Angeles.....	454	2
San Francisco.....	108	4
Buffalo.....	1	—
Dallas.....	12	6
Phoenix.....	31	—
Raleigh.....	1	—
San Antonio.....	16	—
Total.....	1,295	1,015

Figure 2.

DAWN MENTIONS

EMERGENCY ROOMS

JULY 1973 - APRIL 1974

NUMBER

NUMBER OF MENTIONS




Figure 3

DAWN MENTIONS (ALL NARCOTICS)


EMERGENCY ROOM NATIONAL PROJECTIONS
JULY 1973 - JUNE 1974

Figure 4

DAVIN MENTIONS

EMERGENCY ROOMS

JULY 1973 - APRIL 1979





Figure 5

DAWN MENTIONS

CRISIS CENTERS

JULY 1973 - APRIL 1974

NUMBER OF MENTIONS



[The following information was submitted for the record by the Drug Enforcement Administration:]

NARCOTIC RELATED AND METHADONE DEATHS IN NEW YORK CITY

Statistics on methadone-related deaths are unavailable prior to the fourth quarter of CY 1972 when the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) became operative. This system reports deaths by category for twenty-four demographically representative Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas nationwide.

The chart below reflects both methadone deaths and total narcotic deaths reported by this system to date for New York City and the Nation. It should be noted that this data is only considered accurate to within a five-percent tolerance, since there is an occasional lag of thirty to ninety days between the actual occurrence of death and its being reported to DAWN.

	Total narcotic related deaths	Methadone deaths
4th quarter, calendar year 1972:		
New York City.....	117	10
National.....	348	41
Calendar year 1973:		
New York City.....	857	489
National.....	1,771	567
1st quarter, calendar year 1974:		
New York City.....	307	234
National.....	608	252

METHADONE: A REVIEW OF CURRENT INFORMATION

Statistical and Data Services Division, Office of Administration and Management—December 1973

AMENDMENT

The attached report, "Methadone: A Review of Current Information", was written in December, 1973. At that time all narcotic deaths reported through the DAWN system were placed in one of three categories: heroin, methadone, or other narcotics. The other narcotics category included morphine deaths. It was later determined, however, that morphine deaths should be placed under the heroin category since heroin converts to morphine after entering the body. This determination alters those statistics and statements in the study in which comparisons between heroin and methadone deaths are drawn. Specifically affected are Sections I, and to a lesser extent, Section V.

In order to clarify and update the death data in this report, the following chart provides corrected and re-defined death data beginning in October 1972.

DRUG RELATED DEATHS

[DAWN-24 cities]

	October- December 1972	January- March 1973	April- June 1973	July- September 1973	October- December 1973	January- March 1974
Heroin/Morphine.....	296	265	223	306	348	336
Methadone.....	41	69	81	168	249	252
Other narcotics.....	11	13	9	12	28	20
Barbiturates.....	260	330	271	296	271	298
Other depressants.....	90	81	101	98	117	132
Stimulants.....	11	15	18	31	19	24
Cannabis.....	1	1	0	2	0	3
Hallucinogens.....	1	2	2	2	1	3
Other.....	15	13	26	6	31	25
Total.....	726	789	731	921	1,064	1,093

It should be noted, however, that the basic conclusions of this report are not altered. In fact, the rising increases in methadone deaths, which were first identified in this report, have become more significant since the paper was written.

SUMMARY

According to the data available to DEA, licit preparations were the primary cause of drug related deaths in the U.S., with barbiturates the most predominant drug, being found in 38% of all drug related deaths. Within the nine month reporting period, however, methadone deaths showed the most rapid rate of increase of any substance, and in the final quarter of the reporting period methadone was found in one of every nine drug related deaths.

This report is a consolidation of information and statistics on methadone. It is divided into five sections which cover several major items concerning methadone abuse and addiction, the relationship of methadone to other drug abuse trends, and DEA's activity against methadone trafficking. Essentially the reports reveals or implies the following:

A. Methadone abuse is rapidly rising. Increasing methadone deaths, declining heroin deaths, and a 5-1 predominance of methadone to heroin deaths in the last six months suggest that methadone is partially replacing heroin as a drug of abuse in certain areas of the U.S.

B. Methadone addicts are not necessarily *rehabilitated* heroin addicts. A limited study of heroin and methadone addicts indicates that methadone addicts are equally prone to arrest, are more prone to commit property crime or crimes of assault, and are usually unemployed; almost half of those arrested obtained methadone outside of treatment programs.

C. By the last quarter of the reporting period, the combined total of drugs acting alone did not cause as many deaths as poly-drug use, which accounted for 54% of all deaths reported from April through June 1973. This suggests that poly-drug abuse may have become the major drug problem in the U.S. Proportionately, methadone had the highest percentage of poly-drug deaths (66% of methadone deaths reported in the final quarter) with barbiturates second (62%).

D. The limited number of DEA methadone criminal cases, and the fact that the cases rarely involved significant quantities of methadone indicates that DEA has not defined the scope of the methadone trafficking problem.

The above items rising from the study put into perspective several types of methadone data. Perhaps of greater importance, they raise several pointed questions.

1. How effectively has the methadone "strategy" worked to reduce drug addiction, and move addicts off the street and into jobs?
2. Has methadone helped to reduce drug related crime?
3. Who is trafficking methadone and in what amounts?
4. Is there such a thing as poly-drug trafficking? If so, what is the structure?
5. What techniques would be effective in curbing poly-drug trafficking and abuse?

I. METHADONE DEATHS AND INJURIES

A review of DAWN death and injury data provides one of the most revealing statistics concerning abuse of methadone both when viewed alone and when seen in relationship with heroin abuse.

A. Deaths

The following chart indicates the rise in methadone deaths over a nine month period and demonstrates additionally that methadone deaths have surpassed heroin deaths in the last six months.

DEATHS¹

	October- December 1972	January- March 1973	April-June 1973	Total
Methadone.....	41	69	80	190
Heroin.....	51	15	14	80

¹ Includes categories of drugs used alone and drugs used in combination with drugs.

It is noteworthy here that there have been twice as many methadone deaths as heroin deaths over the nine month period. More important, methadone deaths have exceeded heroin deaths by a ratio of about 5 to 1 in the last six months. It is also significant that methadone deaths have doubled from the first quarter to the third.

Geographic distribution.—The majority of heroin and methadone deaths (65%) occurred in the Northeast region of the U.S., while "other narcotics" deaths were predominant in three regions.

DEATHS

	Heroin	Methadone	Other narcotics
Northeast.....	41	135	281
South.....	9	27	21
Central.....	9	18	139
Northwest.....	1	0	1
West.....	20	10	307
National total.....	80	190	749

Eighty-four percent of the methadone deaths in the Northeast were reported in New York City, indicating that where methadone programs operate on a large scale basis, methadone is readily available and heavily abused, contributing substantially to the overall drug problem. This is further supported by an examination of all drug deaths in two cities (New York and Washington, D.C.) with long standing methadone treatment programs.

DEATHS.—OCTOBER 1972-JUNE 1973

[Percent]

	Heroin	Methadone	Other narcotics	Depressants	Other
New York.....	8	26	60	6	4
Washington, D.C.....	4	29	10	45	12

More deaths were recorded in the methadone category in Washington, D.C. than in any other category. In New York methadone was second only to "other narcotics." However, in the last quarter of the reporting period methadone deaths exceeded other narcotic deaths in New York. Nonetheless, "other narcotics" accounted for over 73% of all reported deaths in the U.S. during the nine month time period suggesting that the predominant cause of narcotic deaths in most areas of the country is most likely to be one of the more potent licit opiate preparations.

B. Injuries

The following chart is a list of injuries reported for heroin and methadone.

	October- December 1972	January- March 1973	April- June 1973	July- September 1973	Total
Northeast:					
Heroin.....	414	492	513	400	1,819
Methadone.....	236	279	336	363	1,214
South:					
Heroin.....	87	42	70	76	275
Methadone.....	38	57	60	57	212
Central:					
Heroin.....	192	130	116	93	531
Methadone.....	41	41	36	10	128
Northwest:					
Heroin.....	1	0	0	0	1
Methadone.....	0	0	0	0	0
West:					
Heroin.....	76	61	53	41	231
Methadone.....	6	3	4	2	15
National total:					
Heroin.....	770	725	752	610	2,857
Methadone.....	321	380	436	432	2,569

Methadone injuries have increased steadily over the last four quarters in the Northeast area of the nation and, like deaths, the majority of all methadone and heroin injuries were predominantly reported in New York, accounting for 26% of all drug injuries in that city. Heroin injuries declined nationally during the time period but still consistently exceeded the number of reported methadone injuries.

Conclusion

It is apparent that methadone abuse has increased significantly over the past nine months with methadone deaths reported to DAWN increasing substantially each quarter. The rise in methadone deaths coupled with a decrease in heroin deaths suggests that methadone is partially replacing heroin as a drug of abuse, especially where methadone maintenance is readily available to addicts. However, the predominance of "other narcotics" deaths over heroin and methadone categories and the fact that heroin injuries still exceed methadone injuries preclude the assumption that heroin is no longer a serious problem. Rather, it supports the theory that all narcotic abuse remains a serious problem and that methadone has become one of the more predominant drugs in this established pattern of abuse.

II. REPORTED ADDICT DATA

A brief statistical analysis of addict arrest sheets suggests several disturbing points concerning the effectiveness of methadone programs.

Addict reports¹: City police arrest sheets

Crime committed.—The statistics below indicate that almost half of those addicted to heroin were involved in drug related crime with only one-third involved in property crimes or assaults. By contrast, 51% of methadone arrests were for property crimes or assault and only 17% for drug crimes. This would suggest that methadone does not necessarily alter the socio-economic crime related syndrome or, in fact, lower the crime rate.

CRIME COMMITTED BY ADDICTS, RELATIONSHIP OF DRUG CRIME TO PROPERTY CRIME OR ASSAULT

	Charges (percent)					
	Total arrests		Possession/sale		Robbery/burglary/assault	
	Heroin	Methadone	Heroin	Methadone	Heroin	Methadone
New York, N.Y.....	779	815	28	15	51	53
Chicago, Ill.....	360	24	62	25	17	30
Detroit, Mich.....	233	16	82	100	4	0
Total ¹	1,372	855	46	17	33	51

¹ All total percentages are computed from total arrest figures and are weighted proportionately to each city's actual arrests.

The above statistics also show that in New York City, where there is an extensive methadone program, there were more methadone addicts arrested for various crimes than heroin addicts.

Employment.—Although employment was slightly higher among methadone addicts, it is more significant that a total of 70% of methadone addicts were unemployed and that there was little difference between the employment rates of heroin addicts and those addicted to methadone. In short, it appears that both heroin addicts and methadone addicts depended equally on either crime or welfare programs for income, and that methadone maintenance does not necessarily insure that heroin addict will become contributing members of society when they enter methadone maintenance.

EMPLOYMENT

(In percent)

	Currently employed		Currently unemployed	
	Heroin	Methadone	Heroin	Methadone
New York, N.Y.....	21	29	79	71
Chicago, Ill.....	30	58	70	42
Detroit, Mich.....	34	50	66	50
Total.....	26	30	74	70

Addicts in treatment.—Finally, it is significant to note that only 54% of the methadone addicts arrested were in methadone maintenance programs, as indicated below.

METHADONE ADDICTS IN TREATMENT, NUMBER AND (PERCENT) OF THOSE ARRESTED

	Methadone treatment	Other treatment	No treatment
New York, N.Y.....	441(54)	5(.6)	369(45)
Chicago, Ill.....	16(67)	5(21)	3(12)
Detroit, Mich.....	8(50)	0	8(50)
Total.....	465(54)	10(1)	380(44)

¹ Data from New York drawn from arrest sheets submitted for July and August, 1973. Data from Chicago and Detroit drawn from arrest sheets submitted for July, August, and September, 1973.

Whether or not methadone addicts *in treatment* are more prone to property crime or drug crime could not be determined at this time; this may be subject for further study. The major point to be made from the above table is that a substantial 44% of the methadone addicts arrested may have been obtaining their drugs not from maintenance programs, but from unknown or illicit sources.

Conclusion

Although the data is quite limited, the statistics concerning addict arrestees bring into question the theory that methadone maintenance rehabilitates heroin addicts, takes them out of the crime syndrome, and gives them incentive to contribute to society via employment. Also, the data on addicts not in treatment suggests that methadone maintenance programs have had the side effect of making methadone more available as an illicit drug of choice.

III. METHADONE THEFTS

Thefts from pharmacies and other licit handlers of controlled substances account for a substantial portion of the illicit supply of synthetic narcotics found in the "street" traffic. The volume of methadone stolen from retail pharmacies has decreased dramatically, as indicated below.

THEFTS OF METHADONE

[Osege units]

	Pharmacies	Other	Total
Calendar year— 1972:			
1st quarter.....	201, 887	12, 955	214, 842
2d quarter.....	1, 010, 770	204, 981	1, 415, 751
3d quarter.....	75, 283	149, 954	225, 237
4th quarter.....	184, 818	93, 973	278, 791
Total.....	1, 472, 758	461, 863	1, 934, 621
Calendar year— 1973:			
1st quarter.....	106, 602	559, 927	666, 529
2d quarter.....	65, 604	19, 754	85, 358
3d quarter.....	14, 1827	22, 329	164, 156
4th quarter.....			
Total.....	314, 033	602, 010	916, 043

A number of factors account for this decline in the volume of methadone stolen. During the Calendar Year 1973, total drug thefts averaged 8.6 million dosage units per quarter, as compared to 15.0 million per quarter in CY 72. In spite of this fact, the total number of thefts have increased from 1,300 per quarter in CY 72 to 1,700 per quarter in FY 73. It must be surmised that security measures have improved considerably on the part of registrants, thereby reducing the quantity of drugs vulnerable to theft.

A more significant fact is the publication in March, 1973, of new Federal Regulations Governing Methadone (Fed. Reg. Vol. 37, No. 242). These regulations effectively eliminated methadone as a prescription drug, thereby reducing pharmacy stocks of this substance. Since most thefts are made at the retail pharmacy level, the impact of these regulations has an immediate impact. The chart following illustrates the effects of this regulation.

METHADONE THEFTS FROM PHARMACIES

	October- December 1972	January- March 1973	April-June 1973	July- September 1973
Northeast.....	88	90	74	20
South.....	77	114	98	23
Central.....	62	84	61	32
Northwest.....	2	6	5	1
West.....	43	93	40	16
Total.....	272	387	278	92

The impact of the new regulations is even more evident, when a single theft from a Philadelphia distributor in January, 1973, involving 500,000 dosage units, is discounted.

IV. DEA CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

During a twelve month period (Oct. 72–Sept. 73) DEA laboratories analyzed methadone exhibits in only 77 cases. Nine of these cases were compliance investigations resulting in no criminal action. Of the remaining 68 cases, the largest case involved 2,977 tablets of methadone. The remaining cases ranged from $\frac{1}{4}$ of a tablet to 281 tablets. Only 18 of the cases listed manufacturer or presumptive manufacturer. Lilly was listed in all 18 cases, Endo in one. One defendant claimed he was enrolled in a maintenance program.

A list of DEA cases by region is as follows:

CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING METHADONE, OCTOBER 1972 TO SEPTEMBER 1973

	Total	DEA	State and local task force
Region:			
Boston.....	5	2	3
New York.....	14	7	7
Philadelphia.....	1		1
Baltimore.....	4		4
Miami.....	4	2	2
Detroit.....	13	2	11
Chicago.....	9	2	7
New Orleans.....	1	1	
Kansas City.....	2		2
Dallas.....	2		2
Denver.....	7	3	4
Seattle.....	1	1	
Los Angeles.....	5	3	2
Total.....	68	23	45

Conclusion

The limited data available on DEA methadone enforcement activity prevents any correlation of DEA activity to the extent of the methadone problem in various areas. This is not only evident by the limited number of cases but also by the nature of the cases themselves. In the great majority of the 68 criminal cases only small amounts of methadone were involved while rather sizeable amounts of other drugs, principally heroin, were removed.

The fact that the average criminal case involved only about 23 tablets¹ per case indicates that we have not focused upon illicit methadone trafficking or defined the scope of the problem.

V. POLYDRUG ABUSE AND METHADONE

From the data drawn from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, it is apparent that poly-drug abuse is increasing in severity, as indicated in the chart below.

DEATHS AND INJURIES

	October- December 1972	January- March 1973	April-June 1973	July- September 1973
Deaths (total).....	726	788	745	NA
Percent of poly-drug	28	37	54	NA
Injuries (total).....	3,901	4,063	3,808	3,923
Percent of poly-drug	30	30	27	28

NOTE.—Poly-drug incidents include all incidents in which at least 1 drug was used in combination with another.

While the amount of poly-drug use relative to total injuries has remained constant, the amount related to deaths has increased from 28% of all fatalities to 54% during the time period April-June 1973. This fact would imply that poly-drug use has far more damaging effects than the use of any drug taken alone, that

¹ Excluding the case with 2,977 tablets.

poly-drug use is rapidly increasing, and may be, in and of itself, the major drug problem in the United States.

With this theory in mind, it is significant to examine those drug categories in which the most deaths have been reported.

DEATHS

	October- December 1972	January- March 1973	April- June 1973
Heroin (total).....	51	15	14
Number in combination with other drugs.....	8	4	3
Percent of poly-drug.....	16	27	21
Methadone (total).....	41	69	80
Number in combination with other drugs.....	19	41	53
Percent of poly-drug.....	46	59	66
Other narcotics (total).....	256	263	230
Number in combination with other drugs.....	67	71	107
Percent of poly-drug.....	26	27	46
Barbiturates (total).....	260	330	272
Number in combination with other drugs.....	71	133	169
Percent of poly-drug.....	27	40	62
Other depressants (total).....	90	81	103
Number in combination with other drugs.....	30	33	52
Percent of poly-drug.....	33	41	50

While total heroin related deaths have decreased over this time period by 73%, this decrease has been largely offset by increased abuse of methadone and other narcotic drugs. During the period in question, methadone polydrug use resulted in an increase from 19 to 53 deaths, nationally. Similar increases were registered with other narcotics, primarily codeine derivatives and demoral. The evidence would indicate that methadone and morphine derivatives are rapidly replacing heroin as the opiate of choice, and that these drugs are more commonly used in combination with other substances.

Of perhaps greater importance is the fact that increasing poly drug use involving barbiturates and other depressants account for the majority of deaths in these categories.

Geographic distribution

POLY-DRUG DEATHS AND INJURIES

	East coast	South	Central	Northwest	West
Deaths.....	560	199	468	(1)	1,023
Percent of poly-drug.....	32	51	41	(1)	42
Injuries.....	6,245	3,629	3,972	(1)	1,849
Percent of poly-drug.....	19	34	35	(1)	40

¹ M. deaths.

It should be noted here that the above chart covering 9-12 months does not reflect the rise in poly-drug use that was existent from quarter-to-quarter in every region. Attention is drawn here to the fact that although the East Coast reported more deaths and injuries than any other section of the U.S., the East had proportionately fewer poly-drug deaths and injuries as compared to the number of instances occurring from drugs taken singly. On the West Coast poly-drug abuse was more prominent implying that where methadone and heroin remain available there may be proportionately less poly-drug use.

Summary

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the previous survey.

Poly-drug use is increasing in all areas of the U.S., although it is less pronounced in areas where methadone and/or heroin are widely available.

In terms of addict population, poly-drug use appears more harmful than the use of most drugs taken alone.

Methadone use and poly-drug use appear closely associated; the properties of methadone probably encourage the use of other drugs to achieve a "heroin-type" euphoric effect in some cases, while in other cases, it is abused as a sedative.

The use of depressants in combination with other drugs and narcotics is increasing. It is widespread in all areas, and predominates in the South and the West Coast.

There is a demonstrated need to regulate the practices of methadone clinics more closely, thereby restricting supply.

With methadone regulation, there is a need to restrict the availability of depressant drugs. Evidence presented by the DAWN system suggests that both methadone and barbiturates are widely available through illicit sources.

Mr. HASTINGS. In regard to the Turkish decision to grow and then their subsequent announcement that they would only allow the straw process, I find some little difference apparently in optimism between the State Department and DEA.

If I can go to your statement, Mr. Bartels, and I will quote you directly, you say, "It is reportedly a more controllable process than that formerly used," and yet from the statement of the Department of State on September 20 they say, "We are very pleased with this decision for effective policing to make sure opium gum is not officially extracted." That is somewhat positive and I suspect that you are not quite as confined perhaps as State who I suppose has a different role in trying to maintain friendly relations with Turkey regardless of the opium situation.

Could I ask for a clarification of your feelings on it, Mr. Bartels?

Mr. BARTELS. Perhaps I am inherently a pessimist, but pessimism plays a very small role in my judgment. I am not encouraged that it will work although the Government of Turkey has said they are going to prevent diversion. The straw process has been a safe process in those countries without a history of widespread peasant knowledge of incision so that the mere use of straw in a lot of the bloc countries such as Yugoslavia has worked because the farmers do not know the agricultural technicalities and sensitivities of how and when to incise the pod. That art has been refined in Turkey and the straw process itself is not a panacea in Turkey. I believe State and I agree on this entirely so I don't think there is any doubt there.

The other discouraging factors, as I state, are simply that despite the efforts of the Department of State, despite the efforts of the United Nations, despite the efforts of the International Narcotics Control Board, the Government of Turkey is now growing in seven provinces rather than four. They have declared an amnesty which has released a number of substantial traffickers and we have a situation where the former head of the Turkish National Police who was very cooperative was suddenly replaced—all of this without notice or details as to what were the efforts of control.

Mr. HASTINGS. I was about to ask you about that because when I was in Turkey prior to their announced decision we had the opportunity to spend some time with the Commissioner of Police and I understand that the reason for a deposition very well could be that he was not optimistic about the Turkish ability to be able to supervise the growth of poppy there but I have read in some reports from Turkish papers that DEA has been charged with some very unusual charges, that of actually hiring traffickers who in turn DEA would arrest and then obviously point with pride to the fact that you have been able to arrest smugglers. This report, I understand, is terribly erroneous but it that a move on the part of either the Turkish Government or the Turkish press to discredit DEA and to perhaps move DEA agents out of the country?

Mr. BARTELS. I don't know. It appeared in Cumhuriyet which is a daily paper out of Istanbul. I don't suppose it is improper for me to call it yellow journalism but it appeared naming the agents and

accusing them of complicity and it generally was part of the entire feeling with the Government of Turkey that this opium issue was something of undue interference by the United States. The paper stated that they were dealers and should be thrown out. I don't believe that there will be any further action on it.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Ernst, on page 3 you talk about the Cabinet Committee and cite that the most recent meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on November 27, 1972. I find it awfully hard to understand why, with the Turkish situation that was pending earlier this year, that the Cabinet Committee did not even meet and talk on this subject.

Mr. ERNST. In connection with that, the working group of the Cabinet Committee met several times. The Cabinet Committee was not called presumably because it was felt that there was no action that it could take at that time. The U.S. position in opposition to lifting the ban was clear.

Mr. HASTINGS. I find that awfully hard to understand. I was at the White House two or three times before I went over there. Certainly Mr. Bartels had been to Turkey, I know how strong he felt about it. The Ambassador came here, Bill Macomber, and I stayed with him in Turkey and I know that he was trying to transmit to State and the White House the serious offer pending decision by the Turkish Government. Frankly, it just comes across to me that the State Department here does not react as strongly as some of the people who are on the scene and know what is going on.

Now I understand with the other problems—and certainly the other problems with Greece and Cyprus and so forth are serious matters, but I find it difficult to understand how a Cabinet Committee on one of the most important decisions as it relates to illicit flow into this country would not even dignify that problem with a meeting.

There are a great number of other questions. I am not going to take the other subcommittee members' time with this. I hope we have an opportunity later, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. We will come back.

Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think from what we have heard, Dr. DuPont's statement is certainly accurate that we have a "genuinely new situation and a worrisome one." You have pointed out how this constantly shifting pattern of drug use requires a great deal of flexibility and every time you turn a corner you find another corner.

One of those shifting new patterns that I was interested in was the growth in heroin addiction in smaller cities like Macon, Ga.; Jackson, Miss.; Des Moines, Iowa. We have always felt that the small towns and the rural areas built the kind of character that guarded against this sort of thing. Perhaps you can guess I am from a district of smaller towns.

Is this trafficking the result of an increase in the use of drugs because of cultural changes, or is there any evidence that traffickers are moving into these areas because they are safer areas?

Mr. BARTELS. I would agree with your former statement that it is based on the premise that all forms of drug addiction, whether it be marihuana or heroin, spread from peer group pressure and the safety that has come in smaller and middle sized towns has been the safety

built on stronger community pressure, whether it be religious, family or ethnic, in promoting the norms of the society and that any sort of concept of total drug involvement would be deviant behavior in that sort of a community. With the ability of people to travel in an open society on airplanes we have seen a spreading of this to a greater extent.

So I would agree with your prior statement that it is a result of an absolute increase and that this is a problem, as the chairman said, that is not like a war that is won but is more of a continuing problem that requires, much like a garden, continual weeding at a fairly high level. Otherwise, as Dr. DuPont says, you have a group that is just going to become drug dependent whether it is marihuana, heroin, alcohol or hallucinogens and that spreads and becomes less of individual deviant behavior than the community norm and as it spreads from the central inner city it can flow out.

Mr. PREYER. Dr. DuPont mentioned a study of ten towns and he mentioned Greensboro which happens to be my home town. Did I understand you to say the study there showed that it has leveled off?

Dr. DuPont. Yes, sir. Greensboro was one of the cities that did not show a current escalation of the heroin problem. I would be very happy to share with you the data specifically about Greensboro.

Mr. PREYER. I would be very interested in seeing that.

[The following information was received for the record:]

GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA—HEROIN USE STUDY

I. INTRODUCTION

Greensboro (1973 estimated population 150,000), the county seat of Guilford County, is located in the Piedmont Crescent, the most highly urbanized and industrialized region of the state. Fifteen percent of Greensboro's population is in the 14-24 year age range. The median age is 25.6. Racial distribution for Greensboro was approximately 72 percent white and 28 percent black. Other racial ethnic groups constitute less than one percent of the population.

Guilford County contains (partially) a second major city, High Point (1970 population 63,000), about 20 miles from Greensboro. In 1970 High Point's population distribution was 78 percent white and 22 percent black.

There are no major military installations in the Greensboro area. The city has several colleges, the largest of which is the University of North Carolina, Greensboro branch (enrollment 6,500). There are three hospitals, one of which treats the majority of drug-related emergencies. There is a County Health Department and a County Medical Examiner's Office. The latter is staffed on a rotating basis by local physicians. Law enforcement is the responsibility of the Greensboro Police Department.

[Editor's note: Figures 36 through 43 mentioned in this report are not printed because they were not clear enough to reproduce.]

Drug abuse treatment was initially provided by the Guilford County Community Mental Health Program. In 1971 the Drug Action Council, a multi-modality program was organized to centralize treatment activities. It is jointly funded by private, city, county, state and Federal sources. The Drug Action Council receives \$325,000 in Federal funds and has 181 treatment slots, the majority of which are for drug free treatment. The program is currently running at 70 percent capacity.

II. QUANTITATIVE DATA OBTAINED DURING SITE VISIT

A. Data from treatment program

Figure 36 displays incidence of first heroin use data for Greensboro residents obtained from Drug Action Council (DAC) admissions.¹ Peak use clearly occurred in 1969, even when corrected for 1974 total admissions and lag. Such cor-

¹ 1974 admissions were projected to an estimated annual total based on data available through April 1974.

rections do little to alter the basic form of the incidence curve. Age at admission for Greensboro addicts has steadily increased, corroborating the 1969 peak in new use:

Year:	Mean age
1971.....	20.8
1972.....	24.0
1973.....	24.8
1974.....	25.0

Figure 37 describes DAC admissions who were not residents of Greensboro. They may be either from the remainder of Guilford County or elsewhere. The 1968 peak and the smaller 1971 peak probably indicate different micro-epidemics, and the latter may actually have peaked in 1972, though the lag correction for this group is uncertain. Precise residence of these individuals was not known. Many were reported to live in nearby High Point, North Carolina. The High Point treatment program was visited to investigate this possibility.

High Point's treatment program data (Figure 38) are harder to interpret, perhaps because the treated population may be less homogeneous. Figure 38 data are *not* restricted to High Point residents² and the poly-modal curve may be due to varying peaks of use among geographically or ethnically distinct cohorts. Like Greensboro there is an obvious 1969 peak, but also evidence of a peak in 1966. Lag corrections suggest that incidence may also be currently rising, but such corrections are based on *Greensboro* lag data (since the High Point program is only two years old).

B. Hepatitis data

Hepatitis cases are reported to the Guilford County Health Department, from which the data in Figure 39 were obtained. Hepatitis-B-associated antigen testing for serum hepatitis is inconsistent, and, as usual, has been growing during the critical period of heroin use.

Figure 39 shows diagnosed serum cases (solid line) and serum plus infectious cases 15-29 year olds—the heroin susceptible age range (broken line).

The most striking property of both curves is that neither remotely reflects the pattern of heroin use implied by the incidence curve, Figure 36. Assuming that a user is equally likely to contact hepatitis during active use (proportional only to the intensity of his use, i.e., frequency of exposure by injections), then hepatitis cases (if drug related) should have peaked around 1970 or 1971. This period should represent maximum prevalence, before the treatment program had succeeded in removing many users from the active pool. There is no coincidence between this inferred prevalence peak and the peak of hepatitis cases.

Similar data are not available for High Point, but Figure 40 shows reported serum cases for Guilford County, excluding Greensboro cases. Numbers are so small as to be inconclusive, especially when viewed against the difficulties in the Greensboro serum hepatitis case data.

C. Heroin Overdose Deaths

North Carolina has a medical examiner system. Close attention is paid to heroin overdose deaths, demonstrated by the diagnostic sophistication shown in the *Carolina Forensic Bulletin*, April 1973, "Heroin Associated Deaths, Including the North Carolina Experience (1969-1972)", the source of the following data.

Figure 41 displays reported heroin-related deaths for the State and for Greensboro. While State totals have fluctuated, Greensboro has remained constant at 2 per year.

D. Heroin overdose emergencies

The majority of drug overdoses are treated at the emergency room of the Cone Memorial Hospital, which operates 24 hours a day. Records of drug incidents were not kept separately. No objective data were obtained.

Many emergencies apparently do not receive *any* medical attention, according to the staff of Switchboard, a telephone crisis intervention service. Unfortunately Switchboard's own files are chaotic, so that not even crude statistical data were obtainable. In general, emergencies were correlated with rock concerts which attracted large groups of nonindigenous youngsters. Calls were also more frequent on weekends.

² Residence was not available from treatment records.

E. Law enforcement data

Property crime has continued to rise in Greensboro, after a dip in 1971 (Figure 42). This 1971 decline occurred one year after the peak of heroin incidence. The subsequent increase is unexplained.

Narcotics arrests (chiefly marijuana) increased sharply between 1972 and 1973, but will probably decline slightly in 1974. Heroin arrests have been separated in police records only during 1973 and 1974. Based on an extrapolation from four months of data, it is expected heroin arrests will also decline in 1974, not only in absolute numbers (from 73 to an estimated 42) but also relative to all drug law arrests (from 11.4 percent of the total in 1973 to an estimated 7.6 percent of the total in 1974). See Figure 43.

F. University community

Several small colleges are located in Greensboro. The largest is the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. No data were obtained on drug use from any of these schools.

Conversations with a consulting psychiatrist from the UNCG health service yielded no special insights, only routine reports of non-opiate drug use.

G. Military community

There are no major military installations in the Greensboro area.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The following data are consistent with the conclusion that heroin use incidence in Greensboro has peaked and is not declining towards endemic levels:

- (a) The treatment based heroin use incidence curve, which shows a sharp peak in 1969 and subsequent decline, even when corrected for lag.
- (b) Rising mean age among year cohorts of addicts first admitted to treatment.
- (c) Low numbers of both fatal and non-fatal heroin overdose episodes.
- (d) Low numbers of arrests for possession and sale of opiates.
- (e) Absence of any reported heroin problem in the University community.

Data which were ambiguous included:

- (a) Hepatitis data
- (b) Property crime data

None of the data sources suggested that heroin use incidence was increasing in Greensboro.

Several pieces of information suggested that nearby High Point may be the site of rising levels of heroin use. These included admission data on High Point residents seen in the Greensboro program and admission data from the High Point treatment program itself. When corrected for lag, the data suggest rising heroin use in this community.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above findings, the following suggestions for future steps that might be taken are made:

- (a) Assess the incidence and prevalence of heroin use in High Point, North Carolina.

- (b) Continue to monitor heroin incidence indicators in the Greensboro program, as well as client demographic data to determine changing patterns of heroin use.

Mr. PREYER. You mentioned earlier and then switched to another area that in July of 1974 the Department of Defense suspended all urinalysis and apparently as a result there has been a 50-percent increase in almost a year in drug use. Why was that suspended? Was that because of some legal test case of invasion of privacy or was it an administrative decision?

Dr. DU PONT. Well, it was an administrative decision triggered by a court case. There were two court cases, one in the U.S. District Court before Judge Gerhard Gesell here in the District of Columbia and that was followed by a court case at the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. In both cases the problem was that the military was using essentially a health test to start disciplinary actions against some soldiers. The court basically ruled that the military had to decide whether its urine testing activity was a law enforcement ac-

tivity or a health activity. If it was a law enforcement activity, then constitutional safeguards had to be observed; if it was a health activity, then disciplinary action could not be applied against the individuals.

Now my own argument to the Department of Defense is that in fact they can continue mandatory urine testing as a health activity and they should do that. The question has been under consideration in the Department of Defense and I am not entirely pessimistic that they may come to a satisfactory conclusion about it. But at the moment I am distressed that the weeks are going by with no urine testing.

Mr. PREYER. I hope you are successful on that. If the military decides that they cannot set up the program in a way that would meet these court tests, I would think this committee might want to take a look at legislation to correct those court decisions because the relationship between urinalysis and addiction seems very direct, and certainly urinalysis is a good way to stop this problem in the military at least.

Mr. ROGERS. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. PREYER. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. I think it would be helpful to the committee if you would furnish us copies of your correspondence and the correspondence of the Department of Defense on this matter. Identify for us the official with whom you are dealing.

Dr. Du PONT. Yes, sir, I will be glad to.

[Testimony resumes on p. 76.]

[The following correspondence was received for the record:]

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUSPENSION OF AND REINSTATEMENT OF MANDATORY URINALYSIS PROGRAM IN THE ARMED SERVICES

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION,
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1974.

HON. MARTIN R. HOFFMANN,
General Counsel, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOFFMANN: Thank you for your letter of October 10, 1974. Your statement that action to restore a meaningful drug abuse campaign "will have to be delayed while empirical evidence is sought to determine the precise effect of the recent suspension of involuntary urinalysis testing" seems to us to be inconsistent with your acknowledgement of "the need for expedited action." It is also inconsistent with our own evaluation of the situation, which is that there is ample evidence already that the effect of the suspension has been serious if not disastrous. It is not the purpose of this letter, however, to pursue the issue of the necessity of urinalysis from a policy standpoint, but rather to examine, from an essentially legal perspective, the three measures proposed in your letter to me.

The purpose of the proposed Presidential proclamation, as I understand it, is to convince the Court of Military Appeals that requiring a serviceman to leave the service by way of a general discharge is not action of such a punitive nature as to raise an issue of self-incrimination under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Given the construction which that Court has placed on Article 31, it seems to me that the effort is likely to fail. The draft proclamation is obviously designed as evidence to support the proposition that a general discharge is just as good as an honorable discharge. Unfortunately, the logical corollary to that would be the proposition that an honorable discharge is no better than a general discharge, and if that is true, the Court is apt to inquire why, then, you refuse to give an honorable discharge to drug abusers and thus avoid altogether this vexatious issue. There being no satisfactory answer to this question, I am very much afraid that the bench and the public alike might perceive the proclamation

as a piece of transparent flummery. If I am wrong about this, if the proclamation were actually issued and taken at face value, then it seems to me you would have destroyed the very thing you are trying to protect, namely, the distinction which rightfully attaches to the award of an honorable discharge. That, of course, is a matter outside the strict responsibility of this agency.

In the absence of greater specificity, it is difficult to evaluate your second proposal, but I must observe that the general tone in which is expressed seems most unfortunate. To be legally acceptable and therapeutically effective, a rehabilitation program has to be exactly that, and not a punishment in disguise. To the extent that pre-Ruiz rehabilitation programs are revised, the revisions must be based on bona fide treatment considerations and not on an effort to restore the pre-Ruiz discharge policy by making superficial procedural changes. I trust that this was not your intent, but a misunderstanding at any level as to the purpose of any changes which are made would invite legal jeopardy no less than programmatic failure.

Finally, while it takes a bolder man than I to predict the outcome of litigation, it seems to me that your problem with Ruiz is not one which is likely to be solved by presenting the Court with a more appealing case on the facts. Speaking of Article 31, the Court flatly holds, "This section of the Uniform Code has a broader sweep than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution," and cites a line of its own cases developing this doctrine. However much I disagree on policy grounds with the aspects of that doctrine which are here involved, I would hate to stake very much on the chance of persuading the Court to reverse it now.

Despite these reservations about the three measures proposed in your letter of the 10th, I do not wish to leave the impression that we think nothing can be done. On the contrary, we continue to urge that mandatory urinalysis be reinstituted forthwith, since the only modification necessary in the light of Ruiz would be that the urinalysis results may not be used in making any determination regarding discharge. Quite without any further programmatic modification, the probability is that the great majority of those detected through urinalysis either would be successfully rehabilitated, or would be discharged for unsatisfactory performance or the commission of disciplinary infractions. Considering how much is at stake, I hope you will find it possible to reexamine your position with respect to this program which so many people in your Department worked so hard to bring to fruition, and whose benefits are now so sorely missed.

Sincerely yours,

GRASTY CREWS II,
General Counsel.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION,
Washington, D.C., October 11, 1974.

HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SCHLESINGER: As Director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, I first wrote on July 30, 1974 to express my concern about the suspension of urinalysis testing and to urge the reinstitution of a mandatory urinalysis program. I want to again create an opportunity to suggest in the strongest terms that the urinalysis issue be promptly resolved. Also, I will propose that a unique and valuable opportunity for documentation of the deterrent effect of urinalysis be exploited as soon as possible.

I see the opportunity in the context that urinalysis has historically been considered as primarily a preventive effort, through its assumed deterrent effect upon drug use; only in a secondary sense was urinalysis planned to be an identification tool. However, results to date are in large measure reversed; the Department of Defense effort to bring servicemen into treatment through the screening process has more than proven the value of urinalysis as an identification technique, while major questions still exist as to the deterrent effects of urinalysis. Very little evidence exists as to the "before and after" effects of conducting urinalysis. Now, due to the suspension of all testing on July 18, a unique opportunity exists to demonstrate the basic value of urinalysis as a deterrent measure. A natural experiment has already begun which, if followed up, could contribute significantly to the national drug abuse prevention effort.

Basically, I am proposing that within the next several weeks, whether or not urinalysis is to be reinstituted within DOD, the Special Action Office and the Department of Defense collaborate in a large scale unannounced random testing of servicemen worldwide, to be conducted prior to any possible announcement of resumption of urinalysis. The results of this test would not be used to refer to treatment, nor to take any administrative or legal action. These results, however, when compared with pre-suspension testing data would give us clear indications of the deterrence provided by the previous urine screening program. This type of experiment would be of considerable value to the military community, and of equal benefit to the civilian community in understanding implications of urinalysis in such areas as employment surveillance and the monitoring of community-based treatment efforts.

I would like to meet with you and members of your staff to discuss my concerns regarding the urinalysis suspension as well as this proposed project. To maximize the potential for the success of this experiment, a meeting as soon as possible is most desirable.

I hope that you will collaborate with the Special Action Office on this important endeavor, and look forward to meeting with you in the near future.

Sincerely,

ROBERT L. DUPONT, M.D.,
Director.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION,
Washington, D.C., October 11, 1974.

Memorandum for: Dr. James R. Cowan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment, HQ, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Germany.
From: Robert L. Dupont, M.D., Director, SAODAP.
Subject: Urinalysis.

1. Have this date communicated by letter to Mr. Schlesinger regarding conducting research to validate deterrent effect of urinalysis. Summary of my message follows:

(a) To date urinalysis in armed forces has served primarily as tool to identify drug abusers. Most involved in drug abuse control program believe but cannot demonstrate that urinalysis also serves as preventive measure, deterring initial drug abuse in some individuals.

(b) Unique opportunity now exists within services to demonstrate if urine screening does in fact deter use, and if so, to measure extent to which the previous program did deter. This opportunity valuable from military viewpoint, and also has significant implications for many important elements of the national drug abuse prevention effort.

(c) Propose that within next several weeks, whether or not urinalysis reinstituted, SAO and your office collaborate in unannounced, random testing of servicemen worldwide. Results not repeat not to be used to refer to treatment or for administrative or legal action. Results to be compared to pre-suspension testing data to give us clear indications of the deterrence provided by previous urine-screening program.

2. Am prepared to discuss proposal with you soon after your return.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
Washington, D.C., October 10, 1974.

GRASTY CREWS II, Esq.,
General Counsel, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CREWS: The concern expressed in your letter of September 27th about the suspension of involuntary drug abuse testing in the armed forces is appreciated. Authorities in the Department of Defense share your disappointment at this development which resulted from issuance by the Court of Military Appeals of the Ruis decision.

Several measures are now being considered to restore a meaningful drug abuse campaign. Before adopting a new course of action empirical evidence is to be sought to determine the precise effect of the recent suspension of involuntary

urinalysis testing. Because of the need for expedited action, the earlier proposal to seek legislation to amend article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice will be pursued only as a last resort. Priority will now be given to three new measures which are designed to permit resumption of involuntary urinalysis testing with a concomitant use of the general discharge for those drug offenders who cannot be rehabilitated. These proposed measures are summarized below.

1. Action will be taken to enhance the image of the general discharge. To accomplish this purpose the President is to be requested to issue a proclamation we have prepared. A copy of the text of this proclamation is enclosed for your convenience. The affirmative assistance of your office in recommending favorable action by the White House will be appreciated. As a shorter-range expedient the DoD Directive which provides for the general discharge will be amended to emphasize the true nature and effect of this type of discharge.

2. The rehabilitation program employed in connection with involuntary urinalysis testing will be revised to include a requirement for the performance of certain special duties by drug offenders who are participants in the program. A general discharge for those who cannot be rehabilitated will be based, when appropriate, on other discreditable conduct and, when such conduct is not in the record, on failure to perform the special rehabilitation program duties when there is such a failure.

3. A new court-martial case, styled *United States v. MacFarland*, which is now being processed in appellate channels of the court-martial system, is to be groomed to obtain a reconsideration of the Ruiz doctrine in the Court of Military Appeals. The idea here is that MacFarland will eventually have the effect of devitalizing Ruiz.

It is hoped that the proposed new measures will prove to be effective. As noted above, your support of the Presidential proclamation is specifically requested.

Sincerely yours,

MARTIN R. HOFFMANN.

Enclosure.

A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Whereas the nature and effect of the general discharge from military service in the armed forces of the United States have been brought into question recently as a result of popular misconceptions; and

Whereas even the courts have had occasion to misconstrue the nature and effect of the general discharge; and

Whereas it is essential, in the interests of maintaining the integrity of proper personnel administration in the armed forces, to correct these misconceptions: Now, therefore,

I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States, do hereby clarify for all individuals and institutions the true nature of the aforementioned general discharge by formally proclaiming herein the principal incidents that are to be attributed to it.

1. The general discharge denotes honorable service in the armed forces of the United States and is awarded for the faithful performance of military duty.

2. Accordingly, the general discharge is not to be construed as importing in any way military service that is less than fully honorable or to have the effect of imputing any kind of stigma to those to whom such a discharge is awarded.

3. In view of the true character of the general discharge all benefits that are provided by departments and agencies of the United States Government to veterans of service in the armed forces shall be accorded to those who have been separated with such a discharge.

4. Further, it is within the contemplation of this Proclamation that all benefits, privileges, status and eligibility attributed to honorable service in the armed forces shall be accorded to recipients of the general discharge by all employers in the private sector and by the public at large.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this ——— day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-eighth.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., October 7, 1974.

HON. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to acknowledge your letter of October 3 in which you request that mandatory urinalysis be reinstated.

Your letter is receiving attention and you can expect a further reply at an early date.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. MAURY,
Legislative Affairs.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., October 3, 1974.

HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am disturbed about reports reaching me which suggest that the discipline and perhaps the combat readiness of United States Military personnel in this country and elsewhere have deteriorated since your order of July 16, 1974, suspending mandatory urine-testing as a means of identifying drug abusers among our younger troops. The purpose of this letter is to share my concern about these reports with you and to request that mandatory urinalysis be reinstated.

Since urine-testing was suspended, I am advised, criminal investigations of drug-related crime and disciplinary actions, such as Article 15's, have been increasing within the Armed Services. I am further advised that in the areas of heaviest troop concentrations, including the Continental United States, drug usage had begun rising during the month or so before testing was suspended, in contrast with seasonal trends of a year ago. Some of the sharpest rises occurred among members of the Navy and the Marine Corps on the West Coast where, I understand, Mexican brown heroin is appearing in increasing volume. An equally disturbing sign is that since the suspension of testing, there has been a sharp decline in numbers of military drug users receiving treatment and rehabilitative services.

My information indicates that many unit commanders in the field want mandatory urine-testing resumed, for its value not only in detecting drug abusers but also as a deterrent against drug abuse by others among their personnel. In addition, I am advised, the Commander-in-Chief of our Pacific command recently sent a request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that mandatory testing be reinstated.

I well appreciate the difficulties that have arisen for the Department of Defense and for the Army particularly, as a result of recent adverse court decisions related to the urine-testing program. However, in the absence of any court order forbidding urinalysis outright, I believe the Department is obligated to resume the use of this tool as a means of safeguarding the combat-readiness, health, and discipline of our Armed Forces.

I would appreciate your giving these concerns of mine your most serious consideration, and I would be grateful to have your comments at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION,
Washington, D.C., September 27, 1974.

HON. MARTIN R. HOFFMANN,
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOFFMANN: As you know, the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention is vitally interested in the drug abuse testing programs of the Armed Forces. The urgent necessity for developing and implementing such programs was one of the principal considerations which led to the establishment of this Office by Executive Order in 1971, and to its statutory creation—with a clear responsibility with respect to drug abuse prevention functions conducted by the Armed Forces—in 1972.

At this point, the information available to us suggests that continued failure by the Department of Defense to respond to the letter of July 30, 1974 from the Director of this office to the Secretary of Defense would carry a serious risk that drug abuse in the Armed Forces will once again approach crisis levels. I have read with care your memorandum of August 13, 1974 to Geoffrey Shepard. As you know, the suspension of the urinalysis program, as it existed prior to the *Ruiz* decision, and the failure of the Department of Defense to develop a modification of that program in the light of *Ruiz*, were predicated upon the hope that *Ruiz* would be reversed upon rehearing. It is now more than a month since any basis for such a hope was demolished, and the need for action is urgent.

Your conclusion, that "[l]egislative action may be necessary to resolve the impasse wrought by *Ruiz*," in no way obviates the necessity for an interim program. Such a program can, we believe, be constructed by eliminating any discharge consequences, honorable or otherwise, from a positive urine sample. This may result in some individuals being retained in the service who, under the pre-*Ruiz* procedures, might have been more promptly discharged, but in the post-*Ruiz* legal environment it clearly carries no such cost. Obviously, a urinalysis program whose results cannot be considered in making discharge determination cannot have less direct on those determinations than a program which is not carried out at all. It was never the primary purpose of the program to furnish a basis for discharge determination, and the fact that it now cannot legally serve that purpose does not appear to be a valid reason for its discontinuance.

The underlying rationale of *Ruiz* appears to be that the Congress, by its approval of Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, intended to cloak military personnel with significantly greater protections than are afforded civilians under the Fifth Amendment. I share your apparent view that this is an unsound doctrine whose reversal can now come only by way of legislative action. Although this is an issue where implications obviously extend far beyond the field of drug abuse prevention and treatment, if you feel that we can be of any assistance in framing appropriate legislation, please be assured of our willingness to do so.

Meanwhile, however, I must reiterate our view that action is urgently needed. As noted in Dr. DuPont's letter of July 30, 1974, referred to above, mandatory urinalysis produces results both in terms of prevention and rehabilitation which, at least in the present state of our knowledge, cannot be achieved by any other means. Its value as an early warning system is difficult to overemphasize. Its loss is already being felt, and in some areas, quite seriously so. The only benefit which can flow from its termination is to provide an easy solution for certain legal and administrative problems. It is our view that this would be a trivial recompense for the risks in terms of military effectiveness alone, not to mention the human costs. We will be more than happy to lend our assistance in developing a program which, pending the enactment of appropriate legislation, will reconcile the requirements of *Ruiz* with the maintenance of military effectiveness.

Sincerely yours,

GRASTY CREWS II,
General Counsel.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., August 14, 1974.

HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am grateful to Dr. Cowan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment), for his recent letter enclosing a copy of the opinion of the United States Court of Military Appeals in the case of *United States v. Ruiz* and the Department of Defense press release announcing the suspension of urine testing by the Military Departments. I understand that the court has since affirmed its decision by denying the Army's petition for a rehearing.

I have reviewed both of the documents that Dr. Cowan sent me, and it is my considered judgment that the suspension of urine testing is neither warranted nor required under the *Ruiz* opinion and, moreover, is contrary to Title V of Public Law 92-129. That law provides: "The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and implement procedures, utilizing all practical available methods, and provide necessary facilities to (1) identify, treat, and rehabilitate members of the Armed Forces who are drug or alcohol dependent persons, and (2) identify those individuals examined at Armed Forces examining and entrance stations who are drug or alcohol dependent persons . . . (emphasis supplied)".

As you know, since the summer of 1971 the Military Services have relied upon urine testing as the best available technique for identifying users of a variety of dangerous drugs prior to placing them in treatment, and for monitoring the success of rehabilitation efforts.

I find nothing in the Ruiz opinion that casts doubt on the legality of urine testing for these purposes; indeed, at one point the court concedes that "urine samples and retests may be essential to the (Army's drug rehabilitation) program." The choice appears discharges to those identified through the program as drug users and found not to be amenable to rehabilitation, or discontinuing the urinalysis program in order to retain the option of administratively discharging drug users who cannot be rehabilitated within the services.

While I recognize the Defense Department's reluctance to allow honorable discharges for persistent drug users, it seems to me that whatever disadvantages this course may entail are far outweighed by the costs of discontinuing the testing program. Loss of this program would undermine what many authorities regard as the most exemplary drug abuse prevention and control program sponsored by the Federal Government.

Military commanders would be left without an important deterrent and would be tempted to resort to some of the haphazard methods which were common before the urinalysis program became available. Treatment specialists would be denied a key tool for gauging the response of drug abuse patients. Under such conditions, I am concerned that undetected drug abuse would flourish in some areas, morale and combat readiness would suffer, and the risk of eroding individual rights would increase.

I therefore urge that you reconsider and reverse your decision to suspend the testing program of the Defense Department.

With sincere best wishes,

HAROLD E. HUGHES,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military Services.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION,
Washington, D.C., August 8, 1974.

Memorandum to: Geoff Shepard.
From: Robert L. DuPont, M.D.
Subject: DOD urinalysis suspension.

Purpose

This memorandum states the position of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention that the Department of Defense urinalysis program should be continued on a mandatory basis.

Background

Since June 17, 1971, the military services have been required to conduct urine screening tests for illicit drugs; DOD Instructions 1010.1 prescribe the urinalysis program.

On July 18, 1974, a memorandum from Mr. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the military departments suspended the urinalysis program.

On July 30, 1974, a letter from this Office to the Secretary of Defense urged reinstatement of the mandatory urinalysis program.

Facts Bearing on the Discussion

Prior to the inception of urinalysis testing in June 1971, the military services had neither a valid indicator of the level of military drug abuse nor an effective system for screening out drug abusers upon entry into the military.

Since inception in 1972 of urinalysis testing of all entering servicemen at their first duty station, nearly 1,000 servicemen have been identified as drug abusers in a single quarter. These were men who were not detected during the thorough physical examination at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFES).

From June 1971 through May 1974, the urinalysis system has confirmed 72,328 urine samples as positive for opiates, barbiturates or amphetamines. This figure represents approximately five Army divisions. Individuals confirmed positive were referred to treatment and rehabilitation services.

Of those servicemen identified as drug abusers, recent figures indicate that three out of four are returned to duty following treatment and rehabilitation.

A tightly run urinalysis program will deter drug abuse, identify abusers early and channel them into treatment, thereby reducing the overall level of drug abuse. An example of this occurred in Thailand in the fall of 1972. At that time, heroin use among Air Force troops apparently approached the proportions of the "heroin epidemic" among troops in Vietnam. A clinically confirmed positive rate of approximately 3.0% persisted. A tightening of the urinalysis system in Thailand resulted in a reduction in the rate of clinically confirmed positives to less than 1.0% by January, 1973.

Members of the Senate Alcoholism and Narcotics Subcommittee, The Special Studies Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee have informally expressed great concern over the suspension of military urinalyses.

The General Counsel of the Special Action Office has concluded that two options are offered by the United States Court of Military Appeals opinion in the case of the United States v. Ruiz. The essence of the opinion is in the following sentence, quoted from Page 5 of the court opinion:

"The answer lies not in depriving the accused of his rights, however inadvertent that might be, but in assuring *either* his *voluntary cooperation* or separating him from the service *without penalty*." (Emphasis supplied)

The court opinion states that the military system may be either an entirely voluntary system, similar to that found in civilian communities, or that the services may continue urinalysis on a mandatory basis. In the latter case, the worst possible consequence to the individual for positive urine samples would be separation from the service with an honorable discharge.

Discussion of Options

Option 1: Cease mandatory urinalysis and adopt a voluntary (civilianized) system.

Advantages

Complies with the court opinion of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals.

Prevents manipulation of the urinalysis system by drug abusers who may desire to obtain early release and honorable discharge from service.

Precludes a policy of giving honorable discharges to drug abusing service members, if their worst action has been positive urine.

Places the maximum emphasis on health care aspects of drug abuse, by requiring the military to use a voluntary drug abuse detection and treatment system.

Disadvantages

Does not measure the level of drug abuse in the armed forces. The military leader or manager will no longer know the extent of drug abuse or the possible effect on combat readiness.

Discards the deterrent effect of mandatory urine screening; this has a potentially critical impact in high-risk overseas areas.

Reduces the likelihood of early intervention and treatment before drug abuse habits have hardened.

May eliminate entrance screening at AFEES. It is not clear that this court ruling would prohibit entrance screening, but a negative impact is probable.

Relies heavily on drug education to prevent drug abuse, and on criminal investigations to detect drug abusers.

Option 2: Continue mandatory urinalysis, with the worst possible consequence of drug-positive urine samples being an honorable discharge.

Advantages

Complies with the court opinion of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals.

Deters some service members, both in CONUS and high-risk areas overseas, from serious involvement in drug abuse.

Detects drug abuse among service members early, and provides treatment and rehabilitation services before heavy involvement in drug abuse.

Measures the level of drug abuse; a tightly run urinalysis system has historically demonstrated the ability to measure with considerable accuracy the level of drug abuse among the troops. Leaders and managers will know the extent and nature of drug abuse within the services.

Assures a screening process upon entry into military service to prevent excessive numbers of drug abusers from entering service.

Disadvantages

Allows service members who desire early discharge to manipulate their way through the drug abuse detection-treatment-rehabilitation process to an ultimate discharge under honorable conditions.

(In fact, this is somewhat misleading, since approximately 22% of administratively discharged drug abusers have received honorable discharges under the previous mandatory urinalysis system. Since inception of the urinalysis program, 4,731 members have received administrative discharges for drug abuse under honorable conditions, as compared to 16,906 less-than-honorably discharged for drug abuse for the same period.)

This procedure formalizes the policy of giving an honorable discharge to drug abusers if their only offense is drug abuse. Veterans groups may object to this policy.

Conclusion

The preferred option is that of continuing a mandatory urinalysis system, with the worst possible consequence of positive urine being an honorable discharge.

In the three years since the President's June 17, 1971, drug abuse control mandate was issued to the military, the Department of Defense has developed the most comprehensive single drug abuse prevention program in existence. The use of urinalysis testing as the key means of identifying drug abusers has been largely responsible for the military's laudable success in early detection and treatment of drug abusers, and in deterring a vast spread of drug use. In addition, the Department of Defense is the only institution or community which has developed a viable indicator system, through urinalysis data, with which to monitor and analyze the level and trends of drug abuse. These three aspects of urinalysis, identifying, deterring and monitoring, are unique and critical to an integrated national drug abuse prevention effort.

The suspension or termination of the Department of Defense program at this time would be a distinct blow to the existing drug abuse prevention policy of the United States. It would clearly be a misunderstood signal that the Federal Government in general, and the Department of Defense in particular, is no longer supporting an aggressive drug abuse prevention program.

Recommendation

That the Department of Defense memorandum for the Secretaries of the military departments, dated July 18, 1974, suspending the urine testing program prescribed by DOD Instructions 1010.1, be superseded at the earliest possible date by instructions to reinstate the mandatory urinalysis program.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION,
Washington, D.C., July 30, 1974.

HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing to express my strong view that it would be inappropriate from the standpoint of national policy in the conduct of drug abuse prevention functions for the armed forces to discontinue at this time the urine testing program for drug abuse prescribed by DOD Instructions 1010.1. I am requesting the Mr. Clements' memorandum for the Secretaries of the military departments, dated July 18, 1974, suspending that program, be superseded at the earliest practicable date by appropriate instructions to reinstate the mandatory urinalysis program.

In the event that the petition for rehearing is denied in *United States v. Ruiz*, U.S. Court of Military Appeals No. 27,249, I recognize that the results of urine tests could not be taken into consideration in determining the character of the discharge of any serviceman, or for any other purpose which could be viewed as incriminating within the meaning of Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In this context, it appears that the worst possible consequence of consistently positive urine samples would be an honorable discharge. However, the benefits of the program are only minimally associated with discharge or disciplinary proceedings. The program was not instituted to serve those purposes, and to terminate it on the ground that it can no longer do so would needlessly impose a severe handicap on efforts which, considering the difficulty and complexity of the problem, have met with exemplary success.

In the three years since the President's June 17, 1971 drug abuse control mandate was issued to the military, the Department of Defense has developed the most expansive single drug abuse prevention program in existence. The use of urinalysis testing as the key means of identifying drug abusers has been largely responsible for the military's laudable success in early detection and treatment of drug abusers, and in deterring a vast spread of drug use. In addition, the Department of Defense is the only institution or community which has developed a viable indicator system, via urinalysis data, with which to monitor and analyze the level and trends of drug abuse. These three aspects of urinalysis, identifying, deterring and monitoring, are unique and critical to an integrated national drug abuse prevention effort. The suspension or termination of the Department of Defense program would be a distinct blow to the existing drug prevention policy of the United States. It would clearly be a misunderstood signal that the Federal Government in general, and the Department of Defense in particular, is no longer supporting an aggressive drug prevention program.

Your attention is respectfully directed to Sections 221 and 213 of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (21 U.S.C. 1131 and 1122). In pertinent part, Section 221 provides, "The Director [of the Special Action Office] shall provide overall planning and policy and establish objectives and priorities for all Federal drug abuse prevention functions," and Section 213 provides, "Except with respect to the conducting of drug abuse prevention functions, nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the operation of the Armed Forces . . . [emphasis supplied]." The legislative history of Section 213 makes clear the congressional intent that the Director's authority should not be exercised in a manner to interfere with the primary mission of the Department of Defense (see, e.g., House Report 92-755, pages 11 and 12), and certainly no such interference is intended here. However, it is equally clear that a legal, as well as moral, responsibility is imposed on this office with respect to policies governing the conduct of drug abuse prevention functions by the armed forces. The results of this mandate, initiated by Executive Order and validated by legislation, have, thanks to a spirit of cooperation on both sides, been fruitful and constructive in the achievement of our common objectives.

Please be assured that we will be more than glad to furnish our assistance in making any necessary adaptations of the urinalysis program to conform with the Ruiz decision.

Sincerely,

ROBERT L. DUPONT, M.D.,
Director.

Mr. PREYER. Just one other question. The chairman asked had there been any cures in drug addiction. The figures you show here on the military again show that there was a substantial number of cures.

Dr. DUPONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREYER. From 42 percent to 2 percent or whatever it was. I take it that one reason for that could be the nature of the heroin that was being used in Vietnam.

Dr. DUPONT. I wish we could demonstrate that the reduced level of addiction in the United States of returning Vietnam servicemen was a direct result of the treatment which was given to them but unfortunately the studies do not support that. They suggest the cure was effected independently of treatment and was particularly the result of changed availability of heroin: The easy availability in Vietnam and the higher price in the United States. There also was change of life circumstances; use in Vietnam was casual with few consequences, whereas in the United States the use of heroin involved the adoption of a criminal life style and giving up a lot of things that most of these young men were interested in. Basically, the study offers important insights into the effect of availability on levels of use within a population.

Mr. PREYER. Well, apart from the availability, I recall testimony from doctors to the effect that heroin addiction was such a powerful addiction that many said that there was no way to break it but that is only true, I suppose, as to some kinds of heroin. Is brown heroin this type of addictive thing, almost zero cures?

Dr. DuPONT. Mr. Preyer, when doctors say that they are talking about a particular subpopulation of heroin users where the cure rate is very, very low, such as people with chronic histories of intravenous heroin addiction within the United States. The problems with this group have been very great, and they are the principal clients for the methadone maintenance. But within the population of heroin users as a whole there are many people who do not escalate their use. Some may use it once or twice, and there is even a fairly large percentage who have a prolonged addiction problem and then stop using on their own.

One study in St. Louis found that addicts stopped use within 20 years, even without treatment. So addiction cannot be viewed in all cases as inexorable and continual.

Mr. PREYER. Cocaine, which seems to be coming fashionable again, is that as addictive as heroin?

Dr. DuPONT. Not in the same way. Cocaine has some of the problems that marihuana does. There are many indications that it is not as dangerous a drug as heroin. Some people see this as offering encouragement for use of the drug, and this is a very serious problem which we need to be vigilant about. The reason we don't have a major problem now is because of the success of law enforcement at limiting the supply of cocaine. If the drug were widely available at a low price, I have no doubt that we would see many health problems from its use.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Bartels, I think it would be helpful for the committee, too, if you could furnish for us through the Department of Justice a list of any court cases involving 500 pounds or more of marihuana and any amounts of cocaine and heroin where a judge has given a suspended sentence or sentences of less than 1 year. I would like also to have the judge's name and the prosecutor.

Mr. BARTELS. I will have to do it federally. Is that fair enough?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

[Testimony resumes on p. 96.]

[The following information was received for the record:]

COURT CASES INVOLVING 500 OR MORE POUNDS OF MARIHUANA

Attached are tables summarizing the results of our regional inquiries regarding marihuana cases of more than 500 pounds. The results appear to be significant since the sheets reveal that less than substantial sentences are being levied on traffickers in many significant marihuana cases. This is particularly true in the border areas of the Southern regions.

As far as the latter portion of the question is concerned, the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 844(a) provide a sentence of "not more than one year" for simple possession of all controlled substances, including heroin and cocaine. Therefore, a field inquiry based on the criteria of "one year or less" in the latter part of the question would have resulted in the reporting of all of the possession cases under 21 U.S.C. 844(a). Therefore, we only framed our Regional inquiry to marihuana cases of more than 500 pounds. A few hashish cases are also included because of the conversion factor of ten to one relative to hashish. In other words, 50 pounds of hashish is equivalent to 500 pounds of marihuana as a practical matter.

BOSTON REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 1)

Case number	Amount of marihuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
B1-72-0082	22,000 lb.	Andrew A. Caffrey	Lawrence Cohan	Geoffrey R. Honneus Arthur B. Gavy, III. William Hellesen Richard W. Gray Richard E. Thurlow, Jr.	10 yr—\$25,000 fine. 3 yr—\$3,000 fine. 3 yr. 2 yr. 2 yr, suspended.

NEW YORK REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 2)

C1-71-0388	5,175 lb.	Leo F. Rayfiel	Robert Clarey	John C. Kiffer, Jr. James P. Kehoe Robert V. Harmash German F. Giraldo Jaime Vega James Kreil Steven Aleman Steven Lieberman Peter Asafirod Harris Lasaway Michael Floyd Stephen Miller Paul Chalfant	3 yr prison. 2 1/2 yr prison. 3 1/2 yr prison. 1 1/2 yr prison, 5 yr special parole. 2 1/2 yr prison, 10 yr special parole. 2 yr prison. 5 yr probation. 3 yr prison. 3 yr prison. 1 yr prison. 1 yr prison. 1 1/2 yr prison 2 yr special parole. 2 1/2 yr prison.
C1-73-0090	1,569 lb seized in New York, 561 lb seized in Columbia.	Edward Neher	Gavin Scott		
C3-73-0176	11,000 lb	Charles Matzner	John Kenny David Cuthner		

PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 3)

PH06R0215001	185 lb	Thomas J. Masterson	Jeffrey Miller	Steven Warner Andrea Warner Alan Friedman Michael Goldberg Jeffrey Oukow Philip Viner Alan Diamond Joseph Markel Thomas P. Vallejo Norman R. Kelm, Jr. Charles Cornet Edison A. Whipple Leonard M. Glassberg David S. Mills	6 mo. 6 mo. 6 mo. 6 mo, 4 1/2 yr probation. 1 yr. 1 yr. Not tried. 1 yr. 5 yr. Omitted. Omitted. 5 yr. 2 yr. 5 yr.
PH06R0210800	2,193.4 lb	Charles Walner	Jeffrey Miller		

BALTIMORE REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 4)

E1-72-0080	700 lb.	Ted Dalton.	Leigh B. Hanes, Jr.	Wallace R. Diaz	Sentenced to 5 yr, 5-yr imprisonment suspended, placed on probation for 5 yr.
			John Paul Jarrell		Sentenced to 2 yr, placed on probation for 3 yr.

MIAMI REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 5)

04-72-0056	1,077 lb.	D. L. Middlebrooks	R. L. Croggner	Thomas Assezza	5 yr in prison plus 5 yr for probation revocation.
				James Dupre	Not guilty, probation revoked, 5 yr in prison
				Harry Kalesinski	Prison—FYCA.
				Richard Mc Grath	Prison—FYCA.
				Robert D. Rogers	Dismissed.
				Joseph P. Haller	Dismissed.
				Duane Strandish	Not guilty.
04-72-0061	624 lb.	Winston Annow	R. L. Croggner	Rodolfo Fuentes	4 yr prison.
04-73-0028	1,532 lb.	Jack Roberts	Jim Brock	William H. Grant	3 yr probation.
				Brian Bernard	3 yr probation.
				John S. Fields	3 yr probation.
				David L. Lush	2 yr probation.
04-74-0003	17,000 lb.	D. L. Middlebrooks	S. Carnuth	Michael W. Holloway	2 yr probation.
				David Carl	1 yr prison.
				Ronald Currents	2 yr prison.
				Donald Savage	2 yr prison.
				Thomas McDonald	2 yr prison.
				Harold Garbenton	2 yr prison.
				William Williams	2 yr prison.
				Alan Gibson	5 yr probation.
				Thomas Miller	3 yr probation.
				Alan Smith	1 yr prison.
				Janis R. Pridoch	1 yr prison.
				Richard Vooheis	Dismissed.
				Diana Brislee	Dismissed.
05-74-0087	2,441 lb.	Norman Roettger	Joel Fanning	William A. Lord	2 yr prison, serve 60 d, 22 mo parole.
05-73-0563	2,386 lb.	William D. Merthens	Ron Rose	Justin St. Edmund Ghorp	3 yr prison.
				Castel Brown	3 yr prison.
				Vibert Graham	Acquitted.
				Teresa Hudson	Acquitted.
				Charles N. Christian	36 mo prison, 6 yr special parole.
				Susan McDonough	96 mo prison, 4 yr special parole.
				Ross Chinnis	2 mo prison.
				Michael Martin	12 mo prison.
				John Van White	6 mo prison.
				Michael Lanasa	12 mo prison.
				Danny Reichert	P.S.I.
				William Forsythe	P.S.I.
01-74-0085	511 lb.	William Mertens	Don Fegruon	Scott Lee	P.S.I.

MIAMI REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 5)—Continued

Case number	Amount of marijuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
G1-73-0248	14,000 lb.	Peter Fay	Vincent Ante	Frederico Oagoberto Nurquez	4 yr prison, 3 yrs special parole.
G2-73-007	4,181 lb.	Robert Martin, Jr.	Lionel Loftin	Nelson Clemente Lopez-Paz	3 year prison, 2 yr special parole.
				William McGregor	24 mo probation.
				Donna Jenkins	12 mo pris
				Charles Jenkins	Dismissed.
				Christopher Campbell	48 mo prison.
				Eugene Fitzwater	36 mo prison, 48 mo probation, 30 mo suspended.
G8-73-0002	525 lb.	Charles Fulton	Herold Keefe	Troy Reed	48 mo prison.
				Jemes Uann	3 yr prison.
G8-73-0007	1,500 lb.	Charles Fulton	Harold Keefe	Tom Conally	3 yr prison.
G8-73-0015	2,000 lb.	William Morhens	Michael Sullivan	Robert Crawford	30 mo prison.
					3 yr probation.

DETROIT REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 6)

H1-73-0244	800 lb.	Oamon Keith	Richard Oelons	John Hecht	Currently in trial—no verdict to date.
				Louis Cunningham	

CHICAGO REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 7)

Negative report.

NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 8)

J4-72-0002	511 lb.	C. W. Allgood	Al Bowen	Johnny Freeman Riley, Steve Jewell, William Y. Smith, Steve Cavender	Each was sentenced to 1 to 5 yr with all but 6 mos suspended and to a probationary period of 5 yr upon completion of 6 mo.
J5-73-0035	509 lb.	Harold Cox	James Tucker	Ronald R. Lopez	Sentenced to 5 yr confinement with 5 yr special parole after confinement.
J1-73-0129	554 lb.	Alvin Rubin	Robert N. Habans, Jr.	Richard E. Ourr	12 mo probation.
				Paul E. Kinchen	36 mo probation.
				Lance Caspary	48 mo Youth Correction Act.
				Ira A. Stone	12 mo probation.

KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 10)

81

Negative report.

DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 12)

N1-73-0073	500 lb.	Alfred A. Arraj	Arthur Bosworth	Candice Gold Peter S. Gach David J. Didler	36 mo probation. 24 mo Federal penitentiary. Indeterminate sentence Federal Corrections Act.	Youth
				Charles S. Fisher Douglas E. Gunn Richard P. Williams	Fugitive 48 mo probation Indeterminate sentence, Federal Corrections Act.	Youth
N3-74-0005	1,070 lb.	Howard Bratton	Harris Hartz	Michael Louis Reynolds Edward Thomas Reynolds Douglas Ray Burns	24 mo probation \$1,000 fine. 24 mo probation \$1,000 fine. 6 mo to serve, 3 yr probation.	
N3-74-0016	1,500 lb.	Howard Bratton	Don Svet	Dan William Standee George William Murphy Joseph Benedict McDevitt	6 mo to serve, 3 yr probation. Dismissed. 90 d to serve, 33 mo probation case being appealed.	
N3-73-0029	1,058 lb.	H. Yearle Payne	Don Svet	Jack M. Stricklin, John H. Franklin, William H. Russell Jerry S. Shankles, Terry W. Johnson, William E. Harris.	4 yr probation, Youth Corrections Act. 1 mo prison, 11 mo probation. 1 yr probation. 5 yr probation.	
N3-74-0031	2,250 lb.	E. L. Mechem	Harris Hartz	Robert Lawrence Sandoval James Michael Simmons John Thomas Johnson Charles Blumstein II	Case still pending; trial set for Feb. 3, 1975	
N4-73-0074	740 lb.	Walter E. Craig	W. Ronald Jennings	Powell, Alice Wright, Raymond Francis Badami, James Ed- ward Maurer, William Charles Ream, Joseph John Patten		
N4-73-0091	968 lb.	James Walsh	Gerald Frand	Salvador Ramirez-Alvarado Guadalupe Martinez-Orozco Jesus Manuel Guerra-Valenzuela Jose Manuel Figueroa-Laprade		
N4-74-0033	815 lb.			Jorge Medina-Orozco John Richard Mattox James Rynn Ziegler Patrio Martinez-Castro Carlos Elias DeLira	Serve 30 mo, 3 yr special parole. Serve 18 mo, 3 yr special parole. Serve 18 mo, 3 yr special parole. 6 yr on 2 counts.	
N5-73-0093	851 lb.	J. A. Walsh	S. McNamee	James Rynn Ziegler Patrio Martinez-Castro Carlos Elias DeLira	Serve 2 yr, 3 yr special parole. Serve 30 mo, 3 yr special parole. Serve 30 mo, 2 yr special parole.	
N5-73-0116	1,236 lb.	W. C. Frey	S. Bailey	Carlos Elias DeLira Felix Bueno-Robles Mano Antonio Mendoza-Garcia Lorenzo Mendoza-Aviles	Serve 30 mo, 2 yr special parole. Serve 30 mo, 2 yr special parole. Serve 30 mo, 3 yr special parole. 1 yr under J.D.A.	
N5-73-0121	1,854 lb.	W. C. Frey	G. Frank	David Espinoza-Correll Louis Dominguez-Ortiz Manuel Yepis-Chacon Humberto Barrios-Ortega	Serve 30 mo, 3 yr special parole. Serve 9 mo, 3 yrs special parole. Serve 9 mo, 3 yr special parole.	
N5-73-0132	1,845 lb.	J. A. Walsh	Stupien McNamee			
N5-73-0136	723 lb.	W. C. Frey	S. McNamee			
N5-73-0138	723 lb.	W. C. Frey	S. McNamee			
N5-73-0143	673 lb.	J. A. Walsh	G. Kneuss			
N5-73-0182	505 lb.	W. C. Frey	G. Frank			
N5-74-0049	1,229 lb.	J. A. Walsh	D. Krauss			
N5-74-0051	895 lb.	J. A. Walsh	S. Bailey			
N5-74-0067	866 lb.	J. A. Walsh	S. McNamee			

See footnotes at end of table p. 95.

DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 12)—Continued

Case number	Amount of merhuena	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
N5-74-0074	2,412 lb.	W. C. Frey	G. Frank	Pedro Nunez-Hernandez	Serve 4 yr, fined \$2,000, 5 yr special parole
N5-74-0077	680 lb.	W. C. Frey	J. Mueller	Servador Nunez-Benitez	Serve 20 mo, 2 yr parole
N5-74-0091	846 lb.	W. C. Frey	B. Heurlin	Baudelio Perez-Martinez	Serve 15 mo
N5-74-0097	2,125 lb.	J. A. Walsh	G. Frank	Esteban Gonzales-Enriquez	Serve 17 mo
N5-74-0098	1,169 lb.	W. C. Frey	G. Frank	Jose Ignacio Ruiz-Pineda	Serve 3 yr, 5 yr special parole
N5-74-0102	1,072 lb.	W. C. Frey	S. Bailey	Glenn Lathrop Jones	Serve 3 yr, 5 yr special parole
N5-74-0110	763 lb.	W. C. Frey	J. Mueller	Antonio Felix-Valdez	Serve 30 mo, 3 yr special parole
N5-74-0151	550 lb.	J. A. Walsh	J. Mueller	Luis Alfonso Alve	Serve 18 mo
N5-74-0150	1,685 lb.	W. C. Frey	J. Mueller	Jose Aguirre-Torres	Serve 6 mo, \$1,000 fine, 3 yr special parole
N5-74-0166	933 lb.	W. C. Frey	G. Frank	Rodrigo Navarro-Martinez	Serve 2 yr, 3 yr special parole
N6-73-0033	2,250 lb.	W. C. Frey	Sarah Bailey	Frank Kevier Trauscht	Youth offender, custody for treatment
N6-73-0035	2,383 lb.	James Walsh	Ann Bowen	Hector Baaz-Vega	Serve 6 mo, J.D.A.
N6-73-0050	1,680 lb.	W. C. Frey	Sarah Bailey	Cervando Refugio Cruz-Lopez	4 yr
N6-73-0053	1,554 lb.	W. C. Frey	James Mueller	David Jimenez Madrid	2 yr
N6-73-0056	540 lb.	W. C. Frey	Dave Knauus	Miguel Angel Marquez-Palomino	1 yr
N6-73-0064	1,230 lb.	James Walsh	Sarah Bailey	Aurora Gomez-Chenez	2 yr
N6-74-0033	630 lb.	James Walsh	Sarah Bailey	Robert L. Richardson	4 yr
N6-74-0036	833 lb.	W. C. Frey	James Mueller	Salvador de la Huerta-Escobedo	18 mo
N8-73-0029	1,000 lb.	W. C. Frey	(Not available)	Malcolm S. Chapel	6 mo
N8-74-0002	572 lb.	C. A. Muecke	(Not available)	Craig M. Day	1 yr
N8-74-0034	918 lb.	C. A. Muecke	(Not available)	Clifford M. Berg	1 yr
N9-73-0002	611 lb.	W. C. Frey	Sarah Bailey	James P. Dunlap	9 mo
N9-74-0117	1,353 lb.	J. A. Walsh	Sarah Bailey	Robert W. Downey	9 mo
N9-74-0018	917 lb.	W. C. Frey	Gerald Frank	Dennis G. Boatner	9 mo
N9-74-0026	717 lb.	W. C. Frey	Stephen McNamee	Eduardo Madrid-Puentes	18 mo
N9-74-0047	590 lb.	W. C. Frey	Sarah Bailey	Epifanio Gonzales-Esquer	2 yr
N9-74-0050	869 lb.	W. C. Frey	Jos. Covington	Arturo Yescas-Murriette	2 yr
N9-74-0077	679 lb.	W. C. Frey	J. Covington	Bruce Taylor Clerk	90 days in jail, then deportation
N9-74-0079	500 lb.	J. A. Walsh	Gerald Frank	Francisco Nunez-Saavedre	3 yr prison, 33 mo probation
N9-74-0030	504 lb.	W. C. Frey	Gerald Frank	Teresa Bayen de Velesquez	Fugitive
				Jose de Jesus Velasco	Custody of attorney general 5 yr, 6 mo
				Manuel Niblas-Alegrie	Jail end remainder supervised probation
				Tomas Long-Gonzales	30 mo prison, 48 mo probation
				Marco Antonio Amaya-Lopez	24 mo prison, 36 mo probation
				Richard Frederick Cervantes	18 mo prison, 36 mo parole
				Victor Manuel Durazo	36 mo prison
				Richard Jose Chavez	Indeterminate sentence, Y.C.A.
				Alberto Valle-Moreno	36 mo prison
				Fernando Perez-Lopez	18 mo prison, 36 mo parole
				Francisco Jesus Noriega-Romo	36 mo prison (Youth Correction Act)
				Rudy Uribe Cota	18 mo prison, 36 mo parole
					36 mo prison, 36 mo probation

SEATTLE REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 13)

S	60680285200	670 lb	W. T. Beeks	Irwin Schwartz	Randolph Donald Ott	4 yr sentence, suspended. Probation. Imposed by Judge Sharp.
			Morrell E. Sharp		Richard Ernest Campbell	2 yr sentence. 2 yr special parole term imposed by Judge Beeks.
					Jon Harold Grotle	5 yr. 3-yr special parole term. Imposed by Judge Beeks.
					Del Eric Grotle	1 yr. This sentence provided on the condition that the defendant be confined in a jail type or treatment institution for a period of 4 mo, the remainder of the sentence would be suspended and the defendant placed on probation for the remainder of the 1 yr. Imposed by Judge Beeks.
					Wayne Elmer Nicholas	3 yr. 3-yr special parole term. Imposed by Judge Beeks.
					Thomas Francis Deegan	5 yr special parole term of 5 yr. Imposed by Judge Beeks.
P1-74-0024	731 lb		Morrell E. Sharp	Irwin Schwartz	Larry Daniel Hodges	2 yr. Suspended on condition of 4 mo in King County, Wash., jail on work-release program. 3 yr special probation.
					Ronald E. Bennett	This subject has pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor. He has not been sentenced as of the date of this report.
					Randolph W. Blankenship	This defendant has pleaded guilty but has not been sentenced as of the date of this report.
					Gene Ven Arsdale	This defendant is presently a fugitive. He has not entered a plea and has not been tried.

DALLAS REGIONAL OFFICE

AUSTIN TASK FORCE

7	3-X046	1,532 lb	Roberts	James Bock	William H. Grant	3 yr probation with special supervision.
			Roberts	James Bock	Brian D. Barnard	3 yr probation with special supervision.
			Roberts	James Bock	John S. Field	3 yr probation with special supervision.
			Roberts	James Bock	David L. Lucas	3 yr probation with special supervision.
73-X043	501 lb		Roberts	James Bock	Anthony Cruz	24 mo prison.
			Roberts	James Bock	Virgil Thompson	5 yr probation.
			Roberts	James Bock	Jason Blackwell	24 mo prison.
			Roberts	James Bock	Larry Stasa	Prosecution declined.
73-0119	1,283 lb		R. Garza	John P. Smith	Oscar Ramirez	8 yr prison, \$10,000 fine.
					Leonelo Sanchez	4 yr prison.

See footnotes at end of table p. 95.

DEL RIO DISTRICT OFFICE

Case number	Amount of marihuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
	500 lb.				
EAGLE PASS DISTRICT OFFICE					
06R0438800	1,520 lb.	J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Robert Clark	5 yr prison.
		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Ronald Clark	5 yr prison.
		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Daniel Sowerby	5 yr prison.
		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Daniel Gile	5 yr prison.
		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Wm. Avery	5 yr prison.
E06R0458400	641 lb.	J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Joseph Reyna	5 yr prison.
		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Charles Rakis	5 yr prison.
MD-73-0021	681 lb.	J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Rodrigo Cano	6 yr prison.
MD-73-0023		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Reyes Gonzales	5 yr prison.
		J. Wood	J. Kerr, Jr.	Jose Vallegas, Jr.	1 yr prison.

EL PASO DISTRICT OFFICE

M7-73-0006	277 kg.	E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Alfredo B. Garcia	5 yr prison; 5 yr special probation.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Betty F. Garcia	5 yr prison; 5 yr special probation.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Richard B. Young	5 yr prison; 5 yr special probation.
M7-73-0035 MEX.	1,795 lb.	E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Manuel Perez	5 yr prison; 5 yr special probation.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Jose Francisco Rodarte	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Rey Gutierrez-Sarda	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Javier Montez-Mora	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Hector Hughes	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Fernando Rueda-Auon	Sentence unknown.
M7-73-0058	615 lb.	E. Guinn	Harris and Ederer	Raul Lazo Aparicio	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
M7-73-0068 MEX.	350 kg.	E. Guinn	Harris and Ederer	Dimisio Marquez-Munoz	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	Harris and Ederer	Juan Ontiveros-Handy	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	Harris and Ederer	Kenneth McGhee	Sentence unknown.
M7-73-0083	578 lb.	E. Guinn	Harris and Ederer	Rosario Serrano	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Lorenzo Casarez	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
		E. Guinn	R. Ederer	Manuel Juan Gonzales	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
M7-73-0098	845 lb.	E. Guinn	Harris	Jose Carlos Flores	5 yr prison; 10 yr special parole.
M7-73-0105	507 lb.	E. Guinn	Harris	Jesus Vasquez Vasquez	Compliment dismissed by U.S. Magistrate
				Hernandez Jose Rodriguez	J. Boyd due to defendants physical condition (Paralyzed from the chest down).
				Jose Hernandez Garcia	Found guilty by jury; sentencing deferred
M7-73-9114	2,112 lb.	E. Guinn	Harris	Carlos Leon	Found guilty by jury; sentencing deferred
		E. Guinn	Harris	Juan Sobreros	Sentence unknown.
		E. Guinn	Harris	Roberto G. Bustos	Sentence unknown.
		G. Eulinn	Harris	Antonio R. Aguilar	Sentence unknown.

M7-73-0136	E. Guinn	Harris	José F. Ramirez	Sentence unknown.
	E. Guinn	Harris	José Orozco Valdez	Sentence unknown.
2,000 lb.	E. Guinn	Harris	Padro Anderson Sainz	Sentence unknown.
	E. Guinn	Harris	Alonso Lopez Sainz	Sentence unknown.
	E. Guinn	Harris	Oscar Viscarra Sainz	Sentence unknown.
	E. Guinn	Harris	Fausto A. Gablondo	Sentence unknown.
	E. Guinn	Harris	Carlos M. Quesada	Sentence unknown.
690 lb.	Wood	R. Ederer	Salvador Moreno Gomez	5 yr. prison; 4 yr. special parole.
916 lb.	Guinn	R. Ederer	Ray Rodriguez-Valverde	Acquitted; sentenced to 6 mo prison for illegal entry.
	Guinn	R. Ederer	Andres Arellano-Lopez	Acquitted; sentenced to 6 mo prison for illegal entry.
	Guinn	R. Ederer	Aurelio Serrano-Martinez	Acquitted; sentenced to 6 mo prison for illegal entry.
	Guinn	R. Ederer	Alvaro Gamboa-Cano	Acquitted; sentenced to 6 mo prison for illegal entry.
768 lb.	Wood	R. Ederer	Juan Bera-Martinez	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
500 lb.	Wood	R. Ederer	Jaime Zubias	Sentence unknown.
	Wood	R. Ederer	Juan Zubies	Sentence unknown.
	Wood	R. Ederer	Rafael Galaz	Sentence unknown.
	Wood	R. Ederer	Luis Taboade	Sentence unknown.
	Wood	R. Ederer	Dolores Taboade	Sentence unknown.
1,100 lb.	Wood	R. Ederer	Hector Cordero-Rivas	Defendant fled back into Mexico while in the custody of the U.S. Customs Service.
710 lb.	Guinn		Manuel Lorenzo Giron	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		James C. Robinson	Indet. sent to New Jersey.
	Guinn		Wm. Petrick Firestina	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
470 lb.	Guinn		Porfirio Cortaz	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		Manuel Serrano-Aguiler	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
500 lb.	Guinn		Wm. Bryon Mosler, III	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
539 lb.	Guinn		Denny Ray Poston	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole; 5 yr special parole to run conclusive.
	Guinn		John David Kapp	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole; 5 yr special parole to run conclusive.
	Guinn		Aurelio Lopez-Ortiz	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole; 5 yr special parole to run conclusive.
730 lb.	Guinn		Ramiro De Leon-Ramiro	5 yr prison; special parole 10 yr.
	Guinn		Hector Gonzalez-Reyes	5 yr prison; special parole 10 yr.
	Guinn		Hector Martinez-Munoz	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		Carlos Garey-DeLeon	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
650 lb.	Guinn		Hector Gallegos-Medrano	5 yr prison; 10 yr special parole.
650 lb.	Guinn		Juan Rocha-Garcia	5 yr prison; 10 yr special parole.
921 lb.	Guinn		Michael J. Halliday	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		Leland Paul Rowe	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		Manuel Antonio Duran	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		James Kennedy, Jr.	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		James P. Gratthan	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
505 lb.	Guinn		Franklin A. Hall	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		Hipolito Avila-Dalagado	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		Luis M. Montes-Chiraz	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
	Guinn		James Leroy Gaceron	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.

See footnotes at and of table p. 95.

EL PASO DISTRICT OFFICE—Continued

Casa number	Amount of marijuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
EP061E068496	476 lb.	Guinn Guinn		Michael Thos. Powell. Edward Craig Bower, Jr.	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole. 3 yr sentence (6 mo prison and 2½ yr suspended); 3 yr probation.
		Guinn		Gregg Taylor Bailey	3 yr sentence (6 mo prison and 2½ yr probation).
AP061E060149	853 lb.	Guinn Guinn		George Elsworth Stone. Pedro R. Vasquez, Jr.	Fugitive. 5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.

FALCON HEIGHTS DISTRICT OFFICE

MF-73-0031	731 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Edward E. Brooks	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
MF-73-0048	540 lb.	Connally	McDonough	Isidro R. Mendez	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
MF-73-0064	1,167 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Victoria Rodriguez	2 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
MF-73-0073	1,800 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Iden Garza	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
MF-74-0016	660 lb.	Cox	Tomkin	Guzman Gilberto	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
MF-74-0040	1,752 lb.	Garza	Sandoval	Rodolfo Fuentes	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
MF-74-0067	761 lb.	Garza	Smith	Jose G. Ydies	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
				Joaquin Predo	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.

HOUSTON DISTRICT OFFICE

MS-74-0010	1,200 lb.	Singleton Singleton Singleton	Horne Horna Horna	Joe Solis Juan Solis Francisco Solis	5 yr probation; \$2,500 fine. 5 yr probation; \$2,500 fine. 5 yr probation; \$2,500 fine.
------------	-----------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------	--	---

LAREDO DISTRICT OFFICE

545 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	David Daniels	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
528	Connally	Alfaro	Manuel T. Garcia	5 yr suspended; \$500 fine.
556 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Michael D. Gutierrez	5 yr suspended; \$500 fine.
886 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Carlos C. Sauceda	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
581 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Tito M. Patino	40 mo prison; 3 yr special parole.
1,095 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Jesus M. Cantu	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
528 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Rogelio Montes	4 yr prison; 6 yr special parole.
546 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Luis G. Gutierrez	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
863½ lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Benito Martinez	5 yr prison; 5 yr special parole.
548 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Oon E. Lampshira	Youth Corrections Act—Indeterminate.
568 lb.	Connally	Alfaro	Jose Gutierrez	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
			Carmen Martinez	18 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.

(7)	796 lb	Co.	Alfaro	Norberto Del Bosque	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; 6 mo to be served the remainder suspended and probated.
(7)		Co.	Alfaro	Simon Conde	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; 3 mo to be served the remainder suspended and probated.
(7)	650 lb	Co.	Alfaro	Leonard W. Campbell	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
	Caizo Machado	610 lb	Cox	Alfaro	Youth Correction Act—Indeterminate.
	Wanda Ballesteros		Cox	Alfaro	Youth Correction Act: 5 yr probation.
	Carlos Delamantes	801 lb	Cox	Alfaro	2 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; placed on probation for 5 yr; \$500 fine.
	Manuel Esparza, Jr.	801 lb	Cox	Alfaro	2 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
	Jerry W. McGlothan		Cox	Alfaro	Youth Correction Act—probated.
	Victoria Rodriguez	540 lb	Connally	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole.
	Ysidro Mendez	731 lb	Connally	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; 6 mo to be served and the remainder probated.
	Edward Brooks		Connally	Alfaro	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; 6 mo to be served and the remainder probated.
	Jacobo Mendoza, Jr.		Connally	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
	Iden R. Garza	1,167 lb	Connally	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
	Raquel Salinas	528 lb	Connally	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; 6 mo and remainder suspended.
	Robert P. Allen	580 lb	Connally	Alfaro	3 yr prison; 2 yr special parole; 6 mo to be served and remainder suspended.
	Gilberto Guzman	1,800 lb	Cox	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
	Gil Flores	800 lb	Connally	Alfaro	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
(7)		Connally	Alfaro	Willie Chape	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.
(7)	1,752 lb	Connally	Tonkin	Jose Vidales	5 yr prison; 3 yr special parole.

MCCALLEN DISTRICT OFFICE

74-0011	1,229 lb	R. Garza	John Smith	Abelardo Trevino-Perez	Youth Corrections Act—indeterminate; 2 yr probation.
74-0022	2,336 lb	C. Atkins	John Smith	Hector C. Gualardo	60 mo prison; 2 yr special parole; \$2,000 fine.
		C. Atkins	John Smith	Juan Chepa	36 mo prison; 2 yr special parole; \$2,000 fine.
		C. Atkins	John Smith	Victor Ortiz	24 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.
74-0031	814 lb	C. Atkins	John Smith	Refugio Ortiz	Youth Corrections Act—Indeterminate.
	806 lb	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Edward M. Reyes	48 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.
		R. Garza	J. Smith	Albert A. Arguillo	Youth Corrections Act—Indeterminate; 2 yr special parole.
74-0055	1,502 lb	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Basilio Ovalle-Silva	6 mo prison; 5 yr probation; \$500 fine.
74-0059	2,013 lb	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Roberto C. Ceberra	48 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.
M5-74-0061	731 lb	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Jose Irineo Garza	40 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.
M5-74-0064	550 lb	R. Garza	J. Smith	Pedro L. Cantu	6 mo prison; 16 mo probation.
		R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Baul H. Quintanilla	12 mo prison; 5 yr probation; 2 yr special parole.
M5-74-0065	571 lb	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Rodolfo C. Ovalle	60 mo prison; 54 mo probation and \$400 fine.
M5-74-0090	1,262 lb	R. Garza	J. Smith	Juan A. Carda	60 mo prison; 5 yr special parole.
M5-74-0109	694 lb	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Juan R. Martinez	60 mo prison; 5 yr probation.

See footnotes at end of table p. 95.

McCALLEN DISTRICT OFFICE—Continued

Case number	Amount of marihuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
M5-73-0014	870 lb.	R. Garza	C. Sandoval	Francisco S. Hernandez	36 mo prison; 1 yr probation.
		R. Garza	J. Smith	Julian H. De Leon, Jr.	36 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.
		R. Garza	J. Smith	Joe A. Ramirez	36 mo prison; 2 yr special parole.
		R. Garza	J. Smith	Adan A. Carazos	Dismissed.
M5-73-0019	675 lb.		J. Smith	YOUTH Corrections Act—Indeterminate.	
M5-73-0076	761 lb.		J. Smith	YOUTH Corrections Act—Indeterminate.	
M5-73-0083	980 lb.		J. Smith	YOUTH Corrections Act—Indeterminate.	
M5-73-0090	873 lb.		J. Smith	Lazaro C. Falcon	36 mo prison; 60 mo special parole.
			J. Smith	Ben Baca	60 mo prison; Youth Corrections Act.
			J. Smith	Ruben Camacho	Dismissed.
M5-73-0122	1,730 lb.		J. Smith	Edwardo Vela Garza	36 mo prison; 2 yr probation.
M5-73-0125	1,002 lb.		J. Smith	Laonel V. Rodriguez	6 mo prison; 5 yr probation.

MIDLAND DISTRICT OFFICE

MC-74-0017	630 lb.	Guinn	R. Ederer	Mario M. Hernandez	5 yr prison.
------------	---------	-------	-----------	--------------------	--------------

OKLAHOMA CITY DISTRICT OFFICE

M4-74-0001	4,654 lb.	L. Bohannon	P. Dawson	Jackie Lee Cosner	5 yr prison; \$5,000 fine.
		L. Bohannon	P. Dawson	Ralph E. Cosner	Youth Corrections Act; indicted.
		L. Bohannon	P. Dawson	John A. Moore	5 yr prison; \$5,000 fine.
		L. Bohannon	P. Dawson	Jerry M. Pinkley	Youth Corrections Act; indicted.

SAN ANTONIO DISTRICT OFFICE

M2-73-0052	970 lb.	A. Spears	J. Conant	John Wesley Hasty	15 yr prison; 30 yr probation; \$45,000 fine.
M2-73-0009	2,764 lb.	A. Spears	J. Conant	Frank Mejia Ruiz	5 yr prison; 10 yr special parole.
		A. Spears	J. Conant	David E. Maspero	5 yr prison; 10 yr special parole.
		A. Spears	J. Conant	Roger Pacheco	5 yr prison; 10 yr special parole.

CALEXICO DISTRICT OFFICE

R6-4828	794.2 lb.	Turrentine	Bower	Manuel Felix-Gonzalez	6 mo, 3 yr. suspended.
Dec. 1, 1972				Alvaro Magallanes-Rodriguez	A/G 3 yr.
R6-4844	591.8 lb.	Turrentine	Peterson	Florene Margaret Thibodeaux	A/G YCA 60 days, 3 yr. probation.
Dec. 14, 1972				David L. Lincoln	A/G YCA.
R6-4862	539 lb.	Goldburg	Schwarz	Ramon Morales Sanchez	A/G 1 yr, 1 day, 2 yr. pardon.
Dec. 27, 1972				Margarita Carmen Sanchez	Complaint dismissed.
				Maria Lourdes Garcia	Sent. susp. 3 yr. probation.

R6-4844.1 Jan. 16, 1973.	600.8 lb.	Thompson.	Peterson.	Reyna Bailey Garcia. Jesse Manuel Robles Pedilla.	Complaint dismissed. A/G indeterminate sentence, 2 yr. special parole.
R6-4902. Jan. 19, 1973.	706.2 lb.	Nielson.	Gott.	James Arthur Teylor. Carlos Valle-Castorene.	Not guilty. 6 mo. 3 yr. suspended.
R6-4903. Jan. 19, 1973.	805.2 lb.	Nielson.	Gott.	Jose Cruz Valle-Castorena.	1 yr. 1 day, 2 yr. parole.
R6-4917. Feb. 6, 1973.	664.4 lb.			Juan Manuel Cecene-Fernandez.	6 mo. 5 yr. suspended.
R6-4986. Mar. 22, 1973.	2,224.2 lb.	Nielson.	Curnow.	Daniel Reyes.	A/G 3 yr. 2 yr. prele.
R6-3668.1, Apr. 29, 1973.	563 lb.			John Lawrence Ryan. Ronald Joseph Tippit.	6 mo. 3 yr. suspended. Dismissed.
R6-4536.1 Apr. 30, 1973.	528 lb.	Strauss.	Freight.	Ruben Felix Suerrero. Prudencio Danny Naungayan.	6 mo. 3 yr. suspended. Sent. susp. 3 yr. probation.
R6-5031. May 28, 1973.	767.8 lb.			Suzene Douthitt. Terri Ann Maffei.	Dismissed. Dismissed.
R6-5034. June 4, 1973.	534.6 lb.			Robert Barker. Henry Martinez Terrones.	A/G YCA. A/G 1 yr. 1 day.
R6-5047. June 11, 1973.	759 lb.			Derrel Wayne Mathews. Robert Keith Clifton.	6 mo. 3 yr. probation. Dismissed.
R6-5060. June 27, 1973.	635.8 lb.			Josa Maria Avellan. Juan Cortez Ojeda.	YCA 3 mo. 3 yr. probation. Dismissed.
R6-73-0016. July 2, 1973.	1,104.4 lb.			David Reese Miller. Ronald Gale Kruger.	A/G FYCA 3 mo. A/G 1 yr. 1 day.
R6-73-0022. July 9, 1973.	567.6 lb.	Turrentine.	Peterson.	David Lizarraze Moreno. Narciso Ochoa Garcia.	A/G 2 yr. Not guilty.
R6-73-0056. August 13, 1973.	701.8 lb.			John Anthony Adams, Jr. Ronald Ponca Alvarez.	A/G YCA. A/G YCA.
R6-73-0071. August 29, 1973.	646.8 lb.			Petrick Eugene Burnfield. Miguel Cancio-Zuniga.	A/G 2 yr. susp. 5 probation. A/G 1 yr. 1 day.
R6-73-0087. September 28, 1973.	649 lb.	Nielson.	Curnow.	Jesus Infante-Martinez.	4 mo. 3 yr. suspended.
R6-73-0109. October 13, 1973.	706.2 lb.	Turrentine.	Coffin.	Francisco Selcado-Gomez.	120 days. 3 yr. suspended.
R6-73-0131. November 15, 1973.	530.2 lb.			Mike Sanchez Garcia.	3 yr. probation.
R6-73-0153. December 11, 1973.	536.8 lb.			Ascencion Limon-Solo. Marjorie Ann Richter.	A/G 18 mo. Dismissed.
R6-73-0156. December 13, 1973.	1,155 lb.	Thompson.	Hendricks.	Manuel Flores-Nava.	A/G 3 yr.
R6-73-0182. December 15, 1973.	660 lb.			Alejandro Guzman-Rodriguez.	A/G 3 yr.
R6-73-0188. December 18, 1973.	550 lb.			Eduardo Sanchez-Enriquez.	6 mo. 3 yr. suspended.

See footnotes at end of table p. 95.

CALEXICO DISTRICT OFFICE—Continued

Case number	Amount of marijuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
RE-73-0175..... December 20, 1973.	574.2 lb.....			Alejandro Flores-Saavedre.....	6 mo. 3 yr. probation.
RE-73-0179..... December 15, 1973.	514.8 lb.....			Gilbert Blakely.....	Suspended, 2 yr. probation. Dismissed.
RE-73-0184..... December 29, 1973.	534.6 lb.....	Turrentine.	Peterson.	Roye Ellen Herpar.....	18 mo. 5 yr., probation.
RE-74-0002..... Jan. 3, 1974.	618.2 lb.....	Turrentine.	Peterson.	Carlos Sanchez-Padilla.....	6 mo. 3 yr probation.
RE-74-0007..... Jan. 6, 1974.	545.6 lb.....			Daniel Bracamontes-Mesa.....	6 mo. 5 yr suspended.
RE-74-0028..... Jan. 25, 1974.	561 lb.....			David Padilla-Robles.....	6 mo. 5 yr suspended.
RE-74-0030..... Jan. 25, 1974.	629.2 lb.....			Alejandro Palacios-Figueroa.....	6 mo 3 yr suspended.
RE-74-0038..... Jan. 30, 1974.	4,400 lb.....			Mark Hanson Strangeland.....	YCA, 3 yr probation.
RE-74-0064..... Feb. 19, 1974.	1,207.8 lb.....			Jeffrey Ted Conley.....	YCA, 3 yr probation.
RE-74-0057..... Feb. 12, 1974.	2217.6 lb.....			Staven Ires Baker.....	YCA, 3 yr probation.
RE-74-0075..... Mar. 1, 1974.	545.6 lb.....			Duncan Scott McKenzie.....	2 yr 2 yr probation.
RE-74-0076..... Feb. 3, 1974.	787.6 lb.....			Juan Lamberto Rodriguez-Avila.....	6 mo 5 yr suspended.
RE-74-0082..... Mar. 7, 1974.	686.4 lb.....	Thompson.	Gotl.	Alberto Garate-Guizar.....	179 days, 2 yr suspended.
RE-74-0123..... Apr. 17, 1974.	550 lb.....			Miguel Padilla-Arias.....	Pending.
RE-74-0170..... June 5, 1974.	1095.6 lb.....			Francisco Robles-Gonzalez.....	Pending.
RE-74-0222..... July 22, 1974.	543.4 lb.....	Swartz.	Robinson	Carmen Rivera-Megene.....	Pending.
RE-74-0223..... July 31, 1974.	541.2 lb.....			Martha Pulido-Gonzalez.....	Pending.
RE-74-0237..... Sept. 25, 1974.	3143.8 lb.....			Manuel Rodriguez-Flores.....	A/G, 6 mo.
RE-74-0282..... Sept. 30, 1974.	584.4 lb.....			Javier Medina-Harrera.....	18 mo.
				Anthony Frank Cota.....	Dismissed.
				Jen William Hutchinson.....	Pending.
				Paul Val Manriquez.....	Dismissed.
				Donne Reed Winslow.....	Pending.
				Armando Fernando Becerra-Reynoso.....	Pending.
				Apollinar Rodriguez-Marquez.....	Pending.
				Javier Alejandro Becerra-Reynoso.....	Pending.
				Pritam Singh.....	Pending.
				Abalardo Ruiz-Ambriz.....	Pending.
				Dora Elena Rojas-Lopez.....	Dismissed.
				James Harold Lovell.....	Pending.
				Jerome Franklin Morse.....	Pending.
				Stephen David Abbott.....	Pending.
				Anthony Staven Theilas.....	Pending.
				Julio Castillo-Romero.....	Pending.

SY06R089100	782 lb	Howard B. Turrentine	Michael E. Quinton	Hugh Coughran	2 yr
SY06R897 400	567 lb	Nielson	William A. Bower	Patrick Elye	120 days
SY06R901 300	855 lb	Nielson	William A. Bower	Carlos Paraz-Corral	18 mo; 2 yr special parole.
SY06R903700	820 lb	Turrentine	William A. Bower	Oscar Perez-Ramos	1 yr, 1 day; 2 yr special parole.
SY06R904400	561 lb	Schwartz	L. Goldberg	Antonio Hernandez-Nunez	1 yr, 1 day; 2 yr special parole.
SY06R909000	580 lb	Turrentine	M. Quinton	Felipe Trujillo-Acosta	6 mo; 3 yr probation.
SY06R909400	723 lb	Thompson	S. Gort	Adam Diaz-Diaz	6 mo; 3 yr probation.
SY06R909400	723 lb	Thompson	S. Gort	Juan Avilar-Dcamp	6 mo; 3 yr probation.
SY06R910900	726 lb	Enright	R. Strauss	Joel Kevin Thoms	3 yrs probation.
SY06R916100	620 lb	Thompson	D. Curnow	Jorge Hernandez-Padilla	3 yr, 3 yr special parole.
SY06R918500	713 lb	Enright	D. Curnow	Javier Flores Godinez	1 yr, 1 day; 2 yr special parole.
SY06R925100	688 lb	Turrentine	D. Curnow	Gary Lloyd Moen	2 yr; 3 yr probation.
SY06R9052900	704 lb	Thompson	P. Nunez	Dennis John Rich	3 yr; 3 yr special parole.
SY06R90933000	655 lb	Enright	P. Nunez	Juan Banales Perez	8 mo; 2 yr special parole.
SY06R90935000	767 lb	Thompson	R. Riso	Miguel Cardenas-Magallon	3 yr; 5 yr probation.
SY06R90935000	767 lb	Thompson	R. Riso	Javier Moreno-Ruelas	3 yr; 5 yr probation.
SY06R90939000	1,430 lb	Nielson	T. Coffin	Teresa Maria Flores	3 yr probation.
SY06R90941700	1,100 lb	Thompson	R. Riso	Jeffrey Lynn	Youth Correction Act, Indefinite sentence.
SY06R90946700	534 lb	Thompson	M. Quinton	Juan Coretz-Dieda	6 mo; 3 yr probation; 2 yr special parole.
SY06R09532	605 lb	Thompson	D. Shanahan	Pilar Jimenez-Lomeli	2 yr; 2 yr special parole.
R2-74-0657	1,181 lb	Neilsen	Strauss	Armando Gonzalez-Amazcua	3 yr probation; 3 yr special parole.
R2-74-0779	495 lb	Hauk	Nunez	Luis Ambriz-Garcia	6 mo custody; 2 yr special parole; 5 yr probation.
R2-74-0793	660 lb	Neilsen	Robinson	Maria E. Rodriguez-Ortega	2 mo custody; 3 yr probation; 2 yr special parole.
R2-74-0793	660 lb	Neilsen	Robinson	Brigida Quinones de Sarrano	2 mo custody; 3 yr probation; 2 yr special parole.
N8-74-0069	1,111 lb	Schwartz	Bower	Manuel Rios-Angulo	2 yr custody; 2 yr special parole.

LOS ANGELES REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION NO. 14)

R1-73-0182	930 lb	William Gray	Jerry Newton	Robert Rubin	30 days prison, 24 mo probation.
R1-73-0318	8,500 lb	William Gray	Barbara Meiers	Mentfer Gasier	Deceased.
				Epimanto Lucero-Barcia	36 mo probation.
				Ramon Casillas-Garcia	24 mo probation.
				Margie Salazar-Lucero	12 mo probation.
				Guillermo Beltran-Rivera	Fugitive.
R1-73-0207	948 lb	E. Avery Gray	Terry Bird	John Leo McCarthy	Sentenced on December 10, 1973, to 2 yr (5 mo in jail, remainder of period suspended), 3 yr probation.
				John E. Bates	Sentenced on December 10, 1973, to 18 mos (2 mo in jail, remainder of period suspended), 2 yr probation.
				Kenneth Lorne Wells	Sentenced to 8 yr.
				George Howard Stratford	Sentenced to 5 yr.
				Susan Carol Ginsburg	Sentenced to 5 yr probation.
				Roger Weston Meador	Sentenced to 5 yr probation.
				Gary Dean Dourlis	Sentenced to 5 yr probation.
				Ross Walter Brown	Sentenced to study under Federal Youth Corrections Act.
R1-73-0231	1,320 lb	Gordon Thompson, Jr. A. Andrew	Elizabeth Meyer James Brannigan		

See footnotes at end of table p. 95.

LOS ANGELES REGIONAL OFFICE (REGIONAL NO. 14—Continued)

Case number	Amount of marijuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
RI-73-0219	1,000 lb	Judge Curtiss	Resich	Richard Victor Dean	Sentenced to 3 mo in prison and 5 yr probation.
RI-74-0069	858 lb	Judge Wholen	Rubal Cava	William Scott Smith	Sent for study, sentence pending.
RI-73-0321	800 lb	Gordon Thompson, Jr.	James Brannigan	Gary R. Lovenguth	36 mo probation.
				Lynn Brian Lovenguth	24 mo probation.
				Randolph S. Bissel	Trial scheduled for Nov. 11, 1974.
				Larry Michael Cardoni	Dismissed Mar. 18, 1974.
				John Craig Pelton	Sentenced to 5 yr in prison, 25 yr special parole.
				Gary Randall Clark	Sentenced to 4 yr in prison, 10 yr special parole.
				Thomas James Cook	Sentenced to 3 yr in prison, 10 yr special parole.
				Russell Haden Hart	Sentenced to 5 yr in prison, suspended, 5 yr probation.
				Ralph Peter Marito, Jr.	Sentenced to 4 yr in prison, suspended, 4 yr probation.
RI-73-0219	1,000 lb	Judge Curtiss	Resich	Jerome Paul Metzger	Charges dismissed.
RI-74-0069	858 lb	Judge Wholen	Rubal Cava	Gary R. Lovenguth	36 mo prison.
RI-74-0277	1,000 lb	Unknown	Unknown	Lynn Brian Lovenguth	24 mo probation.
Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Randolph S. Bissel	Trial scheduled for Nov. 11, 1974.
				Larry Michael Cardoni	Dismissed Mar. 18, 1974.
				Allen G. Palmer	Pending Federal court.
				Paul R. Pattengale	Fugitive.
				Thomas James Cook	Arrested Oct. 10, 1974.
				Russell Haden Hart	Sentenced to 3 yr in prison, 10 yr special parole.
				Ralph Peter Marito, Jr.	Sentenced to 5 yr in prison, suspended, 5 yr probation.
				Jerome Paul Metzger	Sentenced to 4 yr in prison, suspended, 4 yr probation.
				David Burton Peterson	Charges dismissed.
				Richard Dale Mail	On Dec. 10, 1973—imposition, sentence suspended, 3 yr probation.
				Deborah Ellen Puckett	Not indicted.
				Alan Dickson	Not indicted.
				Franklin Eugene Hobbs	Sentenced June 23, 1972, to 18 mo (6 mo) in jail, balance of period suspended.
				Richard Henry Espe	2 yr probation.
				Albert Alcalá	Sentenced same as Dickson.
				Christopher Bell Shelby	Indictment dismissed.
					Suspended sentence, placed on 3 yr Federal probation.
LA06R0808200	706 lb	Robert Kelleher	Brian O'Neill		

LA06R071900	1,600 lb	Foley	Larry Samanza	Gregory Handler	Sentenced to 1 yr for each of 2 counts to run concurrently, special 2-yr parole term.
				Kenneth Lee Gingerich	Sentenced to 3 yr, 6 mo in prison, remainder on parole, special 2-yr parole for count 1, count 2 same.
LA06R0711600	500 lb	Stephens	Larry Campbell	William Bruce Freeburn	Sentenced to 2 yr imprisonment, suspended 90-d psychiatric study and served 6 mo in Federal prison.
				William Reed Deill	Sentenced to 1 yr probation.
				Leslie Kay Deill	Sentenced to 3 yr probation.
				Brian James Hagen	Sentenced to 3 yr probation.
				Richard Merrill Heister	Sentenced to 3 yr probation.
LA06R0530403	1,100 lb	Pragerson	Earl Boyd	Thomas Walter Meggett	Sentenced to 4 yr probation, \$3,000.
				Ronald Cruz McCarty	Sentenced to 1 yr probation.
				George Patrick Olsey	Sentenced to 2 yr probation.
				Phillip Cipriano	Sentenced to 3 yr probation.
				Donald Lee Bryan	Sentenced to 3 yr probation, 2 mo jail, \$2,000.
				Wayne Sherman Morris	Sentenced to 3 yr probation, 3 mo jail, \$3,000.
				Vandra Dewey Nunley	3 yr probation.
LA06R0807300	14,680 lb	Ferguson	Chester Brown	Gilbert James Kuhn	6 mo with credit for time served.
				Leopoldo Redondo-Duran	6 mo with credit for time served.
				Carvajal Nicholas-Meza	Dismissed, insufficient evidence.
				Robin P. Gordon	Dismissed, insufficient evidence.
R3-73-7	958 lb	Schnacks	Lawrence Callahan	Sherrie P. Presnell	Dismissed, insufficient evidence.
				Thomas W. Bueno	\$5,000 fine, 6 mo prison, 54 mo probation and SS.
				Patrick M. McMullen	Dismissed, cooperating defendant.
				Anna M. Shideler	60 mo probation, \$5,000 fine, 60 mo SS.
				Ward S. Shideler, Jr.	\$5,000 fine, 6 mo prison, 54 mo probation, 54 mo SS.
				James Neat Sawyer	Sentenced to 6 mo in jail, 5 yr probation (Federal).
R7-73-0012	20,000 lb	Phillip C. Wilkins	William Shubb	Herbert Laurason	Sentenced 30 mo (Federal prison), 5 yr Federal probation, 2 yr special parole.
				Brian Lance Mailer	Sentenced 6 mo Federal prison, 5 yr probation, 2 yr special parole.
				Jerry McCoy	Sentenced 36 mo Federal prison.
				Richard Catlik	Sentenced 6 mo Federal prison, 5 yr probation, 2 yr special parole.
				Jerry Y. Melford	Sentenced 60 mo Federal probation, 2 yr special parole.
				Thomas May	special parole.
				Sebastian DeLa Roca Felix	Fugitive.
				Martin Wolley	Fugitive.
R7-73-0016	20,279 lb	Sherrill Halbert	Bruce Babcock		Sentenced 6 mo Federal prison, 36 mo special parole.
Unknown	6,710	Crocker	Dwayne Reyes	Timothy Peterson	Sentenced to 2 yr on Apr. 27, 1973.
				Ronald B. Craft	Sentenced to 3 yr on Jan. 29, 1973.
Unknown	7,040 lb	Crocker	Dwayne Reyes	Anthony Simone	Sentenced to 3 yr, Feb. 20, 1973.

See footnotes at end of table p. 95.

SAN DIEGO DISTRICT OFFICE

Case number	Amount of marihuana	Judge	Prosecutor	Defendant	Sentence
R 8-73-0001	939 lb	L. Nielson	R. Rizzo	Carlos Jaime-Barrios, Rafael Pini-Ornelas	Custody of A.G. 1 yr and 1 day, 2 yr special parole, unsup. (same dispo. for both def's.)
R8-73-0004	634 lb	E. Schwartz	L. Goldberg	Francisco Javier Beltran-Marcado, Antonio Silva-Martinez	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 2 yr special parole (same dispo. as above)
R8-73-0024	1,371 lb	L. Nielson	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Jesus Jaime Trigueros-Rodriguez, Manuel Rodriguez-Alvarado	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 3 yr special parole, 3 yr unsup. probation, 2 yr, to serve 6 mo, 3 yr probation
R8-73-0038	3,762 lb	G. Thompson	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Pope Lugo-Nava, Mario Godoy-Calderson, Raul Gonzalez-Gonzales, Maria Rodriguez-Nava	Fugitive—custody of A.G. 5 yr, to serve 6 mo, 5 yr probation custody of A.G. 5 yr, 10 yr special parole, custody of A.G. 6 mo suspended, 3 yr probation
R8-73-0039	3,170 lb	H. Turrentine	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Federico Gutierrez-Bramasco	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 2 yr special parole
R8-73-0041	748 lb	G. Thompson	S. Gott	Craig Morin Sweeney	Trial Pending (Oct. 31, 1974)
R8-73-0048	715 lb	G. Thompson	S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Jorge Lopez-Salinas	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 2 yr special parole
R8-74-0001	702 lb	H. Turrentine	S. Peterson	Alex Anthony Estevez	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 5 yr special parole
R8-74-0003	572 lb	G. Thompson	S. Gott	Jorge Perez-Donzalez	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 10 yr special parole
R8-74-0004	539 lb	W. Enright	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	David Benjamin Munoz	Custody of A.G. 18 mo, to serve 6 mo, 3 yr probation
R8-74-0018	1,712 lb	H. Turrentine	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Rafael Bravo	Custody of A.G. 18 mo, to serve 6 mo, 3 yr probation
R8-74-0023	1,023 lb	E. Schwartz	B. Bower	Victor Manuel Hernandez-Rodriguez	Custody of A.G. 2 yr, 2 yr special parole
R8-74-0024	790 lb	G. Thompson	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Raul Ocampo-Ovalle	Custody of A.G. 5 yr, 5 yr special parole
R8-74-0027	1,100 lb	H. Turrentine	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Casimiro Martinez-Rodriguez	Custody of A.G. 2 yr, 2 yr special parole
R8-74-0031	1,894 lb	G. Thompson	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Tomas Lopez-Rodriguez, Richard Vasquez-Avilos, Jose M. Calles-Coronel	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, 5 yr special parole
R8-74-0058	605 lb	L. Nielson	U.S. attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Francisco Moreno-Moreno	Custody of A.G. until 21st birthday (Oct. 22, 1975)
R8-74-0065	660 lb	A. Hawk	U.S. Attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Martin Chavez-Gonzalez	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, to serve 4 mo, 3 yr Probation, 2 yr special parole
R8-74-0066	777 lb	E. Schwartz	B. Bower	Jesus Gonzalez-Zepeda	Custody of A.G. 3 yr, to serve time served, 5 yr probation
R8-74-0069	1,734 lb	G. Thompson	P. Nunez	Alejandro Encinas-Arellano, Jose Arambula-Huerta, Jose Aguirre-Gutierrez	Custody of A.G. 6 mo, 5 yr probation
R8-74-0073	1,093 lb	H. Turrentine	U.S. Attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Jose Luis Villa-Angel	Custody of A.G. 18 mo, 2 yr special parole, Custody of A.G. 5 yr, to serve 6 mo, 5 yr probation
R8-74-0074	2,085 lb	A. Hawk	R. Strauss	Maria Castro-Valdez	Custody of A.G. 1 yr and 1 day, 5 yr special parole
R8-74-0075	706 lb	A. Hawk	U.S. Attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Francisco Ceballos-Aguilar	Complaint dismissed in Mag. court. FTCA A.G. 5 yr. to serve 6 mo, 5 yr probation
R8-74-0076	627 lb	W. Enright	W. Shaw	Javier Mejia-Rivera	2 yr special parole
R8-74-0079	546 lb	H. Turrentine	b. Peterson	Francisco Alvarez-Garcia, Ruben Flores-Camacho	5 yr probation on each count
				Jerald Leroy Smith	Custody of A.G. 5 yr., to serve 6 mo, 5 yr probation
					Custody of facility for diagnostic study for 60 days
					Custody of A.G. 2 yr., 2 yr. special parole.

R8-74-0084	757 lb.	A. Hawk	W. Shaw	Antonio Morales-Avila	Custody of A.G. 5 yr. to serve 5 mo. 5 yr. probation, 2 yr. special parole, custody of 6 mo in addition to above.
R8-74-0090	537 lb.	H. Turrentine	U.S. Attorney, San Diego, Calif.	Grace Maria Gonzales	Set for disposition Dec. 2, 1974 (dismissal probable).
R2-74-X0007	535.12 lb.	William Enright	Steve Paterson	Armando Rivero-Gomez	Custody of A.G. 3 yr. to serve 120 days, 3 yr probation, 3 yr special parole.
R2-74-X200	600 lb.	William Enright	Steve Pettiz	Francisco Abraham Lee-Lara	(Same sentence as above.)
R2-74-0004	728 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	T. M. Coffin	Michael Wilson	4 mo. prison/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0068	1,056 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	D. P. Currow	James Stanley Pochodowicz	4 mo. prison/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0103	827 lb.	Howard B. Turrentine	S. N. Peterson	Gary Gilmore	To be sentenced Nov. 4, 1974.
R2-74-0118	605 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	J. F. Arbetman	David McDonald	To be sentenced Nov. 4, 1974.
R2-74-0178	593 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	J. F. Arbetman	Donald Brown	To be sentenced Nov. 4, 1974.
R2-74-0179	528 lb.	Howard B. Turrentine	P. E. Nunez	Marco A. Chavez-Ortiz	2 yr. prison/2 yr. special parole.
R2-74-0183	563 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	M. E. Quinton	Guadalupe A. Galvez-Lopez	6 mo. prison/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0183	677 lb.	William Enright	R. E. Strauss	David E. Kurtz	3 yr./5 yr. special parole.
R2-74-0186	525 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	J. F. Arbetman	Michael N. Robinson	6 mo./2 yr. probation.
R2-74-0199	1,150 lb.	Gordon J. Thompson	C. R. Gott	Rafael Santiago-Luis	4 mo./2 yr. special parole/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0223	1,742 lb.	Howard B. Turrentine	S. N. Peterson	Antonio Almaraz-Guerrero	5 mo./2 yr. special parole/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0227	660 lb.	William Enright	C. R. Nunez	Contrado Barajas-Guiterro	6 mo./5 yr. probation.
R2-74-0357	1,729 lb.	Howard B. Turrentine	S. N. Peterson	Manuel Rodriguez-Alvarado	6 mo./2 yr. special parole/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0366	661 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	J. F. Arbetman	Manuel Rodriguez-Alvarado	6 mo./2 yr. probation.
R2-74-0387	659 lb.	Gordon Thompson	D. G. Hendricks	Manuel Oviedo-Tega	6 mo./2 yr. probation.
R2-74-0551	558 lb.	Howard B. Turrentine	S. N. Peterson	Juan M. Viloso-Siso	Probation for period of minority (1.5 yr.).
R2-74-0552	750 lb.	Leland C. Nielsen	R. E. Strauss	Rogelio Altemirano, Jr.	5 mo./2 yr. special parole/3 yr. probation.
R2-74-0631	631 lb.	Andrew A. Hawk	D. G. Hendricks	Manuel Moreno-Solano	3 yr./2 yr. special parole.
R2-73-0527	594 lb.	Enright	Strauss	Juan Gonzalez-Solano	3 yr./5 yr. special parole.
R2-73-0602	1,200 lb.	Neilson	Nunez	Samuel Madrigal-Frevino	Probation for period of minority (2 yr.).
R2-73-0605	1,376 lb.	Thompson	Strauss	John A. Lobo	4 yr./5 yr. special parole.
R2-73-0608	500 lb.	Thompson	Currow	Juan M. Bolanos-Muniz	5 yr. probation.
R2-73-0647	636 lb.	Enright	Strauss	Rodrigo Valdez-Eze	6 mo./5 yr. probation.
R2-73-0655	570 lb.	Enright	Strauss	Rodrigo Prieto-Pinon	2 yr./3 yr. special parole.
R2-73-0653	516 lb.	Thompson	Brannigan	Jorge Duarte-Tostado	3 yr. probation; 3 yr. special parole.
R2-73-0133	3,120 lb.	Thompson	Neilson	Carlos Montero-Velasquez	5 yr. probation; 2 yr. special parole.
R2-73-0186	600 lb.	Enright	Nunez	Eduardo Chavira-Carrasco	Custody 1 yr and 1 day under 428(x2); 2 yr special parole.
R2-73-0206	694 lb.	Enright	Quinton	Phillip Rodriguez Luna	2 yr probation.
R2-73-0220	523 lb.	Turnline	Quinton	Jose Guzman	6 mo custody; 3 yr probation.
R2-73-0223	1,841 lb.	Thompson	Hendricks	Gabina Garcia-Arballo	3 yr custody; 3 yr special parole.
R2-73-0230	1,000 lb.	Turnline	Gott	Josa Villahormuz-Nava	3 yr probation.
R2-73-0252	536 lb.	Neilson	Arbetman	Jaime Villahormuz-Luniga	2 yr custody; 3 yr probation.
				Robert Flint	\$5,000 fine; 6 mo custody; 2 yr special parole; 5 yr probation.
				Jerome R. Ebnel, Jr.	\$1,500 fine; 5 yr. special parole.
				Jose Garcia-Reynoldo	1 yr and 1 day custody; 2 yr special parole.
				Armando Esquivel-Dejatorre	3 yr probation.
				Ramon Marroquin-Beal	5 yr probation; 2 yr special parole.
				Manuel Medina-Angulo	3 yr custody; 3 yr special parole.
				Carlos Moreno-Solano	3 yr custody; 2 yr special parole.
				Humberto Villanueva-Rubalcaba	1 yr and 1 day custody; 2 yr special parole.

1 Hashish.

2 Hashish oil.

3 Former Customs agency service case numbers not available.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Heinz.

Mr. HEINZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. DuPont, in your statement you discuss the fact that the past favorable trend on heroin had trailed off and that we are no longer facing such a favorable trend. What is the pattern of use and abuse with drugs other than heroin? Is this still spiraling upward?

Dr. DuPont. I think it is fairly similar. What we are experiencing now is a continuing increase in drug use, but not the explosive kind of increase that we had a few years ago. I am unable to identify any drug and say that we clearly have a dramatic downward trend in its use. LSD might be the only possibility. Mostly that we are finding is reduced negative consequences associated with the use of drugs as a greater understanding of the drugs develop within the drug using culture. But it is very difficult to point to any of the drugs and say, we have really licked this one and we can move on the others. We still have all the problems we had before.

Mr. HEINZ. In view of the use of cocaine, marihuana and other drugs, would you say that in any sense we face an epidemic of drug addiction?

Dr. DuPont. I think the situation has more or less stabilized in the last few years. One of the definitions of an epidemic is a rapidly changing rate of a health problem, so in that sense we don't have an epidemic but we do have widespread use. In Public Health we use the word "endemic" to describe that phenomenon.

Mr. HEINZ. With respect to your testimony on page 6 and again on page 8 that there has been an increased demand for treatment slots in Pennsylvania, my State, could this be due to the fact that you have concentrated your enforcement efforts in other cities such as New York and Washington, D.C., to the detriment of Pennsylvania? Could that be a possibility?

Dr. DuPont. Well, Mr. Bartels could perhaps speak more effectively to that. We have not found very much addict mobility anywhere. In other words, when the situation gets hot in a particular city, we find a very small number of people who are sufficiently mobile that they move to another city where heroin may be more readily available. There just is very low mobility of the consumer on the demand side.

Perhaps Mr. Bartels could comment on the movement of the suppliers.

Mr. HEINZ. To what then do you attribute the demand in treatment slots?

Dr. DuPont. We saw Philadelphia on a downward course with respect to heroin addiction a year or so ago and that is no longer the case. It is now a city that has absorbed all the available Federal treatment capacity.

Mr. HEINZ. Thank you, Dr. DuPont.

Mr. Bartels, did your Division of the Justice Department make any recommendations to the State Department regarding the situation in Turkey when it became clear early in this year that Turkey was going to unilaterally modify its prior agreement with the United States?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we worked together on it.

Mr. HEINZ. What recommendations did you make?

[The following information was received for the record:]

CONCERN OVER RESUMPTION OF POPPY CULTIVATION IN TURKEY EXPRESSED BY
DEA TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Upon learning of the Turkish intentions to rescind the opium ban, DEA both in Washington, D.C. and Turkey expressed to Department of State officials our growing concern over the resumption of the opium poppy cultivation in Turkey. Logically, the rationale for DEA's concern stemmed from the vast amounts of opium which had historically been diverted from Turkish licit production for more than twenty years. This diversion fed in excess of 500,000 U.S. heroin addicts through the late 1960's and early 1970's.

DEA's concern centered primarily upon the above as well as the first-hand knowledge provided by DEA experts who had worked with the Department of State and the government of Turkey in the years prior to the opium poppy ban.

In the Spring of this year Administrator Bartels wanted to hold a press conference but was vetoed by the Department of State due to the sensitivity of the Turkish situation.

During May of this year Administrator Bartels and Chief of the International Operations Division Cusack travelled to Turkey and discussed the lifting of the ban with Ambassador Macomber.

At inter-agency meetings at the Department of State Cusack and his key staff discussed DEA's concerns with the lifting of the ban and the enforcement problems envisioned once opium is cultivated again in Turkey.

Mr. BARTELS. Well, we made a number of recommendations. They changed during the course of the negotiations but we first tried to persuade through diplomatic methods the Government of Turkey not to go in at all. We then tried to increase through multilateral approaches the diplomatic pressure from other countries not to go in. We discussed with them various control techniques and it was on that level as well as the international law enforcement level that we made most of our recommendations.

Mr. HEINZ. What recommendations did you make to the administration with respect to insisting that Turkey maintain its ban on the production of the opium poppy?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, we recommended that the United States insist that they maintain that and there was no disagreement on that. The problem came then as to what consequences should be taken if they ignore it.

Mr. HEINZ. Did you at any point recommend the termination of foreign aid to Turkey?

Mr. BARTELS. No; that was not my province. That is purely a province of State and Congress. We were asked for our estimates on law enforcement techniques and on potential diversion and we gave them.

Mr. HEINZ. So you recommended no sanctions whatsoever to be taken?

Mr. BARTELS. I was not called upon to recommend the cutoff of aid because there are obviously other considerations—Cyprus, NATO, a whole slew of other considerations which are frankly beyond my limited expertise and responsibility.

Mr. HEINZ. I imagine as a result of Turkey's decision you will be needing the additional resources to do your job, and I think you have pointed that out previously.

Mr. BARTELS. That is correct.

Mr. HEINZ. I think you have provided valuable information to the committee and I thank you, Mr. Bartels.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. Ernst, Mr. Hastings asked you about the Cabinet committee not having had a meeting since November 27, 1973. You mentioned that although the Cabinet committee did not meet to discuss the problem of Turkey that your working group did meet. What recommendations did your working group make with respect to Turkey?

Mr. ERNST. The problem was, of course, to make an assessment as to whether or not after the Turkish Government announced that it had decided finally to lift the ban——

Mr. HEINZ. Let's take it a step at a time, then. What recommendations did your working group make prior to the formal announcement by the Turkish Government, which was on July 1 but several months after it had become clear that the Government of Turkey was considering this step? What recommendations did your working group make?

Mr. ERNST. Well, I am not able to speak to that prior period, since I just came on to this work July 1. However, I know from my colleagues that decisions were made, of course, to exert the influence of diplomacy on the Turkish Government to make sure that that Government was aware of the very great concern with which the United States viewed the possible resumption of opium production in Turkey.

Mr. HEINZ. Would it be fair to say that you know in part because you came in on July 1 but you are not aware of any specific recommendations that the working group made to the Secretary of State or to the President? Is that correct?

Mr. ERNST. That would be correct, yes.

Mr. HEINZ. On page 15 of your statement you discuss the protocol that was offered by the United States with respect to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. You say that it would considerably strengthen controls over illicit production but that we need at least eight more countries to ratify that protocol.

Now, I believe, it was back in November 1972 that that protocol was first ratified by the United States and 32 other countries of the 40 needed to ratify it since then. It seems to be going slowly. We are nearly in November 1974. You apparently think this is an important protocol. Why is it going so slowly?

Mr. ERNST. Largely because of the constitutional processes in other governments. I think that is the primary reason.

Mr. HEINZ. Should the United States take any additional actions to stimulate consideration of this by other countries?

Mr. ERNST. We have and we continue to.

Mr. HEINZ. I assume that there are numerous countries, for instance, that could ratify it which are receiving foreign aid of various kinds.

Mr. ERNST. Yes. I believe it would be safe to say that as international agreements involving this number of countries are involved go, the rate of accession is quite good in respect to this. These things do take a long time. However, we use every occasion to encourage others because we are keenly interested in the strengthened controls that this will enable.

Mr. HEINZ. Very well. Thank you.

One last question.

Mr. ERNST. May I just add, sir, that when we ourselves ratify the Psychotropic Convention it will undoubtedly help in speeding up the coming into force of this other convention.

Mr. HEINZ. I think that is an important point. I gather that is still pending in the U.S. Senate.

Mr. ERNST. Yes.

Mr. HEINZ. How long has it been there?

Mr. ERNST. Well, it has been there for 2 years, I believe.

Mr. HEINZ. Two years. That is a long time.

Mr. ERNST. Three years.

Mr. HEINZ. Three years.

Mr. Chairman, one final question, if I may.

I note on one of the attachments to your testimony, namely the table which deals with the way money is spent by activity in South-east Asia and Mexico, that of the \$35,416,000 spent slightly over \$30 million of that money is for equipment and about \$2.7 million is for personnel. What safeguards and other techniques are we employing to make sure that the equipment, which I assume is equipment like helicopters and other hardware of that nature, is being appropriately used? It does come to mind that in countries like Thailand and Laos, perhaps even in Burma, there could be other uses for those helicopters in terms of military uses. What safeguards do we have?

Mr. ERNST. We have the safeguard of an intergovernmental understanding that this equipment serves the purpose for which it was meant.

Mr. HEINZ. What monitoring is there?

Mr. ERNST. We have our embassy staff in each of these countries. We have other American officials, Drug Enforcement Agency officials, there who are interested in the same work who will be aware of the uses of this equipment.

Mr. HEINZ. Do you receive regular reports on the use of the equipment or not?

Mr. ERNST. Well, we are just getting to the stage in this program where important amounts of equipment are being transferred.

Mr. HEINZ. I see.

Mr. ERNST. It is too early to have had a bulks of experience yet.

Mr. HEINZ. Might I just encourage you, since three of these four countries to which you are sending equipment are in proximity to a rather critically balanced international situation—namely, the countries that are part of the Indo-Chinese conflict that has been going on for many, many years—that it might be useful to try and do your best to make sure that none of this equipment is diverted to other less desirable purposes.

Mr. ERNST. I can assure you that we are very sensitive to that point and that every feasible monitoring and control measure, within the confines of the agreement whereby we turn this over to another sovereign government, will be taken.

Mr. HEINZ. Fine, Mr. Ernst. I am sure you will. Thank you very much.

Mr. ERNST. Thank you.

Mr. HEINZ. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Kyros.

Mr. KYROS. Mr. Ernst, I notice in your statement you say that we paid the Turkish Government \$15 million for an agreement to totally ban the growing of the opium poppy but now they are growing it again. So we poured that \$15 million down the drain, is that it?

Mr. ERNST. Well, some of that did go into what turned out to be a useful experience in crop substitution.

Mr. KYROS. How useful is it when the Turks are now growing opium poppies again?

Mr. ERNST. From the point of view of the immediate Turkish problem it would be difficult to say it was useful in the context in which you are presenting it. However, we are very interested around the world in what possibilities crop substitution offers as a technique to get at the supply of these dangerous drugs.

Mr. KYROS. But it requires the full cooperation of the host government, does it not? Now you say here on page 10 of your statement, "We would, of course, have vastly preferred that the ban were not lifted." Then you say, "Information from Ankara is that new and substantial enforcement measures are being developed."

Well, isn't it a fact that just within the last 2 or 3 months one of the greatest hauls of heroin was picked up in New York essentially through some French connection and that essentially this came from Turkey?

Mr. ERNST. I am not familiar with that.

Mr. KYROS. Mr. Bartels.

Mr. BARTELS. That is correct.

Mr. KYROS. What are you talking about here?

Mr. ERNST. The cultivation of the poppies by countries not involved in the production of opium will be done in keeping with the new system, the poppy straw system, whereby the farmer does not collect the opium.

Mr. KYROS. And you really think the Turkish Government is going to enforce that against the Turkish farmer who is constantly courted and seduced by their own kind of gangsters over there and hoodlums to subvert the crop?

Mr. ERNST. We are encouraging by every means we have to assure that the controls will be as good as they can be. We just have to wait and see what happens.

Mr. KYROS. Mr. Ernst, I cannot believe that. We have armed a Turkish Army that is invading Cyprus today with American weapons, American tanks and American guns and planes and every day we encourage them to leave. I think we have underwritten their poppy growing.

What were the crops that were substituted for the opium poppy?

Mr. BARTELS. Sunflower, wheat and some cattle development projects.

Mr. KYROS. How extensive? How many tons of sugar beets were harvested?

Mr. ERNST. I don't have this information, sir, but there was a General Accounting Office report which gave a favorable assessment of the crop substitution activity in Turkey.

Mr. KYROS. What sanctions have you recommended against the Turkish Government in case they don't follow our repeated suggestions, as you call them, our grave concern to stop the flow of this deadly poison to the United States?

Mr. ERNST. Two things will happen if it is found that the controls are not effective. No. 1, the determination will be made under section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act, American legislation.

Mr. KYROS. What are we sending them under that?

Mr. ERNST. I will have to get that for the record.

[The following statement was received for the record:]

In fiscal year 1974 we provided approximately \$161 million of military assistance grants and loans and \$6 million in economic assistance grants and loans.

Mr. ERNST. No. 2, the International Narcotics Control Board would, if controls were ineffective, make a finding to that effect and recommend that other countries embargo the legal purchase of opiates from Turkey.

Mr. KYROS. Let me ask you this. The Foreign Assistance Act, under military sales and credits we send to Turkey around at the rate of \$209 million-plus a year, is that right?

Mr. ERNST. Mr. Congressman, you are way out of my area, I am only working on narcotics. Questions such as that I would respectfully request that you ask someone from the Bureau of European Affairs.

Mr. KYROS. I am sure you are competent in your area but it is one country we are dealing with and it is one United States and we don't operate here separately or departmentalized. We should be able to tell the Turkish Government if they do not do thus and so we can be compelled to—we can be friends but you should know the weapons.

You just say, "We would have vastly preferred that the ban were not lifted." On page 7 of his statement Mr. Bartels tells us, "Despite Turkey's announced intention to thoroughly police this process, we fervently hope that new shipments of heroin do not again appear on the East Coast."

We are dealing with the Turks who are going to do anything they want to that suits themselves and their own people, and even today they are growing the opium poppy.

How big was that haul in New York?

Mr. BARTELS. Seventy-five kilos.

Mr. KYROS. Is that pretty big?

Mr. BARTELS. The largest in the past 3 years, one of the largest we have ever made.

Mr. KYROS. When do you estimate that started out from Turkey with your own intelligence?

Mr. BARTELS. From which province in Turkey?

Mr. KYROS. No. From when do you estimate?

Mr. BARTELS. It had to be prior to 1971.

Mr. KYROS. It had to be prior to 1971. And the people were still operating out of Turkey?

Mr. BARTELS. That is right.

Mr. KYROS. Don't you think the time has come to take some firm steps with the Turks?

Mr. ERNST. There was no production in 1972 and 1973 so this haul must have come from stockpiled morphine or opium.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, it did. It came from stockpiled heroin which had been processed from morphine prior to 1971.

Mr. KYROS. From France?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. KYROS. So there is still a French connection?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. KYROS. There is not a mere trickle?

Mr. BARTELS. No.

Mr. KYROS. There is some concern.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. KYROS. I ask what weapons we should give you to stop the nonsense of fervently hoping with the Turkish Government with whom we want to be friends. Other people who are gangsters and hoodlums will take any price they can extract from this country and they have this incredible commodity that they can use. It seems to me the time has come for us to be very firm and very tough. No one is going to watch out for us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. We have covered some very broad points now and I think the committee would like to zero in on some specifics. If it would be convenient, I would like to adjourn now until about 2 o'clock if that would be convenient.

The committee stands adjourned until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]

AFTER RECESS

[The committee reconvened at 2:25 p.m., Hon. Paul G. Rogers, presiding.]

Mr. ROGERS. The subcommittee will come to order.

This afternoon we are continuing our oversight hearings on drug abuse and the heroin problem.

I was interested in knowing what kind of coordination and cooperation you are getting between the various agencies. I am interested in knowing the relationship between DEA and Customs and Immigration. I also notice the State Department said CIA is involved in some strategic intelligence, and I would like to know what cooperation and what contact is maintained there.

Then perhaps if you could just give us a brief rundown with the States, Mr. Bartels. Then I would like to have that same information, Dr. DuPont, in the treatment field in how we are coordinating. Could we coordinate, for instance, activities in the law enforcement field with the treatment and so forth?

Mr. BARTELS. DEA's relationship with the other law enforcement agencies include increased relationship with the FBI. Director Clarence Kelley came in with an Assistant Director in charge of narcotics matters. He assigned 17 senior agents according to regional concept which matches that of the Organized Crime Task Force to work with us and we in turn designated 17 agents to institutionalize the flow of information back and forth and make sure that we were exchanging and that it wasn't on an ad hoc personal basis as sometimes it tends to be.

We have signed, I believe, three operating agreements with the Bureau of Customs and I can supply those for the record.....

Mr. ROGERS. I think that would be well to have.

[Testimony resumes on p. 118.]

[The following material was received for the record:]

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF NARCOTICS RELATED INFORMATION

Background: The U.S. Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have a continuing need to cooperate through the exchange of narcotics related information in order to accomplish our respective and complementary missions. The Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System (NADDIS) has been developed by DEA to provide a centralized file of narcotics violators for the use of DEA enforcement personnel. The Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) has been developed by Customs to provide a centralized file of subjects of interest to the Treasury Enforcement Community. Narcotics related information collected and entered into TECS and NADDIS must be made available to Customs and DEA. Availability of DEA's NADDIS information will ensure wide dissemination of this data base and greatly enhance Customs total interdiction efforts against all forms of smuggling, including that of narcotics and dangerous drugs at ports of entry and along the land and sea borders. Accessibility to TECS narcotics records by DEA through NADDIS will aid substantially in carrying out the DEA's narcotics investigative efforts. The volume of inquiries and response time constraints for Customs at airports, seaports and land border crossing stations make it imperative to exchange the reference data and store at least an index in the respective systems.

Purpose: To define the responsibilities of Customs and DEA in regard to an automated interface between the TECS and NADDIS systems.

Customs/DEA Responsibilities:

1. Review all narcotics related records in TECS and NADDIS for incorporation into the system.
2. Exchange tapes containing all data elements of narcotics related information that have been reviewed.
3. Review the exchanged tapes for input into the respective systems.
4. Identify the data elements that will be input into the respective systems.

5. Order communications circuit between TECS and NADDIS.
6. Input the records into TECS and NADDIS.
7. Provide full record accessibility to each system through the system identification numbers for retrieval after a hit on an index record.
8. Provide for regular updates after the initial tape exchange.
9. Exchange TECS and NADDIS terminals at the respective Headquarters Offices for the purpose of facilitating communications and expediting the entry of lookouts.
10. Customs will continue support to the DEA ODALE system through December 31, 1973.
11. DEA and Customs will share equally (50% - 50%) in the installation and monthly charges for Telecommunications cost between TECS and NADDIS.

Approved:

(signed)
 John A. Hurley
 Assistant Commissioner
 Administration
 U.S. Customs Service 12-30-73

Approved:

(signed) 12-26-73
 N. B. Coon
 Assistant Administrator for
 Administration and Management
 Drug Enforcement Administration

*This is a copy of the original signed agreement executed on 12/26 and 12/30/73.



THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
WASHINGTON

FILE



SEP 28 1973

REPLY TO

FAC-12-07-A:F:C 0

Mr. N. B. Coon, Director
Administration and Management
Drug Enforcement Administration
1405 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20537

Dear Mr. Coon:

Both copies of the attached agreement between the Drug Enforcement Administration and U. S. Customs Service, concerning communication support in the U. S./Mexico border area, have been executed.

This agreement is a slight modification of the one that you recently forwarded. I assume you will find the modifications acceptable, in which case, please sign and return one copy to me. We are pleased to be able to assist DEA in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John A. Hurley
Assistant Commissioner (Administration)

Enclosures

Effective Date: OCT 2 1973

AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
(THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)
AND
THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
(THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY)
CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT IN
THE UNITED STATES/MEXICO BORDER AREA

Article 1 - Discussion

- A. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has a requirement for radio communications along the U.S./Mexico border.
- B. The U.S. Customs Service has a viable communications system, known as the U.S. Customs Sector Communications Network, which provides radio coverage of the U.S./Mexico border area, the State of California (as far north as San Francisco), and desired courses of entry into the State of Florida.
- C. It is reasonable that the two agencies enter into a cooperative agreement whereby the entire Customs Sector Communications Network be made available on a shared basis between Customs personnel and DEA personnel pending operational capability of the proposed DEA Radio Communications system (UHF) along the United States/Mexico border.

Article 2 - Agreement

- A. It is therefore agreed that the Drug Enforcement Administration will utilize the existing U.S. Customs Sector Communications Network (VHF).
- B. It is understood that the proposed DEA radio communication system will be implemented over a period of time and that Customs will be provided with an implementation schedule.

- C. It is understood that, upon termination of the use of the U.S. Customs Sector Network by DEA personnel, full usage will revert to the U.S. Customs Service.
- D. When DEA no longer has an operational need for VHF communication equipment, all such equipment received from Customs will revert back to the U.S. Customs Service at no cost to either agency; except for the normal cost of removing mobile radio equipment from DEA vehicles, such costs being assumed by DEA.
- E. All DEA mobile radios presently containing crystals set to the frequency of 165.4625 MHZ, often referred to as Treasury Common, will have this crystal removed and shipped to one of the four Customs Sector Networks for storage and/or future use.
- F. In the event that Customs vacates a certain segment of the communications network as being of no value to Customs, DEA will assume responsibility and open negotiations, with principally involved parties for site and tower rental and all miscellaneous costs such as maintenance or line costs.
- G. The Drug Enforcement Administration will recruit and employ four qualified maintenance officers whose responsibilities will encompass the around-the-clock maintenance of DEA radio units operated within the four sector networks; one maintenance officer for each network.
- H. The Drug Enforcement Administration will provide its maintenance personnel with the necessary tools, test equipment, and spare parts to properly maintain the DEA share of the U.S. Customs Sector Communications Network.
- I. The Drug Enforcement Administration will provide each of its maintenance officers with a vehicle appropriate to the terrain in which the maintenance officers must operate.

- J. The Drug Enforcement Administration will provide its mobile radios with the equipment necessary to access the U.S. Customs Sector Communications Network.
- K. This agreement shall run until June 30, 1975. If at the end of this period, DEA has not completed the related portions of its radio system and hence is still utilizing Customs system, negotiations shall be entered into for a new agreement.

Article 3 - Funding

- A. The Drug Enforcement Administration will absorb all costs pertaining to the installation and crystallizing of radio units to the Customs Sector frequencies in DEA vehicles.
- B. The Drug Enforcement Administration will absorb all costs pertaining to the employment of four maintenance officers, the providing of tools and necessary spare parts, and the providing of appropriate vehicles.
- C. The U.S. Customs Service will continue to be responsible for the payment of site rental and line costs at locations still utilized by Customs.
- D. The Drug Enforcement Administration will assume responsibility for payment of site rental and line cost at any location no longer utilized by Customs.
- E. The Drug Enforcement Administration will assume the cost of any new facility and recurring costs where said facility is solely required for DEA Operations.

THIS AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO AND MADE EFFECTIVE THE

2nd DAY OF October, 1973.

AB Com
Director for Administration
and Management

John A. Huley
Assistant Commissioner
(Administration)

Attachment A

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE REGARDING THE
DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN DEA SPECIAL AGENTS AS CUSTOMS OFFICERSI. Purpose

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Customs Service (CUSTOMS SERVICE) agree that effective enforcement of the laws relating to narcotics, marihuana and dangerous drugs requires close cooperation and coordination between the two agencies and have therefore entered into this agreement to govern the use of Customs officer designations by certain DEA special agents.

II. Background and Authority

Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 (the Plan) transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Attorney General all intelligence, investigative and law enforcement functions relating to narcotics, marihuana and dangerous drugs, except that the Secretary of the Treasury shall retain and continue to perform "those functions to the extent that they relate to searches and seizures of illicit narcotics, dangerous drugs and marihuana or to the apprehension or detention of persons in connection therewith, at regular inspection locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land or water borders of the United States . . ."

The Secretary of the Treasury's responsibilities under section 1 have been delegated to the Commissioner of Customs.

III. Agreement

There may be instances where it may be necessary on occasion for certain employees of the DEA to be able to perform certain Customs duties. Pursuant to section 401(i), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, (19 U.S.C. 1401(i)), and Treasury Delegation Order 165, Revised (T.D. 53654, 19 F.R. 7241) as amended, the Commissioner of Customs is authorized to designate persons as Customs officers to perform any of the duties of a Customs officer.

- 2 -

The two agencies have, therefore, entered into an agreement as follows:

A. The Customs Service agrees:

1. to initially designate certain GS 1811 Special Agents of the DEA, who were transferred from the Customs Service to the DEA under the Plan, as Customs officers (Excepted) without additional compensation to perform the duties shown on the attached Customs Form 55 (which is hereby made a part of this Agreement).
2. to have its headquarters issue a designation form to each qualified DEA special agent, as an A.1. above.
3. to cooperate in DEA investigations when requested by DEA to the extent permitted by manpower availability.
4. to process seizures and arrests, effected by DEA special agents acting as Customs officers, which do not involve controlled substances.
5. to supply to the DEA pertinent Customs instructions and directives applicable to Customs officers for distribution to DEA special agents designated as Customs officers (Excepted).

B. The DEA agrees:

1. that Customs officer designations to DEA special agents will be used when Customs officers employed by the Customs Service are not immediately available or when a Customs officer employed by the Customs Service requests a DEA special agent to use his designation.
2. a. to advise the Customs Service in advance whenever possible, or as soon as practical thereafter, of each situation in which DEA proposes to use, or has used, a Customs officer's designation.
b. to thereafter report in writing to Customs the results of any designation used.

-3-

3. to promptly furnish the Customs Service information relating to modus operandi of smugglers or smuggling techniques, which the DEA becomes aware of.
 4. to turn over to the Customs Service all items other than controlled substances and evidentiary material seized by a DEA agent acting under a Customs officer designation.
 5. to advise the Customs Service of each court proceeding in which the validity of Customs search, seizure or arrest authority has become an issue; and to permit Customs to provide legal memoranda or other assistance in such cases when desired by Customs.
 6. to follow Customs Service directives and instructions applicable to Customs officers concerning Customs search, seizure and arrest authority.
 7. to have each designated agent file copies of the designation with each regional commissioner of Customs having jurisdiction over the area in which the designated agent is assigned.
 8. from time to time to provide training, as agreed to by the Customs Service, to designated DEA special agents, necessary to perform their duties as Customs officers.
- B. Both agencies
1. recognize that any abuse of Customs officer designations may lead to the revocation of such designations by the Customs Service.
 2. agree to exchange implementing instructions prior to issuance.
 3. agree to meet from time to time to review this agreement.

Drug Enforcement Administration

U.S. Customs Service

/s/ JOHN R. BARTELS, JR. 1/11/74
Administrator

/s/ VERNON D. ACREE 1/11/74
Commissioner

DEA
NOTICEUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

CLASSIFICATION CODE

6642

11/8/73

Cancellation

Date: 12/31/73

SUBJ: FUGITIVE TRANSFER FROM CUSTOMS SERVICE TO DEA

A. PURPOSE. This Notice provides guidelines concerning the responsibility for handling U.S. Customs Service drug-related fugitives transferred to DEA.

B. BACKGROUND. As a result of the President's Reorganization plan, the narcotic, dangerous drug and marihuana intelligence and investigative functions of the United States Customs Service have been transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration. The responsibility to locate and apprehend Customs fugitives wanted for drug-related offenses has now become a DEA responsibility. To facilitate the transfer of the fugitive responsibility, the Customs Service and DEA have mutually agreed to the following policy and procedures.

C. ACTION.

1. The Customs Service has agreed to have each local office review its files to identify drug-related fugitives. The local Customs offices will notify and discuss each case with a DEA representative assigned by the involved Regional Director to determine if the fugitive status should or should not be continued. In this determination, the agency representatives will mutually consider the availability of witnesses, the certainty of identification due to time lapses, the relative importance of the subject in the case, and other factors. In the event that a determination is made to seek a declination of prosecution, the involved Customs and DEA representatives will work together with the local U.S. Attorney to have the file closed.

2. In those cases where it is mutually determined that the fugitive status should be continued, it is the responsibility of DEA in every instance to assume responsibility for and treat the Customs fugitive as a DEA fugitive. However, to keep accurate files, the U.S. Customs Service will also maintain an open case file on those fugitives wanted in connection with drug investigations completed by Customs prior to July 1, 1973 in situations where the individual has not yet been tried. In such cases DEA will nevertheless, have the responsibility for locating and apprehending the fugitive and will process all transferred fugitives in accordance with the procedures outlined in this issuance.

Distribution:

11-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9

Initiated by: ENP

DEA FORM
(July 1973) — 46

F-1,2,3,4(),5()

Previous editions are obsolete.

DEA Notice
Page 2

6642
11/8/73

3. Where the fugitive status is to be continued, the Customs Service has agreed to provide DEA with all related information and copies of documents and files which will assist DEA in the further identification, location and apprehension of the individual involved.

4. When a fugitive case is adopted by DEA, the assigned agent will execute a Report of Investigation, DEA-6, to open a case file. A record check should be conducted in each case, and if an appropriate existing file concerning the same subject is located, that file number should be used. If no appropriate DEA file exists, a new case number will be assigned. The report should clearly state that a Customs fugitive now the responsibility of DEA is involved, list the warrant information, the charge, the involved Customs office, identifying data, FBI numbers, date and place of birth, and like information. (See sample Fugitive Establishment Report, Attachment A.) A DEA-202, Personal History Report, will also be prepared entering all available information. (See Attachment B.)


5. The assigned DEA file number should be provided to the local Customs office for inclusion on the Customs Fugitive Report, CF-59. The local Customs office will forward this form to Customs Headquarters and the data will then be transmitted to DEA Headquarters.

6. The DEA Headquarters Fugitive Coordinator will then initiate action to have the individual entered into the NCIC and NADDIS systems (and others, as appropriate) and notify Customs when this action is completed. Customs will then delete its "want" from NCIC.

7. After assuming the fugitive case, the assigned DEA Region or District Office agent will commence an active investigation to locate the fugitive and comply with the status report and other requirements outlined in Section 6642 of the Agents Manual, relating to DEA fugitives.

8. This Notice will remain in force until such time as the appropriate involved fugitives have been transferred to DEA or expire on December 31, 1973.

A copy of the corresponding order issued by the Customs Service is attached for your information.



John R. Bartels, Jr.
Administrator

Attachments



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
WASHINGTON



CIRCULAR: INT-1-INT

xADM 5

DATE: Nov 19, 1973

Subject : INTELLIGENCE; Customs Fugitive Program

References: Customs Circulars INT-1-INT dated June 9, 1971,
March 2, 1972, August 24, 1972, and January 3, 1973

1. PURPOSE

This circular is to provide a procedure for the transfer from Customs to the Drug Enforcement Administration information and documentation relating to Customs Fugitives in narcotic cases, and to transfer validation and file maintenance responsibility for certain fugitives.

The instructions contained in this circular will apply only to Customs Fugitives connected with narcotic, dangerous drug or marihuana cases.

2. BACKGROUND

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 has transferred from Customs to the Drug Enforcement Administration responsibility for intelligence and investigative functions which relate to the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotics, dangerous drugs or marihuana. Therefore, the responsibility for any investigative effort to identify, locate or apprehend persons who have become Customs Fugitives in narcotic, dangerous drug or marihuana cases is resident with the Drug Enforcement Administration.

As a result of the broad definition of a Customs Fugitive set forth in Customs Circular INT-1-INT dated June 9, 1971, wanted persons in various stages of the judicial process have been designated as Customs Fugitives. In many cases the primary responsibility for apprehension is that of the U. S. Marshal or the F.B.I., but they have been carried as Customs Fugitives for the purpose of gathering intelligence and investigative leads. With the transfer of narcotic investigative functions, many Customs Fugitives no longer fall within Customs' area of responsibility. To accomplish an orderly transfer, each case must be reviewed in the field and coordinated with the appropriate Drug Enforcement Administration field office and U.S. Attorney according to the guidelines set forth in this circular. The

provisions of this circular have been coordinated with the Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters, which has issued a similar instruction to its field offices. (Copy attached).

Customs will furnish the Drug Enforcement Administration any information and copies of any documents which will assist in the identification, location and apprehension of Customs Fugitives who are wanted in connection with narcotic, dangerous drug or marihuana cases.

The Drug Enforcement Administration will assume responsibility for fugitives connected with investigations which were active but not completed on June 30, 1973, and which were continued by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Customs will cancel the Customs Fugitive status of those persons.

Customs will continue to carry as Customs Fugitives those fugitives connected with cases in which the investigation has been completed prior to July 1, 1973, but in which the fugitive has not been tried. Customs will exert no unilateral investigative effort to locate the subject, but will assist other agencies as requested.

Customs will cancel the Customs Fugitive status of those fugitives connected with cases in which the fugitive has been tried but subsequently fled.

3. ACTION

On receipt of this circular, all Office of Investigations field offices are to review all narcotic, dangerous drug and marihuana cases relating to Customs Fugitives. Copies of any documents and any information which would assist in identifying, locating, or apprehending those fugitives are to be furnished to the appropriate Drug Enforcement Administration field office. A record identifying the documents of which copies were furnished, the Drug Enforcement Administration office, and date furnished is to be kept in each case file or noted on the original document which will remain in the Customs case file.

During the review, each fugitive is to be placed in one of the following categories, and the appropriate action is to be taken.

- a. If the investigation was active and the case was open on June 30, 1973, and the Drug Enforcement Administration is continuing the investigation, cancel the Customs Fugitive status of the subject. Advise the appropriate Drug Enforcement Administration office.
- b. If the investigation was completed prior to July 1, 1973, and the subject has not been brought to trial, retain the subject as a Customs Fugitive.

- c. If the subject has been brought to trial and has fled subsequent to the conclusion of the trial, cancel the Customs Fugitive status of the subject. Advise the appropriate Drug Enforcement Administration office.

If it is determined that a subject is to be retained as a Customs Fugitive, no further action is necessary by Customs with respect to this instruction. Subjects in this category will also be listed by the Drug Enforcement Administration as Customs Fugitives.

If it is determined that the Customs Fugitive status of a subject is to be canceled, submit Customs Fugitive Report (Customs Form 59). On the Customs Fugitive Report (CF 59) enter the date of the report, the case number, the name of the originating office, and check the cancel box. The subject need only be identified by name, date of birth, TECS system identification number, and Customs Fugitive number. In the space provided for "other reason for cancellation, date" enter "Turned over to DEA" and the date. In the space provided to "explain other reason" show what Drug Enforcement Administration office the matter was turned over to, their case number, and the reason, i.e., the category into which the subject falls. Distribution of the completed report is to be in the usual manner, except that the triplicate--Bureau Desk Officers' Copy--is to be furnished to the Headquarters, Intelligence Division, with the original.

If a determination as to a subject's status has not been made by October 5, 1973, when the next Customs Fugitive Status Verification (CF 60) is due to be issued, the cancellation may be reported on the CF 60 when it is returned. The CF 60 may be used if the cancellation information required for the CF 59 set forth above is included on the CF 60.

Sector Intelligence Units receiving Customs Forms 59 or 60 reporting the cancellation of Customs Fugitives, by reason of the Drug Enforcement Administration assuming responsibility, are to modify the subject's TECS entry as follows and forward their source documents to the Headquarters, Intelligence Division, with a copy of the modified record on an Intelligence Division transmittal. Modify scan line 52, fugitive number, to replace the Customs Fugitive number with Other Agency Fugitive (52:O/.).

Modify scan line 41, remarks, by placing "DEA Fugitive-Confirm status with DEA-" as the first 37 characters followed by any pertinent remarks contained in the existing record.

Modify scan line 36, case number, by replacing the existing case number with 0J22A0223500 and enter the existing Customs case number in scan line 53, related case numbers.

Enter the station code FVIN in scan line 46, entering station code, to transfer the record to Headquarters, Intelligence Division.


On receipt of Customs Forms 59 or 60 reporting the cancellation of Customs Fugitives by reason of this circular, the Headquarters, Intelligence Division, will furnish the Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters with copies of the Customs Headquarters fugitive control file and advise of Customs intention to cancel the NCIC entry. When notified by Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters that the subject is entered in NCIC by that office, the Customs NCIC entry will be canceled. Customs Headquarters, Intelligence Division, will coordinate with the Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters for the periodic validation of those subjects entered in TECS as DEA fugitives.

In those cases where a Customs office has posted a lookout (INS Soundex, Coast Guard, local police, FBI Form I-12, etc.) with another agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration is assuming responsibility, the agency holding the lookout is to be advised by the Customs office posting the lookout that the matter is being assumed by the Drug Enforcement Administration. A new contact number for the appropriate Drug Enforcement Administration office should be furnished to the agency holding the lookout.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES

It is the responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to insure that the instructions contained in this circular are carried out.

File: ENF 9-01 1:1:S


Commissioner of Customs

DISTRIBUTION: All Office of Investigations Personnel
All Regional Commissioners
All Regional Counsels; All Customs Advisors
All Regional Directors, Security & Audit
Director, National Training Center
Director, Law Enforcement Data Processing Division
Chief, CIE

Mr. BARTELS. As well as one general operating agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Customs ones are more specific.

[The following agreement was received for the record:]

Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization
ServiceDrug Enforcement
AdministrationOPERATIONAL AGREEMENTI. Introduction

CONSIDERING that Executive Order 11727 dated July 10, 1973 designates the Attorney General as the Coordinator for all activities of the executive branch, departments, and agencies which are directly related to the enforcement of laws on narcotics and dangerous drugs;

DESIRING to meet the mandate of Recorganization Plan No. 2 which places on the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, or any officer or any agency of that Department the responsibility to make investigations and to engage in drug law enforcement activities at ports of entry or along the land and water borders of the United States;

RECOGNIZING the Drug Enforcement Administration's primary jurisdiction in drug enforcement and the Immigration and Naturalization Service's incidental role in the same activity, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, have jointly decided that the following Operational Agreement will become effective immediately.

II. Intelligence

A) All information received by INS relating to the illicit drug traffic or other violations of the Controlled Substances Act will promptly be referred to DEA for appropriate action.

B) INS will initiate a service-wide program to insure that all of their sources of information are debriefed as to any knowledge of drug related matters.

C) As a matter of routine policy, INS will debrief all arrested illegal aliens about their knowledge of the illicit drug traffic, either in the United States or in foreign countries, with a view towards locating foreign sources of supply of illicit drugs.

- 2 -

D) Any information received by DEA relating to the clandestine entry or smuggling of aliens, as well as other violations of immigration laws, will be referred promptly to INS for appropriate action.

E) The agencies herein involved will share and make available to one another relevant information gleaned from their respective sources and, where possible, the source will be made available.

F) INS will routinely supply DEA with copies of Reports of Apprehensions and Seizures (INS Form I-44) and DEA will, without delay, furnish INS a copy of all Personal History Reports (DEA Form 202) pertaining to arrested aliens or naturalized citizens and, as soon as possible, afford INS the opportunity to debrief arrested aliens regarding their status, their knowledge of clandestine entry or smuggling of aliens, or of other violations of immigration laws.

III. Operations

A) All seizures of drugs effected by INS incidental to their daily operations, will be referred to DEA as expeditiously as possible, whether or not the drug was known to have been smuggled into the United States.

B) Drugs seized by INS will be surrendered, against receipt, to DEA who will also assume custody of all defendants arrested at the time of seizure. Follow-up investigations will be the sole responsibility of DEA.

C) If the amount of drugs seized is minimal, the seizure will, at the discretion of DEA, be referred to the State or local authorities for judicial action. If these authorities decline action, the drugs seized will be surrendered, against receipt, to DEA for disposition.

D) Any cache of drugs located by INS along the borders of the United States, on land or water, will be brought to the immediate attention of DEA who shall assume jurisdiction over the case. If practical, INS will continue to assist DEA in the surveillance and eventual interrogations of suspects in these cases.

E) Whenever DEA anticipates conducting a drug investigation between ports of entry, the matter will be coordinated with the appropriate INS representative.

- 3 -

F) When a "convoy" operation is anticipated, DEA will coordinate the operation with the appropriate U. S. Border Patrol headquarters supervisory officer in order to eliminate the possibility of compromise and the danger of unnecessary or inadvertent exposure of the convoy subject(s) by Border Patrol Agents.

G) DEA will be furnished maps or charts, as needed, showing area locations of sensing devices. Prior to entering a border area where U. S. Border Patrol sensing devices have been installed and are operational, DEA field supervisors will notify the appropriate INS field supervisor (i.e. Chief Patrol Agent). Information on the locations of sensing devices will be limited to a strict "need to know" basis.

H) To avoid duplications in the expenditure of money, manpower, and electronic detection equipment, INS shall be primarily responsible for the acquisition and operation of electronic intrusion and road monitoring equipment. DEA will furnish whatever technical support is available, particularly in the development of new detection devices.

I) INS will be given, on a continuous basis, biographical data on all DEA fugitives who shall be entered in the INS Look Out System. Likewise, DEA will routinely make appropriate inquiries to detect and report the location of all individuals wanted by INS.

J) In matters of joint interest, INS and DEA will, if necessary and to the extent possible, and as authorized by law or Departmental regulations, support each other's operations with personnel and equipment.

IV. Communications - Training

A) In matters of mutual interest in the area of the border, upon specific request for a particular location, the Service will authorize DEA the privilege of operating radio equipment on frequencies assigned to the Service. In those circumstances, DEA will observe all INS radio standards and operational procedures.

B) DEA and INS will, without delay, initiate a cross training program designed to familiarize all personnel with the laws governing each respective agency. The training shall also be geared towards promoting better understanding of the responsibilities of each agency and, thereby, increase the total effectiveness.

- 4 -

V. Liaison

A) To insure the smooth implementation of this agreement, each agency will designate liaison representatives at the level of their respective Headquarters. These liaison representatives will meet, as required, to review all operational or policy problems, promulgate programs to increase cooperation, and formulate plans to meet future requirements.

B) The same close liaison will be implemented at all managerial levels in the field to insure operational effectiveness.

Washington, D.C., 11/29, 1973

/s/ James F. Greene
Acting Commissioner
Immigration & Naturalization
Service

/s/ John R. Bartels, Jr.
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration

Mr. BARTELS. In addition, most of our operations, our coordination with those other two agencies concern naturally the borders. To some extent with Customs it is overseas, and with the help and assistance of Ambassador Vance we are in the process of signing an agreement with Customs involving the Federal Republic of Germany.

Most of our agreements, however, are along the border and involve the exchange of information and intelligence between our two agencies. We have institutionalized an agreement and we are in the process of setting up a trial basis, or at least as an experiment, an intelligence center at El Paso which had the awful acronym of BRAIN for Border Regional Area Intelligence Network, which I hated, until I killed it, but nonetheless, it is a formal task force to exchange information among the various agencies.

DEA, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, and to a lesser extent with the State agencies which have formed regional groups. [The following information was received for the record:]

EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER

The agreement between DEA and INS is verbal and the extent of the commitment includes manpower allocation and shared administrative expenses. Attached is a copy of a memorandum from INS Deputy Commissioner Greene to the Associate Commissioner, Enforcement, which provides complete background information on our agreement with INS.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Associate Commissioner, Enforcement

CO 1285-P

DATE: Oct. 4, 1974

FROM : Deputy Commissioner

SUBJECT: El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

On March 4, 1974, in response to the request of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the position of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on salient issues related to the security of the United States' borders, the Department of Justice submitted to OMB a paper entitled "A SECURE BORDER: An Analysis of Issues Affecting the U.S. Department of Justice". Recommendation No. 7 of this paper suggested:

"...that DEA establish and direct the operations of a Southwest Border Intelligence Service Center which would provide for the most effective sharing of intelligence developed by border enforcement agencies. The Center would be staffed by representatives of DEA, I&NS and Customs."

DEA Proposal

Mr. John R. Bartels, Jr., Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration wrote a letter to Commissioner Chapman on April 23, 1974, in which he referred to Recommendation No. 7 and stated that:

"I would like to propose that we in the Department of Justice, DEA and I&NS cooperatively utilize our resources to accomplish this stated goal."

OMB Decision

On June 5, 1974, a letter from Mr. Roy L. Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget to Attorney General Saxbe indicated that an operating agreement was needed "to provide for the implementation of the border intelligence service center under DEA leadership."

- 2 -

I&NS Response

In a letter dated June 17, 1974, from Deputy Commissioner Greene to Mr. William J. Durkin, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, I&NS endorsed the concept of the Southwest Border Intelligence Service Center and suggested discussions between DEA and I&NS relating to "the need for greater emphasis on tactical intelligence at the proposed center and I&NS' share of the funding and staffing of the center."

Over the next two months, discussions were held during which DEA laid out its basic proposal. (Copy attached) I&NS indicated what it was willing to put into the system and what it expected to get out of the system. During this period, explorations of possible resource commitments were undertaken.

The Proposed System

DEA's original proposal for the Intelligence Service Center suggested that the purpose of the Center would be to provide a complete and accurate intelligence "picture" of the Southwest border for use in the provision of tactical and strategic intelligence to agencies with border responsibilities. The basic methodology of the Center would be the gathering of data from DEA, I&NS and Customs arraying the data in a meaningful way, identifying "holes" in the data, and asking DEA, I&NS or Customs agents to "plug" those "holes".

The personnel at the Center will not be involved in conducting investigations or developing informants but rather would depend upon the I&NS, DEA and Customs forces already available to perform this type of operational field work. The job of the Center is to consist almost exclusively of gathering, analyzing, and summarizing information and disseminating relevant intelligence to the appropriate border offices. It will serve as the hub of an intelligence network which coordinates the anti-intrusion efforts of Federal agencies.

The input to the system would include, but not be limited to:

- All DEA-6 and 202 reports;
- All similar I&NS reports (I-44);
- All DEA and I&NS drug related teletype messages;

- 3 -

- All DEA and I&NS drug related monthly status reports; and
- Input from other agencies is yet to be determined. Other agencies being considered as possible sources of data include Customs, ATF, IRS, DOD, Coast Guard, FAA and FBI.

The proposed output of the system is:

- Collection and coordination of tactical intelligence activity;
- Coordination of all border activities with non-fixed base components, i.e., DEA and I&NS aircraft and vehicles and with all border regional or district offices;
- Production of tactical and strategic intelligence reports; and
- Coordination of sensitive collection methods and operations.

The possible I&NS contributions to the Center include:

- Aircraft spotting by our widely deployed force;
- Reports from Border Patrol pilots about the frequency of use of remote airstrips;
- Information gathered from the I&NS informant network could be expanded to include drugs; and
- Information developed by debriefing apprehended aliens.

The benefits which I&NS may derive from the Center include:

- Strategic information about the growing, transportation and destination of marihuana;
- Tactical (operational) intelligence about when, where and how much marihuana will be coming in so we may send a team out to intercept the load;
- The informant network of the other agencies involved will be used to provide information on alien documentation counterfeiting rings and alien smuggling rings; and

- 4 -

- DEA may provide some tactical assistance, i. e., helicopters.

Resource Commitments

DEA proposed that I&NS commit twelve (12) positions and agree to share 20 to 25 percent of the cost of the facility, while DEA would commit twenty-one (21) positions and pick up 50 percent of the cost of the facility.

It was agreed that I&NS would fund and staff six(6) officer positions and that any decision about other I&NS resource commitments would be deferred until some undefined later date.

Mr. Jacques Kiere of DEA has been designated as Chief of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and Mr. Gerald O'Connor of I&NS has been selected as the Deputy Chief.

Direction and Support

Operational control of all I&NS personnel will be maintained by the Deputy Commissioner with day-to-day coordination by the Associate Commissioner, Enforcement and Assistant Commissioner, Border Patrol. Administrative support will be furnished by the Southwest Regional Office through the Chief Patrol Agent, El Paso, Texas, and additional funds will be allotted to the El Paso Sector for such purpose. Travel will be authorized within the limit of I&NS funds available. The determination as to travel and personnel and equipment will be made by the Deputy Commissioner, on the advice of the Associate Commissioner, Enforcement and the Assistant Commissioner, Border Patrol.

Mr. BARTELS. I would say in general the exchange of information, intelligence and coordination has improved over the past year. I think while I have problems with the overall view of where we stand toward the future, that area has improved and is improving and I am somewhat more optimistic about that. With the State and local governments it frankly varies.

We have put an emphasis, as you can tell, on higher level traffickers and on major interstate and overseas dealers. In working with the States naturally we have had to reassess our manpower and resources so we have taken resources frankly from some of the inner cities, some of the major cities, and put them overseas or at the border, thereby decreasing our strength in the major cities and in some of the smaller cities.

To compensate for that, we have tried to increase the task force idea which is a program intended to combine the efforts of some of our personnel with those of State and local police.

The intention of it is that there will be a leverage effect and that the State and local police will work on major violators, with the assistance of our interstate capability and our overseas capability and intelligence capability rather than working on personal possession of marihuana cases.

They have increased not as fast or as quickly as I had hoped. Part of the problem with those lies in a disparate pattern of funding throughout the various States and among the various cities.

In your district there is a very active one in Broward County, as I am sure you are familiar with, and there has been one operating in Miami, so that we would hope that they continue, because the mere act of putting men in different jurisdictions in the same room, having them sit down with one another and work together, forces them to recognize the limitations of their own experience and abilities, to learn new techniques and new approaches from other people, and to recognize and overcome the petty jurisdictional jealousies that periodically spring up, as well as to increase the exchange of intelligence when needed to see what the size of our problem is, what we are doing, and to approach it rationally.

I think it makes a lot of sense, and I hope it continues.

Mr. ROGERS. What do you have to do if you want FBI people involved?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, what we have done is I have talked with the Director on a monthly to bimonthly basis. In turn, we have used the concept of a Federal organized crime task force to exchange that information and that intelligence.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you exchange information?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we do.

Mr. ROGERS. I suppose you need some personnel.

Mr. BARTELS. That is beyond their jurisdiction statutorily and also by agreement.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, now, I don't know about statutorily. Where in the statute does it say the FBI cannot enforce Federal law on drugs?

Mr. BARTELS. The statute gives prime responsibility to the Drug Enforcement Administration—there is nothing in the statute that phrased it the way you phrase it.

Mr. ROGERS. No; there is nothing that prohibits the FBI.

Mr. BARTELS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS. But maybe by agreement there may be some condition set. That is what I am concerned with. What are those conditions? Why can't they be called upon? How many agents do they have, do you suppose, just roughly?

Mr. BARTELS. Approximately 8,000 agents but——

Mr. ROGERS. How many do we have on DEA?

Mr. BARTELS. DEA has 2,200.

Mr. ROGERS. And some of those are overseas, or is that counting——

Mr. BARTELS. No; we have approximately 1,800 domestically.

Mr. ROGERS. So, there is 8,000 that agreement says they don't get involved.

Mr. BARTELS. They don't routinely get involved. There is no reason, and, indeed, they have been used in certain limited instances and the thesis behind the agreement is that there should be one organization with responsibility both in dealing with other law enforcement organizations on a Federal, State, and foreign level, so that we won't be stepping all over one another.

I believe in that concept. We have used the FBI and their personnel in an operational sense on several specific examples. I think their use and their expertise is more effective and lies in the exchange of intelligence, in computers, in organized crime activity, and in debriefing informants, and that is where Assistant Director Cleveland and I have tried to improve that coordination.

Frankly, the undercover operations are sophisticated and difficult enough so that for an FBI agent trained in a number of other areas, and far superior to us in a number of other areas, to unilaterally and suddenly engage in that sort of activity could be counterproductive.

I think there is enough that we can do here initially where improvement can still be made before we get into the other areas.

I may add that I omitted the assistance of the Coast Guard, which I think has a tremendous role that it could play and that it has started to play under Admiral Siler.

It is the Coast Guard who have been most helpful and most efficient in intercepting the wholesale yacht traffic from Jamaica.

As you know, they are within the Department of Transportation and until recently have been somewhat reluctant to engage in law enforcement activity, and here in a limited area I think they have proven to be very helpful.

Mr. ROGERS. Has there been any agreement with the Coast Guard now?

Mr. BARTELS. Not a formal agreement on operating procedures in general. They have agreed, again through the efforts of Ambassador Vance and at the request of the Government of Jamaica, to assist us and in turn assisting the Jamaicans.

I hope to be able to interest them to do more of that along the Southwest between Baja California, and southern California, where again we are getting hurt by yacht traffic.

Mr. ROGERS. What would you have to do to get their full effort?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, I have a meeting scheduled with them—I am afraid the date escapes me, but it is an indeterminate period after the initiation of this Jamaican situation—in which I intend to press on them that added task.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you let this committee know?

Mr. BARTELS. I would be very happy to. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. I would think the Coast Guard would have that as part of its responsibility.

Mr. BARTELS. I would like to interest them.

Mr. ROGERS. And if they are not interested, let this committee know and we will get some interest going.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you.

[The following information was received for the record:]

AGREEMENT WITH COAST GUARD

DEA requested the United States Coast Guard to render assistance in DEA "Operation Buccaneer," concerning trafficking from Jamaica.

On July 27, 1974, the Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District, Miami, Florida published an Operation Order which instructed his District to participate in "Operation Buccaneer." This was done with concurrence of the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, after he had been given a briefing on Buccaneer by Special Projects Division. The first Coast Guard Cutter was on station in the Windward Passage on August 1 and the operation is continuing.

On October 18, 1974, Administrator Bartels requested that the Coast Guard continue their assistance through December 15, 1974 and the request was approved by the Commandant on October 21.

Mr. ROGERS. Also, I think it might be well to let us see the agreement with the FBI.

Mr. BARTELS. We will.

Mr. ROGERS. I think the committee would be interested in that.

Mr. BARTELS. That is in a series of letters and I will send the entire correspondence.

[The following information was received for the record:]

AGREEMENT WITH FBI

Form DJ-130
(Rev. 4-26-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : All Regional Directors

DATE March 26, 1974

FROM : George M. Beik
Assistant Administrator
for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Liaison with FBI

The recently issued DEA Notice entitled Regional Intelligence Operations covers, among other areas, the general span of our interface with other enforcement agencies. This memorandum supplements the Notice with reference to FBI liaison. The contents of this memorandum will be incorporated into the Agents Manual in the near future. (Reference Notice Sections G2(b), G3(c), Attachment A to Notice, Sections A1(a), A2(b), and B2(c).

BACKGROUND


Following meetings between the Director, FBI, and the Administrator, DEA, the FBI has agreed to an intensified narcotic intelligence collection effort. In turn, DEA will collect and furnish information of interest to the FBI. Neither agency will have responsibility to identify sources by name or agree to their being debriefed by the other agency. The RIU Supervisor (or the designee for this function) will assure that any dissemination of information will not jeopardize any ongoing enforcement or intelligence activity. In these instances, the dissemination may be delayed until such time as appropriate.

PROCEDURES

1. The RIU will act as the focal point for liaison with the FBI. In those field offices not having a separate RIU, field management will designate a supervisory level or senior agent to perform this function.

-2-

2. Information developed through the field office informant debriefing program (Notice G3(a)), or any other field office activity, that would be of interest to the FBI will be fed to the RIU for dissemination to the appropriate FBI point of contact.
3. The field office will design its liaison program with the FBI to assure that incoming information from them is received by the RIU for internal dissemination or filing.
4. The RIU will establish appropriate files to readily retrieve information on the adequacy of liaison with the FBI. This would include the number of referrals to and from, as well as subjective information on the merit of the information. The reporting called for in Notice Attachment A: A2(b) will encompass the FBI liaison in the RIU territory; including statistical and subjective information gleaned from the above files. These would be done quarterly, initial due date 6/1/74.
5. FBI/DEA liaison at the Headquarters level will be handled by the Office of Intelligence, Domestic/Central Section (IGDC). The reports prepared under (4) above will be forwarded to IGDC.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "George M. Belk". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a prominent initial "G".

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Phillip R. Smith, Chief
Domestic Intelligence Division

DATE: December 19, 1973


FROM : George M. Belk
Assistant Administrator
for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DEA/FBI Cooperation

As a result of two recent meetings between Mr. Bartels and FBI Director Kelly, the FBI has agreed to debrief their informants regarding narcotics intelligence and provide this data to DEA on a continuing basis. Concurrently, this agency has agreed to do the same with its sources and provide the FBI with intelligence on non-narcotic activities that come within their area of jurisdiction.

The Administrator has asked me to meet with Bill Cleveland and work out the details of such an exchange. I plan to meet with Mr. Cleveland shortly after January 1st along with you and Dan Casey.

In view of this please prepare, in collaboration with Enforcement, a position paper to include pertinent discussion points we wish to cover. This should also be included as an agenda item at the DRD's conference, scheduled for January 8-9, 1974.



George M. Belk

Form DJ-1, 56
(54-4216-55)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Mr. William J. Durkin
Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement

FROM : S. B. Billbrough, Chief
Enforcement Policy and Communications
Division

SUBJECT: Request for Names of DEA Agents
for FBI Liaison Function

DATE: JAN 2 1974

Mr. Tartaglino telephoned today to request that you nominate agents to serve as selected city liaison officers to the FBI. This request is apparently the result of an agreement Mr. Bartels made to Director Clarence Kelley at their recent meeting.

I was informed Mr. Bartels agreed we would provide the names of higher level supervisors in the following cities and that the FBI would in turn provide names from these offices:

New York City
Buffalo
Newark
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Pittsburgh
Cleveland
Detroit
Chicago
St. Louis
Kansas City
New Orleans
Los Angeles
San Francisco

Mr. Tartaglino stated you might want to add a few other cities (such as Miami) and might want to discuss this with Mr. Bartels.

Mr. ROGERS. Now, for Customs you have an agreement arranged where you may do some work and may even follow, into the country from an outside source if it has been followed at the time of entry; is that correct?

Mr. BARTELS. That is on the convoy type of case. Our arrangement is that we may do it, but with two preconditions. One, notification has to be made as soon as possible, hopefully before the shipment comes in, which has not been a problem.

Second, where at all possible the narcotics have to be removed and nontoxic material substituted. In other words, so that therefore we could follow the convoy in, not necessarily intercept it at the border, but take it on to its ultimate destination and hopefully break up a ring.

There are some details that we are working out as we see cases arise, but in general that is working.

Mr. ROGERS. What are the main problems that you see?

Mr. BARTELS. You get a chain-of-custody problem. In other words, there are two problems. One is if the seizure is made at the border, what are the circumstances? If it is made openly at the border, if we know a brown Cadillac is coming in and it is made openly at the border, frequently traffickers will have somebody standing by to see if that car goes through Customs unmolested.

If it is stopped and examined and there is any substitution or anything unusual is done to the car, that watchman will forward that news ahead so that the circumstances of any substitution or search have to be done in an unusual manner depending on the circumstances.

The individual judgment decision unhappily frequently has to be made under sudden circumstances by people right at the border and occasionally you will get a disagreement, but not generally.

The same example is true that if the same or similar problem exists upon the seizure at the border of those narcotics in the chain of custody, we have been able to work that out.

Small practical problems that could be a problem. Do they go to the Customs chemist first? Do they then go to our chemist? If they don't go to the Customs chemist, how does Customs know from their own point of view that it is indeed heroin of a certain strength?

Mr. ROGERS. Do they take the word of your laboratory?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, but there could be problems. They say, we have the statutory responsibility, so that we are working it out jointly.

Mr. ROGERS. But currently they don't take the word of your lab people. They have to do it in their own laboratory.

Mr. BARTELS. If it is over two ounces and one of their labs is available, they do it there and we follow it right through.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you take their word?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes. I don't put it as taking the word—

Mr. ROGERS. Taking their scientific finding.

Mr. BARTELS. The problem is that when you make different tests on heroin you can come up with different scientific findings depending on which portion you test. If you have a kilo of heroin and you take it out of the lower right-hand corner, I am informed that it may be a different strength than that of the upper right-hand corner, so nobody doubts that it is heroin, nobody doubts that it is in such and such a range.

It would be difficult for court testimony if you had a situation where one chemist said it is 98 percent pure and the other said it is 87 percent pure. It raises the specter that perhaps it has been tampered with.

I am concerned lest that specter be raised. I would rather have one chemist or a joint testing immediately, and we are in the process of that.

Mr. ROGERS. I would think so, because I would think the more you have testing it the more variety you might have.

Mr. BARTELS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS. But that is currently the situation?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. Is that going to be changed?

Mr. BARTELS. It is changing in San Diego as we get a laboratory there. Part of that situation is not any different between Customs and DEA. Part of that circumstance is a change in the traffic and DEA did not have a laboratory in the San Diego area. Therefore, we used the Customs laboratory and Customs said, and quite rightly, fine, we will test it but then we want to store it and we want it done our way and that is in the process of changing.

Mr. ROGERS. Is there differing testing procedures that you use from Customs?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes; there can be.

Mr. ROGERS. Why?

Mr. BARTELS. I can't give you the scientific chemical reasons why. It depends what you are looking for.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, what are we looking for? Are we trying to find out whether it is heroin, the strength, maybe with any signs as to where it came from or how it was processed?

Mr. BARTELS. That is right. We are looking for the three major factors, whether it is heroin, the strength, and what its secondary characteristics are as an indication of where it comes from.

You can take it through a series of what they call chemical signature, using a fairly sophisticated procedure and bring it down into the situation where you may be able to tell which laboratory refined it.

Mr. ROGERS. Is this generally done?

Mr. BARTELS. No. It is too expensive and too time consuming, but it is done on certain samples and it requires a broader sample and it requires a lot of chemists' time as well as some fairly sophisticated machinery.

In some areas Customs has machinery, in others we have it, but the point that I want to stress to you is that there is not a difference of philosophy or an antagonism that exists there.

Mr. ROGERS. Should we establish one set of laboratories that both services can use, or anyone else in the Federal service, even the FBI could use for the analysis of chemicals?

Mr. BARTELS. I don't think for analysis. I thought about that a great deal because I think your question makes an awful lot of sense, but the different agencies have different goals frequently.

Mr. ROGERS. But couldn't you request the lab to give you what information you desire?

Mr. BARTELS. Not and handle what we are doing. For instance, we are in the process now of building other labs. I think what we do need is one uniform research laboratory.

The chemical analysis, I have been to the Customs labs, I have seen the type of work they do. I have seen where their expertise lies, where I believe they are more sophisticated and better equipped than we are, and vice versa.

The research laboratories, I think there is a legitimate purpose in having one uniform research laboratory in the entire executive branch for law enforcement. I think to some extent we are reinventing the wheel periodically.

Mr. ROGERS. How many do we have?

Mr. BARTELS. There is one in the Bureau. We are in the process of expanding one. It was very small and frankly pretty basic.

There is one in Customs. I suspect each agency has one depending on its size and nature.

Mr. ROGERS. What about CIA?

Mr. BARTELS. It has one.

Mr. ROGERS. And do you have any contact with CIA?

Mr. BARTELS. Fairly limited.

Mr. ROGERS. To what extent?

Mr. BARTELS. There have been meetings where we have sat down—"we" being our scientific people, the man who is in charge of our scientific laboratory—has sat down with a group of laboratory directors including the agency to see what is available on the shelf, on the market, and to exchange information along that line.

Mr. ROGERS. But otherwise no.

Mr. BARTELS. No, not in basic research.

Mr. ROGERS. Do they ever give you any information as to movement of heroin?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, but not from the laboratory. That would be through the program that Mr. Ernst spoke to.

Mr. ROGERS. What contact do you have there? What lines are established?

Mr. BARTELS. In every embassy where there is a DEA agent and a station chief, there will be a country team. Each representative will be a member of that team. That team meets with regularity. That is overseen by Ambassador Vance's office and the exchange of information comes at that level.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it frequent?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. But it is at the embassy level in the various countries?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes. It comes up to headquarters level when there is a problem or where there is some indication that we should amend something or change it. But it has been frequent and to my knowledge open and good.

Mr. ROGERS. Did you want to comment on that?

Mr. ERNST. Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer back to my mention of the organization under the Cabinet committee and particularly to the coordinating subcommittee and various functional bodies appended to it, one of which is the intelligence subcommittee which is chaired by a representative from CIA and includes drug enforcement administration people, people from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other concerned agencies. This group makes periodic assessments of the extent of the problem in such and such a country as it bears on the American drug scene, and, therefore, it is

an essential resource to our decision making as to how to deploy our resources in this fight.

Mr. ROGERS. How often are these decisions made?

Mr. ERNST. I would say every 2 months or so there is a meeting of that group on one or another country. Then each year in connection with program planning there is an overall assessment to bring in the latest information to reaffirm the priorities which we attach to different programs.

Mr. ROGERS. Where are these meetings held?

Mr. ERNST. In the Department of State.

Mr. ROGERS. Here in Washington?

Mr. ERNST. Yes. This is the Washington side, and as Mr. Bartels says, at the embassies there are groups. There is the country team in which the members function and also there are narcotics action committees serving under the country team, usually chaired by a senior State Department official, often the Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. ROGERS. One of the criticisms of a former report of the General Accounting Office was that the national police of the various countries lack the reliable means of exchanging information. Does that problem still exist?

Mr. BARTELS. In some countries, yes.

Mr. ROGERS. Are we doing anything to try to be helpful?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes. In some cases we are successful and are able to bring different police forces together on a greater level and others we are not. But we are doing something about it. In others I am not happy.

Mr. ROGERS. I think you might let us have a list of those where you feel something has been done and those that have not. Now, what about the use of informers in the international drug control? That was one of the criticisms, they were not using informers. Is that still true?

Mr. BARTELS. We are not using them as much as I would like to see.

Mr. ROGERS. What have you done to change that?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, you have to get men from the Drug Enforcement Administration of such judgment and skill in the language and knowledge of local customs that they can enjoy the confidence of both the Ambassador and his team first, and, second, the local law enforcement people. In a number of countries we are moving in fairly new and that form of trust and confidence builds up slowly over a period of years.

What needs to be done about it is that we have to continue doing what we are doing now except on a larger scale.

I can furnish the committee with a study that was done by the Institute of Defense Analysis for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. It was done on that but it was during the early part when I first came in.

It is still true, I believe, that a very small percentage of our manpower, approximately 8 or 10 percent seizes 90 percent of the drugs that we seize. The cost-benefit of an agent overseas is tremendously higher than that of an agent in one of the internal inner cities because of his motivating influence on the foreign police overseas including State and local as well as national.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, I think that would be helpful.

[Testimony resumes on p. 215.]

[The following study, referred to, was received for the record:]

PAPER P-941

NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE STUDY

Part 1: Main Paper

J. Lawson, *Project Leader*

R. Cohen

J. Henry

L. Minichiello

April 1973



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION

400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202

Contract No. J-LEAA-019-73

FOREWORD

This report has been prepared by the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President in response to Contract OST-J-LEAA-019-73. Under the contract, IDA was asked to undertake a study of national narcotics intelligence in two phases; this report constitutes a statement of progress made toward the study objectives during the two month period of Phase I. Few substantive compilations of data or analyses have yet been completed and this report represents only preliminary findings and assessments.

The work presented here was prepared under the general direction of John B. Lawson. In addition to Mr. Lawson, the principal authors were Lee P. Minichiello, Robert H. Cohen, and James H. Henry.

The authors would like to acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of the many representatives of the federal and city narcotics control and intelligence agencies who provided much of the information upon which the report is based. Their candor and their insights into the problems associated with narcotics intelligence were invaluable to the authors in developing an understanding of a broad and complex community within the time constraints of the Phase I study.

GLOSSARY

ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AID	Agency for International Development, Department of State
ASAN	Arrest and Seizure Analysis Program
ATAF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Department of the Treasury
BNDD	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice
Bu Prisons/DOJ	Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice
CADPIN	Customs Automated Data Processing Intelligence Network
CCINC	Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (Chaired by Secretary of State)
CCPC	Critical Collections Problems Committee, U.S. Intelligence Board, National Security Council
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CONIC	Cooperative Narcotics Intelligence Committee (City of New York)
DAWN	Drug Abuse Early Warning Network
DDI/CIA	Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDP/CIA	Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense
DoD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency, Department of Transportation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice
FDLE	Florida Department of Law Enforcement

HEW/NIMH	Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute of Mental Health
HEW/CDC	Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Communicable Disease Center
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service, Depart- ment of Justice
IRS	Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice
LEIU	Law Enforcement Intelligence Units
Marshals/DOJ	United States Marshals Service, Department of Justice
NADDIS	Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Intelligence System
NIS/USN	Naval Investigative Service, United States Navy
NSA	National Security Agency,
NYCPD	New York City Police Department
ODALE	Office of Management and Budget
ONNI	Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, Department of Justice
OSI, USAF	Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force
Organized Crime/DOJ	Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice
SAODAP	Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention
SIO	Strategic Intelligence Office, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice
SS/Treas.	United States Secret Service, Department of the Treasury
TELANS	Telephone Analyses
USIB	United States Intelligence Board, National Security Council
USACIC	U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	Purpose	1
B.	Scope	1
C.	Approach	3
II.	FINDINGS	5
A.	Assignment of Authority and Responsibility . .	6
B.	Sharing of Intelligence	8
C.	Narcotics Intelligence Resources and their Allocation	9
D.	The Narcotics Intelligence Process	12
III.	THE ROLE AND TYPES OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE . . .	17
A.	Role of Narcotics Intelligence	17
B.	Types of Narcotics Intelligence	18
C.	Strategic Intelligence	19
D.	Operational Intelligence	20
E.	Tactical Intelligence	21
F.	Use of Information in Support of Legal Prosecution	22
IV.	THE NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE PROCESS	25
A.	Introduction	25
B.	Interagency Requirements	28
C.	Sources of Narcotics Intelligence	32
D.	Targeting and Collection	36
E.	The Coordination and Sharing of Narcotics Intelligence	39
F.	Information Storage and Retrieval	44
G.	Intelligence Analysis	47

V.	INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS AND INFORMATION GAPS	51
A.	Products	51
B.	Dissemination	52
C.	Intelligence Gaps	53
VI.	NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES	57
A.	Summary of Existing Resources	57
B.	Resource Allocation	60

APPENDIX A: PEOPLE CONTACTED DURING THE STUDY

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The stated purpose of the six-month narcotics intelligence study was to "determine the intelligence needs of the national narcotics control community and to examine alternative means of making use of existing and potential resources to provide an effective all-source intelligence system to serve national narcotics control objectives."

At midpoint in the two-month Phase I study, the representatives from the Executive Office of the President indicated that three topics were of particular interest: the personnel resources currently being expended in support of narcotics intelligence, and additional resources which might be needed; the requirements process for the several types of narcotics intelligence; and recommended actions which could be undertaken immediately or in the near term to improve the narcotics intelligence process and its products. Consequently, the Phase I report has been focused on these areas.

B. SCOPE

This Phase I report represents a statement of progress made during the first two months of the study.

During Phase I emphasis was placed on intelligence activities in the headquarters of the federal agencies. Contact with law enforcement field offices was limited due to time constraints. However, to provide some understanding of the use

and production of intelligence in the field, visits were made to two BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) Regional Offices (New York and Baltimore) and the head of the intelligence unit of the BNDD Washington, D.C. District Office was also interviewed. Examination of the interface between federal and local enforcement agencies had, for the same reason, to be confined to nearby cities: visits were made to the New York City Police Department; and to the Executive Council of the Cooperative Narcotics Intelligence Committee (CONIC), which consists of representatives from New York area federal and local agencies. A further limitation was the degree to which intelligence operations abroad could be characterized, since it was not possible to visit foreign offices--interviews with Washington area officials dealing with foreign intelligence provided coverage in this area. Allowances should be made, therefore, for the fact that Phase I field investigations were limited to New York which is atypical of other U.S. cities, both in the size of its drug problem and in the extent of the federal presence, and Baltimore which is very close geographically to the federal agencies in Washington. An examination of field operations in a more representative group of cities, domestic and foreign, should be made in the Phase II study.

Attention in Phase I was focused on intelligence activities related to trafficking in hard drugs (opiates and cocaine) in reflection of the priority emphasis placed on these drugs by the community. Consequently, intelligence associated with the compliance enforcement function in BNDD (monitoring the production of commercial drugs) was not examined.

Although tactical intelligence reports from the various agencies were reviewed during the course of the study, the study focus was on the process of requirement formulation, collection, analysis, and information flow within and among agencies, and not on the specific information contained in

these reports. While the content of the various types of intelligence products are characterized in general terms, no use is made of names of individuals or other substantive information.

C. APPROACH

The approach followed was to make, within the time constraints of the study, the broadest possible contacts with the agencies (and within agencies, with the appropriate offices) considered to be a part of the narcotics intelligence community or to contribute intelligence to it. An attempt was made to examine the overall intelligence process for each agency, including requirements, sources of information, collection, coordination, analysis, and information storage and retrieval. The personnel resources (both number and types) involved in narcotics intelligence were also examined. In the course of these interviews the views of agency officials were solicited on their own intelligence needs, their perception of the intelligence needs of the community, narcotics control and the major problems and issues which they felt were involved with the development of an effective narcotics intelligence system. (A listing of offices visited and individuals contacted is contained in Appendix A.)

A review was made of past studies dealing with narcotics intelligence.¹ These are, however, few in number, and in each case deal with only a portion of the overall problem (the CCPC and NSC studies treat only foreign narcotics intelligence, and the BNDD study focuses almost exclusively on strategic narcotics intelligence).

¹NSCIC Working Group, U.S. Intelligence Activities Relating to International Narcotics Traffic, 21 March 1972, SECRET; U.S. Intelligence Board, Critical Collection Problems Committee, Intelligence Activities Against Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, October 1972, TOP SECRET; and Godfrey, E. Drexel, The Internal Intelligence Needs of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, prepared for BNDD, October 1970.

Study Limitations

As pointed out above, the Phase I progress report is based on an examination of the narcotics intelligence process and a survey of the narcotics intelligence community conducted over a two-month period. It was not possible within this time span to undertake detailed analyses in such areas as specific resource requirements, intelligence content, and ADP system configurations and techniques in support of intelligence. Although many of the findings reached during the course of the study were voiced by some of the officials interviewed, the judgments, as expressed, are those of the study team which is solely responsible for them. To a considerable extent, then, this report reflects the assessments of the authors both as to requirements and deficiencies in present arrangements. All of the areas covered in this progress report require examination in greater depth in the Phase II study. Findings, therefore, must be considered preliminary, and it is possible that they might be altered by the results of further study.

Organization of the Study

The Phase I progress report is divided into two parts. Part 1 presents findings and actions proposed for consideration, and a discussion of the problems and issues identified. Part 2 consists of descriptions of the intelligence process in the agencies principally involved in narcotics intelligence, a discussion of ADP in the community, and an examination of the interface between federal and local agencies. A supplement to the report contains the submissions of the agencies in response to the request made by the Director of the Domestic Council at the initiation of the study.

TABLE 1. CATEGORIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE			OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE			TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE		
TYPICAL CONTENT	TYPICAL USE	POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS	TYPICAL CONTENT	TYPICAL USE	POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS	TYPICAL CONTENT	TYPICAL USE	POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS
OVERVIEW OF: DRUG SOURCES TRAFFIC FLOW PATTERNS PRODUCTION (QUANTITY) CORRUPTION IN FOREIGN NARCOTICS PROGRAMS POLITICAL FACTORS POBORN GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES AND COMPLIANCE WITH ANTI-DRUG AGREEMENTS DRUG PRODUCTION DRUG TRAFFICKING U.S. COUNTERACTION PORTION COUNTERACTION	POLICY FORMULATION DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS EARLY WARNING OF RISKS IN PRODUCTION SOURCES OVERALL RESOURCE ALLOCATION ASSESSMENT OF INTER- NATIONAL CONTROL PROGRAMS	WHITE HOUSE CCIC DEPARTMENT OF STATE TOP DECISION LEVELS IN • BND • CUSTOMS • DOD	IDENTIFICATION OF: PRINCIPAL TRAFFICKING IN- TERSTATE AND ORGANI- ZATIONS MAJOR TRAFFICKING ROUTES MAJOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MONEY FLOW PRINCIPAL PRODUCTION CENTERS PRINCIPAL TRANSHIPMENT/ STOCKPILE PORTS MODES OF OPERATION COMMUNICATIONS	INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRAFFIC LISTS DEVELOPMENT OF LEADS ON SUSPECTED INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS PLANNING FOR DISRUPTION OR INTERDICTION RESOURCE ALLOCATION	WHITE HOUSE POLICY AND TOP OPERA- TIONAL LEVELS IN • BND • CUSTOMS • DOD/DA, SERVICE AGENCIES • IRS	IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF MAJOR TRAFFICKERS AND COURTRES LOCATION OF PROCESSING SITES, LABS, CACHES SPECIFIC ROUTES AND MEANS OF TRANSPORT SCHEDULES OF MAJOR SHIPMENTS POINTS AND TIMES OF ENTRY INTO U.S. SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES MODES OF OPERATION	INTERNATIONAL MOUNTING JOINT OPERATIONS WITH FOREIGN SERVICES INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES FOR THEIR OPERATIONS ALERTING U.S. SERVICES FOR SHIPMENT INTERDICTION • OSI, USAF • IRS, USN • CB, USA • IRS	OPERATIONAL SCHEMATA IN • BND, HQI AND FIELD • CUSTOMS, HQI AND FIELD • BND • OSI, USAF • IRS, USN • CB, USA • IRS
CHANGES IN: ADDICT POPULATION PATTERNS OF DRUG USAGE OVERALL DRUG AVAILABILITY PRICE/MARKET STRUCTURE DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS	DEVELOPMENT OF LAW EN- FORCEMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY EVALUATION OF IMPACT OF DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMS OVERALL RESOURCE ALLOCATION ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC CONTROL PROGRAMS EARLY WARNING OF NEW PATTERNS OF DRUG ABUSE	WHITE HOUSE TOP DECISION LEVELS IN • BND • CUSTOMS • DOD MAJOR U.S. CITIES SAGBAR	IDENTIFICATION OF: PRINCIPAL PORTS OF ENTRY MAJOR IMPORTING INDIVIDU- ALS/GROUPS DISTRIBUTION NETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MONEY FLOW OTHER SUPPORT TO GROUPS MODES OF OPERATION	DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT OF TARGET LISTS IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDU- ALS FOR SURVEILLANCE PLANNING FOR JOINT (FED- ERAL/LOCAL) OPERATIONS SHIFTS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION PLANNING FOR DEPLOYMENT OF SERVICES	POLICY AND TOP OPERA- TIONAL LEVELS IN • BND • CUSTOMS • COALE • IRS MAJOR U.S. CITIES	IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF IMPORTERS, WHOLESALERS/ RETAIL DEALERS, COURTES LOCATION OF PROCESSING, STORAGE FACILITIES SPECIFIC ROUTES, MODES AND TIMES OF SHIPMENT TIMES AND LOCATIONS OF TRANSFER SALES IDENTIFICATION OF FINANCIERS/ MONEY FLOW	DOMESTIC PLANS FOR DETAILED LAW EN- FORCEMENT ACTIONS (ARRESTS, SEIZURES) RESOURCE ALLOCATION (FEDERAL/LOCAL) INFORMANT PROTECTION SENIORE DEPLOYMENT LITIGATION AND IMBARASSMENT TARGETING INDIVIDUAL DEAL- ERS, WHOLESALERS/RETAIL PURCHASERS COUNTER INTELLIGENCE	OPERATIONAL SCHEMATA IN • BND, HQI AND FIELD • JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION • CUSTOMERS, HQI AND FIELD • IRS • COALE • DOD, SERVICES AGENCIES • IRS • LOCAL AND STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

b6, b7c

b6, b7c

b6, b7c

Chapter II

FINDINGS

The point of departure for the study was the premise that an effective narcotics intelligence system is a necessary component of the overall narcotics control program. The study identified four general areas in which actions might be taken for improving national narcotics intelligence: assignment of authority and responsibility; sharing of intelligence; resource allocation; and the intelligence process. Findings in each of these areas are presented below. Following each finding are one or more possible actions proposed for consideration. In the course of the study, three categories of narcotics intelligence were defined: strategic, operational, and tactical. Table 1 indicates the typical information content, use, and intelligence consumers in each of these categories.

In order to formulate broad policy and strategy, there is a need for strategic narcotics intelligence, which provides an overview of the narcotics threat, foreign and domestic: foreign strategic narcotics intelligence is required to obtain a comprehensive picture of drug production and trafficking, while domestic strategic intelligence is needed to observe changes in the patterns of drug abuse and to assess the impact of control actions. The overall allocation of law enforcement resources is supported by operational intelligence which provides an overview of trafficking groups and their operations, and assists in targeting and operational planning. Finally, the planning for, and conduct of, specific law enforcement actions requires tactical intelligence to identify traffickers and facilities involved in the production and shipment of illicit drugs.

A. ASSIGNMENT OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Finding:

The national narcotics intelligence community is currently characterized by compartmentalization, and by a lack of adequate mechanisms for the coordination of intelligence. There is neither an assignment of responsibility nor clearly defined lines of authority for the collection, production, and dissemination of narcotics intelligence. The study identified 13 federal agencies with principal responsibilities for narcotics intelligence, but an even greater number of federal agencies contribute information of potential intelligence interest. Currently, the focus of intelligence efforts in the narcotics community is on the collection of information in support of ongoing operations in each individual agency, rather than in support of the intelligence needs of the community as a whole (pp. 25-27, p. 51).

Consequently, the following action should be considered:

- Assigning primary responsibility for specific narcotic intelligence products to individual agencies, and establishing a mechanism for coordinating and levying interagency requirements on designated collectors. For example, the responsibility for the production of foreign strategic narcotics intelligence could be assigned to one agency which would then develop collection requirements and be given the authority to task other agencies in order to assure coverage of priority areas (p. 28).

Finding:

Centralization of narcotics intelligence functions has been suggested. However, if it is to be viable, narcotics intelligence in support of operations (operational and tactical intelligence) should not be divorced from the law enforcement

agencies which it serves. The production and consumption of tactical and operational intelligence are an integral part of the law enforcement cycle (planning and conduct of operations) which should include a continuing interaction between operators and intelligence analysts to support operations and to maintain control over sensitive information (p. 26).

Therefore, the application of the following criterion should be considered:

- In assigning primary responsibilities among agencies for collecting, producing, and coordinating operational and tactical intelligence, the need for close association between these functions and law enforcement operations should be recognized. This requirement imposes an important constraint on the possible assignment of intelligence functions among the agencies of the narcotics intelligence community (pp. 26, 49).

Finding:

The production of foreign and domestic strategic intelligence needed for the formulation of broad national policy need not necessarily be associated with operations and, in fact, may benefit from being set apart from the law enforcement agencies. The separation of strategic intelligence from operations may be advantageous both in terms of improved objectivity and access to information outside of law enforcement areas of responsibility. For example, in the latter case, data from public health sources and treatment programs needed for domestic strategic intelligence could be more readily obtained if that intelligence function were located apart from the law enforcement agencies (p. 26).

B. SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE

Finding:

Regardless of changes which might be made in the overall structure of the narcotics control community, there would still be a need to develop better mechanisms for the coordination and sharing of narcotics intelligence among agencies under appropriate security controls. Foreign strategic intelligence products are regularly disseminated to those agencies with a need-to-know, but this is not true of some information in the strategic domestic area and even less so in the operational and tactical intelligence areas due to considerations of security and maintenance of agency control over ongoing cases (pp. 39-44).

Four actions were identified which could encourage sharing of intelligence, but others should be explored:

- Incorporating measures in the OMB Performance Measurement System which promote sharing of intelligence and coordination of operations. For example, periodic reporting on the number and types of joint operations and joint intelligence programs (p. 39).
- Developing interagency lists of major domestic and international targets (i.e., major narcotics traffickers): for example, a list of the most important international traffickers compiled jointly by BNDD, Customs, and CIA. Such lists would provide a vehicle for such interagency actions as the coordination of operations, development of specific collection requirements, division of responsibility for targets, and sharing of intelligence (p. 36-37).
- Promoting, through federal funding, regional coordinated intelligence organizations involving federal, state, and local agencies: for example, LEAA (or

other) funding of basic cadre and expenses of organizations like the Cooperative Narcotics Intelligence Committee--CONIC--in the New York area. Such a program could demonstrate national interest in encouraging such initiatives, and facilitate their establishment by providing the necessary resources (pp. 40-42).

- Establishing joint intelligence units in overseas regions where they do not now exist: for example, experience with the joint Bangkok intelligence unit (BNDD and CIA) should be examined to determine the potential for setting up similar units in Europe, Latin America, or the Middle East, with representation, as appropriate, from BNDD, Customs, CIA, and DoD (pp. 43-44).

C. NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES AND THEIR ALLOCATION

Findings:

The study identified 186 personnel currently dedicated on a full-time basis to foreign and domestic narcotics intelligence in the federal law enforcement agencies (BNDD, Customs, IRS, and ODALE). Of these, 112 are in regional or local intelligence units in the U.S., 36 are located abroad, and 38 are in the headquarters of the various agencies. Of the latter, 23 are intelligence analysts distributed among three agencies (BNDD, Customs, and ONNI). In the U.S., dedicated intelligence resources are about 3 percent of total federal narcotics agent strength in the field (Tables 3 and 4, p. 58).

Very few of these personnel are dedicated to analysis, which is required for the development of strategic and operational intelligence. Most dedicated intelligence personnel in the law enforcement agencies are involved with the collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence, principally in support of ongoing law enforcement operations (pp. 59-60).

Four areas were identified in which a reallocation of resources could increase intelligence analysis capabilities:

- Maintaining the continuity of foreign strategic narcotics intelligence production in CIA and increasing its analytical resources applied to narcotics intelligence: for example, an increase of personnel to a level more nearly comparable to that required for the production of strategic narcotics intelligence in 1971. Greater utilization of CIA's past experience in the narcotics intelligence area, and its unique collection and analytical capabilities could assist in fulfilling the needs for foreign strategic intelligence expressed by representatives of the Executive Office of the President (p. 61).
- Increasing the operational intelligence analysis capability in the law enforcement agencies: for example, an augmentation of the small intelligence analysis staffs in BNDD and Customs which currently have six and five analysts, respectively. An increase would be necessary to provide operational intelligence coverage of such major areas as Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the U.S. comparable to that achieved in a recent BNDD study of Latin America. An increase in operational intelligence production would also be in consonance with the interest in this category of intelligence expressed at the highest levels of the narcotics law enforcement community (pp. 61-62).
- Increasing the manning of the operational desks in BNDD which provide intelligence support to the field: for example, an augmentation of the three personnel who now service all BNDD offices in Latin America. Such augmentation would provide a better interface.

between intelligence and operations at the Headquarters level, and would permit a more thorough review of field reports for intelligence content and better service for such field requests as name traces on traffickers (p. 62).

- Utilizing resources of the ONNI for the production of domestic strategic intelligence: for example, studies on changes in the U.S. addict population and the national market structure of major drugs. The focus of ONNI resources on this category of intelligence would help to fill one of the major gaps in narcotics intelligence coverage (p. 61).

Finding:

There is an imbalance between the numbers of narcotics law enforcement personnel assigned in the U.S. and those stationed abroad: about 3,000 agent personnel are currently in the U.S., while only about 134 are overseas. Almost all of these personnel are operational agents who, although not dedicated to intelligence, are the principal collectors of tactical intelligence. Consequently, there is a comparable imbalance between domestic and overseas intelligence collection resources of narcotics law enforcement agencies (Tables 3 and 4, p. 58).

Two means for augmenting these resources should be considered:

- Augmenting BNDD overseas resources on a selective basis, taking into account the importance of targets in each area, and the attitudes and anti-narcotics capabilities of host countries. For example: only one agent is currently assigned to Bolivia and two to Columbia, both considered major cocaine trafficking areas; only two agents are assigned to Afghanistan,

a major area for heroin and hashish trafficking; and only one agent to India, the world's largest licit opium producer (Par II, p. 14, Table 1).

- Continuing, and perhaps, increasing the overseas narcotic intelligence collection by the national security community agencies (CIA, NSA, DoD, and State). For example: an expansion of DoD's collection role should be examined. The collection capabilities and the potential breadth of coverage offered by the national security agencies could be increased to supplement the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies (pp. 63-64).

D. THE NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

1. Interagency Requirements

Finding:

There is currently no systematic process in the narcotics intelligence community for the formulation of interagency collection requirements. It does not appear, however, that a single requirements mechanism, such as that considered by the CCPC and ONNI, is appropriate for all three intelligence categories--strategic, operational, and tactical (pp. 28-32).

The following actions should be considered for requirements:

- Establishing a mechanism for the formulation of standing interagency collection requirements for international and domestic strategic narcotics intelligence; and, for domestic strategic intelligence which requires statistical data, establishing uniform reporting systems for federal and local inputs. An example of foreign strategic standing requirements are those which have been levied on the country teams through Department of State channels. Examples of uniform

reporting systems contributing to domestic strategic intelligence are those for reporting drug prices, drug-related deaths, and new drugs of abuse (pp. 29-30).

- Developing a less formal process for establishing interagency operational and tactical narcotics intelligence requirements. For example, a requirements process based on joint interagency target lists of major foreign and domestic traffickers. This type of requirements mechanism would permit continuous updating to reflect new violators and rapidly changing patterns of trafficking, and would be compatible with the perishable quality of the information in these two intelligence categories (pp. 31-32).

2. Sources

Finding:

During the course of the study several data bases were identified which are not now being fully exploited for their intelligence content (pp. 32-36).

Although the examples below are not exhaustive, the number of relatively untapped sources identified suggests that the following actions be considered:

- Greater utilization of the following intelligence sources: (pp. 33-36):
 - Existing case files in BNDD and Customs.
 - Laboratory analyses of purchased and seized materials.
 - Existing data bases compiled by state and local agencies (such as the computerized State of Michigan Criminal Justice Information System).
 - Debriefings of arrestees and prison inmates.
 - Information on financial dealings associated with drug trafficking.

- A systematic search for other relevant narcotics intelligence sources at federal, state, and local levels (p. 36).

3. Information Storage and Retrieval

Findings:

In terms of overall information storage and retrieval in support of operations and intelligence production, the current systems of the principal narcotics law enforcement agencies (BNDD and Customs) are in need of substantial revision. Although the Customs CADPIN system and the BNDD NADDIS system are being developed to assist in information retrieval, the current filing and document retrieval systems of these two agencies remain an impediment to full exploitation of the existing intelligence data base (pp. 44-47).

The following changes in storage and retrieval systems are suggested:

- Establishing storage and retrieval systems designed for intelligence purposes (as opposed to the existing systems based on case investigations) within the narcotics law enforcement agencies to facilitate access to information in support of both operations and analysis. Two critical elements of such systems would be (1) the implementation of serial numbering of field reports to permit direct retrieval of individual documents, and (2) the establishment of dossier files to assemble all available information on each major trafficker in one location (pp. 45-47).

Finding:

Existing ADP systems in the narcotics law enforcement agencies have been developed independently by each agency and there

is at present no exchange of information on a systematic basis among these systems.

The following actions are suggested in the ADP area:

- Establishing, as a first step, a centralized name index system for traffickers which can at least identify agencies holding information on an individual trafficker (pp. 44-45).
- Initiating a community-wide study of narcotics-related ADP to examine such factors as access, computer system characteristics, information sharing, types of information, and available data bases toward the establishment of specific ADP requirements for the community; and postponing development of major new ADP systems until the results of this study are available (p. 45).

4. Analysis and Production

Finding:

Relatively little intelligence analysis is currently being conducted within the narcotics control community, principally because of a dearth of analytical resources, but also in some cases for lack of an appreciation of what strategic and operational intelligence might contribute to decisions on policy, strategy, and operations (pp. 47-49).

In the foreign strategic intelligence area, CIA's *International Narcotics Series* has been suspended and CIA production in strategic narcotics intelligence is continuing at a lower level of effort. The production of domestic and foreign strategic intelligence within the law enforcement agencies is also at a relatively low level (p. 51).

The PILOT study, an operational intelligence analysis of Latin America trafficking, conducted by an interagency study team under BNDD direction, is the principal finished product in the operational intelligence area. Although it has not been fully evaluated, information developed in the course of the PILOT study has proved useful in enforcement operations (p. 48).

Four actions were identified to improve operational and strategic narcotics intelligence production:

- Ensuring that consumers of strategic intelligence at national policy levels make their requirements known to the agencies producing such intelligence (p. 48).
- Undertaking operational intelligence analyses, like PILOT, on a continuing basis in both the foreign and domestic areas (p. 49).
- Initiating a study on domestic trafficking in heroin comparable to the *World Opium Survey* (p. 54).
- Examining the role of ADP in narcotics intelligence analysis. An example of an existing application is the telephone toll-call correlation system (TELAN) in Customs (Part II, p. 32).

Chapter III

THE ROLE AND TYPES OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE

A. ROLE OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE

Until several years ago, intelligence collected and used within the narcotics control community was confined almost solely to the types of information traditionally associated with the support of individual law enforcement actions. With the very rapid growth of the narcotics problem and its elevation to a major area of concern for both domestic and foreign policy, perceptions of the role of narcotics intelligence began to change to include broader contributions to the formulation of both policy and strategy. The recognition of this broader role has prompted a variety of initiatives at the federal level to enhance narcotics intelligence capabilities.

In this view, an effective and comprehensive narcotics intelligence system is a necessary component of the overall narcotics control program since it can provide the information to identify the most meaningful targets and points of vulnerability within the trafficking systems. This, in turn, permits the optimal application of limited resources to law enforcement actions. In addition, intelligence can provide an appraisal of changes in the overall narcotics problem and a means of evaluating the impact of law enforcement actions upon it.

Intelligence collection and production can also act as a catalyst in improving the institutional relationships among the agencies, foreign and domestic, which are involved in narcotics control efforts. The sharing of intelligence among U.S. agencies--federal, state, and municipal--particularly at local or

regional levels--offers the first step toward better coordination; agencies will sometimes exchange intelligence where the coordination of active operations would be out of the question.

In overseas areas, U.S. agents are few in number and lack law enforcement jurisdiction. Their possession of intelligence which can demonstrate the extent or importance of local drug trafficking can be, and has been, used to spur foreign agencies to more aggressive enforcement actions, including the provision of increased resources against narcotics targets. At higher levels, a strategic intelligence overview of the importance of a country in the overall traffic can be used to apply pressures on its government for the development of anti-narcotic statutes and policies.

To date, however, intelligence in the U.S. narcotics control community has continued to be dominated by information collection in direct support of specific law enforcement actions: the bulk of the resources of the community are oriented toward this type of intelligence; and there is considerable scepticism on the part of the operational portion of the community about what concrete payoff, if any, may result from efforts expended on developing broader intelligence coverage. However, the nascent efforts directed toward the development of other types of intelligence have progressed to the point where it is possible to characterize their products and to examine the places within the community where each type of intelligence might best be produced.

B. TYPES OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE

The types of intelligence which will be referred to throughout this study, and which are defined below, are categorized primarily by the use to which each intelligence product is most likely to be put, and by inference, then, by the type and level of the consumer to which each is primarily directed. Each category is defined as well by the time sensitivity of the

information which it contains, and by the time span covered by intelligence estimates developed in each area.

The definitions adopted for strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence correspond generally to those developed by the Strategic Intelligence Office (SIO) of BNDD; the final discussion on information support for legal prosecution has been included to take into account those materials which are needed to support prosecution and which are likely to include intelligence information.

It is recognized that there is some overlap among the categories. Information developed as part of a strategic estimate, for example, may contribute to operational intelligence on trafficking patterns. Similarly, the identification of a top trafficker through operational intelligence analysis may also serve as tactical intelligence for planning a law enforcement operation. All three types of information could, in some cases, be used to support legal prosecution. The utility of these categories, however, is that they take into account differences in the sources used, the types of collection needed, the analysis required, the principal agencies involved in production, and the consumers interested in each product.

C. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Strategic intelligence--which provides an overview of the narcotics threat, international and domestic, and of the magnitude of the domestic narcotics problem--contributes to the formulation of broad policy and strategy. International strategic intelligence is directed toward obtaining a comprehensive picture of the sources and production of, and international trafficking patterns in, narcotics and dangerous drugs, and includes international political factors which may be involved with drug trafficking or which may affect U.S. counteractions

against such traffic. Strategic intelligence also includes information on the compliance of foreign governments with their commitments for narcotics control and on the existence of corruption in foreign narcotics control programs.

Domestic strategic intelligence encompasses an overview of the domestic drug abuse problem, which is of interest to both law enforcement and treatment agencies. These topics of common interest include changes in the addict population, patterns of drug abuse, and availability and price of drugs. Domestic strategic intelligence also involves topics of more direct interest to law enforcement agencies, including the sources, import centers, and internal distribution routes of illicit drugs, as well as the overall impact of enforcement programs on traffickers and trafficking patterns.

Consumers of international strategic intelligence appear to be largely confined to the highest policy levels of government particularly in the Executive Office of the President, and in the Department of State. Relatively little interest in international strategic intelligence products was found in the federal law enforcement agencies, where intelligence is focused on support to operations. Some interest was evinced by law enforcement agencies in domestic strategic products.

In general, these strategic estimates are not time-sensitive, and the information from which they are developed is not particularly perishable; many of the areas they cover are not likely to change rapidly.

D. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Operational intelligence provides an overview of the trafficking patterns of illicit drugs, both foreign and domestic, and aims at providing information on the overall operations of drug trafficking groups and the routes and modes of operation involved. It is intended to assist in narrowing the search for

new groups and routes, to develop leads to permit more detailed investigations, and to permit targeting of principal groups. It is also intended to give early warning of major shifts in trafficking patterns and changes in major trafficking groups which may aid in specific targeting.

The consumers of operational intelligence are the highest levels of the law enforcement community, where, in fact, considerable interest was expressed in the production of such information. Operational intelligence is intended to provide these decision-making echelons with a basis for resource allocation and for the formulation of specific law enforcement strategies. In addition, operational intelligence analyses are intended to develop inputs which can contribute to operational planning.

The rapid changes in the composition of trafficking groups and in their modes of operation can make some operational intelligence products time sensitive. While many active traffickers may have been involved in illicit narcotics for extended periods of time, changes in their associates and patterns of trafficking make most operational intelligence subject to relatively frequent updating.

E. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

Tactical intelligence contributes directly to the planning for, or the conduct of, law enforcement actions such as the arrest of traffickers (or those supporting them, such as financiers or corrupt officials) and the seizure of drugs or materials and facilities involved in illicit drug production. International tactical intelligence can be provided to foreign law enforcement services to enable them to take action against traffickers or laboratories, or can be used to alert U.S. domestic enforcement agencies on the arrival of drug traffickers or shipments. Domestic tactical intelligence is the information most commonly

utilized by law enforcement agencies, and is used to mount specific actions against suspected violators. Tactical intelligence in almost all instances involves the identification of individual traffickers and their specific modes and places of operation.

The major consumers and producers of tactical intelligence are the operational elements of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, tactical intelligence is the basic information input to the operational intelligence analysis process described above.

Most of the information on which tactical intelligence is built is extremely perishable due to the mobility of traffickers and changes in their patterns of operation, and hence the production and transmission of this information to potential users often involves a very stringent time scale. For this reason, tactical intelligence is generally not consumed as a finished product, but is more often than not used as raw or semifinished intelligence in direct support of operations.

F. USE OF INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF LEGAL PROSECUTION

This category includes all materials which are amassed in support of legal prosecution. Frequently, the bulk of evidence needed to prosecute is first produced as intelligence information, either operational or tactical. The inclusion of these intelligence materials in case files which will be used by prosecuting attorneys raises a particular problem. Under current laws of evidence (§3500, Title 18) these files are subject to subpoena by the defense, and hence, any sensitive information on informants, police knowledge of network operations, or the identity of covert police agents is subject to potential exposure during the conduct of a court case. Thus, a problem arises over what materials will be included in these case reports, and over the tradeoff between full support of the legal case with relevant information as opposed to the protection of sources

new groups and routes, to develop leads to permit more detailed investigations, and to permit targeting of principal groups. It is also intended to give early warning of major shifts in trafficking patterns and changes in major trafficking groups which may aid in specific targeting.

The consumers of operational intelligence are the highest levels of the law enforcement community, where, in fact, considerable interest was expressed in the production of such information. Operational intelligence is intended to provide these decision-making echelons with a basis for resource allocation and for the formulation of specific law enforcement strategies. In addition, operational intelligence analyses are intended to develop inputs which can contribute to operational planning.

The rapid changes in the composition of trafficking groups and in their modes of operation can make some operational intelligence products time sensitive. While many active traffickers may have been involved in illicit narcotics for extended periods of time, changes in their associates and patterns of trafficking make most operational intelligence subject to relatively frequent updating.

E. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

Tactical intelligence contributes directly to the planning for, or the conduct of, law enforcement actions such as the arrest of traffickers (or those supporting them, such as financiers or corrupt officials) and the seizure of drugs or facilities involved in illicit drug production. Tactical intelligence can be provided to foreign law services to enable them to take action against traffickers, laboratories, or can be used to alert U.S. domestic agencies on the arrival of drug traffickers or vessels or information.

and sensitive information. The practice of filing essentially all intelligence information in the form of case files raises the question of whether all intelligence will be reduced to writing in a timely fashion if by so doing, investigating agents feel that they may be jeopardizing continued use of informants or special information sources.

In addition, classified reports from the national security intelligence agencies must be excluded to avoid disclosure of sensitive operations and sources.

The principal producers of this type of information are the law enforcement agencies themselves, and the principal consumers, the U.S., state, or local attorneys.

* * *

Of the total production of intelligence in the narcotics control community, the vast bulk falls in the category of raw tactical intelligence. Very little finished strategic intelligence is currently produced by the community; and even less finished operational intelligence, although raw operational intelligence, such as that on trafficking groups, is being produced and consumed in that form. The requirements for, and processing of, each type of intelligence are discussed below, together with an examination of the current products in each category.

Chapter IV

THE NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

There is currently no overall intelligence "system" within the narcotics control community, but rather a collection of independent agencies with meager dedicated intelligence resources and unclear lines of authority and areas of responsibility for intelligence collection and production.

The lack of an intelligence system also stems from two characteristics of the narcotics law enforcement agencies. First, there is no tradition of intelligence analysis within the law enforcement field in general, or the narcotics enforcement agencies in particular. Federal and local agencies have just begun to use analysis and automated information retrieval and are still in the process of developing an understanding and demonstration of their potential for supporting operations. Consequently, the analytic resources needed for an effective intelligence system are now lacking. In addition, there are no existing broadly-based intelligence systems in the law enforcement area to serve as models.

Second, law enforcement agencies are traditionally organized on a decentralized basis. Operational control is exercised at the local or regional level and information flows to headquarters or other regions may be limited in some cases.

Information exchanges among agencies are effected laterally in the field, largely through informal contacts, and are generally case oriented, involving specific tactical intelligence required for immediate action.

Proposals to create an effective overall narcotics intelligence system must take into account the fragmented nature of the community, its lack of tradition for analysis, and decentralized operational organization. Past proposals to remedy the intelligence system have included emulation of the national security intelligence process and the centralization of the intelligence function apart from the operational agencies. These approaches appear to ignore these characteristics of the law enforcement agencies, which narcotics intelligence must serve and support.

It is the perception of the study group that operational and tactical intelligence functions, if they are to be effective, cannot be divorced from the law enforcement agencies which they serve. This stems from a need for continuous dialogue between the operators and intelligence analysts, to provide intelligence support for field operations and to maintain control over sensitive intelligence information. Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is not in direct support of law enforcement and may, in fact, benefit from being set apart from operations, both for objectivity and for more ready access to sources of needed information which lie outside of law enforcement areas of responsibility.

The discussion below attempts to identify ways in which an enhanced intelligence capability may be developed taking into account the need to place many intelligence functions within law enforcement agencies, the characteristics of these agencies, and their needs for intelligence in support of operations. Table 2 identifies the 13 principal federal agencies with responsibilities for foreign and domestic narcotics law enforcement and

Table 2. NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

PRINCIPAL FEDERAL AGENCIES	NARCOTIC RESPONSIBILITY		LIAISON AGENCIES ^a	DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN SOURCE
CCINC ^b	F	EI	STATE AND LOCAL POLICE DPTS	D
BNDD ^b	DF	EI	FBI	D
ODALE ^b	D	EI	INS	D
ONNI ^b	DF	I	U. S. ATTORNEYS /DOJ	D
CUSTOMS	DF	EI	CRIMINAL DIV /DOJ	D
IRS	D	EI	MARSHALS /DOJ	D
STATE	F	I	ORGANIZED CRIME /DOJ	D
OSI /USAF	DF	EI	BU PRISONS /DOJ	D
NIS /U.S. NAVY	DF	EI	SS /TREAS	D
CID /U.S. ARMY	DF	EI	ATF /TREAS	D
CIA	F	I	AGRICULTURE	F
DIA	F	I	AID	F
NSA	F	I	FAA	D
			SAODAP	D
			HEW /NIMH	D
			HEW /CDC	D

^a LIST IS REPRESENTATIVE, NOT NECESSARILY EXHAUSTIVE.^b NO RESPONSIBILITIES OUTSIDE NARCOTIC CONTROL.

D = DOMESTIC

F = FOREIGN

E = ENFORCEMENT

I = INTELLIGENCE

intelligence. Also included are State and local police and other federal law enforcement and health agencies which are sources of intelligence and which interface with the primary agencies through varying forms of liaison. It should be noted that only the first four agencies listed in Table 2 are devoted solely to narcotics problems; all the other agencies have responsibilities in areas other than narcotics control.

responsibilities in areas other than narcotics control.

The discussion of the narcotic intelligence process in this chapter is directed toward the development of a narcotic intelligence system involving: (1) collection and interchange of intelligence at local levels among members of the narcotic intelligence community; (2) vertical transmission of intelligence information through established channels to headquarters

of one or more agencies; (3) exchange of intelligence at the headquarters level; and (4) storage, analysis and production of different types of narcotics intelligence.

A. INTERAGENCY REQUIREMENTS

The "requirements process" is the traditional intelligence terminology for the mechanism by which intelligence needs are levied on the field for collection. The narcotics enforcement community has not yet developed established mechanisms by which one agency can levy collection requirements on another. The reliance on ad hoc or informal procedures for interagency intelligence requirements was recognized as a problem in most of the agencies contacted. However, this situation is largely a consequence of the lack of designated responsibilities for production and collection of specific types of narcotics intelligence. As a first step toward correcting this situation, it would appear that primary responsibility for specific intelligence products could be assigned to individual agencies, and that these agencies could be given the authority to coordinate and levy interagency requirements on designated collectors in these areas. This assignment of authority and responsibility would require action at the Executive Office level.

A second reason for the lack of interagency requirements mechanisms is that, unlike the USIB agencies which maintain a very formal requirements process, the law enforcement agencies traditionally do not use formal systems for levying intelligence requirements. After examination of the substance and time sensitivity of intelligence requirements in the narcotics community, it appears that different requirement processes should be used for interagency coordination of strategic, operational and tactical narcotics intelligence requirements.

1. Strategic Intelligence Requirements

For the development of strategic narcotics intelligence in the international area it appears desirable to frame a general set of standing collection requirements similar in nature to those of the USIB. These would be levied on the interagency country teams with collection responsibility designated to individual agencies as appropriate. The responsibility for formulating foreign strategic intelligence requirements for narcotics has not yet been established. The current requirements in the field appear to have been formulated by the CIA in the course of producing the *World Opium Survey*. They were then coordinated with BNDD and levied on the narcotics country teams by means of State Department airgrams. BNDD has also levied requirements on CIA on an ad hoc basis. The requirement for country teams to submit an annual country situation report also serves as a broad intelligence requirement, in addition to the primary purpose of developing the narcotics control plan. In addition, DoD (CINCPAC) has levied requirements on military collectors in the Pacific area and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations has levied a standing requirement for narcotics intelligence on its units worldwide.

The mechanism for levying interagency foreign strategic intelligence requirements on the country team, using the usual procedures of the national intelligence community, appears to have been an acceptable process; it seems appropriate to continue this mechanism for both broad and specific intelligence items requiring interagency collection. However, primary responsibility for producing strategic intelligence and for formulating and coordinating the associated requirements needs to be delineated in order that the current requirements can be updated, and a systematic collection effort maintained. The collection agencies--BNDD, State Department, CIA, DoD, and others--should receive specific guidance on areas in which they have primary collection responsibility.

In order to obtain effective collection abroad, the individual agencies must assign narcotics intelligence collection a high priority, and transmit this priority to the field. Critical parts of this requirements process include visits by key personnel to the field, briefing of personnel in Washington before assignment to the field, as well as cable traffic.

Standing requirements can also be used for domestic strategic intelligence. Standing information requests are now used in law enforcement agencies such as BNDD and ODALE for reporting items of strategic intelligence and management information. In addition, the need for continuous collection and analysis of statistical data (in the areas such as the size, rate of growth, and characteristics of the addict population, new drug usage, and arrest and seizure information) requires establishment of uniform reporting systems and convergence of the information for analysis. For instance, a centralized information system for reporting illicit drug prices could be established using both federal and local purchase price and laboratory analysis data.

The collection of information to be used for domestic strategic intelligence is not now centrally coordinated and proceeds largely on an ad hoc basis within individual federal and local law enforcement agencies. In order to obtain integrated, national strategic intelligence, the responsibility and authority for producing domestic strategic intelligence and coordinating interagency collection requirements needs to be delegated. Domestic narcotic treatment and public health agencies, as well as law enforcement agencies, must be included in allocating the responsibility and authority for collection and production of information in areas such as the addict population and drug availability. In order to avoid duplication of effort and to obtain as complete information as possible, efforts to centralize and coordinate collection efforts within metropolitan areas are required.

2. Operational Intelligence Requirements

For operational intelligence, the requirements process should focus intelligence collection as well as operations on the principal law enforcement targets. Interagency foreign and domestic target lists, as recommended in Section D(p. 32), appear to be natural mechanisms for transmission of operational requirements, as is the circulation of violator debriefings with requests for requirements. The production and dissemination of operational intelligence should generate leads and further requirements for the agents in the field.

Currently, there are no broad interagency exchanges of operational intelligence requirements. The focus of operational intelligence on changing trafficking groups along with the need for continuous dialogue with operators in the field, suggest that that the standing requirements process used for strategic intelligence will not be flexible or timely enough. It appears that interagency operational intelligence requirements, therefore, had best not use the standing requirements process but could adopt mechanisms that focus on major traffickers. Because of the sensitivity of operational information associated with these targets, dissemination probably will be on a need-to-know basis in operational and intelligence channels.

3. Tactical Intelligence Requirements

Tactical intelligence forms the bulk of information flow in the law enforcement agencies. Within and between agencies, tactical intelligence requirements are placed by phone, field report, or cable, or personal contact. The specificity and urgency of these requests suggest that the present mechanisms are the appropriate ones and that no formal coordination of each specific tactical request is feasible. However, the agent in the field can benefit from new mechanisms to enable him to identify appropriate collectors and sources: for instance, the establishment of interagency regional and headquarters files on

all personnel currently under investigation which can be queried by agents from the field; and the establishment of liaison points in headquarters and in the field. Increased support at headquarters can benefit the field by more effective and extensive forwarding of field information requests to appropriate collectors. Cooperative interagency metropolitan intelligence efforts such as the CONIC can form an interface for federal, state, and local information requirements.

B. SOURCES OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE

The sources of tactical and operational narcotics intelligence are those most commonly associated with police operations--informants, debriefings of arrestees, penetrations of illicit organizations, audio-visual surveillance, and covert purchase of illicit drugs. In addition, laboratory analysis of seized and purchased materials is a source of technical intelligence with both strategic, operational, and tactical content.

Most domestic tactical intelligence appears to be developed through informants and through case investigations by the principal enforcement agencies. Procedures for utilizing and protecting informants are recognized throughout the law enforcement community as a critical and controversial area. Narcotics law enforcement practice is often to "burn" or expose the informant when the case goes to prosecution. However, the FBI and CIA, for instance, have a practice of protecting their informants; they also maintain central indices on informants and their areas of knowledge. Because of the time limitations of the Phase I study, we were able only to identify informant procedures as an important area. A review of narcotics informant practices would have to determine the best overall procedures, taking into account operational, intelligence, and legal considerations.

The major sources of international tactical and operational intelligence are liaison with foreign narcotic enforcement agencies and U.S. unilateral operations (including penetrations, informants, and surveillance).

Domestic and foreign strategic intelligence derive from sources within and beyond the law enforcement agencies. Examples of non-law-enforcement sources are the agricultural and economic data from which estimates of opium growing areas and yields are derived. Strategic intelligence draws on law enforcement data for information on the domestic price and availability of drugs as well as the major shifts in foreign producing and trafficking countries.

The identification of potential sources which can contribute to the development of narcotics intelligence, but which are not now being tapped or fully exploited, was undertaken during the Phase I study. There appear to be several important potential sources.

First, the tactical intelligence now being collected by the narcotics law enforcement community is not now fully exploited for its intelligence value: the case files of BNDD and Customs are the largest repositories of this type of information. While these files are used to conduct name checks and to extract some collateral information, systematic investigation of these files to form potential conspiracy cases, identify major traffickers, or generate tactical and operational intelligence is only now beginning to gain acceptance. Specific examples and recommendations on utilizing this existing source of data appear below in Sections F and G.

The tactical intelligence generated by state and local police agencies is another source which offers great potential if better information sharing can be developed with the Federal Government. The Federal Government has permanent narcotics agents on a full-time basis only in major U.S. cities. Even in these

cities, the local agencies often have numerically larger resources devoted to narcotics control. For instance, in New York City, the BNDD has 200 agents including a 16-man intelligence unit, while the New York City Police Department maintains a 1,000-man narcotic and organized crime unit with a 53-man intelligence unit.

Exploitation of intelligence developed by local agencies can and has led to cases against major domestic and even international traffickers. This comes about when the intelligence goal of "working up the distribution chain" is successfully achieved. For example, a local agency arrest of a street level pusher has in one city led to the development of intelligence on identifying an ethnic Chinese connection in a nearby port city. However, to successfully follow up such intelligence, a cooperative federal-local endeavor is often needed to cross state and international jurisdictions and to provide the necessary resources for surveillance and for buying narcotics as evidence. Section E discusses procedures to improve sharing of narcotics intelligence, the lack of which has traditionally impeded the effectiveness of both federal and local organizations.

The exploitation of law enforcement sources outside of the three or four major narcotic enforcement agencies also appears to offer greater potential. (See Table 2 for a list of agencies identified in the course of the study who now contribute such data.) For example, FBI informants, although now providing substantial information to support narcotics efforts in some localities, represent a resource which should be considered for more systematic exploitation for narcotics intelligence.

It is the perception of the study group that information which is being collected by the investigative agencies of the military Services (OSI, NIS and CID) is also not used in a systematic way by the federal law enforcement agencies, and that the collection capabilities of these agencies might be more broadly utilized.

Financial information is another source which appears to offer important intelligence information. For example, the repository of IRS case files (which are subject to legal and administrative restraints, but can apparently be made available upon specific request to the federal investigative agencies) and other information within the Department of Treasury are believed to contain a great deal of information which could be combined with profit with investigative data from other agencies. The Department of the Treasury is now developing a plan for exploitation of financial information in support of narcotics contro, but this was not available for review during the course of this study.

There are other data bases now being established which appear to offer a potential for narcotics intelligence, but where the interface with the narcotics enforcement agencies is not clear. A principal example is the Racketeer Profile data base now being set up in the Justice Department. Provisions should be made in all such cases to ensure that the relevant narcotics intelligence content of such files can be made available on a continuing basis to the appropriate federal agencies.

A potentially important source which has not been fully exploited on a systematic basis is the records of state and local police agencies. While some of these data are made available on an informal basis to federal agents in locales where information sharing arrangements have been established, there may be a payoff in selective exploitation of some of the larger repositories, particularly those which have been computerized, such as the State of Michigan's Criminal Justice Information System, and the New York State Police Intelligence System, both funded by LEAA.

A number of other data bases which are compiled for purposes other than law enforcement offer potential inputs to several types of intelligence. For example, it was discovered in the course of the study that the Bureau of Prisons records

on standard medical forms the drug abuse history of all inmates at the time that they are incarcerated, and that these data are computerized so that drug related information, sanitized to exclude the names of individuals, could be easily extracted. Such information could provide an insight into changes in drug usage required for the development of domestic strategic intelligence. This information may also be available in state penitentiaries, although this source was not investigated during the Phase I study.

Similarly, the urinalyses of prisoners in city lockups are also compiled in some locales and could contribute not only to knowledge of drug usage but also to an overview of the local availability of different drugs and to the measurement of the effects of specific law enforcement actions in those areas.

Other data now being compiled, as already mentioned, are those from public health sources and from drug treatment programs which can be used as an input to domestic strategic intelligence.

The potential sources suggested above are by no means exhaustive; there was insufficient time in the Phase I study for a comprehensive search for all appropriate sources. However, the number of relatively untapped sources that were discovered during the course of the study suggests that a systematic search for such information is warranted.

C. TARGETING AND COLLECTION

1. Targeting

Intelligence does not now play a major targeting role in the narcotics law enforcement although a need for domestic and international lists of principal violators was expressed by officials in each of the principal agencies. The maintenance of such an interagency list in the field can serve to coordinate operations, focus intelligence collection and analysis efforts, divide

responsibilities for targets among agencies, and promote sharing of intelligence. It also can be used for assessing progress and the effectiveness of operations. These target lists should provide operators with information and incentives to mount cases against major traffickers rather than targets of opportunity. It also should ensure that recognition for concluding a case against a major violator will be given credit within the enforcement community. The development and maintenance of interagency targets lists and accompanying dossier files on major traffickers and trafficking groups warrants priority attention as a means to improve the effectiveness of overall enforcement efforts. The targeting role of intelligence, to be successful, must be carried out in the field as well as at headquarters, and be an integral part of the enforcement process.

2. Collection

An important difference between intelligence collection in the narcotics law enforcement agencies and in the national security community (including the members of that community--CIA, DIA, and NSA--who also collect narcotics intelligence) is that the bulk of law enforcement collection derives from the development or conduct of case investigations designed to lead to specific law enforcement actions. BNDD, Customs, ODALE, and IRS intelligence collection is, therefore, generally a by-product of the activities of their operational agents rather than the product of dedicated intelligence collectors attempting to amass information to satisfy substantive information requirements and to fill gaps in intelligence coverage. This difference in objectives is reflected in the respected agencies' approaches to collection, and in their intelligence coverage in any given area. Thus, law enforcement intelligence collection which permits a case to be carried through to arrest and conviction has successfully fulfilled its purpose, regardless of how much it has contributed to the knowledge of overall

trafficking patterns and networks. This is not to denigrate the application of intelligence to this purpose, but only to point out that the content of intelligence collected in pursuit of this goal is likely to be very different from that obtained from an intelligence collection operation mounted specifically to identify the most important targets as a means of optimizing the use of law enforcement resources. It is recognized that intelligence collection in direct support of individual cases will continue to dominate in the law enforcement agencies, but a case can be made for the initiation of dedicated intelligence operations as well.

The Special Projects Division in BNDD conducts some operations which are designed to produce intelligence in specific areas. For instance, Operation CACTUS will assign agents on a temporary basis to areas along the Mexican border to conduct undercover purchases, monitor electronic tracking devices from airborne platforms, and request Title III wire intercept authority if appropriate.

In areas where intelligence is collected against listed or perceived requirements (rather than in the course of an individual case) there is considerable uncertainty within the narcotics intelligence community over who is responsible for the collection of what types of information. As described above, requirements have been generally levied at large, rather than to individual agencies with known collection capabilities; and in areas where several agencies have the potential for collection, coordination of collection and production has not been established. (A number of agencies are collecting data on illicit drug prices, for example, and are producing estimates based on varying criteria.) In order to minimize duplication and to make best use of available collection resources, it would appear desirable to delineate collection and coordination responsibilities in major substantive areas to individual agencies.

D. THE COORDINATION AND SHARING OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE

The establishment of a single point of authority over the community could presumably alter the institutional compartmentalization which hinders the sharing of intelligence. However, it would probably produce an ameliorating effect over time rather than a sudden reversal of the practices which have pervaded the operational echelons of the law enforcement agencies for many years. Thus, with or without consolidation of lines of authority, it appears necessary to seek mechanisms for information sharing and coordination which can offer better information flow among agencies and which appear feasible to implement in the face of recognized contrary practice in the community.

A prerequisite to any attempt to establish information exchange mechanisms throughout the community is a clear and enforced policy on the part of all agencies involved that information sharing and coordination is a primary concern of officials at all echelons. To ensure a level of compliance at operational echelons which will foster the practical implementation of coordinated arrangements, it would appear necessary to establish a system of incentives to encourage these actions and sanctions for departures from the policy.

Current incentives in the law enforcement area are largely focused on individual agency arrest and seizure records. The emphasis on independent action sometimes to the point of direct competition resulting from this system is an impediment to the sharing of information and the coordination of operations between agencies. One means of correcting this might be to make use of OMB's Performance Measurement System which has a number of parameters in addition to arrests and seizures. It appears desirable to formulate the measures to promote interagency intelligence and operational coordination. For example, the number of joint operations and joint intelligence programs could be included in the system.

In the course of the study, an effort was made to identify cooperative initiatives which had been undertaken, and other

areas in which coordination appeared appropriate and feasible. Although coordination on an informal and personal basis was noted in a number of areas both in Washington and in the field, there appeared to be very few channels which were firmly enough established to survive shifts in personnel or operational conflicts among agencies. Several which did offer a potential as mechanisms for effective intelligence sharing are described below.

Both domestically and internationally the importance of regional operations is manifested in both the organizational structures and operational practices of the agencies of the community, and more particularly, in the law enforcement agencies. It was of particular interest, therefore, to examine the operation of the Cooperative Narcotics Intelligence Committee (CONIC), a regional cooperative arrangement which has been established in New York.

The CONIC grew out of the common interest of several agencies in a potential conspiracy case being developed by the New York City Police Department (NYCPD), and a recognition by the senior regional officers that closer coordination of ongoing operations and sharing of intelligence could cut duplication and enhance the operational effectiveness of all agencies concerned. The CONIC, whose participants are BNDD, Customs, ODALE, NYCPD, and the New York Task Force,¹ established its goal as the "integration of all law enforcement efforts of allied agencies engaged in narcotics enforcement" toward the common mission of successful prosecution of traffickers. Although the CONIC has objectives beyond the intelligence area (solving problems which have curtailed cooperation among agencies, stimulating mutual trust, preventing duplication of investigatory efforts), the first institutional action taken was the establishment of

¹Consisting of representatives of the New York State Police, the NYCPD, and the federal narcotics agencies.

an intelligence committee and a common repository with entries for all traffickers (above street level) in whom the agencies had investigative interest. The entry into the repository is to be made at the time an individual is placed under investigation.

Of the 4,791 entries made in the repository between September and the end of December 1972, 340 traffickers were found to be the subject of investigation of more than one of the participating agencies. Where more than one agency is involved with a given trafficker, discussions among the interested agencies are held to determine whether the cases should proceed in parallel, whether the case should be assigned to a single agency, or whether a joint operation should be undertaken. In the event of the identification of a target of opportunity, the repository is to be checked for other agency interest before an arrest is made.

The CONIC has also established a common index for informants found to be unreliable by one of the agencies, and is currently discussing the establishment of some form of common target list of the most important traffickers in the New York Metropolitan area. Other intelligence matters of common concern are addressed at weekly meetings of the Intelligence Committee which consists of the senior intelligence officers of the agencies.

Although intelligence sharing under this system is not total (substantive files on investigations are not automatically available to each agency, and no index of active informants has been established), it represents a substantial start toward both exchange of information and the coordinated conduct of operations. The potential security risks involved in this type of exchange are recognized by the participants and appear to be accepted, as is the possibility that one agency may use information derived through the CONIC for its own purposes. However, the chance of the latter is decreased by the close contact among

the participants and the fact that such use would become known to the others.

Unfortunately, to our knowledge and that of the law enforcement officers interviewed, the CONIC, as an institutionalized mechanism is unique in the country. In addition, it is only realistic to assume that any new arrangement of this sort will be fragile until it has been tested over time. However, the potential for this type of mechanism in other major metropolitan areas or regions warrants federal encouragement.

Although the Federal Government cannot direct the participation of state and city law enforcement agencies, it can provide through the regional offices of its own agencies a means of proposing such action and can also make funds available for cadre (perhaps an executive secretary, several intelligence analysts and clerical help) and basic expenses for any area which would undertake a similar organizational arrangement.

It is probable that not all cities or regions will be considered appropriate for such institutionalized coordination: known corruption, or the total lack of intelligence capabilities in some policy systems would make the proposal undesirable in those cases. However, federal initiatives toward the establishment of CONIC organizations in major trafficking areas like Miami, San Francisco, and other selected cities appears feasible and desirable. The additional degree of institutionalization provided by LEAA (or other federal) funding, and the demonstrated willingness on the part of federal agencies to share information with local police (local belief holds that federal agencies will accept information but not share their own) could enhance the changes for successful establishment and survival of these mechanisms.

In summary, the CONIC appears to be a pragmatic approach to dealing with the two major problems which make the sharing of intelligence difficult among law enforcement agencies: the very

real problem of potential corruption and breaches of security which can destroy cases; and the concern that shared information may be misused in unilateral actions by individual agencies.

It was not possible to examine overseas cooperative mechanisms directly during the course of this study; therefore, it is not possible to comment on the degree to which working relationships within the country teams fulfill the need for intelligence and operational coordination.

Information available on the Bangkok intelligence unit was of interest, however, since this joint organization appeared particularly suited to the production of operational intelligence for consumption both in the field and in Washington. The Bangkok unit consists of two full-time BNDD agents and a clerk and one full-time and one part-time CIA personnel; it is under the direction of the BNDD Regional Director. The advantage which this arrangement appears to offer is not only its dedication to narcotics intelligence production, but the day-to-day working contacts of representatives of the two major regional agencies with narcotics collection capabilities, who between them have the bulk of available information on the area. Even broader membership would appear desirable in such a unit (DoD representation would appear particularly appropriate in Bangkok so long as any substantial U.S. forces are stationed in the area).

There is no basis for assessing the intelligence output which such a unit might make possible, since the Bangkok unit has only been in operation for a short period. However, the potential for joint units producing operational intelligence in, say, Latin America and in Europe appears to warrant further investigation.

The establishment of cooperative intelligence arrangements is important because in many areas the narcotics unit of a single agency may be too small to justify a separate and dedicated

intelligence unit, or even an individual assigned solely to intelligence. Also, the establishment of a joint intelligence group facilitates access to the information contained in the individual agency files through agency representatives.

At all levels information convergence remains a problem, and is particularly important for the production of international and domestic operational intelligence. Although a single point of all-source information convergence is probably impractical regardless of the structure of the community, means are now lacking, and should be developed, for facilitating the collection of all-source information in response to specific production or operational needs. Two methods appear to offer the greatest overall potential: a broader and more systematized dissemination of regular intelligence products; and a centralized index system, principally for names of traffickers, which can at least identify the repository of relevant substantive information.

E. INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL

The principal intelligence repositories of the community are largely compartmentalized. Access to information on traffickers held by another agency is difficult, and it may, in fact, be difficult to ascertain that information on some violators is being held by another agency.

While the requirement on the part of the law enforcement agencies to protect the integrity of their ongoing operations is recognized, some means should be devised to ensure, at the minimum, that one agency can, through some form of name trace, be made aware that information exists somewhere in the system, as suggested above.

A logical means of achieving this minimum goal is to provide some degree of common access to the major computerized files held in the principal agencies. It is proposed, therefore, that an examination be made of means of accessing the name

indices held by all the domestic agencies, both to provide an early capability for this type of search, and a means of identifying problems which would be associated with a centralized computerized index on traffickers.

ONNI also plans a large computerized data storage system, although specifics on utilization of the system and the individual data base to be developed are lacking. However, the further proliferation of major systems without consideration of the needs of the overall narcotics control community and without examination of the feasibility of some form of centralization does not appear desirable. Therefore, it seems desirable that a thorough examination of all existing ADP systems in the narcotics intelligence community be undertaken toward the end of determining community requirements and that the development of any new ADP systems be postponed until present capabilities are evaluated.

In terms of overall information storage and retrieval in support of operations and intelligence production, the current systems of the principal law enforcement agencies involved (BNDD and Customs) are in need of substantial revision. The problem is not principally one of information flow: essentially all reporting from the BNDD and Customs field offices is sent to their respective headquarters. However, once at headquarters the information receives inadequate review due to resource limitations, and the filing systems now employed make retrieval of information very difficult for collateral addition to field reports and for intelligence analyses.¹ Although BNDD and Customs have centralized files cross-indexed by the names of subjects covered in field reports, all reports are filed exclusively

¹In December 1972, Customs converted to a centralized index file which should permit retrieval of documents pertaining to individuals. However, some prior holdings will remain outside of the system.

by case number, which makes the search for individual documents needed in, say, a name trace or an operational intelligence analysis, time consuming and cumbersome.

Although case files are necessary for the amassing of information in support of legal prosecution, the more general uses of these data for name traces and analyses could be greatly facilitated by the institution of a serial numbering system, and the maintenance of serialized document files for all traffic to and from field offices. Under this system, which is essentially that used by CIA, an entry in the name index identified by document serial number will lead directly to that discrete document, without searching the case files (in which a copy will also be kept). While the case file storage method was probably adequate some years ago when agency holdings were much smaller, the rate of growth of these files (in BNDD nearly 250,000 documents per year at the current rate and nearly 70,000 annually in Customs) will require a new system. It may not be practical to redo existing files in the serial system, but it is recommended that it be instituted in both BNDD and Customs for future traffic. If this is done, old documents will be no more difficult to retrieve than at present, and new acquisitions will be substantially easier to locate in a timely fashion.

Another technique which is directly applicable to the operational needs of both BNDD and Customs is the creation of dossier files on major traffickers. Under this system all existing information on these important violators is collected in a single file or series of files identified by a unique dossier number and can be instantly retrieved without further search when the individual again becomes the subject of operational interest. This system is also a useful way to collect all-source information on major traffickers for common use in the community.

Both of these techniques (serialized document and dossier files), as well as other information handling systems, have been used for an extended period by CIA, and it is suggested that their expertise be made available to the domestic law enforcement agencies to survey these storage and retrieval problems, and to propose solutions tailored to individual agency needs. Past experience in other agencies suggests that it will probably be necessary to upgrade the job levels of personnel involved in the storage and retrieval process to ensure the needed level of accuracy in the filing systems proposed.

An example of the perceived need for more efficient information handling systems emerged from the experience of the analysts who recently completed the prototype operational analysis, Operation PILOT. It was their judgment that this study, which in fact took nearly nine months to complete, could have been completed in a substantially shorter period had the files used been structured in a way conducive to rapid and accurate information retrieval.

Storage of other types of information to support law enforcement should also be considered, e.g., a photographic register, an index of aliases, informant indices, phone number indices, and files of financial data relevant to narcotics trafficking. Some of these files already exist in some regional or local offices, and in some agency headquarters, but there are no centralized interagency repositories in any of these areas.¹

F. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Relatively little intelligence analysis is currently being conducted within the narcotics control community, principally because of the dearth of analytical resources, but also in some

¹CIA maintains an interagency source register for international narcotics intelligence (i.e., an index of informants and other information sources).

cases for lack of interest in the finished intelligence product or lack of an appreciation of what these analyses might contribute to decisions on policy, strategy, and operations.

In the area of international strategic intelligence, some analyses are being conducted on a limited basis for special studies and reports in CIA and BNDD, although at a modest level in both agencies. ONNI's first analytical effort is to be a broad cocaine study which touches both international and domestic issues.

Some analytical work is also going into the production of such estimates as the national addict population, which would contribute to domestic strategic intelligence, and BNDD has also undertaken several studies in this area.

The sum of analytical work in the strategic area, however, is very modest. Although the number of consumers of this type of intelligence is probably quite small, they are at the policy level of government and their needs for finished strategic intelligence on a broad range of topics appears considerably greater than that which they are currently receiving. To maintain and augment analysis and production in this area, there is a need for these consumers to make their requirements better known and to set priorities so that appropriate levels of effort may be applied.

Two areas identified during the study as deserving of greater attention and support are the production of operational intelligence and the interface between intelligence and operations which can make this product more useful to the field.

The prototype operational analysis mentioned above (Operation PILOT), conducted by a joint team (BNDD, Customs, CIA) in BNDD is the only concerted effort undertaken to date toward the full exploitation of collected tactical intelligence materials. This project, which attempted to collect, collate, and analyze

data on Latin American traffickers on an all-source basis, produced an overview of trafficking networks in that area and a degree of visibility into the trafficking group which would not be possible through the regular perusal of operational traffic. The results of the completed effort have not been fully evaluated, but the potential for this type of analysis, at least, seems clear. For this reason the continuation and expansion of similar analyses appears desirable. An increase in resources for this purposes is discussed in Chapter VI.

A critical factor in this type of analysis, and in whatever level of success was achieved in the prototype effort, is the interface between the intelligence analysts and the agency field offices which takes place at the area desks of both BNDD and, to a lesser degree, in Customs. These desk officers are parts of the headquarters operational divisions. While they are not intelligence personnel per se, they provide the means for effective transmission of the results of intelligence analysis to the field, and in turn translate feedback from the field to better focus the analysts on the area of primary pay-off to the operational echelons.

These same area desks are the points through which the tactical information from the field flows on a daily basis in BNDD. It is their responsibility to provide intelligence support to the field in the form of name traces, and the addition of collateral information to raw tactical reports.¹ In both of these roles, the area desks constitute the channel of intelligence information to and from field offices, and as such are an integral part of the overall intelligence process. With the current levels of manning in BNDD, (15 personnel divided among seven area desks) the degree to which both operational and intelligence functions can be performed at the desks (and

¹In Customs this is the responsibility of the Intelligence Division.

in Customs the degree to which this interface with intelligence can be maintained) is limited. For this reason an increase in these resources is also discussed in Chapter VI.

Some intelligence analysis is also being conducted in the field. The Bangkok intelligence unit cited above is one example of intelligence analysis which is specifically focused on regional needs. The operational intelligence analyses which are beginning to be produced in some of the BNDD Regional Intelligence Units is another. While it is too early to judge the value of these regional products and to perceive how they might fit in with similar efforts at the headquarters level, the concept of analysis directly responsive to operations appears to have merit and should be further investigated. At present, the capability of these regional units to undertake any form of analysis is severely limited by their resources.

The final evaluation of all types of intelligence analysis, however, must be based on their usefulness to the consumer. In order to gain full acceptance for the intelligence function as an integral element in the narcotics control community, intelligence products must be continuously assessed for their contribution to policy formulation, to the conduct of law enforcement actions, and to the development of new operations. It is suggested, therefore, that these prototype analytical efforts be assessed at the earliest opportunity through the elicitation of comments from potential users at policy and operational levels, and that such evaluations be included in the plans for all similar analyses.

Chapter V

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS, DISSEMINATION, AND INFORMATION GAPS

A. PRODUCTS

The bulk of intelligence in the narcotics control community is used in its raw state in direct support of field operations. Few finished intelligence products are produced and disseminated in comparison with the information flow. The principal products in the area of foreign strategic intelligence are CIA's *World Opium Survey*, and the related *International Narcotics Series*. This series has now been discontinued, and future CIA finished reports on narcotics will be produced in response to individual requests or on topics perceived to be of particular importance. It appears that this production will be at a lower level of effort than that expended during the preparation of the initial series. It is intended that future finished narcotics intelligence products by CIA will have much more limited distribution than was the case previously. The Strategic Intelligence Office (SIO) of BNDD also produces special reports on selected topics of strategic intelligence.

There is no domestic equivalent to the *World Opium Survey*. Internal monthly intelligence reports, such as the *BNDD Monthly Summary* and BNDD and ODALE regional intelligence reports, contain domestic strategic intelligence items as well as other operational and strategic intelligence and are the principal vehicles for reporting major trends and important items of operational intelligence. The quarterly *Intelligence Review* and periodic *Intelligence Bulletins* of the Bureau of Customs are significant since they provide feedback to the field from intelligence received. These documents have a wide dissemination,

2,000 copies, and contain cases showing the results of intelligence provided by the field and intelligence news of interest to Customs officers.

Although items of operational intelligence appear in agency monthly intelligence reports, there are only two studies that can be characterized as extensive finished operational intelligence products: Operation PILOT, and a Bureau of Customs working paper produced in 1972 entitled *Significant Heroin Seizures (1965-Date)*, which discussed some of the major heroin cases of the past. In the field, operational intelligence analysis is sometimes performed using regional intelligence files in the compiling of conspiracy cases against specific trafficking groups.

Most tactical intelligence is used in a raw form, but the potential for more finished tactical intelligence processing is beginning to be recognized. This would entail combining available collateral information from all agency sources in a short time for use in support of a specific operation in the field. The CADPIN on-line computer system is an example of a real time computer product for tactical intelligence support. Desk personnel in BNDD and Customs provide, as time allows, intelligence summaries from headquarters files to the field on important cases. The Arrest and Seizure Analysis (ASAN) system printouts are distributed monthly to the field and provide breakouts of arrest and seizure by various categories.

8. DISSEMINATION

In the law enforcement agencies the dissemination of both raw and finished intelligence is largely internal within agencies. Interagency dissemination of raw intelligence is now the exception rather than the rule. It is recommended that a policy of interagency dissemination at headquarters of all intelligence reports in certain categories such as foreign reporting,

debriefings, laboratory analyses, and arrest and seizures reports, be considered. For example, the New York Joint Task Force Intelligence unit has established some guidelines on reports which it expects to receive from each agency; under this directive copies of all BND-6s (Reports of Investigation), and BND-7s (reports of seizure to which lab analysis is attached) are to be sent to the Intelligence Unit. Documents which did not receive interagency dissemination in such selected areas would be exceptions for reasons such as unusual sensitivity.

C. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

There appears to be general agreement in the community on the types of intelligence needed and the fact that the current state of knowledge is fragmented and partial in most major intelligence areas. For example, the recent USIB study of foreign narcotics intelligence includes a list of information gaps showing deficiencies in most areas of the world on opium production, trafficking routes, and principal trafficking organizations. The clandestine nature of illicit drug traffic and its continuously changing patterns and groups indicate that intelligence needs can only be met completely in specific areas and at specific times, so that collection and production sources must be allocated judiciously to achieve maximum support for the narcotics control effort. Some of the principal gaps (i.e., areas where there are needs for information or products) are discussed below by the three types of intelligence.

1. Strategic Intelligence

The need for a broad overview of the international situation appears to have been met by the production of the *World Opium Survey*. However, a continuing need was expressed for more specific and in-depth studies to support control actions in specific geographic areas of the world. The intelligence gaps are broad and include the identification of the principal sources, routes,

and traffickers for heroin reaching the United States. In order to assess the political aspects of the international control effort a continuing need was expressed for information on the compliance of foreign governments and the existence of corruption in foreign countries' narcotics programs.

There is a need for a domestic strategic study to play a similar role as the *World Opium Survey* did in the foreign field. Principal domestic strategic intelligence gaps are in knowledge of the sources of drugs entering the United States, the principal import centers, and domestic distribution modes and routes. In addition, little centrally collected and analyzed statistical information is available on the extent and changes of the drug abuse problem and the availability of drugs. A specific example of information needed for the assessment of control efforts effectiveness, is a continuing program to document the disposition and trafficking activities of violators after their arrest. (Such data are available from administrative records kept by the Federal court system.)

2. Operational Intelligence

In considering the need for operational intelligence, it is appropriate to ask if the principal traffickers are unknown or if they are known but very difficult to prosecute, indicating that tactical enforcement intelligence is the primary need. It is the opinion of the study group that many major international traffickers and domestic importers and distributors are not well known. An overview study which would indicate the principal traffickers and systems which are known to the narcotics enforcement community is a needed operational product. The recommended target lists and dossier files would be vehicles for keeping this product up to date.

3. Tactical Intelligence

There is also a need for greater tactical intelligence support to the field. This support requires files of targets, informants, cases under investigation, aliases, photographs, phone numbers, financial information, etc. ADP and analytic support at headquarters is needed to produce timely products in support of field requests. All the kinds of information that can be usefully explored are not even identified at present, but the initial efforts of the community in telephone and financial data suggest that these and others should be explored.

There are a number of suggestions throughout this paper which would help to improve the existing intelligence coverage and fill gaps on knowledge. They include development of new sources, exploitation and analysis of the existing information data base, and allocation of increased resources. The time and scope of this study did not permit an examination of ways to fill specific intelligence needs, such as identification of the source of heroin entering the country by means of new laboratory techniques for source analysis. For these reasons, quantitative estimates of the collection capabilities and resources needed to fill narcotics intelligence gaps are not now feasible.

Chapter VI

NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

A. SUMMARY OF EXISTING RESOURCES

Manpower figures have been developed to indicate the resources of the narcotics enforcement community which are devoted to narcotic intelligence. Estimates obtained from each of the principal agencies are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.

In compiling these figures, it was difficult to take into account the contribution of persons who collect or produce narcotic intelligence in the course of pursuing primary duties in other areas of the enforcement program. In the Headquarters entry in Table 3, only personnel who are dedicated to narcotics intelligence production and liaison have been indicated. Other headquarters personnel who contribute to the intelligence effort are noted in the narrative either in this section or in the individual agency descriptions in Part II.

Two categories of field personnel are shown: personnel who are entirely dedicated to narcotics intelligence; and operational field agents. The field agents are also the principal collectors of operational and narcotics intelligence, but it does not appear possible to break out a fraction of their time as being primarily devoted to intelligence. The combined resources of the narcotics community which are now being devoted to intelligence production or liaison at the headquarters of the Washington agencies is on the order of 40 men per year. The 40 persons listed in Table 3 reside in three principal offices: the Strategic Intelligence Office of BNDD; the Intelligence Division at Customs; and ONNI. Half of these are in ONNI. In addition, CIA maintains at

**Table 3. NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
(Personnel or Man/Year Equivalents)**

Agency	Headquarters Production and Liaison		Field Intelligence Collection				Totals	
	Strategic Intelligence	Operational and Tactical Intelligence	Domestic		Foreign		Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^a
			Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^a	Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^a		
BRDO	5	6	62	1,228	9	107	82	1,346
DDALE	-	1	33	690 ^b	-	-	34	690
DDNI	20	-	-	-	-	-	20	20
Customs	1	5	17	500 ^c	27	27	50	550
INS	-	-	-	569 ^d	-	-	-	569
DoD	2	-	-	54 ^e	-	72 ^e	2	128
Total	28	12	112	3,041	36	206	188	3,303

^aIncludes full time operational narcotic agents who collect intelligence in the course of enforcement operations as well as dedicated intelligence personnel. CIA, State, DIA, and other part time foreign collectors not included. Other domestic agencies, SS, ATF, BPR, FBI, INS considered as liaison sources and not primary narcotics intelligence resources.

^bIncludes 365 federal personnel (100 attorneys, 173 on loan from BRDO, 41 on loan from ATF, and 51 from other agencies) and 325 state and local investigators on loan to DDALE.

^cEstimated man year equivalent of the narcotics related activities of the 975 Customs investigative agents. Customs estimates that approximately half of their investigations are narcotics related.

^d344 intelligence agents and 225 auditors are pursuing individual INS narcotics targets.

^eThe DoD maintains a force of 2,858 agents in the investigative elements of the three services. Drug offenses range from 20 to 40 percent of the investigations conducted by these personnel. The Army was able to identify 125 of its agent personnel as being devoted entirely to drug investigations, the Navy identified 2, and the Air Force, none.

Table 4. FOREIGN NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

Region	BRDO		Customs		DoD ^a		Totals	
	Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^b	Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^b	Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^b	Dedicated to Intelligence	Total Agents and Intelligence ^b
Canada	1	3	2				3	5
Mexico	1	15	4				5	19
Latin America	1	14	5			1	6	20
Mid East		13	2				2	15
SE Asia	4	18	4				8	22
Far East	1	9	1			18	2	28
Europe	2	27	9			53	11	89
Totals	10	99 ^c	27			72	37	198

^aIncludes 70 U.S. Army and 2 U.S. Navy investigative agents devoted entirely to drug abuse cases.

^bIncludes full time operational narcotics agents, who collect intelligence in the course of enforcement operations as well as dedicated intelligence personnel.

^cThere are now 8 additional agents abroad.

headquarters a Narcotics Control Group with full time narcotics responsibilities, including liaison and distribution of reports from the field. However, DDI personnel at CIA who have produced Intelligence Memoranda on international narcotics problems are not assigned on a full-time basis to the narcotics field. Consequently, the level of CIA resources devoted to the production of finished intelligence products is now assigned on an ad hoc basis to meet specific production requests, and the number of persons is dependent on the number and nature of these requests.

The number of personnel in the narcotics agency headquarters who are actually engaged in intelligence analysis on a full-time basis (excluding CIA and NSA) is only about 20 individuals, since management and liaison functions occupy many personnel in these small intelligence units. There are four analytic units composed of six analysts in SIO at BNDD,¹ five analysts in Customs, and about 12 analysts in ONNI. A majority of these resources appear to be devoted to strategic intelligence, including most of the ONNI resources and perhaps half of the BNDD and Customs resources

At headquarters, there are a number of individuals and organizations who collect or disseminate intelligence-related information in the course of their activities. In BNDD, for example, they include the statistics division, the special projects office, and the area desk managers in the enforcement office.

The dedicated domestic narcotics intelligence personnel in the field are found primarily in the regional offices of BNDD and Customs; they represent about 3 percent of the total domestic agent field strength. These personnel perform intelligence functions, including liaison, source development, and analysis, along with administration and information management functions to varying degrees in different regions and agencies. The

¹Two of the six are on temporary loan from CIA.

3,000 operational field agents are the primary collectors of tactical and operational intelligence, in the course of their investigative work. BNDD accounts for about 40 percent of these personnel, while the remainder reside in Customs, ODALE,¹ and IRS in roughly equal numbers.

As shown in Table 4, the overseas narcotics control strength is only about 6 percent of the domestic field strength, and represents about 200 people worldwide. Nine of these BNDD personnel, including three on loan from other agencies and 27 Customs personnel, are fully devoted to intelligence activities. Additional support in intelligence collection on a part-time basis is given by other members of the country team including the State Department, CIA, and DoD. It is the impression of the study team that the bulk of this support has been provided by CIA, and that the DoD components have not been effectively integrated into the collection effort abroad.

B. RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The six intelligence analysts in BNDD and five intelligence analysts in Customs, due to their small number, can review in detail only a small portion of the daily flow of raw intelligence. In-depth analyses using the headquarters case files are generally not feasible, except in special projects like the PILOT Study. Strategic intelligence analyses are even more limited since operational intelligence support often is given first priority. Intelligence and operational personnel in both agencies were in agreement that additional intelligence analysts are needed and could provide useful support to enforcement operations. The modest resources allocated to intelligence analysis appear to make little sense in light of much larger resources in manpower and ADP processing equipment which are now being expanded to collect, collate, and file data.

¹The ODALE contingent is formed from personnel loaned by the other federal and local agencies.

In addition, the responsibilities of the four principal intelligence producers--BNDD, CIA, Customs, and ONNI--are now overlapping in some areas of operational and strategic intelligence, and in domestic and foreign intelligence, so that the limited resources are dispersed and are not used in an optimal manner.

Consequently, it appears that a high priority should be given to the consideration of augmenting existing intelligence resources and dividing responsibilities for the different types of intelligence among the principal agencies to make more efficient utilization of their resources. The following specific areas are offered for consideration.

In the near term, it appears that continuity of foreign strategic intelligence production will have to be maintained by CIA. This agency possesses unique capabilities for the production of foreign intelligence to support international policy and it will be difficult to duplicate these capabilities in the law enforcement community within practical time or financial constraints. The maintenance of a continuing group of analysts in CIA/DDI for narcotics intelligence should be considered to draw upon that agency's production and support capabilities.

A determination of the resources needed for domestic strategic intelligence production should follow a decision on which responsibilities for production are to be placed within the law enforcement community and which should reside in the public health and treatment areas (some production is now going on in SAODAP). The utilization of the 12 analysts in ONNI should be considered for the production of domestic strategic intelligence within the law enforcement community.

In consonance with the interest in this category of intelligence expressed at the highest levels of the narcotics law enforcement community, consideration should be given to

increasing the strength of the operational intelligence units in the principal operating agencies (BNDD and Customs). Additional intelligence resources would be needed for several of the functions discussed in this paper, including the targeting role (discussed in Chapter IV, Section E) and the maintenance of target lists and dossier files. Personnel in several agencies indicated that it would be useful to have several projects of the PILOT type going on concurrently.

As stated earlier, in order to carry out the PILOT operational analysis which focused on Latin America trafficking patterns, an interagency group of five analysts worked for a period of approximately nine months at BNDD. Similar analytical efforts could cover major trafficking areas, such as Southeast Asia to identify trafficking groups which are exploiting heroin supplies in this area; Europe, to determine new patterns of trafficking, such as the trans-shipment of heroin through Spain, and to identify morphine base storage points in West Germany and elsewhere; for the Middle East to identify groups which may be exploiting new heroin sources, such as Afghanistan; and for the United States, to develop an understanding of distribution networks for heroin of European and Asian origin, and for cocaine (the PILOT analyses treated heroin only).

Additional resources should be considered to increase the manning of operational desks in BNDD to provide (1) better interface between intelligence and operations at the headquarters level, and (2) adequate intelligence support to the operational elements in the field. These personnel should be analysts, and although they may be assigned to the intelligence office, they would work at the operational desks in support of the field needs for intelligence support of operations. Such an augmentation should be accompanied by additional personnel and ADP needed for implementation of improved information handling and filing procedures as discussed in Chapter IV, Section F. A similar augmentation should be examined for Customs.

In considering the resources for intelligence in the field, one is struck by the imbalance between resources allocated to the foreign effort and those in the domestic areas. This is particularly significant in light of the belief of many people in law enforcement that the recent domestic heroin shortages originated primarily as a result of international actions, and the fact that seizures of heroin abroad outnumber domestic seizures by 4-to-1 even with a 1-to-20 discrepancy in foreign to domestic resources.

Consequently, it is suggested that current foreign operational intelligence resources be examined for adequacy of coverage and that augmentation be considered.

Intelligence is a major activity of all BNDD overseas agents. They serve as an international intelligence system to bring to the attention of the host country, information developed by the United States and other countries. The 134 BNDD and Customs agents abroad are too few and spread too thinly to perform adequately the intelligence collection and foreign liaison in support of the international narcotics control effort. For instance, in many trafficking countries of Latin America and the Middle East, there are only one or two agents per country, and some countries have no representation. Two conclusions result from these limited resources.

First, for the near term at least, the national security intelligence community will probably have to continue, and perhaps increase, its overseas narcotics intelligence collection. It will represent the majority of resources devoted to strategic narcotics intelligence abroad for some time, and will also be needed for whatever operational intelligence collection it can provide in support of the operational agencies. The different agencies can provide support in different areas of the world according to their resource distribution abroad. It appears, for example, that DoD could play a significantly

greater role if the appropriate headquarters priorities were established, and the activity coordinated in Washington and in the individual country teams overseas.

Second, BNDD personnel should be selectively augmented in critical areas needing additional operational intelligence and liaison coverage. Areas should be selected on a priority basis (according to the relative importance of each area in terms of trafficking) and provided with qualified operational personnel as resource allocation and training time allow.

Since there are now only nine BNDD overseas agents dedicated to operational intelligence collection and analysis, consideration of additional analytic support should be given on a case by case basis for the principal regions. An alternative is to increase headquarters support to meet the field's needs for operational intelligence support. The appropriate combination of field and headquarters analysts will depend on the geographic regions involved. However, at present, the analytic resources, both at headquarters and in the foreign field, are largely lacking for this important role.

In the domestic field the principal intelligence area where additional intelligence resources appear to be needed is intelligence analysts at the metropolitan and regional areas.¹ The extent of the need varies from region to region, but there are few full-time analysts in the field. A decision to use some non-agent personnel in this role is probably needed. In addition, the extent to which additional dedicated intelligence collection resources should be allocated from the overall pool of domestic operational field agents warrants careful examination. This allocation now varies depending on the needs and resource allocation decisions of the regional directors.

¹BNDD is now evaluating its regional intelligence units.

APPENDIX A
PEOPLE CONTACTED DURING THE STUDY

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Central Intelligence Agency	Seymour R. Bolten	Special Assistant for Narcotics Control Operations and Chairman, Intelligence Subcommittee of the CCINC	Jan. 18 Jan. 30 Feb. 13 Feb. 27
Development Branch, Information System	John Gorsuch Robert Crum Donald Cryer	Chief	Feb. 27 Feb. 27 Feb. 27
Department of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency	Col. Werner E. Michel, USA Lt. Col. Alfred G. Keggins, USA Lt. Col. James Carino, USAF	Assistant Deputy Director for Counterintelligence and Security Acting Chief, Counter- intelligence Office Chief, Special Actions Division, Director of Criminal Investigations	Jan. 24 Feb. 2 Jan. 24 Feb. 2 Feb. 12
Air Force Office of Special Investigations	Maj. Charles A. Hines, USA Capt. Joel L. Leson, USA	Director, Office of Criminal Investigation Liaison Officer	Feb. 12 Feb. 12
Army Criminal Investigation Command	Bert G. Truxell	Acting Special Assistant for Systems Development	Feb. 12
Naval Investigations Service			

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs	John Ingersol	Director	March 4
	John Warner	Assistant Director	Jan. 22 Jan. 30 Feb. 21
Strategic Intelligence Division	Robert Goe	Chief, Strategic Intelligence Staff	Jan. 30 Feb. 21
	Richard Bly	Intelligence Analyst	Jan. 30
	John Bacon	Intelligence Analyst	Jan. 30
	Lt. Col. Walter Sears, USMC	DoD Liaison Officer	Jan. 30
	William J. Durkin	Chief	Feb. 21
Criminal Enforcement Division	Marvin J. Markman	Area Manager	Jan. 30
	George O'Connor	Area Manager, OA-1	Jan. 30
Operations Planning Division	Jerry Strickler	Area Manager, DA-2	Jan. 30
	Walter Yates	Area Manager, DA-3	Jan. 30
	S. B. Billbrough	Chief, Operations Planning Staff	Jan. 30 Feb. 21
Criminal Investigation Division	John R. Enright	Assistant Director	Jan. 30
	Phil R. Smith	Chief	Feb. 3 Feb. 21
Special Projects Division			

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Statistical Division	Douglas F. Wainer	Chief	Feb. 21
Office Of International Affairs	William Wanzeck	Senior Staff Assistant	Feb. 21
Data Systems Division	Moses Jackson	Chief	Feb. 21
District of Columbia Regional Office	Dennis Dale	Supervisor, Intelligence Unit	Feb. 6
Baltimore Regional Office	William Olivanti	Director	Feb. 6
	Robert N. Hinds	Deputy Director	Feb. 6
	Charles Henry	Intelligence Coordinator	Feb. 6
New York Regional Office	William Casey	Director	Feb. 7
	Anthony Pohl	Associate Director for Special Programs	Feb. 7
Criminal Division			
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section	William E. Ryan	Chief	Jan. 22
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section	Gerald Shur	Attorney Supervisor	Jan. 29
	Carol Cragg	Analyst	Jan. 29
Immigration and Naturalization Service	Donald Coppick	Deputy Associate Commissioner Domestic Control	Jan. 23
	Joe Staley	Assistant to the Deputy Associate Commissioner Domestic Control	Jan. 23
	John E. Matson	Chief, General Investigations	Jan. 23

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Bureau of Prisons Office of National Narcotics Intelligence	George Dieffenbacher	Project Officer of NARA Unit	Jan. 23
	William C. Sullivan	Director	Feb. 14
	O. T. Berkman	Assistant Director for Liaison	Jan. 16
	Thomas Fox	Liaison Division	Jan. 16
	Waldo Dubberstein	Consultant	Feb. 14
Office of Drug Abuse and Law Enforcement	Dr. David Rosenbaum	Assistant Director for Systems Administration and Computerization	Jan. 16
	Miles Ambrose	Director	Feb. 7
	John R. Bartels	Deputy Director, Field Operations	Feb. 14
	John T. Cusak	Acting Chief, Investigation	Jan. 23
	James Devine	Assistant Administrator, Office of Criminal Justice Assistance	Jan. 23
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration	Joseph Mulvie	National Impact Coordinator	Jan. 23
	Mrs. Juanita Moody	Chief, Information Reporting Element	March 6
	Wallace Friestedt	Customer Relations	March 6
	E. M. Trietly	Customer Relations	March 6
	Commissioner William P. McCarthy	Deputy Commissioner for Organized Crime Control	Feb. 2
New York City Police Department	Chief James Taylor	Chief, Organized Crime Control	Feb. 2

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research	Deputy Inspector Robert Howe	Commanding Officer, Intelligence Division	Feb. 2
	Inspector Frank Smith	Deputy Inspector, Commanding Officer, Intelligence Section	Feb. 2
	Chief Hugo Massini	Chief of Inspectional Services	Feb. 2
Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters	Lawson Moyer	Director, Coordination Staff Office of Intelligence Liaison Affairs	March 2
	John Donovan	Intelligence Analyst International Organization Affairs	March 2
	Malcolm Lawrence	International Relations Officer	March 2
Treasury Department	Robert Merchant	Assistant to the Director (Intelligence)	Jan. 24 Feb. 7 Feb. 8
Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs and Operations	Dr. Edwin I. Golding	Assistant to the Director (Technology)	Feb. 7 Feb. 21 Feb. 22
	Bruce A. Burns	Assistant to the Director (Organized Crime)	Feb. 7
	Morton Bach		

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Secret Service Special Investigation and Security Division Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau of Customs	Robert R. Snow Donald Zimmerman	Special Agent in Charge Chief, Intelligence Branch	Jan. 24 Jan. 24
Office of Investigations Intelligence Division	John Sullivan Patricia Weidman Andrew Aganhangeliou E. Richard Atkinson	Communications Technician Staff Assistant Director Intelligence Research Specialist	Feb. 22 Feb. 22 Feb. 8 Feb. 22 Jan. 24 Feb. 8 Feb. 15 Feb. 22
Criminal Investigation Division Office of Administration Law Enforcement, Data Processing Division	Bernard J. Hazur D. J. Lane John A. Lund, Jr. Michael H. Lane	Chief, Analysis Branch Special Agent Director Washington Liaison Officer	Feb. 15 Feb. 8 Feb. 22 Feb. 28 Feb. 8
Office of Law Enforcement	Robert G. Efteland	Special Assistant for International Affairs	Jan. 24 Feb. 7

Agency	Name	Title	Date of Contact
Internal Revenue Service Compliance Intelligence Division	Joseph Pagani James Lane Ronald E. Saranow	Staff Assistant to the Director Narcotic Program Manager Assistant Narcotic Program Manager	Jan. 24 Feb. 7 Feb. 21

Mr. ROGERS. Do we have that effect on our own State and local governments?

Mr. BARTELS. To a lesser extent than I would hope. For one reason, we don't always have the good offices of an interceding group such as the State Department. That makes a big difference overseas. In many States a sense of mutual confidence and trust is built up over a year or so between our people and State and local authorities. But this relationship may be interrupted due to changes in personnel.

A local chief may be replaced. Then we are dealing with a new man. Or one of our agents may be transferred and the local chief is dealing with a new man.

Mr. ROGERS. You have how many overseas?

Mr. BARTELS. We have now 151 agents permanently overseas I believe. We average approximately 60 to 70 on various temporary duty stations overseas.

Mr. ROGERS. Are all of those conversant in the language of the country to which they are assigned?

Mr. BARTELS. Almost all of them. We have agents who speak Urdu, Farsi, and various other fairly exotic languages. There may be a few who are not familiar with some of the Southeast Asian dialects. Most of our people in Southeast Asia are bilingual at least.

Mr. ROGERS. So how many do not speak, would you think, the language of the country to which they are assigned or it is one of their assignments?

Mr. BARTELS. I would suggest here that there are probably less than 10 who do not speak one of the two languages of the country and I can get you that information.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you doing anything to get people proficient in the language?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we are doing a number of things. We are searching out other agencies who have people who are knowledgeable in the exotic languages. We are using the Foreign Service Institute as mandatory training. Normally it is 10 months; sometimes it is as little as 6 months depending on the college level ability.

Mr. ROGERS. This is to give them language training?

Mr. BARTELS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS. You are using what school?

Mr. BARTELS. The FSI, Foreign Service Institute, over in Arlington.

Mr. ROGERS. How many will they allow you to train at any one time?

Mr. BARTELS. Essentially as many as we want. They have been very helpful and we have been training wives as well, because in many areas if the wife doesn't speak the language it affects the agent's performance and her ability in the embassy.

Mr. ROGERS. We would like to know how many cannot speak the language where they are assigned.

[The following information was received for the record:]

AGENTS ASSIGNED IN FOREIGN REGIONS AND THEIR LANGUAGE TRAINING

As of October 17, 1974 there were 164 DEA Special Agents assigned to foreign offices. DEA's authorized ceiling for FY-74 was 174 Special Agent positions.

There are currently 10 approved vacancies. These will be filled upon completion of DEA's selection process, language training (where required) and Foreign Service Institute Orientation.

Of the 164 Special Agents who are currently assigned, the following indicates where they either learned or expanded upon their present foreign language skills:

	<i>Total</i>
Foreign Service Institute.....	62
Native speakers.....	45
College.....	07
United States Border Patrol Academy.....	09
Berlitz school.....	04
Monterrey (U.S. Army schools).....	05
Language training on post.....	09
Subtotal (A).....	141
Not applicable to post of duty.....	08
No language training received.....	15
Subtotal (B).....	23
Grand total.....	164

A review of the above summary reveals that more than 85 percent of those Special Agents currently assigned have a proficiency in a foreign language. Less than 10 percent have not received language training. However should the need for training be identified, funds will be made available for language training on post.

In order to prepare for the replacement of Special Agents currently assigned, and the assignment of Special Agents to newly established positions (FY-75), the following program is being conducted on an on-going basis at the Foreign Service Institute:

Language training completed:	
Language:	<i>Number trained</i>
French.....	5
Spanish.....	8
German.....	3
Portuguese.....	4
Thai.....	2
Total.....	22
Language training in progress:	
Spanish.....	3
Italian.....	2
German.....	1
Thai.....	5
Turkish.....	2
Farsi.....	1
Arabic.....	1
Chinese (Cantonese).....	2
Burmese.....	2
Korean.....	1
Laotian.....	2
Total.....	22

Key I

RD—Regional Director
 DRD—Deputy Regional Director
 ARD—Assistant Regional Director
 CA—Country Attache
 SAIC—Special Agent-in-Charge
 SA—Special Agent

Key II

1—Spanish
 2—French
 3—Italian
 4—German
 5—Portuguese
 6—Thai

Key II—Continued

- 7—Burmese
 8—Laotian
 9—Japanese
 10—Chinese (Mandarin)
 11—Chinese (Cantonese)
 12—Farsi
 13—Turkish
 14—Malaysian
 15—Vietnamese
 16—Arabic
 17—Dutch

Key III

- N/A—Language Not Required
 Berlitz—Private Studies or Studies
 funded by the Government
 FSI—Foreign Services Institute
 Monterrey—U.S. Army Language
 School, Monterrey, CA.
 LTOP—Language Training on Post
 USBP—United States Border Patrol
 Spanish Study Course
 Native—Native Speaking
 College—Language Studied in College

DEA SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO FOREIGN OFFICES AS OF OCT. 17, 1974

Position and post of duty	None available	Berlitz	FSI Monterrey	LTOP	USBP	Native	College
CA—Ottawa.....	X			2			
SAIC—Montreal.....	X						
SA—Montreal.....	X						
Do.....	X						
SAIC—Toronto.....	X						
SAIC—Vancouver.....	X						
SA—Vancouver.....	X						
RD—Mexico City.....					1		
DRD—Mexico City.....						1	
SA—Mexico City.....						1	
Do.....						1	
Do.....			1				
Do.....						1	
Do.....			1	1			
Do.....			1				
Do.....						1	
Do.....						1	
Do.....						1	
SAIC—Guadalajara.....							
SA—Guadalajara.....						1	
Do.....			1				
SAIC—Hermosillo.....						1	
SA—Hermosillo.....			1				
SAIC—Mazatlan.....					1		
SA—Mazatlan.....			1				
SAIC—Monterrey.....						1	
SA—Monterrey.....			1				
CA—San Jose.....					1		
CA—Kingston.....		X					
RD—Bangkok.....							
DRD—Bangkok.....							
ARD—Bangkok.....				14			
SA—Bangkok.....				6	6		
Do.....				6	6		
Do.....				11			
Do.....				6	6		
Do.....					6		6-8
Do.....				6			
Do.....				6	6		
Do.....				6	6		
SAIC—Chaing Mai.....				7			
SA—Chaing Mai.....				6	6		
Do.....				6			
SAIC—Songkhla.....				6			
SA—Songkhla.....				6			
Do.....				6			
CA—Vientiane.....				6	8		
SA—Vientiane.....				15			
CA—Kuala Lumpur.....			6		6		
SA—Kuala Lumpur.....				8			
CA—Singapore.....				15	14		
SA—Singapore.....							
CA—Saigon.....							
SA—Saigon.....							
Do.....			15		15		
Do.....			15		15		

DEA SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO FOREIGN OFFICES AS OF OCT. 17, 1974—Continued

Position and post of duty	None available	Berlitz	FSI Monterrey	LTDP	USBP	Native	College
CA—Hong Kong.....	X						
SA—Hong Kong.....	X						
Do.....	X						
Do.....						11	
RD—Paris.....						2	
DRD—Paris.....		2		2			
ARD—Paris.....			2			1	2-3
Do.....			2				
SA—Paris.....			2				
Do.....			2	2			
Do.....						2	
Do.....			2				
SAIC—Marseille.....				2			
SA—Marseille.....			2				
Do.....							
CA—Vienne.....						4	
CA—Brussels.....			2				
SA—Brussels.....						2	2
CA—London.....			1				
CA—Bonn.....			4				
SAIC—Frankfurt.....				4		4	
SA—Frankfurt.....						4	
SAIC—Hamburg.....			4				
SA—Hamburg.....			4				
Do.....			4				
SAIC—Munich.....						4	
SA—Munich.....			4			4	
SA—Munich.....							
CA—Rome.....		3					
SA—Rome.....				3			
Do.....			3				
Do.....				2-3			
SAIC—Genoa.....						3	
SA—Genoa.....			3				
SAIC—Milan.....			3	3			
SA—Milan.....						3	
Do.....			3				
CA—The Hague.....				17			
SA—The Hague.....							17
CA—Madrid.....						1	
SA—Madrid.....			1	1			
Do.....			1	1			
SAIC—Barcelona.....						1	
SA—Barcelona.....						1	
Do.....						1	
RD—Caracas.....				1	1		
DRD—Caracas.....			1				
ARD—Caracas.....			1				
SA—Caracas.....						1	
Do.....						1	
Do.....		1					
CA—Buenos Aires.....			1				
SA—Buenos Aires.....							1
Do.....						1	
Do.....						1	
CA—LaPez.....						1	
SA—LaPez.....						1	
CA—Brasilia.....		5					
CA—Santiago.....						1	
SA—Santiago.....				1			
CA—Bogota.....					1	1	
SA—Bogota.....							
Do.....			1				
Do.....						1	
CA—Quito.....					1		
SA—Quito.....							
Do.....						1	
SAIC—Guayaquil.....					1		
SA—Guayaquil.....						1	
CA—Panama City.....						1	
SA—Panama City.....						1	
Do.....					1		
CA—Asuncion.....					1		
SA—Asuncion.....						1	
CA—Lima.....							
SA—Lima.....						1	
Do.....			1				
CA—Montevideo.....						1	
SA—Montevideo.....						1	
RD—Ankara.....			13		13		
DRD—Ankara.....			13		13		
SA—Ankara.....			13		13		
Do.....			13		13		

DEA SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO FOREIGN OFFICES AS OF OCT. 17, 1974—Continued

Position and post of duty	None available	Berlitz	FSI Monterrey	LTOP	USBP	Netive	College
SA—Ankara.....			13	13			
SAIC—Istanbul.....			13	13			
SA—Istanbul.....			13	13			
Do.....			13	13			
SAIC—Izmir.....			13	13			
CA—Kabul.....			6				
SA—Kabul.....			16				
CA—New Dehli.....	X						
CA—Tehran.....			12				
SA—Tehran.....			13	12			
CA—Beirut.....						2-16	
SA—Beirut.....						2-16	
Do.....							
Do.....			16				
CA—Islamabad.....	X						
SAIC—Karachi.....	X						
SA—Karachi.....	X						
RD—Manila.....			9				
DRD—Manila.....				10			
SA—Manila.....							
Do.....							
Do.....							
CA—Tokyo.....				9			
SA—Tokyo.....				9			
Do.....							9
SAIC—Naha.....							
CA—Seoul.....			9				

Mr. ROGERS. What problems have you seen with the Department of State in assigning your officers overseas and their abilities to carry out their functions when there is not much support from the embassy?

Mr. BARTELS. If there is not much support——

Mr. ROGERS. Have you found this to exist?

Mr. BARTELS. No, I don't believe I have. I found examples of misunderstanding as to what our role should be.

Mr. ROGERS. Did you find any problems with getting quarters, even in Japan?

Mr. BARTELS. I have not seen our new quarters in Japan, but you may have been over there more recently.

Mr. ROGERS. Maybe I predate you on that.

Mr. BARTELS. Well, traditionally we have been in the basement of the embassy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. Maybe not even there in some places.

Mr. BARTELS. Traditionally we have been in the basement of the courthouse, too.

Mr. ROGERS. But I think we have got quite a bit of information on that on a trip this committee took concerned about the acceptance in allowing the DEA officer to deal with their counterparts. There has been tendency to want them to go through the lines of communication already established by State. Is there still a problem there?

Mr. BARTELS. Less so. Sometimes it is a problem. We are going into a number of new countries, countries which may have different approaches toward law enforcement and different laws. I think it would be unusual if the Ambassador didn't look at us being the new boy on the block with some apprehension.

We have had the feeling that he can look at us with apprehension but in the event there is a misunderstanding or a problem, it has to be brought back to Ambassador Vance's shop. We should be able to do something about it.

I must say in all honesty we have had cases where some of our people have conducted themselves in a way that would justify that apprehension so we have been able to remove them and have done so very quickly.

Mr. ROGERS. What is your relationship to the Department of Defense?

Mr. BARTELS. It is more limited. I would say that probably the relationship of Dr. Du Pont to the Department of Defense has been more than ours. They operate from a law enforcement point of view independently. We meet with them. They are part of the country teams. If it is overseas we exchange information both domestically and overseas. They conduct their own law enforcement operations.

Mr. ROGERS. Even here domestically?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. How often do you meet with their people?

Mr. BARTELS. I met with General Escola 2 weeks ago, a little bit less than 2 weeks ago. I would say our people meet with them on the strategic planning level with some regularity and the enforcement with a great deal less regularity, but on a planning and strategic situation I would estimate it varies.

Mr. Belford and his people from Intelligence meet at least monthly with Department of Defense people to exchange information as to shifts in patterns where the Department of Defense may expect changes.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you telling me you would not take an arrest, pursue anyone on a military post?

Mr. BARTELS. Not without contacting the commandant first, no, and we would not normally go in there. We have been invited in there. We have trained some of their people, worked with them, but normally it is their CID that does that.

Mr. ROGERS. Do they also have authority to go where it originates?

Mr. BARTELS. No, not normally, but when they arrest somebody they do inform our local office as a regular practice and if it is a matter of any unusual nature, anything that would attract the attention of our people, and we try and train our people to be alert to that, if there is any information on source, both the military and our people are encouraged and alerted to work that out. I frankly don't know the extent to which anything does slip by.

Mr. ROGERS. I just wondered how you sometimes draw the lines. Suppose there is a drug operation on the outskirts of the post where military people are?

Mr. BARTELS. We will do it and work with them right then and there. There is no competition. At least no instances of it have been brought to my attention.

One series of posts, for example, on the outside of St. Louis in a fort—its name escapes me—but we had a long term investigation into drug activity, both on the post and off it in an area known as the four cities area outside—I think it is Leonard Wood—which resulted as a result of good cooperation in a series of good cases that broke that up.

Mr. ROGERS. What about amphetamines? What has happened to amphetamines? Are they being abused in this Nation still?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. What have we done to prevent it?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, what we have done is, working with the Mexican Government over the past 9 months or so we have come up with this investigation which resulted in 100-some-odd Americans being arrested and over 40 Mexicans being arrested as well as these 4 tableting machines.

On September 11 of this year, working with the Mexicans, we executed a series of these arrests based on sealed indictments in 10 different districts. It ran from Charleston, W. Va., New York, out to California, and of course along the entire Southwest border.

There are two ways to work on this amphetamine problem which both Dr. Du Pont and I believe is a bad one. One is to reduce the quotas pursuant to the statute.

Mr. ROGERS. Have we done that recently?

Mr. BARTELS. Recently we have not, but under Mr. Ingersoll they were reduced to approximately 10 percent of what they were previously.

Amphetamine slippage according to our statistics and investigations from legitimate sources has dwindled down to precious little. The slack was made up through the illicit minibennie smuggling operation which came about as stated from four dies on which you could take ballistic-type samples.

In other words, when you saw the minibennie you could recognize and analyze which of the dies it came from. They tell me that they believe they have gotten all the dies that exist in Mexico as a result of this operation.

I am skeptical. If that is true it would mean that this process should be drying up for a period of time and we should be able to see a hiatus until somebody else comes out with a new die.

Mr. ROGERS. Was the production of the amphetamines in Mexico illicit?

Mr. BARTELS. No, sir, it was imported from Europe and that is part of the problem, that it wasn't illicit. It did not become illicit under Mexican law until it was exported to the United States and there is no provision under Mexican law or no other European countries similar to our Controlled Substance Act for the regulation of export and import of amphetamines.

Mr. ROGERS. So they have to show that the pills have come across the border into the United States. Then it becomes illegal in Mexico.

Mr. BARTELS. Their statute—and again, I am not an expert on Mexican law—but as I understand it, their statute applies a severe penalty for exporting of drugs, so if the drugs are there in such quantities and with other indications of intent to export showing, that is sufficient under Mexican law.

Mr. ROGERS. This showing has been made in four instances.

Mr. BARTELS. It has been made in the seizures of these four tableting machines which were turning out phenomenal amounts in an illicit manner. There was nothing done in normal business circumstances. It was hidden with phony corporations under circumstances that made it clear it was to be exported.

Mr. ROGERS. Have there been any shipments of amphetamines from the United States into Mexico?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, there have been some, but it is not a serious amount and I believe it has dried up or is in the process of drying up.

Mr. ROGERS. Have you authorized the export?

Mr. BARTELS. I will have to supply that for the record. I believe I did under the *Penwalt* case authorize some, and others were not. The facts escape me, and rather than guess, I would rather give it to you.

Mr. ROGERS. All right. I think it would be helpful to have that for the record.

Mr. BARTELS. I don't believe since *Penwalt* there have been.

Mr. ROGERS. And where else have we authorized any exporting of amphetamines?

What about barbiturates?

[The following information was received for the record:]

EXPORT AND IMPORT FIGURES FOR AMPHETAMINES AND BARBITURATES

The total quantity of amphetamine exported from the U.S. is as follows, expressed in kilograms:

	Kilograms
1972.....	31. 258
1973.....	3. 870
1974.....	174. 440
Total.....	109. 568

¹ This year's total includes one large shipment of 73 kilograms of Dextroamphetamine to England, which England was not able to manufacture due to a petrochemical shortage in Europe.

There have been no importations of amphetamine other than minute quantities for research or analytical uses since August, 1971 when the amphetamines were placed in Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act.

Of the barbiturates there are approximately twelve major types, some of which fall under Schedule IV controls (phenobarbital, barbital), some in Schedule III (hexobarbital, cyclobarbital, butabarbital), and three were placed in Schedule II in late 1973 (secobarbital, pentobarbital, amobarbital).

These three, amobarbital, secobarbital and pentobarbital, were moved into Schedule II because of the documented abuse. Prior to 1974 for these three barbiturates and up until the present on the other, non-Schedule II barbiturates, as Schedule III and IV substances, less comprehensive import/export documentation is required under the Controlled Substances Act. To import or export a Schedule III or IV substance, prior authorization is not required under the Controlled Substances Act, but only that DEA be notified of the shipment fifteen days prior.

Of the three barbiturates placed in Schedule II, where authorization is required, a total of 23.525 kilograms have been exported in 1974, due primarily to the inability of Europe to produce because of the petrochemical shortage. There have been no importations of these three barbiturates in 1974.

Mr. BARTELS. Our estimate is that to a greater extent barbiturates, that illicit recreational use of barbiturates is both a diversionary and a smuggling problem, so that we are looking very closely at rescheduling an additional four barbiturates, I believe, up into schedule two.

Recently we rescheduled the two most widely abused into schedule two which, as you know, would provide a quota and stiffer security measures. The other four which were pharmacologically similar to the two that we upgraded had no history at all of abuse, and we have been watching those very closely and will be taking another look at it.

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any indication that they are being abused?

Mr. BARTELS. None now, and yet they are pharmacologically similar if not, I believe in one case, almost identical.

Mr. ROGERS. Are we exporting barbiturates?

Mr. BARTELS. I don't believe so. Again, I will give you the exact figure.

Mr. ROGERS. We have reduced the production of two of the barbiturates?

Mr. BARTELS. The two which had the greatest potential for abuse, of which we saw some signs of abuse.

Mr. ROGERS. What have we done, if you have someone here who can tell us.

Mr. BARTELS. Secobarbital, amilbarbital, and pentobarbital that we have upgraded.

Mr. ROGERS. And what have you done as a result of this upgrading?

Mr. BARTELS. We have limited the quota on manufacturing of seco, pento and amil barbitals and we have naturally insisted on their security in export.

Mr. ROGERS. Have your examinations of the records of any of the companies shown a leakage, or slippage, in American-made amphetamines or barbiturates?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. To what extent?

Mr. BARTELS. In the barbiturates to the extent that we estimate not just a slippage from wholesalers and distributors, but to a greater extent from false prescriptions that the recreational abuse is somewhere in the vicinity of 30 to 40 percent in barbiturates from domestic sources as opposed to the amphetamines where we don't find that.

Mr. ROGERS. How many pills would that represent?

Mr. BARTELS. I will have to get that figure.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the general production of barbiturates?

Mr. BARTELS. I don't know what the illicit use of barbiturates is. Once you get into those numbers they stagger me, and I can't keep them in my mind, but you are always up into the billion dosage units, and I don't know what the illicit number of dosage units is. I can supply it for the record.

Mr. ROGERS. All right.

[The following information was received for the record:]

ILLICIT BARBITURATE DATA

DEA & FEDERAL TASK FORCE REMOVALS OF DEPRESSANTS FROM DOMESTIC ILLICIT MARKET

(In dosage units)

Fiscal Year	
1970	2,339,590
1971	319,006
1972	688,810
1973	933,199
1974	649,188

DRUG THEFTS

Description of Data:

Registered handlers are required to report the theft of any controlled substances to DEA. The data below summarize the number of thefts and the volume of drugs reported stolen during the past three fiscal years.

Analysis:

There are two dominant trends in these theft data resulting from the conflict of an increasing demand for drugs in the illicit market with a decreasing supply of drugs. First is the rapid rise in the incidence of theft, which more than doubled from FY 72-74. The second is the relative decrease in the volume of drugs stolen, especially the drop in stimulants due to increased regulation and production controls imposed in FY 72.

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974
Number of thefts.....	3,622	6,382	7,942
Volume stolen:			
Total (millions of dosage units).....	28.9	49.6	33.4
Narcotics.....	8.3	20.2	12.5
Stimulants.....	16.8	15.4	8.7
Depressants.....	3.8	14.0	12.2

Mr. BARTELS. Production quotas of the amphetamine-type drugs have been cut from 2.2 billion in 1972 to 630 million. So they have been cut down to approximately one-third. That does not break down the drugs beyond the amphetamines, which are class 2, and I can break this down for you in a writing, and I will be happy to. The depressants we have just started to regulate and they are at 500 million dosage units.

[The following information was received for the record:]

REDUCTION OF QUOTAS ON DANGEROUS DRUGS

The attached chart sets forth quotas granted, in terms of basic class, for those substances having legitimate medical use which fall under the quota system (Schedule II). Supplemental information showing the industry requests is also set forth.

The 1972 and 1973 quotas for amphetamine and methamphetamine reflect significant decreases over 1971 production, however, the figures may be misleading in terms of sales. The quota granted only reflects that quantity of bulk basic class drug which may be produced. However, inventories of raw materials which existed prior to control were formulated into dosage units for sale in subsequent years. The increased 1974 quota for amphetamine was necessary to replace depleted inventories to create the necessary reserve stocks required by the Controlled Substances Act.

There are no domestic manufacturers of Methamphetamine, and the quota reflects the total quantity to be imported. The increase in 1973 was necessary for inventory replacement and for a strike contingency allowance.

The Phenmetrazine quota for 1972 and 1973 reflected decreases over the 1971 production. The 1974 quota again includes an inventory replacement quantity and a strike contingency quantity. In addition, due to lengthy production time for the manufacture of the finished dosage unit, it is necessary to provide production inventory for sales in the subsequent year.

Methaqualone, Amobarbital, Secobarbital and Pentobarbital were placed under Schedule II control in late 1973. The quantities shown for the three barbiturates are the quotas granted to date, as the final allocation has not yet been granted. The 1974 quota requests are reasonable equivalents of 1973 production.

DANGEROUS DRUG QUOTA UNDER THE CSA

Basic class	1971 Produced	1972 quota		1973 quota		1974 quota	
		requested	granted	requested	granted	requested	granted
Amphetamine.....	9,356	19,956	1,564	2,159	992	5,635	3,657
Methamphetamine.....	4,926	8,941	969	2,752	561	815	1,517
Methylphenidate ²	2,320	2,070	1,857	2,820	2,440	2,554	1,516
Phenmetrazine.....	4,638	6,174	2,672	5,300	1,204	3,219	3,046
Amobarbital.....						11,400	8,274
Pentobarbital.....						71,231	22,094
Secobarbital.....						32,700	4,821
Methaqualone.....						37,230	15,023

¹ In addition, 1.375 kg of 1-desoxyephedrine hydrochloride was issued for use in the production of a noncontrolled over-the-counter preparation.

² Represents quantity to be imported.

Note: All figures are expressed in terms of kilograms of anhydrous base.

Mr. ROGERS. 500 million.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, 519,125,000.

Mr. ROGERS. And have you had any arrests or any prosecutions for any slippages in these areas?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Any significant ones?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir, we have had some. The *Penwalt* case, which you are familiar with as well as several doctors.

Mr. ROGERS. Hallucinogens, what is the situation there?

Mr. BARTELS. Well, the hallucinogens I believe have stabilized and are less popular than they were before. LSD has declined in usage, I believe, although Dr. DuPont may have more exact figures. We see a greater shift among the hallucinogens from the synthetic ones, those that have names that sound like oil additives, LSD, PCP, toward the natural one, marihuana, hashish, and hashish oil. There has been some increasing traffic in PCP, especially around the Detroit area for some reason, but in general there has been a substantial increase in the natural hallucinogens now, marihuana, hashish, and hashish oil.

[The following information was received for the record:]

HALLUCINOGENS IN U.S. ILLICIT MARKETS

The main problem is the ready availability of hallucinogens in US illicit markets nationwide. This condition springs primarily from increasing flows of hallucinogens from clandestine laboratories and tableting operations, rather than from diversion out of legal production.

Today there are approximately 110 known patterns of tablets of such drugs as LSD, PCP and MDA being punched and sold clandestinely in the US. Additionally there is a large but unknown number of clandestine laboratories operating on varying schedules turning out liquid and powder methamphetamine, PCP, LSD, hashish oil and other hallucinogen substances.

Precursor and surveillance programs supporting investigations of clandestine laboratories use up sizeable amounts of manpower, and of themselves are not sufficient to bring substantial constraint on this primary flow.

A multi-pronged, coordinated approach to develop major conspiracy cases, of a kind used by Enforcement, Intelligence and Prosecutive offices in CENTAC 4, as well as regional groups using State and local enforcement agencies, is needed.

No new legislation is required because controls currently provided for under the Controlled Substances Act appear adequate.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it true that they are bringing in now a different type of hashish, or marihuana, which is not specifically covered in the law?

Mr. BARTELS. I don't believe so. If you are talking about the difference between cannabis indica, our position is that it is the same plant. There has been a series of court cases where there was a divided authority, and I believe it is here in the District. Our posture is that that is the same plant and is definitely covered under the Federal law. There is some question in another State as to whether indica is covered under the law. I don't believe it is a serious problem.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Hastings brought that to my attention, that there had been some statement that there was some concern about that. If so, we would want to make it very clear it is certainly the intent of the Congress itself to cover such drugs.

Mr. BARTELS. We are engaged in litigation on it. I think we are going to win that litigation.

Mr. ROGERS. But if there isn't, then we can amend the law very quickly.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Here are questions that Mr. Symington has that you could answer for the record. [See p. 236.]

Mr. ERNST. Mr. Chairman, may I refer back to the question of the reception by our missions abroad of the DEA presence.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. ERNST. And I would just like to say that the antinarcotics effort remains a priority foreign relations concern, and our ambassadors and missions are under a Presidential directive which brings that priority to their attention.

Mr. ROGERS. Has this been renewed by President Ford?

Mr. ERNST. Not specifically, but I anticipate that that will certainly be done.

Mr. BARTELS. I understand he intends to do so.

Mr. ROGERS. That he will ask again our ambassadors to make it top priority?

Mr. ERNST. To reaffirm a continuation, and in the context of that our missions are under instructions to grant every facility so that the DEA personnel can be most effective, and while there may be difficulties in connection with housing and so forth, I am sure that that sort of thing is less and less, if not completely, a thing of the past.

I would like also to say that each year there is a regional meeting of the narcotics coordinators from our various Embassies and at these meetings, which are held in different parts of the world, not only the State Department, but DEA and other agencies involved are present to review not only the programs and the activities and the extent of the problem, but also the relationships on the scene.

Mr. ROGERS. Now, out of your funding you were spending how much for Mexico?

Mr. ERNST. For Mexico, \$5 million.

Mr. ROGERS. Is that a proper amount? They now say Mexico is the largest problem we have.

Mr. ERNST. It could be that more money can justifiably be spent there, and in connection with the planning for \$42.5 million we will allow a contingency which would be adequate to add to that or any other programs where we think it would be most effective.

Mr. ROGERS. As I understand, that money goes to mount an attack within the country, maybe aid for helicopters, and this sort of thing.

Mr. ERNST. Right.

Mr. ROGERS. How many helicopters are involved?

Mr. ERNST. In Mexico? Let me just check the figures.

Mr. BARTELS. I think there are approximately 12 down there that were down there on a full-time basis.

Mr. ROGERS. Should there be more?

Mr. BARTELS. We are expanding. It is part of the plan that there be better maintenance, that there be a stockpile of parts, that there be mechanics on site so that the downtime is less. Even though there are 12, if they are down 33 percent of the time—

Mr. ROGERS. If they are down how much?

Mr. BARTELS. If they are down, as many helicopters are, 33 percent of the time, then you have the equivalent of eight operating helicopters, so we are working on upgrading that element. Yes, I think there should be some more.

Mr. ROGERS. In other words, we do not have the spare parts down there. They have to be brought back?

Mr. BARTELS. Frequently.

Mr. ROGERS. How are they brought back?

Mr. BARTELS. By plane.

Mr. ROGERS. So how often are they on the ground? What has our experience been there?

Mr. BARTELS. It needs improvement. I can't give you the figure but we all agree it needs improvement, and it is getting it in this year's budget from the State Department.

Mr. ROGERS. How much are you allocating from State for this year?

Mr. ERNST. \$5 million.

Mr. BARTELS. Specifically for helicopters, I don't know offhand. I may add that part of the problem is not just State allocating the money, part of it is the legitimate sensitivity on the part of the Government of Mexico in finding Mexican mechanics and firms that will handle this in size that we need. We would have done it earlier. It wasn't a matter that either State or DEA didn't anticipate as much as it was a matter of finding and training competent Mexican mechanics on helicopters.

Mr. ROGERS. Have they called on the armed forces to be helpful in this?

Mr. BARTELS. Our Armed Forces?

Mr. ROGERS. The Mexican Armed Forces.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes; they have, and at one point last year they had 12,000 members of the Mexican Armed Forces going through on an eradication campaign. That varies in effectiveness.

Mr. ROGERS. I thought they might have helicopter people trained.

Mr. BARTELS. They have had some, but we haven't called on them for that. The reason is that simply there is a shortage of helicopter pilots and Mexican mechanics throughout Mexico and the commercial firms pay a tremendous premium for those people, more than either the civil service of the Mexican Attorney General or the army can pay.

Mr. ROGERS. Are they drafted into the army?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir, those people I believe—I don't know whether the pilots and mechanics are.

Mr. ROGERS. It just seems to me that \$5 million, if you are operating helicopters, is not a very significant budget to help a government that seems to be cooperating and willing to help do something about this problem, and if it is now the major source, which I understand it is—don't you say 70 percent is now coming in from Mexico?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. I would think \$5 million out of \$42.5 million is a misplacement of priority, would it not be? Maybe the committee needs to meet again.

Mr. ERNST. As I indicated, Mr. Chairman, we envisage the possibility of being able to find useful purposes for the expenditure of more. I might say between 1972 and 1974 there were 15 fixed-wing aircraft provided for Mexicans, 11 Bell and four, 212 Helicopters.

Mr. ROGERS. And the problem has gone from what to what? What did we have coming in from Mexico in 1971 and 1972?

Mr. BARTELS. In 1972 it was 8 percent.

Mr. ROGERS. And now it is 70, so if you were starting with that in 1972 I would think a proportionate increase might be warranted.

Mr. ERNST. Ambassador Vance will be meeting with the Mexican Attorney General late this week.

Mr. ROGERS. The committee would be interested in knowing what is going to be done in that area; whether we are going to do something about it or creep along at the \$5 million level.

Mr. ERNST. Let me say the intention is to apply the resources that can be effectively employed down there.

Mr. ROGERS. I understand that, and I know you want to apply the \$5 million effectively. What I am asking is this: Couldn't we really be more effective with more of an effort? I wonder if we couldn't. In fact, it might even allow you to put people in their helicopters under their direction with a liaison from DEA. Was this ever done?

Mr. BARTELS. No; we have suggested that, and they are very sensitive about that. It is their feeling that it is politically impossible to do that.

Mr. ROGERS. I understand.

Mr. BARTELS. I can understand that because you have got the rough area that is like Utah and the peasants don't want to be surveilled by Americans.

Mr. ROGERS. Surely, I understand. But I think it would be helpful to know what the Agency as well as State Department plans to do in this coming year. I think the committee would like to know that.

On treatment, Dr. Du Pont, why is it you can't get the Department of Defense to cooperate with a special action office? Aren't you still operating as the representative of the President in this instance?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, we have—

Mr. ROGERS. That is why we allowed the office to continue, as you may recall, because there was some call by Members that this be abolished. But we thought, and it was my understanding, that the reason for it was so that you could be more effective with these other agencies, and the Department of Defense was one specifically mentioned.

Dr. DU PONT. Well, we have been effective to the point of gathering the information and pointing out the issues to others in the White House and to the Department of Defense. But of course the legislation did not authorize us to change their policies. It merely provided that we could advise the President on this, and advise the other departments of Government, which we have now done.

I am not completely pessimistic about the outcome but it has been very slow.

Mr. ROGERS. But I think when we set up the office we asked Dr. Jaffe if he didn't want control of the budget and I think he said the Office of Management and Budget did not want control of the drug budget of Defense. And you still don't have it.

Dr. DU PONT. No, we don't have control of their budget, that is right.

Mr. ROGERS. Can you make recommendations?

Dr. DU PONT. We have, yes. We will supply for the record our recommendations to the Department of Defense on that subject, and we welcome the support of your committee.

Mr. ROGERS. When were these given to the Department of Defense?

Dr. DU PONT. We first raised it with them about 3 months ago.

Mr. ROGERS. And there has been no action yet?

Dr. DU PONT. No action yet, that is right.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you let us have a copy of that for the record?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. And to whom it was directed, and we will ask for a reply as to how they responded.

Dr. DU PONT. I think that would be very helpful.

[See correspondence with DOD on p. 67, this hearing.]

Mr. ROGERS. What support are you getting from the Office of Management and Budget? Are you setting the budget figures in this area or is the Office of Management and Budget?

Dr. DU PONT. It is a shared responsibility. Of course, as the Office is coming toward the end of its legislative life we operate a little bit more as a lame duck in this regard.

Mr. ROGERS. You have what? Until 1975?

Dr. DU PONT. 1975, yes, sir.

But we do continue to hold budget hearings and we will be doing that with respect to the fiscal year 1976 budget within the next month. We expect that the Federal budget for drug abuse prevention will be established jointly with the budget section of OMB and our office.

Mr. ROGERS. Are 95,000 slots for treatment sufficient?

Dr. DU PONT. Mr. Chairman, 6 months ago when we settled on the fiscal year 1975 number of 95,000 I honestly felt we would not be able to fill them. The situation is obviously quite different now and I am not at all satisfied that this number will be sufficient. We do, however, want to be careful that the Federal Government does not take over funding of programs in such a way as to discourage State and local initiatives in this area, so we are watching very carefully what the State and local levels are doing.

We are now funding about half of all the drug abuse treatment in the country, and we won't want that to go over the 50 percent mark. So far the States and localities have continued to increase their investments as well, but we may very well be in a position of needing more support in the near future.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you plan to recommend more support?

Dr. DU PONT. If the current trends continue, we will, yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. When will you make that judgment?

Dr. DU PONT. Probably within the next 60 days.

Mr. ROGERS. Will that be time to get it into the budget process?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, it is around the end of December that the final decisions are made in the executive branch.

Mr. ROGERS. It would appear that the trend is such that you will have to make this recommendation if it continues. This is what you are saying.

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, sir, that is my sense and, might I say that, given the current concern about the economy and the importance of cutting back on Federal spending, we are also concerned about the fiscal year 1975 budget as well as the fiscal year 1976. It may be that in the present mood of austerity we may not be talking expansion but talking of holding onto the capacity we have. But that is a priority that will be set here and in the White House.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Well, what I wondered is, where you have already seen this increase come about, where we have statistics showing more use of

heroin in the country, where we have had the decision of the Government of Turkey to go back into the production of the poppies, why is it the drug enforcement agency has already asked for more men and asked for \$60 million anticipatory, and yet our treatment programs have not?

Why is there this lag? Why can't we get on top of the problem instead of waiting until everything develops and then try to crash treat it?

Dr. DU PONT. The expansion of the treatment budget so far has been inhibited by the existence of unused treatment capacity, and our top priority has been to fill those federally funded slots. As I mentioned, we had only 55 percent utilization in February of this year. We were poorly positioned to argue with the Office of Management and Budget or the Congress that we needed more capacity.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, were those slots that were simply located improperly?

Dr. DU PONT. Partially it was that.

Mr. ROGERS. Not that they weren't needed in other places?

Dr. DU PONT. It was really a combination. We had a very rapid increase in our budget for treatment over the course of about a year and a half, and there was in some instances a problem getting out the money and starting up the programs. There was also some inefficiency in that process, so that the slots just weren't full.

Some of the programs were not well run and were not attractive to patients. That was part of the problem. We overbuilt in some parts of the country where there was too much treatment capacity, whereas we had other areas in which we had no treatment capability. We are only now seeing the full utilization of the Federal treatment funds and, frankly, there is still some unused State and local treatment capacity in many parts of the country. Of course with the existence of that we don't want to ask for additional funds, so we have to be very careful about this.

Mr. ROGERS. I don't think anyone wants you to ask for funds which are not needed. Certainly not in these days and times.

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. But are we on top of the problem enough to make intelligent judgments as to what facilities are being used or not where they are needed.

Dr. DU PONT. I think I can say this, that we soon will have filled all the federally funded slots. All our fiscal year 1975 funds are now committed. On the other hand, there are places where we are unable to respond to identified growing problems because there are not enough funds available. What we are doing now is cataloging areas of excess and insufficient funding. One of the areas that is of great concern to us now is the city of Chicago, for example.

Mr. ROGERS. You had a hundred percent increase in deaths there, so it would indicate a rather large problem.

Dr. DU PONT. That is right, and, frankly, they have had a very inadequate State and local treatment response in size in relation to the problem overall. But still, we are embarrassed at not being able to give additional funds to the State of Illinois and the city of Chicago to increase their capacity.

This is the problem that we are facing in a variety of cities around the country. We are, first of all, supporting State and local initiatives

to fill up those unused slots in those areas. Then when that process is completed we will be in a position to ask for additional Federal funds.

Mr. ROGERS. What about the District of Columbia? Now, you ran the program here. There has been a great decrease.

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Have those slots been changed?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, they have been. As a matter of fact, that was one of the areas where there was a substantial reduction in Federal funding because the slots were not all full.

California has been a major area of expansion in Federal funding recently. Philadelphia and Oregon have also received substantial increases.

As you also know, Mr. Chairman, we have been working with single State agencies in each of the States and the major increase in the Federal drug abuse budget from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 1975 was a \$10 million increase in formula grant funds for the States.

Part of our reason for recommending increasing support for the single State agencies is so that the States can make priority assessments themselves of the areas which most need the services.

Mr. ROGERS. So where did the District of Columbia slots go?

Dr. DU PONT. They went into a 15,000 slot pool that was then distributed around the country. I couldn't identify those particular ones.

Mr. ROGERS. Have all of them been allocated now, or do you have enough—

Dr. DU PONT. Oh, yes, they are all allocated now. Absolutely. That went on at the end of fiscal year 1974. All the money is committed for this year, all the projects are coming up to their full utilization rate, and we expect to have 100 percent utilization by January 1975.

Mr. ROGERS. What does LEAA do, or have contact with in this area?

For instance, your agency, is there any contact?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, we have a good bit of contact with LEAA. They do not fund basic treatment programs the way they did a couple of years ago. That has been one of the areas that has gone over to the National Institute on Drug Abuse. LEAA's major overlap with us is in the area of diversion from the criminal justice system into treatment. They have a very active program which we started two years ago called TASC; they are administering that right now. We also have a research project underway with LEAA studying the relationship between crime and addiction.

Mr. ROGERS. I notice that crime has gone up in New York, that is drug-related crime, supposedly, I think for this year. Now, this is during the time period that the so-called Rockefeller Law has been in existence. This is the law that the State of New York enacted with, as I recall, very heavy penalties and without too much discretion to the judge in what penalties should be assessed.

Could you give us comment on this, and what has happened so far this year and the experience that has resulted from this particular law?

Mr. BARTELS. The experience is fairly limited because of the time lag from the law. Based on subjective impressions, that is talking to informants, other undercover conversations with defendants, initially a great deal of people who heard about the law did in fact go to Con-

necticut or New Jersey and stopped for a period of time and waited to see what happened. As a result of the general dilatory nature of the criminal justice system, I am informed that those people are back. Also as a result of the increased availability of Turkish heroin, much the way a commodity man trades in the futures, so too those people start to release their stockpile. There was greater availability of heroin within the city of New York even in advance of the Government of Turkey's decision on July 1 to renounce the ban. That is, the people who had stockpiles started releasing them, anticipating that the ban being lifted the price would go down.

We have seen greater availability and greater purity of heroin on the streets of New York over the past 6 months. I don't know that the Draconian penalties will solve that. It is being studied by a great number of organizations, and there is a great deal of political controversy as to what that law will do. At this stage it is too early to say, but it is not the total panacea that some people said it was going to be.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, to date then it has not, you feel, been effective?

Mr. BARTELS. It must have discouraged some people because we hear it periodically. Some people have gone. But it hasn't been effective to the extent hoped for, I don't believe.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes; we are talking about anticipating what the Turkish Government would do. I notice there was a letter in the record which had been dated March 25, far before the July 1st announcement from the Ambassador to Turkey, which stated that in effect they were going to resume, and would try to get the whole poppy into the Government. He has already told us back in March just about what has happened.

Who carried on the negotiations with Turkey in this area on this?

Mr. ERNST. Sir, negotiations were primarily carried on by Mr. Macomber, our Ambassador in Ankara. Conversations were also held with the Turkish Ambassador here by principal officers of the Department of State.

Mr. ROGERS. Which officers?

Mr. ERNST. The Under Secretary, the Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs. I would like to point out that the Turkish decision to go to the poppy straw process was made on the 12th of September when the Turkish Cabinet made that decision, even though there had been inklings concerning it before.

I would also point out that the United Nations drug agency meeting in Geneva earlier this year went on record as indicating that the straw process was one which it thought the world should move to in the case of countries that were going to plant the poppy. But I want to underline that the decision was not made by the Turkish Government to my knowledge until the Cabinet made that decision on September 12.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it says "Although the Turkish Government has not taken any final decision on this difficult and complicated issue"—that is whether they should permit the growing of the poppy or not—"it has made it abundantly clear that should Turkey decide to resume opium poppy production, this will be done without slicing the poppy bulbs."

Now, this was back in March.

Mr. ERNST. We are aware of the fact that Turkish officials knew of the process and were considering it, but as I say, there was no decision until September.

Mr. ROGERS. I think it would appear the decision to do the poppy bulb had been made. It was just the decision as to whether they would again resume. That was the basic decision that they had not yet agreed upon, according to the Turkish Ambassador's letter.

Mr. ERNST. It could be interpreted like that.

Mr. ROGERS. I would think it is rather clear.

Now, how many people do you think we have been able to give treatment to and effect a cure in the broadest sense of that term?

Dr. DU PONT. I would estimate that we probably treat 250,000 people a year in the United States for drug abuse, perhaps a little more than that. In terms of total cure, that is difficult to estimate because of the prospect of relapse even after long periods following treatment. I think a substantial proportion of those 250,000 people, however, have been helped to reduce their illicit drug use and many of them to stop it altogether. But in terms of long-term effectiveness studies, those are only beginning and I don't have any precise figures.

Mr. ROGERS. Do we know what the rate of recidivism is?

Dr. DU PONT. We do only within fairly narrow populations. But basically we don't have a very clear picture on what it is. What we need is a followup study to find out how the people are doing later. In the District of Columbia we found that about 1.1 percent a month of all discharged patients were readmitted to treatment, which came to about 13 percent a year. But of course that only includes those who come back in for treatment. There is another group that relapses to drug use but does not come in for treatment.

Mr. ROGERS. What do you figure would be the relationship of those who come in and those who simply don't come in?

Dr. DU PONT. I think that a very large percentage of the people who relapse who come in at some point. The question is how long do they delay and what kind of mischief do they get into for themselves and other people in the meantime.

Mr. ROGERS. Are we having any people come into the treatment centers now who have just begun drug abuse?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, there is a fairly predictable lag between the onset of heroin use and entering into treatment. About 10 to 12 percent of people come into treatment in their year of first use, and within 6 or 8 years after first using heroin virtually all the people have come into treatment.

Mr. ROGERS. So what is the showing as of this year? They would not start in the first year of their abuse?

Dr. DU PONT. About 10 to 12 percent do.

Mr. ROGERS. Have we had an increase? I presume we have, because you say most of your slots are filled.

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, but many of these slots are being filled with people who have gotten addicted in the past. In most cities the peak rate of new use of heroin occurred between 1968 and 1970. In most cities there does not appear to be an increasing rate of new addiction. Rather, it appears that the increased availability of heroin in most cities has produced an increased prevalence, that is, a substantial

number of people who had stopped using heroin have now started again.

Mr. ROGERS. So it is not effecting too much of a cure.

Dr. DU PONT. Well, it is less than we would have achieved if heroin had not become available again, but of course there are many who do not relapse, also. I mentioned in my statement 250,000 untreated active heroin users in the country now, so that is an opening measure.

Mr. ROGERS. How many?

Dr. DU PONT. 250,000 now, so there are large numbers of people who are not in treatment, now that we need to do more about bringing into treatment, and also to impact in terms of reducing availability.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, if we have filled up our slots where will we put them?

Dr. DU PONT. We have got to have greater success in two ways. One is to increase the number of slots to meet the need, and the other is to reduce the availability of heroin so that more current users stop using it.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the average time that we take to treat a heroin addict? In time, is there a mean?

Dr. DU PONT. It appears that an average treatment slot treats 1.7 clients per year. Now, in a drug-free program the figure would be higher, around three per year. In a methadone program it is closer to 1.2 or 1.3 per year, but the average overall, is about 1.7 people per year.

Mr. ROGERS. Now, I notice that we are having—I think, Mr. Bartels, in your statement—in New York we are having more methadone deaths than heroin. For instance, in the first 9 months of fiscal year 1974 you report 624 methadone deaths and only 242 heroin deaths.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. That doesn't hold, for instance, for Chicago.

Now, why would that be?

Dr. DU PONT. I think there are a number of factors, but particularly there is a lot more methadone being used in New York City than there is in Los Angeles and some other cities. Keep in mind, New York City had a very substantial reduction in heroin deaths. The number of heroin deaths had gone from something like 800 a year to approximately 200 a year.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it has kind of made up. We are still at 800.

Dr. DU PONT. Yes. The overall decrease in the total number of deaths in New York City is fairly substantial. I think there was a 20-percent decrease between 1972 and 1973 in New York City. I am not saying this in any way to justify the methadone overdose death situation in New York City. It is a matter of very grave concern, and I have been in regular contact with the city and State officials on this subject. We are very concerned about it and I hope that reductions in methadone overdose deaths will be effected. Certainly in the District of Columbia, where methadone overdoses were a very serious problem, it was brought under control and I have talked with them in New York about this.

Roughly 80 percent of methadone deaths in the country are now occurring in New York City, so there is a very clear concentration

of this problem in that area and we have got to do something about it.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it well to have the physician at least look at an addict who has had a lifestyle of heroin usage and he is now on methadone, to at least ask them at the end of a 2-year period to look at him and make a judgment whether he is an individual that should be continued?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, sir; I think that that makes sense. In fact, I think he ought to be evaluated more often than that.

Mr. ROGERS. I would hope so, but certainly he is at least looked at at the end of 2 years.

Now, Dr. Dole, I believe, takes exception to that as saying he thinks that the political process is interfering with the practice of medicine. Do you interpret it that way? I don't.

Dr. DU PONT. Well, I have the uneviable position of counting both you and Dr. Dole as very good friends, so it is a little difficult to work my way through this one. But let me try.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, let me have your professional judgment.

Dr. DU PONT. I think Dr. Dole interpreted those regulations as saying that a person must come off methadone after 2 years. He found that to be an unwarranted interference with the practice of medicine. I don't believe, sir, that that was ever your intention.

Mr. ROGERS. Nor does it say that.

Dr. DU PONT. Nor does it say that. So I have spoken with Dr. Dole about it and he does not object to the requirement that a physician evaluate the individual for continuation on methadone. I don't think he has written to JAMA or to you recently about that; he seems at least somewhat mollified.

Mr. ROGERS. This would require people to be examined—that is, in effect, what it is—at the end of a 2-year period, and of course we were concerned because some of the clinics—perhaps Dr. Dole was not aware of it—but some of the clinics were run for a profit.

Dr. DU PONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. It was to their advantage to keep as many people on methadone as they could, and there was nothing to encourage them to get them off of it, no real impetus to have a medical judgment made after 2 years.

So I think Dr. Dole and I just simply disagree about that. But I am concerned about the deaths that methadone is still causing which is much higher than the drug which we are trying to cure in New York. I don't know if that is helpful overall if you have the same death rate even though you may die of a different cause, hoping to cure another.

What is our relationship with the States now? Do you feel the single agency is working out—single State agency?

Dr. DU PONT. Yes; I am quite pleased at our relationship with the single State agencies. In general they have demonstrated a commendable ability to organize within the States and to rationalize a very complex pattern of funding to get the maximum benefit for the States. We have been working very closely with their association and with the individual States and are pleased with these efforts.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the use of drugs in the Armed Forces now? Is it going up, for instance, in Europe?

Dr. Du Pont. It was going down prior to the termination of the urine testing program in the military. Europe was a good example of an area where the heroin rates were coming down. Frankly, we don't really know what the effect of stopping the urine testing has been on these rates, but it is hard to think they would do anything but go up.

It is hard for me to imagine how you could reduce the urine testing program and have any other outcome than an increase in illicit drug use.

Mr. Rogers. Has there been any indication to DEA about that?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, availability, and for the reason Dr. Du Pont states, the fear of detection isn't there.

Mr. ROGERS. And you are going to let us know the Department of Defense reaction to your request that they do something about it?

Dr. Du Pont. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I might also mention that in a follow-up study of returnees from Vietnam the men were asked the question about whether they favored urine testing or not and 95 percent said they did favor it. This then is a program that is not imposed from the outside by command but is something that most of the soldiers welcome as improving the quality of life in the military service.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I appreciate your patience in getting some of these questions answered. I think we needed to make the record clear.

I am very much concerned about the upward trend of the use of heroin and marihuana. I hope we can mount a proper offense. This committee is very anxious to do what is necessary and we hope you will let us have your recommendations, even though it is not approved by the Office of Management and Budget. If you will let us have those, and we are asking officially for those, we will be glad to send a copy to the OMB and let them know your recommendations, but I think this committee needs it in order to fashion legislation that may be required.

You have been most patient and we are grateful to each of you, and we will be anxious to hear what happens to Ambassador Vance's trip and the results of his discussions in Mexico and Central and South America. We will welcome your keeping us advised of the situation in any areas where you think the Congress should be active.

Thank you for being here.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you for holding the hearing.

[The following questions from Mr. Symington and DEA's answers were subsequently received for the record:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN SYMINGTON AND ANSWERS BY DEA

Question 1. In an interview on April 1, 1974 with U.S. News & World Report, DEA Administrator Bartels indicated that the United States has "turned the corner on heroin abuse." Do you still think so? What does turn the corner mean? Mr. Bartels indicated it meant a dramatic drop in the number of heroin addicts? How many heroin addicts are now in the country? How many are in Missouri? How many in St. Louis?

Answer. The standards used in determining and measuring heroin abuse are many. The traditional environment used to predict levels of drug abuse have been the communities of drug enforcement, rehabilitation and treatment facilities. Evidence or theories presented by any singular module in and of itself would be misleading. However, when examining all evidence submitted, we can say that

the levels of heroin abuse has remained somewhat constant today as when reported in April 1974. In support of this statement and by assessing the New York drug situation we find that the price of available heroin has gone up. The purity of heroin in New York ranged by 38% wholesale and 6.7% retail during the first quarter of 1972 to 22.3% wholesale and 5.8% retail during the first quarter of 1974. Also the distribution of brown heroin on the Eastern seaboard demonstrates the decline of European white heroin availability. The number of persons reported to the New York City Narcotics Register has also declined from 53,000 persons in 1972 to 37,000 in 1973.

There are estimated to be 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States, 7,000 in the State of Missouri and 5,000 in the city of St. Louis.

Question 2. During that same interview, Mr. Bartels said that 80% to 90% of the top layer of French drug rings are now in jail. What is the current estimate? Who is now running drug operations? Are there still amateurs or are the established French/Corsican families back in business?

Answer. The current situation in France has remained quite stable. Most of the major figures in the previously known French Connection group have been immobilized; either through incarceration in France or the United States. There are some remnants of the Connection still directing the remaining traffic, but younger groups of criminals are carrying out functions previously conducted by the old timers who were in the business for more than twenty years. No individual or single group can be singled out as "running" drug operations in France. The French heroin manufacturing and distributing industry consists of a number of loosely-structured groups. Internal feuds have led to bloody gang wars in Marseille and thus resulted in the elimination of several important figures in the traffic. Our information indicates that there are still some old time traffickers in the business but through the usual insulation technique they will probably not become directly involved in any new French Connection which could develop in the future.

Question 3. In the 1950's and 1960's, according to Mr. Bartels, between 70% and 90% of the heroin coming into this country came from France; but, more recently, trafficking rings have brought a great deal of heroin in from Mexico and South America. (a) In this regard, please give us a percentage breakdown of heroin sources by country or world region. (b) Has Miami become the main point of entry? (c) Compare Miami to New York on this point. (d) Are Seattle and Vancouver still serious problems?

Answer (a) Several indicators and factors told us that as of June 30, 1973, 62.8% of the heroin available in the United States was white and the balance, 37.2% was brown.

By December 1973 we saw a dramatic increase of brown heroin availability—70.2% and the balance 29.8% was white. Our current best estimates now indicate the following for heroin availability in the United States.

Availability of heroin in the United States by color

	Percentages
Brown.....	60 to 70
White.....	30 to 40

Area origin of heroin in United States

	Percentages
Mexican ¹	50 to 60
Asian.....	20 to 25
Europe/Middle East.....	20 to 25

¹ However, on just the basis of seizures in the United States, this figure may be as high as 70%.

Brown heroin origin area as percent of total available heroin

	Percentages
Mexican ¹	50 to 60
Asian.....	10 to 12.5

¹ However, on just the basis of seizures in the United States, this figure may be as high as 70%.

White heroin origin area as percent of total available heroin

Europe/Middle East.....	20 to 25
Asian.....	10 to 12.5

(b) No. New York continues as the main point of entry, however, Miami is certainly a major center for importation.

(c) New York receives a far greater percentage of European origin heroin. However, Miami has been used as the primary entry point for cocaine and a secondary entry point for heroin from Europe and South America. There has been some evidence of a deceleration of heroin smuggling into Miami over the past two years.

(d) Yes. Vancouver, and to a lesser amount, Seattle continue to be used as points of entry for heroin shipments of Southeast and Far East Asian origin.

Question 4. How many agents and the general locations? How many narcotics agents does the New York Police Force have, the Miami Police Force, the Seattle and Vancouver Police Forces?

Answer. As of August 31, 1974 DEA had 2,036 Special Agents on board. These Agents were located primarily in the geographic areas covered by DEA regions in New York (15%), Los Angeles (14%), Dallas (10%), Miami (7%), and Denver (6%). The New York City Police Department has 750 officers assigned to narcotic enforcement. Similarly the Miami, Florida Police Department has 23, Seattle, Washington 33 and Vancouver, Washington has 6.

Question 5. In how many different cities are you operating strike task forces? Give us data on increases in drug arrests and convictions.

Answer. There are two separate and distinct entities with which DEA is involved. One is the task force operations. These are LEAA funded units composed of State and local officers and DEA Special Agents geared toward drug enforcement.

Attachment #1 shows a breakdown of each DEA Task Force and the number of DEA and State and local personnel in each.

Attachment #2 shows the Task Force Arrests for FY-1973 and FY-1974. Although the arrests have decreased, the level of violator being investigated is on the rise. This will be monitored more accurately in the future with the inclusion of these arrests in DEA's Geo-Drug Enforcement Program which identifies the level of violator arrested.

Complete statistics on the number of task force convictions are not available since it is very difficult to determine disposition of cases in State and local courts where many of the task force cases are prosecuted.

DEA also participates in the Department of Justice Organized Crime Strike Forces which are composed of representatives of several Federal Government agencies aimed at coordinating enforcement and intelligence efforts against multi-jurisdictional major violators. Agents are assigned to strike forces in the locations listed in Attachment #3.

ATTACHMENT NO. 1: STAFFING OF DEA TASK FORCES

City	DEA agents	State/local officers	City	DEA agents	State/local officers
Boston.....	7	2	Minneapolis.....	2	2
Hartford.....	2	3	Houston.....	6	10
New York City (separate funding).....	64	144	Dallas.....	9	7
Buffalo.....	3	11	Fort Worth.....	1	2
Rochester.....	2	8	Austin.....	1	4
Newark.....	5	10	San Antonio.....	5	4
Westbury.....	5	18	Lubbock.....	3	4
Philadelphia.....	10	26	El Paso.....	2	8
Pittsburgh.....	3	26	Denver.....	5	12
Baltimore.....	4	13	Phoenix.....	3	5
Miami.....	9	20	Albuquerque.....	3	3
Atlanta.....	3	18	Seattle.....	5	8
Orlando.....	3	10	Portland.....	4	6
Detroit.....	8	12	Spokane.....	1	4
Columbus.....	2	6	Los Angeles.....	18	22
Cleveland.....	5	6	San Francisco.....	11	9
Chicago.....	10	14	San Diego.....	5	35
Indianapolis.....	1	8	Reno.....	5	9
Mt. Vernon.....	1	5	Honolulu.....	2	20
Hammond.....	2	7	Orange County.....	5	29
New Orleans.....	5	16			
Kansas City.....	5	13			
St. Louis.....	3	8	Total.....	261	583

ATTACHMENT NO. 2—DEA TASK FORCE ARRESTS

DEA Task Force arrests for FY-73 and until January 1, 1974 are not retrievable by class of violator. However, we can estimate that these arrests will fall into the same distribution as the arrests from January 1, 1974 to June 30, 1974 which have been retrieved by class.

DEA task force arrests fiscal year 1973¹.—7,176.

DEA task force arrests fiscal year 1974 (until Jan. 1, 1974).—2,161.

DEA task force arrests fiscal year 1974 (Jan. 1, 1974 to June 30, 1974).—Class I, 19; Class II, 36; Class III, 596; Class IV, 1,558 (total—2,209).

ATTACHMENT NO. 3.—DEA STRIKE FORCE PARTICIPATION

Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New Orleans, New York (Eastern district), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and St. Louis (total 16 cities).

Question 8. In the April 1974 interview, Mr. Bartels indicated that the 1971 move to halt legal opium production in Turkey disrupted the traditional source of heroin for French/Corsican groups. (a) Will this "connection" be reestablished? (b) Bring us up-to-date on your efforts with the French.

Answer. (a) Turkey has declared its intent to permit the cultivation of 20,000 hectares (approximately 49,420 acres) of opium poppy. We have received reports that planting has started this month. Our current estimates indicate that there could be an increase of between 35-40 percent in heroin availability in the United States. This will depend mainly upon the following factors:

(1) Decisions of the holders of illegal stockpiles of Turkish opium under the new Turkish control system;

(2) Decisions by these same persons concerning how much of their stockpiles will go to the French, rather than to other markets, such as Egypt (opium), Lebanon (opium and morphine), and Northern Europe (morphine base for the addict market); and

(3) The actual effectiveness, as seen by mid-summer 1975, of the Turkish control program.

On the French side, assuming there will be a resumed high availability of their preferred Turkish morphine base, the rejuvenation of old connections will involve recapturing markets invaded from elsewhere in recent months. New competitors include East Asians and Lebanese, and most recently, small number of Turks are now beginning to engage in heroin manufacture in Turkey itself. French authorities, while believing that the French/Corsican underworld may presently consider such things as arms and cigarette smuggling more safely lucrative than narcotics, are convinced that former heroin traffickers retain a high degree of interest in heroin.

There was no licit opium production in Turkey in the 1974 crop year. Some minor illicit production may have occurred in a region about 100 miles northeast of Ankara. During the period of the ban (July 1972 to July 1974) both opium and morphine base continued to flow into illicit international channels from Turkey. Opium shipments, mostly to Egypt, sometimes amounted to more than a ton. Both the opium and the morphine base shipments were derived from illegal opium stockpiles accumulated over many years before the imposition of the 1972 ban. With the resumption of legal opium production beginning with the summer 1975 harvest, an increase in both illegal opium and morphine base can be expected; drawn mainly from illegal stockpiles rather than new production.

Judging from past performances and announced plans for the 1975 crop year, and assuming normal weather conditions prevail; the Government of Turkey has projected an opium crop of 200 tons. However, most experts believe that under normal conditions, 20,000 hectares in Turkey, should yield 400 tons of opium.

If the traditional method of pod incision is used, and if the control measures used in 1971 and 1972 are applied, diversion would probably amount to between 100 and 200 tons. If improved control systems are introduced or if the commitment in manpower and vehicles to harvest control is greatly increased, diversion might be held below 100 tons.

The poppy straw method, if used, would in theory reduce greatly the problem of diversion of opium gum. However, under the terms of the Single Convention there

¹ Task force—DALE instituted FY-1973.

are no control provisions for cultivation and licensing of poppy straw. Turkey is aware of this, and we fear that the cultivation "could get out of control" in a few years if the farmers are allowed to grow without "licensing" and "controls" similar to gum opium controls. If they grow on State farms, the straw cultivation could be adequately controlled. Reaching this objective, however, would depend on total cooperation from the growers, a foolproof system for maintaining surveillance over poppy fields during the harvest period, or a combination of both. In practical terms, it is estimated that 100 tons of illicit opium might be gathered illegally in Turkey during 1975, either from unlicensed plots or illicit incision. This amount would tend to increase in later years as growers with trafficker connections devise ways to avoid detection.

(b) Our current level of cooperation is at an all-time high with the French authorities. The efforts they have put forth are truly commendable. The assistance given to DEA by their police service on a day-to-day basis has been in our judgment, one of the cornerstones of our foreign enforcement programs.

Question 7. What happened to the \$35 million we gave Turkey to assist in the phasing out production of heroin (opium)? Do we know where all that money went? If so, give us a breakdown of the distribution of all those millions of dollars.

Answer. A total of \$35.7 million in United States aid was pledged to Turkey after announcement of the poppy ban. \$20.4 million was earmarked for rural development projects, \$15 million to compensate for foreign exchange losses and \$300,000 to support surveillance and increase law enforcement capabilities for the Turkish Police. Of the \$20.4 million for rural development the United States Government has paid out \$5.3 million. Of the \$15 million for foreign exchange losses, \$10 million has been given to Turkey and the total of \$300,000 was fully obligated and dispersed. Thus, of the pledge, \$35.7 million, the Government of Turkey had received a total of \$15.6 million. No additional payments will be made.

Question 8. Why can India control distribution of its opium production while Turkey has so much trouble? What percentage of Turkey's legal opium production is diverted? What does opium mean to the Turkish economy, i.e., what percentage does it represent of the GNP? What percentage of their total exports?

Answer. Announced production for the current crop year in India is 1,050 tons. No illicit production is reported. As much as 100 tons of Indian licit opium production may be diverted into illicit trade, with most of it being consumed locally. There have been numerous reports of smuggled Indian opium arriving in Sri Lanka, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai. Some illicit opium may also be brought into India from Southeast Asia. At the present time it is unclear whether India is a net exporter or importer of illicit opium.

The assumption that India is able to prevent significant opium diversion from its legal production rests primarily on official Indian claims. Available intelligence information indicates that there is diversion, both for internal consumption and illegal export to Sri Lanka and several of the Persian Gulf Emirates. Notwithstanding this, it is clear that Indian efforts at preventing diversion have been more effective than the Turkish ones, particularly in the years before 1971, when the Turks began tightening their opium collection controls. The main reason for the superiority of the Indian system was probably due to better controls at the village level.

The following chart gives estimates of total production and diversion of Turkish opium between 1967 and 1972.

Year	Estimated production (metric tons)	Available to illicit market (percent)
1967	295	70
1968	260	52
1969	190	33
1970	140	57
1971	195	25
1972	85	9

In the year 1971 the value of the total gum production, according to Turkish estimates, was \$5.6 million. U.S. estimates differed from this, putting the value at about \$3 million. On the basis of the Turkish estimate, the total value of the opium poppy crop—export earnings, plus domestically consumed gum, seeds, oil, and poppy straw fodder—was about one-half of one percent of its Gross National Product.

Although exact figures are not available, it is estimated that opium comprises not larger than one half of one percent of Turkey's exports.

Question 9. What of methadone diversion? Does methadone result in the deaths of more people than heroin?

Answer. *Methadone diversion.*—DEA surveys of methadone diversion completed in 1972 and 1974 reflect an apparent decrease in methadone availability on the street subsequent to the promulgation of FDA's regulations in 1973. Most of the methadone now leaking to the street emanates from patient take home supplies and is available in limited quantity primarily in liquid. There is now adequate Federal control with the FDA regulations and the soon to become effective (on or about November 1) DEA regulations requiring separate program registration predicated upon adequate safeguards.

Heroin and methadone deaths.—According to results received from the DAWN survey for three quarters (July 1, 1973—March 31, 1974), the number of heroin deaths outnumbered the number of methadone deaths by approximately one third. The number of heroin deaths during this period was 990 and the number of methadone deaths was 669. These statistics were taken from information received from 24 major cities in the United States.

Question 10. How many tons of heroin are needed each year to satisfy the habits of addicts in this country? Give us a profile on the "average addict—age, race, sex, area of country, etc."

Answer. It is estimated that the average addict uses 50 mg of heroin daily. At this rate, the 250,000 addicts in the United States consume approximately five tons of 100% pure heroin each year.

Based on a recent survey of 90,000 known narcotic abusers a profile of an "average" addict would be between 18 and 30 years of age (73%), black (56%), male (84%) and primarily from the large urban areas.

Question 11. The December 1973 GAO report on "Difficulties in Immobilizing Major Narcotics Traffickers" indicated that Mexican refusal to extradite individuals and Mexican laws making undercover buys illegal has hampered the effort to end trafficking from that country. What progress, how many meetings have been held with Mexican officials to correct these problems?

Answer. On October 24, 1973, a meeting was held between DEA officials and the Mexican Attorney General to discuss means for implementing the Treaty statute pertaining to extradition, which includes Mexican nationals. It should be pointed out that the Government of Mexico has not indicated any reluctance to extradite U.S. citizens and Third State nationals wanted by the United States. Furthermore, Mexican authorities have expressed a willingness to prosecute Mexican citizens whose trafficking activities extend into the United States and who are the subject of U.S. indictments.

As a result of the October 24, 1973 meeting the Government of Mexico dispatched an attorney to the Eastern Judicial District of New York to study cases involving Mexican nationals and to establish criteria for expediting extradition requests. To date, an appropriate substantive case has not developed.

The Mexican Attorney General has directed the State Attorneys General to compile a list of U.S. citizens and Third State nationals known to be in the United States and who are wanted in Mexico for violation of Mexican narcotic laws. A similar list is being prepared in the United States for wanted persons, including Mexican nationals known to be in Mexico. Further, negotiation will ensue upon completion of these lists.

Mexico, like many other countries, related undercover buys to entrapment and makes the informant or undercover agent equally guilty. Undercover buys, however, represent only one of many tools available to law enforcement; and therefore, is not an indispensable requirement. In addition, it must be remembered that Mexican law includes certain features that enhance law enforcement efforts and which are lacking under U.S. law. For example, narcotic offenses are not bondable in Mexico and the individual remains incarcerated at least until adjudication of his case. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the U.S.

Question 12. Have there been any developments regarding heroin production or seizures in Southeast Asia? Is it your position that there is no Chinese Communist involvement; i.e., their government has neither sanctioned nor approved such traffic? Have you or any other Federal officials been in touch with the Chinese regarding a joint drive against producers in the "Golden Triangle"?

Answer. There have been several major developments with regard to the heroin and opium picture in Southeast Asia. Starting with the most important opium

growing area, Burma, more aggressive enforcement by the Burmese authorities resulted in the interdiction of traditional caravan routes and has forced the traffickers to adopt more costly methods of operation.

Limited U.S. assistance has been provided and recently overtures have been made for possible DEA narcotics training. The Thais too are becoming more effective in their anti-narcotics operations; in recent cases, Thai authorities seized a significant heroin laboratory in Bangkok and put out of business a trafficking operation which had been shipping heroin and morphine base to Hong Kong via air freight. A new DEA office in Songkhla, in southwestern Thailand, and increased Thai enforcement efforts on the Thai-Malaysian border are expected to have a substantial effect on traffic in this most important area.

The efforts of the Thai, South Vietnamese and Hong Kong authorities coordinated by DEA, have already borne fruit in the interdiction of trawlers smuggling opium, morphine base and heroin from Thailand to Hong Kong. The most recent trawler seized by the Vietnamese Navy was carrying close to two tons of opium.

Unfortunately, in spite of increased seizures at all levels of the traffic, there has been an increased demand for heroin worldwide. This demand, with its concomitant increase in price, has resulted in a continuing flow of drugs at a relatively high level. Some new trends have been noted in the traffic. For example, there has been a substantial increase in the number of Asians arrested while smuggling heroin into Western Europe. In most of these cases the drugs are destined for Amsterdam; we have yet to determine how much of this is intended for further smuggling to areas such as the United States. Also, probably due to increased efficiency and lessened risk of detection, traffickers are taking to smuggling an incompletely processed opium product as opposed to the more traditional opium, morphine base or finished heroin. There has also been a notable increase in the amount of heroin production in Malaysia.

We continue to believe that the Government of the People's Republic of China is in no way involved in the international narcotics traffic; this is to say that the Chinese Government neither participates in nor sanctions the illicit trade. There is of course some inevitable cross-border trade between ethnically homogeneous tribesmen in Yunnan and the border regions of Burma and Laos but we do not view this trade as having any appreciable impact on the international narcotics traffic.

We are not aware of any contact between U.S. and PRC officials for a joint drive against Golden Triangle producers. The PRC does not seem to be willing or able to influence the Burmese Communist Party elements which are assuming a greater role in the northern Burmese opium trade. Since there is no known trafficking through PRC territory, it is doubtful that they would be of much assistance in curbing the Golden Triangle narcotics activity.

DEA has, however, recently requested the State Department to allow a technical group to initiate formal discussions with PRC officials concerning the narcotic situation. We understand that State has this matter under study at this time.

Question 13. Is it possible or probable to cooperate with the Chinese Communists in the same fashion as we've been cooperating with the French and Mexicans? Would a bilateral treaty with the Chinese be desirable? I understand that more than 100 nations have signed one or more treaties regulating drug traffic; have the Chinese been a party to any of these treaties?

Answer. It is not probable that we can cooperate with the Chinese in the same manner with which we cooperate with the French and Mexicans at this time. This is because our present relationships with France and Mexico have been developed over a lengthy period of time from a point where the cooperation was unsatisfactory. Further, we do not believe PRC is either a major source or transshipment country as are the others.

The Chinese might be helpful in connection with efforts to disrupt the shipment of opium and narcotics by trawler into Hong Kong. It is known that from time to time, trawlers move through PRC territorial waters in order to avoid detection by Royal Navy and Hong Kong Police patrols. When they do so the increased interdiction risks which could be arranged and heavy penalties at the hands of PRC authorities would further discourage traffickers from using these routes.

However, there are major political questions involved. For example, we must consider the sensitivities of Hong Kong and British officials in such an initiative, especially as it relates to the increased presence and activity of armed PRC Naval Units in the area. DEA is not in a position to assess fully the various other political considerations, U.S. Government interests and priorities involved because our relationship with PRC is in a developmental phase.

The answer might lie in some formalized tip-off procedure involving ourselves, the Chinese, the British, Hong Kong, and the Thais. In this manner, there could be exchange of information without the possibility of violations of territorial waters by either the Chinese or Hong Kong authorities. Bilateral treaties are desirable only if they serve a useful purpose. In this case, a common goal of interdiction narcotics shipments could probably be better accomplished through a multi-national agreement.

As of this time, the PRC has not ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. However, PRC representatives have taken part in proceedings of the United Nations Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) narcotics activities. PRC attitudes at these narcotics-related meetings tended to focus on reaction to the various accusations, mostly Republic of China originated, that the PRC was behind the Asian opium/heroin problem. However, more recent statements have shown a definite softening in the PRC's earlier position that "each nation should go it alone with respect to narcotics" and it is expected that PRC ratification of the Single Convention—and possibly greater international cooperation—will be forthcoming in the not too distant future.

Question 14. Please give us a breakdown as to the latest retail prices of heroin in different regions of the country; I am especially interested in the price and purity of heroin as a measure of any shortage. Has the price of heroin gone up as fast as food and fuel prices? What is the purity (percentage of pure heroin) of the average street purchase?

Answer. A breakdown of heroin retail prices and purity for the nation and for five geographic areas are included as Attachment #1. Those figures show that near the end of FY-72 heroin was available nationwide at \$86/mg and 6.6% purity. In comparison heroin was available near the end of FY-73 at \$1.16/mg and 4.6% purity. At the end of FY-74 the price was \$1.15/mg and 5.7% purity.

Heroin price and purity suggests a relationship with the availability of heroin. If this is correct it can be assumed that near the end of the fourth quarter FY-73 heroin availability nationwide was at the lowest in the past three years. Similarly then we could say that heroin was most available at the beginning of FY-72 and has now risen to a point slightly above the lowest availability of a year ago.

During FY-73 the national price index for retail heroin rose 14.1% compared to 12.6% rise in food stuffs, 15% rise in fuels and the 7% increase in the consumer price index.


Question 15. What about drugstore robberies as a source of illicit drugs? (a) Give us data on drug thefts from pharmacies, doctors offices, etc. (b) What is the Administration doing to stop drugstore robberies? (c) Is it officially and firmly opposed to making a drug theft from a drugstore a Federal crime? (d) Why can't drugstore robberies and the theft of narcotics be treated in the same fashion as a bank robbery? Give comparative data on the value of drugs stolen from pharmacies versus the dollars and securities stolen from banks? (e) Would the Administration favor public hearings on drugstore robbery legislation? (f) Would the Administration meet with pharmacists' groups regarding this problem?

Answer. (a) Thefts from pharmacies accounted for 28,272,497 dosage units of various controlled drugs diverted to the illicit traffic during FY-74. Thefts from medical practitioners were responsible for an additional 1,358,698 dosage units while manufacturers, distributors, and other firms lost 3,629,965 dosage units; for a total loss by thefts of all kinds of 33,261,160 dosage units. These figures reflect all losses by theft during FY-74, required by regulation to be reported to DEA on a timely basis.

During FY-1974 a total of 7,907 drug theft incidents were reported to DEA. Pharmacy thefts account for 6,320 of these reports. Armed robbery was committed in 16% (988) of the cases reported, while burglary occurred in 77% (4,875) of the cases. Additional robberies and burglaries not involving drugs, but where only money and merchandise were taken, are not reported to DEA and are not reflected in the above figures.

When figuring actual loss to the pharmacist the replacement value of the drugs is used, rather than the inflated cost of the drugs when later sold in illicit traffic. The replacement value figures below were taken from the Drug Topics Red Book.

Total replacement cost of all drugs reported stolen during FY-1974 was \$1,212,375 representing 33,261,160 dosage units. Of this amount, 28,272,497 dosage units, costing \$1,025,079 to replace, were taken from pharmacies. Thefts from medical practitioners cost \$40,143 (1,358,698 dosage units) the balance was lost from manufacturers, distributors, and other intermediary firms.



PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

FMS

LEVEL

1


U.S. HEROIN PRICE INDEX
BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

HEROIN PRICE INDEX

EAST

Retail

\$/gm Net.




Purity %



Purity %		7.7	6.7	6.5	5.5	4.2	5.7	5.7	3.6	4.1	5.8	4.6
Retail \$		440	850	950	1540	1200	750	850	1600	1500	1150	1310

SOUTH

\$/gm




Purity %



Purity %		9.1	6.7	6.6	5.3	3.1	4.4	6.1	5.5	5.5	6.4	4.8
Retail \$		460	660	750	1550	1400	1200	1160	1540	1140	1350	640

CENTRAL

\$/gm



Purity %



Purity %		6.5	6.3	6.8	4.3	4.6	6.0	3.1	4.0	4.6	4.9	6.0
Retail \$		570	660	1140	1500	1300	1140	1550	1350	1200	1680	110

WEST

\$/gm



Purity %



Purity %		5.8	6.0	5.2	6.6	6.8	6.7	5.8	6.1	7.7	9.2	6.7
Retail \$		680	600	670	650	800	750	700	760	780	600	830

NORTHWEST

\$/gm



Purity %



Purity %		5.2	9.1	5.2	6.6	5.0	6.6	7.0	5.2	5.2	5.4	7.2
Retail \$		1880	640	1140	1470	1340	900	790	1470	1070	900	1020

(b) The Drug Enforcement Administration has initiated a Pharmacy Theft Program to determine what impact can be made on drug thefts in a major metropolitan area. The program will not be expanded until its effectiveness can be evaluated. Theft prevention programs include recommended security techniques such as minimum stocking of controlled drugs and either dispersion of controlled drugs among general pharmacy stock or use of safes or other suitable locked containers to safeguard drugs.

(c) The Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Administration does not support Federal legislation which would make thefts from pharmacies a Federal crime, although it is concerned with those drugs stolen and diverted to illicit channels. Successful investigation of robbery, burglary, and other forms of theft requires fairly immediate law enforcement response capability. DEA as presently organized does not have sufficient numbers of Agents strategically dispersed to respond satisfactorily to pharmacy theft incidents. A recent indepth study of pharmacy thefts covering all parts of the nation shows generally excellent response time on the part of the local police.

Pharmacy burglaries, robberies, and other forms of theft are not always directed at controlled drugs. During FY-74 the average replacement cost for controlled drugs taken during a theft from a pharmacy was \$162.20, while our indepth study of all pharmacy crimes shows an average loss of \$400 or more per incident. This would certainly indicate that the majority of pharmacy crimes are not directed at controlled drugs.

(d) As previously stated, the value of controlled drugs taken from pharmacies during FY-74 was \$1,025,079. During the same period, FBI statistics reveal that losses from all bank crimes totalled over \$178,000,000. More specifically, there were 3,485 incidents of robbery, extortion threats, burglary, and larceny which resulted in losses totalling \$27,149,947. In other words bank losses from outside origins appear to be 25 times as high as from similar drug losses, but with only half the number of incidents to investigate. Further, the violent crimes in banks (armed robbery and extortion threats) comprise 80% of the total incidents, against an armed robbery rate of 16% in pharmacies.

When it is appropriate for DEA to do so, we will assist the local jurisdiction insofar as we are reasonably able. In fact, we frequently respond to local requests for information and for identification of violators. We will also assist directly in the conduct of local investigations when appropriate.

(e) The Drug Enforcement Administration cannot recommend hearings or other proceedings in progress toward Federal legislation against pharmacy thefts, as the costs and manpower requirements resulting from such legislation would outweigh any benefits beyond what is now being accomplished by local police agencies. DEA has in the past, and will continue to meet with the various national associations representing pharmacists in order to work toward a reasonable solution to the pharmacy theft problem.

(f) Yes, the Administrator met with representatives of pharmacies national associations in August of this year. Further meetings have taken place and are taking place with DEA's Compliance personnel.

Mr. ROGERS. We have one more witness that I have asked to be present.

Mr. Rayburn F. Hesse, executive director of the National Association of State Drug Abuse Program Coordinators, and we would be glad to have you make a statement at this time.

The committee appreciates your presence and patience in waiting this long.

STATEMENT OF RAYBURN F. HESSE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM COORDINATORS AND CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL POLICY

Mr. HESSE. Mr. Chairman, we thank you for inviting us to present our views here today.

We have prepared not an elaborate statement but a summary of high priority points which we would like the committee to consider.

Given the unique nature of these hearings and the broad ranging interests expressed, I will also testify in part as the chairman of the International Committee on Social Policy, a 15-nation group who recently presented, in Copenhagen, an international perspective of drug abuse, based upon the testimony and submissions of national spokesmen from throughout the world, and you have that report in front of you.

Our perspective of the needs of the drug abuse industry and of the several States is founded upon and extends from our assessment of the drug abuse problem, current approaches to that problem, and, particularly the scope and design of proposed approaches, especially the decentralization of authority and responsibility to State governments.

Our assessment supports the following observations and conclusions:

1. The former administration's decision to budget for a level of 95,000 treatment slots represents an incomplete analysis of the narcotic addiction problem, and does not, as such represent a workable assessment of the needs of the drug abuse industry.

2. In the absence of a clearly defined social-political-budgetary policy on drug abuse, of which narcotic addiction is a part, the Nixon administration's decision on the current HEW budget can be viewed as reinforcing the conclusion that the Nixon administration's primary preoccupation was with narcotic addiction, and, having achieved some success in that category, prepared a series of steps, beginning with the current budget, to reduce the priority given to drug abuse, without having really addressed drug abuse in its totality.

3. The former administration maintained that its budget, despite a reduction in funding for the National Institute on Drug Abuse of \$55.7 million, from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 1975, is sufficient to support a treatment base of 95,000 slots, but, the same administration spokesmen conceded that this budget does not permit any new starts nor does it permit new funding to implement State plans.

4. The future success of the national drug abuse strategy, now so dependent upon State action, depends then in large part upon the implementation of the now approved State plans and upon maintaining the momentum of this Federal-State approach.

5. Our analysis of these State plans indicates that a minimum of \$35 million in new funds—in addition to the formula grants—is needed to maintain the thrust of the drug abuse programs in this country. These funds are needed in such areas as treatment, rehabilitation, crisis intervention, research and training, particularly in areas, Mr. Chairman, that go beyond Federal scope.

6. There has not been, in any administration to date, a priority given to primary and secondary prevention, which we States deem as absolutely essential to an effective reduction in the incidence of drug abuse and drug misuse.

7. A recent survey, which we conducted under contract to the Government, concluded that a comprehensive, multiresource, multifaceted, in-depth approach to primary and secondary prevention, of sufficient scope to have the desired maximum impact on the problem of drug abuse, would cost Federal, State, and local governments and agencies as much as \$280 million.

The recommendations of our survey respondents went far beyond traditional informational and educational approaches to prevention,

recommending such programs as alternative life styles programs, minority group programs, skills training, career education, early intervention, family counseling, youth counseling, inschool peer guidance programs, outreach programs, teacher training, training of program professionals, community awareness and prevention programs, overdose treatment and counseling services for marginally involved users, inschool reentry programs, and others.

Most significantly, the States and community respondents called for a national merging of resources, not simply a program executed by the National Institute.

Indeed, their estimate of programs and funding needed included \$74.1 million from NIDA; \$49.3 million from the Office of Education; \$43.8 from LEAA; \$54.6 from the Department of Labor; and \$7.5 million from Model Cities.

In sum, the States recommended programs that go well beyond the traditional jurisdictions of drug abuse programs; they recommended programs that address cause as well as effect.

Now, Mr. Chairman, when we say that the recommendations of the previous administration represented an incomplete analysis of the problem, we are saying that an approach based primarily upon treatment approaches is in itself not sufficient.

Moreover, many of the kinds of programs which the States and localities desire and need are outside of current Federal scopes of work but cannot be funded to any appreciable degree from formula grant funds, which are currently the major resource for programs that fall outside these scopes of work.

This is especially true of programs directed to nonusers who are vulnerable to drug misuse and abuse, and to experimenters and social-recreational users.

We States have repeatedly expressed our concern that the corner has not been turned on heroin addiction and our steadfast belief that, when we consider drug abuse in its totality, the 27-month history of actions implementing Public Law 92-255 amount to a substantial beginning, not a conclusion.

We believe, given the insights into the problem which Dr. Du Pont has shared with us based upon Federal reporting, and our own evidence, that this administration should go forward to the Congress at the very earliest opportunity with requests for new funds.

Dr. Du Pont has said this morning that NIDA is meeting existing demand with existing resources, but, that he may find it necessary to request additional, supplemental funding. He noted with concern that the 95,000 slots currently available will be filled by January—a concern that is aggravated we believe when one considers his other testimony about the increased rates of drug abuse in several sections of the country.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, we can anticipate a situation in which we will not have sufficient treatment slots for our heavily impacted populations, principally the addict, at the same time that we do not have sufficient funds for the other kinds of programing which are necessary to any well-balanced approach.

The States have already prepared to submit certain conclusions and recommendations to Dr. Du Pont, whom we greatly admire. I think it is relevant to an oversight hearing of this kind, Mr. Chairman, to

note on the record that the States have been particularly pleased with Dr. Du Pont who has been most sensitive to our needs and responsive to our problems.

But, there is a gap. We know the policies and priorities of the Nixon administration. We do not know the policies and priorities of the Ford administration.

We are approaching a critical time; many of the most important authorizations in drug abuse programing expire next June 30. These include the authorities of the Special Action Office as well as the basic authorities and formula grants for the States.

The Congress and the administration, and particularly this committee, must develop new legislation. We trust, Mr. Chairman, in the light of the testimony given by Dr. Du Pont and Mr. Bartels today, that this legislation will not be drafted in an atmosphere of having won the battle.

We have, at best, as Dr. Du Pont described the situation, stabilized the problem so that we no longer have the wildly gyrating spirals of new drug incidence. Yet, there is legitimate fear that we have done little to eradicate the root causes of drug abuse so as to prevent another recurrence of this dread epidemic.

And, we are not alone in these concerns. I submit for your record, Mr. Chairman, the report of our international committee and conclude it with the observation that the representatives of several dozen nations deem this problem to be sufficiently significant to warrant the calling next year of an interparliamentary congress on drug abuse, a Congress which will address broad issues of social policy on drug abuse, in a major effort to effect a total societal response.

I might mention, incidentally, Mr. Chairman, that you are among the 150 national legislators who will be invited to participate.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we have strengthened our resources, expanded our technical capability, advanced our knowledge of effective responses. We have enjoyed a brief respite from certain of the challenges in drug abuse. Now, the evidence is new and convincing that we must redouble our efforts.

And I would say to you as a final comment, a personal comment even, that what we need is not just a system of treatment for the addict and not merely treatment but rehabilitation and a system of treatment and rehabilitation that is enforced and made workable by a system of primary and secondary prevention to reduce the absolute incidence of drug abuse. We have never gone that final step.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Hesse.


Your statement was very helpful to the committee and we will take into our consideration your recommendations. Thank you for being here.


Mr. HESSE. My pleasure.

Mr. ROGERS. That concludes the hearings and the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

H 197 75





LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 018 423 800 7

